THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

CHARLES BADHAM.
THE

PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH

INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A

CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,

AND A CHAPTER OF

PALAEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS;

BY

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1878.
TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,
MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear Master,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the Philebus, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some δεύτερος πλοῦς became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,
as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will you think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatisers who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Graeculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which
they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscurity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, Λ. 'Αρα τοίνυν, ὁ ξένε, οὖνω καὶ καθάπερ ἢτα Σωκράτης πᾶσι λεκασιμένος ἦσι; if you will read Heindorf's note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Αρά τοίνυν, ὁ ξ., οὖνως—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, ν; where for ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνησθαί, it is self-evident that you want ἐφ. δ. μεμνησθαί.—In the Laws, 904, δ where we now read διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἁγιον ὅλον μετακομισθεία, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέλαβε τόπον, ἀγιαν ὅδον μετακομισθεία, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced from the Phædo. It is in the passage 1) beginning ὅτι δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιάν, where the very opposite precept is put into Socrates' mouth in place of that which Plato had assigned to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἔφας ἂν and ἔφης ἂν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χαίρειν ἔφης ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα, into χαίρειν ἔφης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποσχίναιο, ἦσι ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαται. And on this rubbish Wyttenebach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemus 305, c, ν. Here ἐν δὲ τοῖς διοίς λόγοις and so forth down to κολούσθαι, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὡσεὶ παρεῖ πᾶσιν. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφώτατον: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφᾶς σοφώτατοι. In the same dialogue 287, β, c, we have these glaring interpolations: [α τὸ πρώτον

1) P. 101, d.
I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place.

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, n, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ἈΘ. Ἡ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν καλῶς ὑμνηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐχ ἦκεστα τὰ τῶν μορφῶν προσφήματα.

ΚΛ. Ποία δὴ;' ἌΘ. Τὸ Λάχεσαι μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν "Ἀτροπον δὲ τρίτην, σωτείραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπεικοσμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρί, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν· δὴ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτείᾳ δεί μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐνομίαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἦμιν δ' ἔτι μοι φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, τῶς χρῆ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλωσθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends' work, τὰ λεχθέντα, should be made ἀμετάστροφα. Now Atropos cannot be σωτείρα τῶν λεχθέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν "Ἀτροπον δὲ τρίτην σωτείραν. τῶν ΔΕΛΕξθέντων—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.
The allusion to the well known το τρίτον τῷ σωτηρί is obvious, and justifies us in placing σώτειραν thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλοοθέντων—, and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεργάζονται must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μεθα being confounded with the participial ending, μενος μενη &c., it is worth while to try ἀπεργαζόμεθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικασμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεγόντων; ἀπεικασμένοι τῇ τῶν κλοοθέντων σατελὸ ἈΙ, τὴν ἀμετάπτομον ἀπεργαζό- μεθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us how this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. Εἰ δὴ καὶ πολιταις καὶ πολιτισί δεὶ μὴ μόνον υψίειαν ν. τ. ἐ. A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. μηνοσκειν δὲ αὐτὴν ν ὅ ταντων ἀνδρειώτατην παῖς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἢν τις μή μηνοσκοιν οὐδ’ ἄν τύπον ἱδοι ποτέ, οὐδ’ λό- γον ξυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατός ἄν γένοιτό εἶς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαιμονία τύχην. This αὐτὴν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. “What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole.” We may therefore translate συντέλεια by joint action. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has πρὸς οὐδὲν, the MS Ω has as a correction in the Margin πόσον δεῖν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνδρειος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; μηνοσκειν δ’ αὐτὴν ν ὅ ταντων ἀχρειώτατην πόσον δεῖν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the
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reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor. 878, π. τραυμάτων οὖν ἑνεστότων ὁργῇ γενομένων for τ. οὖν ἐν ἱστῳ τῶν ὅ. γ. Thus also in 829, ά we read τοῦτων δὴ τούτῳ ἐστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν, γενομένη μὲν ἀγαθῆ βίος εἰρηνικός κ. τ. ἐ. in place of ἵστε καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. ἐ. and in 837, δὲ ὥρῶν ἤ ἔρων τῇ ψυχῇ, δεύντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτεθυμηκώς κ. τ. ἐ., for ἤ ἔρων, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ὑντώς τ. ψ. ἐ. 836, c, ἀκολουθῶν ὧν ἄκολουθόν, and πιθανόν for ἀπιθάνω. 898, κ. περιπεριφέρεσθαι (an absurd repetition of κ) for περιφέρεσθαι. 899, ά, αὖτον δὴ ἀμεινόν for ἀῦτον ἦν δὴ ἀμεινόν, omitting χρεών. 903, κ. μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἵν πυρός ἱδώρ ἐμπυροῦν, καὶ μὴ ἐμπυρολλα ἐς ἐνός—for ἵδωρ, ἐμπυρὲ καὶ μὴ, ἐμπυρολλα ἐς ἐνός. and lastly, in 904, κ. ὅσον ἀγαθῶν ψυχῆς, διενοθῇ—for ὅσον ἦν ἀγαθὸν ψυχή διανοικῇ. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 829, ά, for τοῦτο ἀποδιδόντων, the sense requires ὧν τοῦτο ἦν ἄποδιδόντων, and in κ. for τοῦτο ἐν, τοῦ ἐν. In 832, κ. we find: τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἦν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἄμφότερα. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἦν νομοθετούμεν, ἦν λέγομεν ἐκπέφευγεν ἄμφότερα. In 833, ά, for σύστασις which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προσωπώμεθα in the Philorus, it would amount to συμπλοκή, so that we should have, ἦν συμπλοκὴς συμπλοκή, read σύστασις, contentio. 834, κ. τόξος καὶ πέλλας καὶ ἀκονίος. This would do very well if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shewn to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ παλτοῖς. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἱππῶν δὴ περὶ ἄγώνος γίγνοιτο ἐξῆς ἦν νομοθετούμενα. The first ΔΗ is nothing but ΔΝ in its right place, and ἦν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from ἦν νομοθετούμεν. 836, κ. I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is περὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὧ διὰ πάντος . . . . τοῦτο ἐν τούτω τίς οἷς ὁμολογεῖ; τοῦτο is the aim, τοῦτο the advocate of purer manners, τούτως are the measures he recommends. 839, ά, For λήψεται γόνυμον κ. τ. ἐ., a new light breaks in upon us, if we read γονύμου δ' ἀπεγομένους ἀρούμας θ. πᾶσης. Thus
we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For περιλαβόν read παραλαβόν, and for τὰ νῦν λέγομεν έστιν εὑχαί, read τανύν λέγομεν. eί δ' έστιν εὑχαί π. τ. ε. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean παλαικῶν and ὁφίνων. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of their αὐθόματα? 844, v, I am altogether for the other reading, παιδίων Διονυσίαδα, and in place of ἦχε χάριτος αὐτῆς, I have no scruple in writing ἡ θεὸς ίχαρίσατο αὐτῆ. The copyist wrote ἔχαρα and forgot to put his dots under the first χα. Then came another, and made this absurd correction. παιδία Διονυσίας is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by grafting. 846, v, For δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν, read δεόμενος ἐπιτηδευσιν. 864, A, ἐσσάθαι τούτων should be ἐπεσάθαι τούτω. 898, v, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [μηδ' ἐν ἕνι] προμενη . . . . μηδ' ἐν (ἕνι) τιν λόγο χίνησις—. But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, A, καὶ ἂν ποι’ ἀρα ἀναγκασθῇ μεταβάλλειν αὐθις—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon σώματα as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer ἀναγκασθῇ, συντασσόμεθας and ἀπολαβῶν. But he is not far off. For αὐθις let us read αὐ τις, and there he is. In c we have παιδίων where it is certain that the author meant us to understand ἀνδρῶν. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—children! Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In d the same mala sedulitas has bestowed on us the word μεταβαλλόμενα which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by δια . . . . πάσχει το τοιούτον which is in its place. In e, the faulty redundancy in οὐδ' αμοίς ἄλλος πως may be accounted for, if we suppose that οὐδ' ΑΑΑΑΩζ was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.
799, e. In speaking of νόμοι he says, οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ χρηστοὶκινοδιϊν οὐτω πος, ὡς ξοικεν, ὁ νόμοσον. By reading TOTE in place of TOTΕ we make the sentence clear and get rid of a then which points nowhere. “The ancients were not ignorant of the connexion between νόμοι and φόδαι,” says he; καθε ὑπνον δὲ οἴνον ποῦ τις ἡ καὶ ὑπερ ᾧ ἀναγεγραφε ὡνεὶντέχε μαντευόμενος αὕτη. If he only dreamed it, he would have no right to μαντεύεσθαι; but I presume he dreamed it παθε ὑπνον ἰεῖον. 800, v. I see here as elsewhere the utmost confusion between δὲ and δή, but it would be rather dull sport to fly the falcons of criticism upon such exiguous game. c. For φαίμεν, I should much prefer φαμίν in a parenthesis, though I am aware that he has already used it. ν. A slight transposition will give the δήματα and the ὄνθ-μοι their fair share in a necessary epithet. I read ύμονίας γονο-δεστάτως. ε. I hope you will consent to the removal of χορούς. The gibe is all the more bitter when he substitutes these funeral singing men for the Tragic Chorus. I note τι . . . ἄν τοῦτο . . . κείσθω as a confirmation of Elmsley’s οἴσθ’ ὡς μέτευξαί. 801, a. Instead of μηδὲν ἐπανεργοτάω, which would mean, “am I to ask no question”? I propose μηθέ. “An ne rogare quidem oportet”? We may surely venture to restore δὲι to the margin where it must have stood as a help to beginners. c. He says that το τον πονητῶν γένος is οὐ πάνυ ἔκανον in judging what men should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutus in our City. What will be the result? They will make us contradict ourselves in our prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray εὐχάς οὐχ ὄρθας, for they may be right, and we wrong. Therefore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the purpose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax. n. He has never appointed any νομοθετεῖς for the purpose mentioned, but certain ἐθολοθετεῖς, of whom he treats in 764, ν &c. 802, v. For ἐπανεργομενον I venture to suggest ἐπανορ(θώσεως δε)όμενον. c. The direction, νομοθέτου βούλημα, cannot begin with πᾶσα δὲ. No wonder then that A and Ω omit the conjunction. The γε is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read, πᾶσα τακτῇ ἣ τάξιν λαβοῦσα π. Μ. διατριβή? This would refer to the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made
so by adaptation. d. Sense and Grammar call for the change of ἐκατέρας into ἐκατέρα. e. The passage about suiting the com-
positions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the ob-
servation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the con-
fusion between the participial endings and μεθα will at once set
us on the right track. ἐστι δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη
κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι, is nothing more than ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν
ἀμφότερα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι. When this is replaced,
and Ast’s supplement introduced, we need only write τοῦτο for
τοῦτο, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803, a. Having settled the general characters of both kinds of
songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are
left suddenly in such darkness as this: τίνα τρόπον χρῆ καὶ οἰστισί
cαι πότε πράττειν ἔκαστα αὐτῶν. What are ἔκαστα, and of what
αὐτῶν are they the particulars? As to οἰστισία and πράττειν they
help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to
change πράττειν into προσάπτειν, and the succeeding sentence
about τρόποι and τροπιδεία, and indeed the whole scope of what
follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that
our business is to ascertain τίνα τρόπον χρῆ καὶ οἰστισία καὶ ὅποτε
προσάπτειν ἔκαστων αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ἀρρένων τε καὶ ἴθηλων. a, b.
οἷον δὴ τις ναυπηγός τῇ τῆς ναυπηγίας ἁρχῇ καταβαλλόμενος τὰ
τροπιδεία ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχῆματα, ταυτών δὴ μοι καίγω φαι-
nομαί ἐμαυτῷ ὥραν τά τῶν βιῶν πειράματος σχῆματα διοικήσασθαι
κατὰ τρόπους τοῦς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὅστε αὐτῶν τα τροπιδεία καταβάλ-
λεσθαι, ποίες μηχανῆς καὶ τίς ποτὲ τρόποις ξυνόντες τῶν βιῶν ἀρίστα
διὰ τοῦ πλοῦτοτοῦ τῆς ξοφῆς διακοινωσθεῖσθαι, τούτῳ σκόπεων ὁρ-
θῶς. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether τρο-
pideía is governed by καταβαλλόμενος or by ὑπογράφεται, and the
rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Ast’s appro-
sitio, that is, that τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἁρχὴν is a sort of anticipat-
ing description of τροπιδεία, is in itself unlikely, for then the
words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if καταβαλ-
lómenos governs τροπιδεία, and ὑπογράφεται governs τῶν πλοίων
σχῆματα, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship’s
hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which
is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words re-
quires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on τροπιδεία
THE LETTER TO THOMPSON.

"Whereas

I leave σχῆματα to find a regimen where it can, only not in this text, to which it is a stranger, and I conclude that, just as the interpolator borrowed the word σχῆματα from the following clause, so when he inserted ὄντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, he helped himself from what preceded. Who needs such an explanation of a play upon words? and is not ταῦταν κ. φ. ἐ. δεῖν enough? Then again what have we to do with any μηκαινῆ; I think it certain that ποίει μηκαινῆς was added, because some one did not see the purport of καὶ in καὶ τίου ποτε τρόποις. Of course μοι ought to be expelled, and as for τῶν βιῶν it looks very like a wish to bring back the τῶν βιῶν which we had before.—The next sentence but one ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐναπύα ἐσμεν, εἰ πως διὰ προσηκοντὸς τινὸς αὐτοῦ πράττοιμεν, ἵσως ἄν ἠμίν σύμμετρον ἄν εἴη is not very clear, nor will the Græculus of διὰ προσηκοντὸς τινὸς commend itself to you. But ΑΙΑ is the paleographical twin of ΑΡΑ, and εἰ πως ἄρα προσηκόντως αὐτῷ πράττοιμεν seems all that is required. ο. "We are the playthings of the Gods, and our best earnest, such as it is, consists in acting as such, and rejoicing before them. People now-a-days say that War is the serious part of life, and Peace the playful part; thus they make the serious to be for the sake of the playful." τὸ δ᾽ ἦν ἐν πολλῷ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ οὖν παιδιὰ περικύπτει οὔτ᾽ αὖ παιδεία ποτὲ ἦμιν ἀξιόλογος, οὔτε οὖν οὔτε ἐσμένη. τὸ δὴ φαμεν ἠμῖν γε εἶναι σπουδαίοτατον, δεῖ δὴ τὸν κατ᾽ εἰσήκων βιῶν ἔκατον πλεῖστῶν τε καὶ ἀριστῶν διεξείδει. τὸς οὖν ὁρθότης παιζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιστῶν, τίνας δὴ παιδίας θύσοντα καὶ θεοῦντα καὶ ὄρχούμεν. τὸ δ᾽ ἦν ἄρα means more than Cornarius understood by it. I should render it: "Whereas we have found that in war &c." The stop should be removed from ἐσμένη, and we must read, δὴ φαμεν ἠμῖν γ᾽ εἶναι σπουδαῖοτατον. "War has no sport nor education worth mentioning, and to have that was just what we affirm to be most serious." But if you insist upon preferring ὠ ... σπουδαίοτατον, non re- munhano. The rest I read thus: τις ὁς ὁρθότης; τίνας δὴ παιδίας παιζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιστῶν; θύσοντα κ. τ. ἐ. It is incredible that any one should have attempted to correct this passage, and that others should have adopted his correction, and yet all have consented to leave such an absurdity as παιδίας θύσοντα in the text.
804, b. πρὸς τόν θέων ἀπιδιόν καὶ παθῶν—Was it once εἰ-κότα παθῶν? b. Perhaps you will approve of οὐχ ὃν μὲν ἢν ὁ πατὴρ βούληται [φοιτώντες] ὑν δ' ἂν μὴ ἐκόντας [τάς παιδείας]. b & e. τά αὐτά δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλείων ὁ μὲν ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν εἰ-ποι πάντα, ὡσ περ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀφόνων, ὡσ καὶ τάς θηλείας ἁσκεῖν δεῖν. καὶ οὔδεν φοβηθεῖς εἴποιμι ἂν τούτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἑπικής οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδρόσαι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἶη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. Never was a passage more miserably inter-polated than this. First his law speaks, and then he speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, that women ought to be trained and drilled as much. Any one who knows what ἔσα καί is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins ἔσα καί with οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς 1), and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious εἴποιμ ἂν absconds from before it.

805, b. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. c. ἐν τούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τούτῳ γ' ; in the meanwhile, till he has found some better reasons.

806, a. As ἄργονς μὲν ταλασίας is opposed to θεραπείας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικὸν τινα βιον, for δὲ τινα we should read δὴ τινα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἰς τῶν πόλεων μὴ κοινωνοῦσας, ὃς' οὖθ' εἰ τίς ποτε δια-μάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως τε καὶ παιδῶν ἀναγκαία τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὗτ' ἂν τόξων, ὃς τινες 'Αμαξόνες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτὲ βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι, οὔθε ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβότας μυρώσασθαι τίνι θεῶν, ὃς ποροθομένες αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναῖως ἀντιστάσας φό-βον γε, εἰ μηδὲν μείζον, τολεμίσαι δύνασθαι παρασείεν ἐν τάξει τίνι κατοφθείσαι; Σανθομάτιδας δὲ οὖθ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μι-μήσασθαι τούτων τὸν τρόπον διαβιοῦσαι, πορὰ γυναίκας δὲ αὐτὰς ἀνδρεῖς ἂν αἱ ἔκεινον γυναῖκες φανεῖν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνοῦσας, δυ-νάμεναι, λαβόσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατοφθείσας. "It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive". Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of ὃστε οὖθ' suffice to shew the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τάς θηλείας ἁσκεῖν δείν.
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come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by πορθομένης τῆς πατρίδος, or that which is here called διαμάχησθαι περὶ τῶν σφικτῶν? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear ἐν τάξει, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not postliminio, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. τῶν δ' εἰς πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνοῦσας, ὡστε (πορθομένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρί-

δος, γενναίας άντιστάσας σφόδρον γε εἰ μηδὲν μείζον πολέμιοις δύνα-

σθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσος);—all this depends upon σφόδρον δεῖν ἦν; Then follows the direct. οὐδ' εἰ δ' τοῦτο διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως (πόσεως?) τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαία τάξις γίγνοιτο, οὔτε τόξων, ὡς τινες Ἀμάζονες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνίσαι ποτε βολής μετά τέχνης δυνάμεναι (φανεῖεν ἄν) οὐδ' ἀσπίδα καὶ δορῦ λαβοῦσαι μι-

μήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, Θαυμαστόδας δὲ οὐδ' ἄν τὸ παράπαντα τολμήσαι

μμῆσασθαι κ. τ. ἐ. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction: Stallbaum's οὐχί ἡμισὺν founded on the reading of the best MSS, οὐ Δ' ἡμισὺν is deserving of much praise. E. For ἄποτελοῦσιν it is absolutely necessary that we read ἄποτέλεσιν. The explanation offered by Ast of αὐταίς in παίδων τε ἀμα θη-

λείων καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταίς, that it is put for αὐτῶν, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; αὐταίς, as I need not tell you, is ἱσίσ seorsim. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. ἡσοσίτια δὲ κατεσκευασμένα τῇ χωρίς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἔγγυς δ' ἔχομεν τά τῶν νείων, αὐ-

τοῖς, instead of τά τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων which is a most vague designation. For what can οἰκείοι mean? Not a man's household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his domestics, who are not members of a συσσιτίον; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων is not so bad as τῶν
... but what writer would ever dream of putting more than τῶν οἷκτιῶν in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807, A. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ' ἐν τρόπῳ βοσκήματος ἔκαστον πιανόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ξην; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ' ἦ τ. β. ἐ. ἦ. π. διαζην. Immediately after, we have οὗκον τὸ γε δίκαιον φαινέν οὐδὲ καλόν, οὐδ' οἶόν τε κ. τ. ἐ. where again the explainers τοιμοίοι δόνων. I read, οὗκον, (τὸ γε δίκαιον ΦΑΝΑΙ) οὔτε καλόν, οὐδ' οἶόν τε—. τ. τετραχωμένων. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. One whole paragraph is missing, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too τετραχωμένον to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks τίς δή τρόπος τοῦ βιού and the rest, and after a description of their messages, he again asks ἄρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενον ἔστι κ. τ. ἐ. This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily became the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he has pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. "We cannot hope that all this will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses." All what? "But if the other second-best measures were tried"—What other? "But men living so have yet another duty and that not a small one"—Living how? Hardily; as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,
Just because the beginning is the hardest; and I grant that it is, by far, the most, because it was next door to θπιμέλειαν, and they looked no further.

808. c. Are you very tired of proofs of the lacuna? Just one more, and I have done. νῦς μὲν δὴ διαγραμμὴ τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἄνθρειαν ἂν τίνα προσφατόχοιτο π. τ. ἑ. d. For the miserable πῶς βιωτέον, I have exhausted every verb beginning with π that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps προλειπέτεον, which the scribes would very readily change to προλειπέτεον. But a certain form of the β, now out of use, is very like the semiuncial λ and one form of π is an ω with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the “Meadow of Conjecture”. d. οὓς ἔδε παῖς πάντων Θηρίων ἦστι δυσμεταχειριστότατον. οὗρ γὰρ μάλιστα ἤχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονείν μῆτω κατηρτιμένην, ἐπιβολον καὶ δριμὸ καὶ ύβριστότατον Θηρίων γίγνεται. To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. “A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures.” This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—“having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed”? Nor is the grammar a whit better: οὖρ μάλιστα with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived “to meet the demand”. Again why use μῆτω for οὖσα in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: οὗτος παῖς πάντων Θηρίων ἦστι δυσμεταχειριστότατον. οὗρ γὰρ μάλιστα ἤχει τινὰ πηγὴν τοῦ φρονείν. μῆτω κατηρτιμένον δὲ, ἐπιβολον καὶ δριμὸ καὶ ύβριστότατον Θηρίων γίγνεται. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent τοῖς διδάσκουσι καὶ ὀτιοῦν. (Τὶ γὰρ; ἃ καὶ τοῖς πλέπτειν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν διδάσκουσι;) And why is καὶ μαθήμασι added? Grant that they are bonds; they are surely not so in the sense in which οἱ διδάσκουσι are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of καὶ ὀτιοῦν ΚΑLambda (καλὸν) ΜΑΘΗΜΑ.

1) Book 10. 905, d. έλ' δ' ἐπιδείξεις ἐτι λόγου τινὸς ἄν εἶ ἦς. Read λ. τ. ἐλλον έλ.
809, b. τα μεν ουν δη χορειας περι μελον τε και όρχησεως έρωθη. Not even a Dithyrambic poet, unless very drunk, would sing of the χορεια μελον τε και όρχησεως. Plato had discussed the question concerning their employment: χορειας περι. c. και τοι τα μεν περι των πόλεμον, δει μανθάνειν τε αυτούς και μελετήν, ξεις τω λόγω, τα δε περι τα γράμματα προστον και δευτερον λύρας πέρι και λογισμόν, ον έραμεν δειν, οσα τε προς πόλεμον και οίκονομιαν και την κατα πόλιν διοίκησιν χρηναι εκάστους λαβείν, και προς αυτα ταύτα έτι τα χρήσιμα των εν ταις περιόδωσ των θείων, άστρον τε πέρι και ήμιον και σελήνης, οσα διοικείν αναγκαίοι έστι περι ταύτα πάση πόλει . . . . ταύτα ούπω σοι πάντα ἵκανος, ω φιλε, παρά του νομοθέτου διείσθαι. In this sentence, οσα te points to things unknown and beyond discovery, χρησι is out of structure, διοικείν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is apposite, and this mention of arrangement seems to have dropped from the clouds. The chief author in all this this mischief is the man who introduced οσα te: λογισμόν ον έραμεν δειν προς πόλεμον και οίκονομιαν και την κατά πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order. Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner —χρηναι δ' εκάστους λαβείν και προς ταύτα ταύτα έτι τα χρήσιμα των εν ταις περιόδωσ των θείων, άστρον τε [πέρι] και ήμιον και σελήνης, οσα [διοικείν] (oh! these interpreters!) αναγκαίοι έστι [περὶ ταύτα] πάση τῆς πόλεως. (Subaudi λαβείν.)—I take this opportunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read, Αέγεται δε και Αλκμαίων τω Άμφιαρε, δε η άλλος θαυμα αυτόν μετα των φόνων, των Άπόλλω ταύτην την γην χρησαι οικείν, the right reading is οτι έδει άλλοςθαι. Soon after the sense is obscured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: επικαλούντες τι τη λέξει; τόδε ος ούπω διείρηκε κ. τ. ἐ. In the next sentence we have προσοιστέων twice; in the first place it occurs in connexion with ιτέων: πότερον ιτέων, ἃ το παράπτων οὐδε προσοιστέων. And these two verbals have the common complement of εις άκριβειαν; the second προσοιστέων is followed by εις γράμματα. It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passive sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσφέρεσθαι εις γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσιτέων. The passage in the beginning of the Republic, τοτε μεν εν ζωντες, νων δε ούδε ζωντες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-
position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from *eis*. In the very next sentence (810, \( \lambda \)) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προσείτον μὲν τοῖνυν φαμὲν *εἰς* μὲν γράμματα παύει δεκατεί σχεδόν ἐνιαυτὸν ὑς τρεῖς; λύφος δὲ ἀνασθαὶ τρία μὲν ἔτη καὶ δέκα γεγονόσιν ἀρχασθαί, [μέτριος ὁ χρόνος] ἱμεῖται δ' ἔτερα τρία. I point out παράνομον which ought to be παρὰ νόμον, and, in \( \nu \), τις ὁς, which should be ὁ ὁσίος, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἀληφ ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δ' ἂνευ δυσμών τηματῶν, ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητόμενα δυσμοῦ τε καὶ ἀρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμματα ἦμιν ἐστὶ παρὰ τινών τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα· οἶς, δὲ πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί χρησεσθε; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοὶ κείμεθα πλάμονες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιητῶν κείμεθα ἐν γραμμασί! But what are we to do with δυσμῶν τηματῶν? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τηματῶν, more especially as δυσμῶν occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: ἃ δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητόμενα δυσμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας, [σφαλερὰ γράμματα] ἦμιν ἐστὶ παρὰ τινῶν [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα. He cannot call them σφαλερὰ γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητωμένων δυσμοῦ καὶ ἀρμονίας) is a sneer, he does not prejudge the question whether they shall use those books. \( \nu \). The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς αὐτῆς is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the same way pleases some and displeases others, and κελεύεις γὰρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἀλήθεις λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κελεύεις δὲ με, \( \omegaς \) ἡ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὀδοῦ \( \kappa \). \( \tau \). \( \dot{\epsilon} \).

811, \( \nu \). The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus:

ΑΘ. ... \( \epsilon \): \( \delta' \) οὔτω τούτ' ἔχει, κληδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρονσαν τοῖς παισὶ τήν πολυμαθίαν. Πῶς οὖν καὶ τί παρανοιής ἐν τῷ νομοφύλακι;
K.A. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις;
ΑΘ. Τοῦ πρὸς τι παράδειγμα ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἂν τὸ μὲν ἐν πάντας μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους, τὸ δὲ ἀποκολύνοι.

Κ.Λ. Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκεινε λέγων.

812, ν. c. ΑΘ. "Εφαμέν, οὕτω, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἐξηγοντοῦτας ὀφέος διαφέρονται εὐωσθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τε τοὺς ὄνομαν καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἕνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μὴ σαύτην τὴν εὕ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐκ τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχῇ γίγνεται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέγεσθαι δυνατὸς ὅν τις τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προφέρων εἰς μὲν ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπάθη ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἐκάστους εἰς ἀριτής ἐπέσθαν κτῆσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe that ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχῇ γίγνεται is correct, or that μιμήσεις μιμεῖται τα ὁμοιώματα means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is μιμεῖται τα παθήματα; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling ὁμοιώματα, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μήρησιν, τὴν εὗ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, ὅστις ἐν ἐπὶ ψυχῇ γίγνεται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ [τα] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέγεσθαι δυνατὸς ὅν κ. τ. ε. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, παθήματα; and the construction δυνατὸς ἐκλέγεσθαι μιμήσις μεμιμημένην τα καὶ τα ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is complete and satisfactory. d & e. The grammar requires παρεχομένου and προσαμότονος. Πικνότης and μαννότης appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

813, Α. Ἀληθέστατα τοινν. καὶ ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν κ. τ. ε. should be read continuously. e. διεξόδων τακτικῶν. Significatur, says Ast, exercitus in acie constituti expeditiones. If it signifies this, it signifies nothing, for this has no meaning. Διεξόδοι are evolutions, and τακτικῶν is a bad gloss. Στρατοπέδων is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τι εἶναι δεῖ κοινώς, ἀφυμένοις μισθὸν παρὸ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τοῦτον μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει πατίδας τε καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ [κόρας καὶ γυναικὰς πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας], κάρος μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τῆς πάσης τῆς ἐν ὀπλοῖς ὀργῆσαι [καὶ μέχρι] μεμελετηθήσας, γυναικᾶς δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναφέσεως ὀπλῶν ἡμένας, εἰ μηδὲνος ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' εἰ τοτε δεήσειε

Platonis Philebus.
Soon K ttl observes: force tempted chance, EiQtiViTijg SvvcifjiEcag vov.

814, d. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὴ τής μὲν παλαιότατης περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δ' όμεν αὐτάς χρή νομίζειν εἶναι, τήν μὲν τῶν καλλίων σωμάτων τὸ σεμνὸν μιμομένην, τήν δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν τὸ φαύλον καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύναται, καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δυνήτις εἶναι, τήν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλεκόμενοι πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνθρώπης, τήν δ' ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε ὑπάρχολα τὰς σώφρονας, ἐν ἰδιότητις τε ἐμέμονον. εἰρήνην δ' ἄν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὀρχησάς λέγω. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην οὕσαν τής εἰρήνης πυρρήνην ἂν τις οὐδ᾽ ἔπραχθον ταῖς τε εὐλαβείαις πασῶν πληγῶν, καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεῦσεις, καὶ ὑπέλεις πάσῃ καὶ ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ ἐγκυψίς, καὶ ταῖς τούταις ἔναντις ταῖς ἀπὸ τὰ δραστικὰ φαιομέναις αὐτίκα σχῆμα, τόξων βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίων, καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματε, ἐπιχειροῦσαν μιμεῖται τὸ τ' ὄρθον ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐτονον. τῶν οὖν ἄμισθῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν ὁπόταν γίγνεται μίμημα, ἐνυφερέτες ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σάματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὄρθον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτωσι τοῦναντίον ἀποδιδόν οὖν ὄρθον ἀποδεχόμεθα.

Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, There, there! and a few will even go further and say, So would we have it. And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ
into $\Pi\Lambda\Theta\omicron\Sigma$, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as this is seldom done except when the joke is ψυχρότερον τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων, as that ribald Lucian has it, so that had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that αὐτής τὰ εἶδη is an explanation of αὐτὰς, that ἐπὶ τὸ σεμῦν is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that ἐμπλεκόμενον is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydides, that ὑδώνοι are μέτριαι, but men are ἐμετροῦ, that ταπεινώσει is probably the gloss of ἐγκύψει, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into $\varepsilon\eta\nu\nu\varepsilon\iota$, that the pyrrhic dance and that alone can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting οὖν, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if ἀποδίδον is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read ἐναντίον, (in which I should not follow you) and that ἀποδεχόμεθα was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator’s Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

815, c. ὃν μὲν βασιλεία τ’ ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ὡς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πάνας καὶ Σειληνοῦς καὶ Σετύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὡς φασὶ, μιμοῦνται καταφωμένους, περικαθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων, ἔμψων τούτο τῆς ὁχήσεως τὸ γένος κ. τ. ἐ. Diu mihi suspectum fuit verbum ἐπονομάζοντες. Sältationes quasdam Nympharum et Fannorum aei orumque numinum nominibus appellant. Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem hae numina ebria. Quae est haec negligentia, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab ἐπονομάζοντες pendentia saltatum onum nōminum significant, ad μιμοῦνται autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adde quod ἐπονομάζοντες, ὡς φασὶ, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his
LETTER TO THOMPSON.

nominibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dicta- rent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebrias
finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt τῶν
ταύτας ἐπομένων? Si sic interpretaberis: "qui Bacchus sequuntur",
praesto eit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, ὡς referendum
esse ad ταύτας. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex lingue norma
dictum est, sequitur ut ἡς etiam de Bacchabes ipsis intelligi opro-
teteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concersis, quid de reli-
qua sententia fiet? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnoceas
necesse est; vel si forte etiam num dubitas, vide num verat
liberet. oct/

Ibid. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου Μοος, ἐν ὄρχησει δὲ τοὺς τε θεῶς
καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παιδισ τιμῶν—Si scriptum eset ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν
ὄρχησει δὲ τιμῶς, vel ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὄρχησει δὲ σπουδαιῶ
τιμῶν, quidquid de reliqua oratione statueremus, δὲ saltem suo
locum positum videretur. Nunc autem plane supervacaneum est.

Vide, num aliquando a margine in orationem invectum fuerit.
Nam in Cod. Ε scriptum est τὸ δὴ τῆς ἃ. M.: unde suspiceris,
dubitasse utrum δὲ αὐτὸν scribendum esset. Equidem
neutrum prob. Ad propositum redeuntes μὲν αὐτὸν usurpant. Sed
tiμῶν longe gravior est controversia; quae lectio nullus du-
bito quin alteri, τιμῶντων, praeferenda sit. Sed unde factum
est ut illam nullus bone notae Codex praeter Ε præbuerit? Scil-
licet qui illum librurn exaravit, ipse finxit. Minime; nam si ita
esset, verba illa quae Bekkerus ex illo codice enotavit, "τὸ τιμῶ
οὐδέτερος", in margine, non in orationis serie, scripta fuissent.
Itaque hoc statuendum; vel lectionem τιμῶν etiam in Α vel Ω
exstare, sed a Bekkero prætervisam fuisse, vel Ε non totum ab
illis pendere, sed habere proprium auctoritatem, utpote ab anti-
quiore libro, qui nonnunquam meliores lectiones præberet, de-
scriptum. Mox pro τὸ μὲν εἰ τῶν τιμῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων
diapereuyτῶν, lege: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ, τῶν ἐκ τῶν τιμῶν κ. τ. ἐ.
816, c. ἐν τάξει. Hec non intelligo. Aliud est καθεροῦ,
aliud tātēnv, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præcesserit. Quæ vero ad tāzīv pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil superatis quam xathēzqov πάντα, ἐν tāzēv.


818, λ. ὡς ἀκριβεῖας ἐξήμενα. "Cum perfectione conjuncta, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀκριβῶς s. δὲ ἀκριβεῖας". Sio Astius, falsa voris permiscens. Lege: ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβεῖας ἐχομένους δεῖ διαποιεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ τινὰς ὀλίγους—Mox sequuntur haec: οὗτο γὰρ πείραν ἦν εὖν. τὸ πλήθει δὲ οὗτοι αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία καὶ πας ὀρθότατα λέγεται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρῶν, δὲ ἀκριβεῖας δὲ ξυμπαίων ὀὔτε ὀξίδιον ὀὔτε τὸ παράπαν συνατον. Quæ sit horam verborum grammatica ratio, οὔτε ὀξίδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν συνατον ἐξηγεῖσθαι. Locus sic mihi constitutendus videtur: τὸ πλήθει δὲ οὗτοι αὐτῶν ἀναγκαία πας ὀρθότατα λέγεται; δὲ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρῶν, κ. τ. ἐ.

Ibid. c. οὗς συνατον. "Alterutrum fortasse delendum est". Ast. Imo συνατον quantocius expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit οὗς h. e. idoneus dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitare.

819, λ. οὗδαμον γὰρ δεινῶν οὐδὲ σφοδρῶν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακὸν. Μον οὗ δεινῶν οὐδὲ σφοδρῶν οὐδὲ μέγιστον haud minus absurde colloccantur quam μέγιστος καὶ σφοδρός ἐστι, quam Cobetus, spreta certissima nostra correctione, in Convivio legenda proposuit. Et quemadmodum illic, ubi de universo amore sermo est, τὸ σφοδρὸν, quod in partem tantum cadit, prorsus alienum est, sic in nostro loco omnium ignorantiam σφοδρὸν κακὸν vocare nec Graecitas nec rei natura patitur. Lege: οὗδαμον γὰρ δεινῶν οὐδ' ἡ σφοδρά ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακῶν. Neque vero hinc exemplum petere possis adjectivi posses cum superlativo conjuncti; nam δεινῶν nequaquam ad κακὸν pertinent. "Nulla in civitate periculo sa est—neque est summum malum." Mox dele τούτων.

—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut πεφύκασι sine nominativo esset, et genitivi a διανομαί pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Alterum καὶ omisi; quod qui inseruit, parum intellexit quid esset εν μέσι καὶ ἑρέξεις, et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod fuisset, εν μ. τε καὶ ἐ.) tertium aliquid in ὧς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli teriarii prioris εν μέσει excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus deinceps fiebat. ὧς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι est ut significaretur certam esse harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem numeri natura immutabiles essent. καὶ δὴ καὶ ποῖζοντες, φιάλας ἔμα χουσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιοῦτον τινῶν ἄλλων κεφανώντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλες ποὺς διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδίαν ἐναρ-μοτοντες τάς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις—Τρια hic præcipue querenda sunt. 1. Quid sit φιάλας κεφανώντες, 2. quo modo ab ὅλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hoc se iterum dicere ait. Duplex, nisi fallor, discernem in poculis fingitur; nam et e diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si hoc verum est, recte opponuntur οἱ κεφανώντες τὰς φιάλας, h.e. qui pocula vino cum aqua permixto implent, et οἱ φ. ὅλας διαδιδόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἁράτων πότων πλήρεις διαδιδόντες. Sed vocem ἁρατός consulto vitavit, quoniam non minus de aqua pura quam de vino mero cogitabat. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ εἶπον? Planissime ad verba ἁροτοτόων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. At qui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros convenire dicas, sive numeros accommodate; et quoniam hoc verius, malim ἁροτοτομεύων. Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quod infra, εἰς παιδίαν κ. τ. ἐ. Praeterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et οἱ δὲ alterum quod-dam sui simile flagitet, lego: ἄλλοι μὲν κεφανώντες. Ατ unde il-lud μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. Ζ, qui pro κεφανώντες μεκεφανώντες habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutile esse particulam pos contendet, simulque ὅλας φιάλας ægere feret, quidni ὅλας πό- σεις reponat?


820, A. El δ' ἔστι μῆτε σφόδρα μῆτε ἰδέα [δυνατά ἔνια, ἀλλὰ]
Retention from the Latin notes the first thing we meet with in the text, that seems to require notice is in 820, c. ταύτα γὰρ ὑποψία τινι διαγγελόντων ἀναγκαίον ἡ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαύλου, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλαις ἀεί, διατριβήν τῆς πεπτείας χαριστέοιραν προσβεθυντιν διατριβονται, φιλονεικεῖν ἐν τοῖς τούτων ἁξιωματο καθολικαίς. You will probably assent to ἀλλοις—πρεσβύτιν ἐνικείν, and likewise to the removal of τα μαθηματα in Clinias' answer. Those who want to remove ςα, shew that they do not understand the force of the particle in ἐπει' ὑποψιν. τοῦ. The Zurich Editors have gone back to the wrong distribution of persons, which Bekker had rectified. Why should the Athenian not call Clinias ὃ ξένε? And how can οὐχοῦν πεὶς θων suit any other mouth than τοῦ Θέου;
Perhaps must be changed into a subdivision by removing tōs. “Those who are at once our fellow-citizens and our youth.” The words ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκήροις σφόν ἃν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλῶσαι δυναμὴν. καὶ τοῦ χαλεπά γε ὑπνα ὃν ποτε οἶος τ' ἢν δηλοῦν τηλικοῦτος οὔς τηλικοῦτος ὁν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either νέος or νεωστί: for a man who has heard a thing οὔτε νεωστί οὔτε πάλαι can scarcely have heard it at all. Τούτων seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct τούτων, by supposing that the old reading was τούτωτων (i.e. τοῦτ' οὔτ' οὖν) νέος—but what second hindrance does he allude to? “That he had not heard it for some time:” but the Greek for “it is long since I heard it,” would be πάλαι οὐκ ἀκήροια, not οὐ πάλαι ἀκήροια, and with οὔτε the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: τοῦτ' οὔτ' οὖν νέος πάλαι τ' οὖν ἀκήροια—. Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὔτε—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

822, 1. Read: τὴν [ἀντὶ ἃν] γάρ αὐτῶν ὃδον, καὶ ἔκαστον . . . μίαν κ. τ. ἕ., and soon after τὸν ἕττημένον. c. I should print the text as follows: ἐν οὖν οἰδάμεθα τὸ γελοίον τε καὶ οὖν ὁδὸν ἔκει γεγραμένον ἃν, ἔνταυθι καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίγνεσθαι; Κ.Δ. Γελοίον μὲν, ὁδὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς. After this I return to another scrap of Adversaria, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. έπι μείζον nullo modo ferri potest; sed non mutandum in ἔτι μείζον, quod nescio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit hoc etiam majus, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam magnum esse contendit? Nec que sequuntur sine offense legi possunt. Quorum enim t' iteratur, ἑτερόν τι—μεταξὺ τι? Deinde si quis doceat περιφέρειαι τι μεταξὺ νοουθητήσεως τε καὶ νόμων, quivis hoc intelligat; sin adjunct νοουθητήσεως τ' μ' α καὶ νόμων, diversa confundisse videatur, sc. τὸ μετέξειν ἀμα τοῦτον καὶ ἐκείνου, et τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦτον καὶ ἐκείνου περιφέρειαι. Satis patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis
LETTER TO THOMPSON. XXV

turbatum parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constitutum esse. Quid si sic legamus? xivdnue"i γαρ δή νομοθέτη το προστατή-

μενον ἐπερόν τι μείζον εἶναι τοῦ τούς νόμους θέντα ἀπηλλάχθαι, ἃμα ὅ εἶναι μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεως τε περίκος καὶ νόμων.

Ibid. e. οἷον περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παιδῶν τροφῆν· οὔ γαρ ὅητα φαμέν εἶναι, λέγοντες τε αὐτά ὡς νόμους οἴεσθαι τιθημένους εἶναι πολλής ἀνοίας γέμειν. Non οἷον sed ἀφρητα desiderari vidit C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in omnibus libris haberi. Post λόγος plenius interpungendum est, legendumque οἷον (τά) περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παιδῶν τροφῆν οὔτ' ἀφρητά φαμέν (οὖν) εἶναι, λέγοντες τ' αὐτά νόμους οἴεσθαι τι-
thēnai polllēs (ἀν) ἀνοίας γέμειν.

Ibid. e. Delo αὐτὸν τις. Structure est οὐ τέλεος ο ἐπαίνος, ὅταν ᾿φην τὸν ὑπηρετήσαντα ι. τ. ἐ. Mox quod Ε ἐπρεβόν χαρσιουμ τοῦ (νομοθέτου) νομοθετοῦντος τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦτος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γράμματι διεξέλθη τὸν βιον ἀϕατον. οὕτος ὃ τε λόγος ὧρθότατος—Locum hucusque de-

scripsi ut mancam esse sententiam ostenderem. “Quicunque non modo legibus verum etiam praecptis consiliiisque legum latoris vi-
tam regit”—quid tum? Inepte autem dicitur βίος ἀϕατος, et con-
junctio sic posita οὕτος ὃ τε λόγος neminem non offendat. Scripsit Plato: ἀϕρότατος οὕτος. ὃ τε λόγος κ. τ. ἐ. Horum partem video jam a Winckelmanno occupatam. Mox post μόνον δελε-

γράψειν.

823, β. Jampridem monui legendum: οἷον μάρτυρα ἐπαγόμε-
nοί δῆλοιμεν ἄν δ' ὑπολόμεθα μάλλον.

Ibid. b. Locum sic interpungi et corrigi velim: πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεξὰ ἱηρούματα [, οὐ μόνον θηριῶν]. ἀλλά καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπων ἔζον ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τὴν τε κατὰ πύλημον καὶ κλω-

πεῖαν καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων. πολλῇ δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ 

φιλίαν—Vulgo hae per amicitiam venatio, in qua procul dubio rem amatoriam, atque omnem suadendi artem et omnia blanditia-

gum generà includi volebat, inter τὴν κατὰ πύλημον θήραν atque 
hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa antem verba sic cor-
rupta sunt: καὶ κλωπεῖα καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπεδίων στρατοπέδους 

θήραι. Quem nostra reponit correctio chiasmum librarium parum 

intellexit.

Ibid. c. Transpone sic: καὶ μετὰ ζημίας νομοθετηθέντων.

Ibid. e. Lege διαπονομένης . . alioquin nec erit quo τῆς referri
possit, et dativi illi ἐγγυγοῦσι, εὐδοῦσι, prorsus ἀνώντακτοι erunt. Ordo est, τῆς διαπυκνομένης κύρτος ἀγγόν θήραι τῶν ἐνύδρων ἔων, μητε ἐγγυγοῦσι μητε εὐδοῦσι. Mox incredibile est quem-quam in verbis μηθ εἰς τῶν ἔσχατων ἐπέλθοι νοῦν ἥσσετε. Qui tot ineptias invito Platoni obturasus defendunt, simul atque Plato ipse in notissimo proverbio jocari coepit, statim nauseant, et cum pro-cells jactu decidere parant.

824, a. Lege: ἑ τῶν δ' ἀναπαύματα πόνον ἔχουσα. Mox pro ὁ διειρημένος lege ὁ εἰρημένος. Pro ἐν ἐγχασίμοις δὲ καὶ ἰεροὶς ἀγίους suspicor olim lectum esse ἐν ἔγγ. καὶ ἀγίους, quod ultimum nescio quis per ἱεροὶς interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in ΑΓΙΟΙΚ veram lectionem ΑΤΡΟΙΚ latere admonuisset. In Α et Ω dittographia ex proba et mala lectione conflata servatur ΑΓ(Π)ΙΟΙΚ.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of palæography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἄντιχθων; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolaus would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forthwith to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,
FEBRUARY, 1877.

CORRIGENDA.

P. VI last line. For me: read we.
IX 9th " After τοῦτω add (i.e. τῶ σχῆματε).
" XIII 26th " For became: read become.
" XVI 6th " from bottom. For κελεύσις: read κελεύεις.
ΕΓΧΩΡΙΣΜΟΙ

ΑΠΟ ΑΡΧΕΙΑ ΜΟΝΑΚΟΣΤΙΩΝ
INTRODUCTION.

THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of good; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the second prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being pleasant, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, in so far as they are pleasures. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of ἐν καὶ πολλά.* The contradiction between the individual as one in nature, and yet many in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as one and

* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the πέριστα in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.
the Parts as many, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of all objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of number, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes per saltum from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protarchus is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the first prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be perfect and self-sufficient. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of
pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer a combination of the two; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself, and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two γένη or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier†, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of more and less. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one ἒδέκα, and receive the name of the Indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, τὸ πέρας ‡ or περατοειδές. The examples of this kind are all definite numbers whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in Philolaus, and the Extract from Bückh's Philolaus in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, Ἐν δὲ ὀξεί καὶ βαρεί καὶ ταχεί καὶ βραδεί, ἀπείροις οὐ στε. (26, A.)

‡ πέρας is properly the ἓδεκα, or that according to which they are one, and περατοειδές, the γένος: τὰ περατειδής again would be the γένος, which we must not confound with γένος, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the γένος, its numerous specimens.
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in all such instances, where qualities are blended with definite proportion, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some γένεσις. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which is made cannot be the same as that which makes, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements* of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awestruck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a mind which

* Socrates speaks also presently (29, 1) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the ἄτομον is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, till controlled by πέρα. Though the Pythagoreans held ἄτομον to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, ἦ ἀφικτὸς δυάς, was reckoned among the ἄτομα.
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it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also: and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause, working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is the chief of the four kinds, will be supreme in heaven and in earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus himself. * The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect rules over all things, and that our intellect is therefore also akin to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not abstractedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the constituent elements of the creature tend towards Harmony; but, when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the consequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of pleasure (and pain) is in Expectation: this kind belongs to the mind alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that there must be an intermediate state of the body, when it is tending neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part; when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect; it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that ἄρχει ἐν τῷ ἕλεος is the highest of all the four kinds; but ἄρχει is νόος, and νόος is inseparable from ψυχή; consequently, ἄρχει is the ground of the highest νόος and ψυχή, i. e., that of Ζεύς.

† Page 33, n. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed

Platonia Philebus.
This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of νοῦς in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to νοῦς become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state;* therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there False Pleasures? Protarchus denies this, and affirms that beliefs † may be true in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of γε into τε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἐν ἔκεινῳ τῇ ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων καὶ πάντων τῶν μὲν ἤστε ἡμών τῶν ἰδίων. 

* The same argument is used by Socrates in the Convivium.

† I have rendered δέξια in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than impressions, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.
or false, but that pleasures are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these δόξαι in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case; then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called Hopes. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are pleasures, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between δόξαι and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those δόξαι, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be bad, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protarchus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar
effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size to near objects and less to those more distant. For the immediate pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and cause a false belief: so that not only false beliefs cause false pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false beliefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution, such a state will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux* deny the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisition of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot come to be truly either. But there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two; that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the highest degree of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid conditions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, Socrates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sensations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

† Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, μανείην μάλλον ή γιόγιην. Diog. Laert. 6, 3.
classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend's ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend's evil is παθέναι; and παθέναι is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked: pure pleasures not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little White, if perfectly unmixed, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmixed pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the predominant element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the pure pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into
two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include \( \gamma\varepsilon\varepsilonις \), temporal existence, that which \( is \) \( ever \) \( becoming \); the latter, \( \alphaυ\alphaια \), eternal being, that which \( is \); indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,\(^*\) is a \( \gamma\varepsilon\varepsilonις \); and if so, it will be in the \textit{opposite} class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a \( \gamma\varepsilon\varepsilonις \), they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a genesis or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject \( νο\upsilon\varepsilon \) and \( \epsilon\iota\pi\iota\sigma\tau\iota\mu\nu \) to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

\(^*\) Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.
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others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination both sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a true blending: Truth, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without Measure; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is Beauty and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good,* but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon Measure: pleasure has *so little claim to Beauty, that it often

* Which Plato thought unattainable. See Republic, vi. 508, 509.
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shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: Πάντι δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρῶταρχε, ὕπο τ' ἀγγέλου πέμπτων καὶ παροῦσι φράξον, ὡς ἔδοικη κτήμ', οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὐθ ἐπιτετοῦν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πη περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτρον καὶ καλῷ καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιῶντα χρῇ νομίζειν τὴν κατοικίαν ἱψισθανει φύσιν. (66, A.)

We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the νοῦς βο-σιλεύς, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean κόσμος; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms σύμμετρον and καλὸν, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are νοῦς and φρόνησις capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words
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of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the Philebus is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the Timæus and the Republic. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to νοῦς and φθόνησις by observing that it is not the divine mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the truth spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. 'For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.' Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputuation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg's objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the Supreme Mind, and consequently can have nothing to do with the νοῦς
and ὑφόνησις, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of gives to us a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg's own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the μέτρον καὶ μέτριον κ. τ. ἐ. to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλὸν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating the same things, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: "et quidquid ejusmodi aternam naturam suscepisse credendum est." In the first place, ὀπόσα χρή τοιαύτα νομίζειν κ. τ. ἐ. cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὀπόσα, τοιαύτ' ὀντα, χρή νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be indispensable.*

But even if we conceived such an interpretation, what would become of περιον μὲν πη περὶ μέτρον? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as "to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature," is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is superadded to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand ἡφίσθαι in the sense of παρείληφέντα, or still less of

* The order has been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαύτα χρή to χρή τοιαύτα. Χρή νομί-ζειν is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, 'all such things as we are bound to believe to have taken upon themselves the eternal nature'? It is therefore evident that we must read ὑπόσα τοιαύτα, and understand ἐστὶ.
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And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been ἐλέσθαι. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the sense is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this search, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of ἩΡΠ into ἩΥΡ, removes all the objections alleged above.∗ It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg’s explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between ἡγιάσαται and γενεῖς, which is annihilated by the particle αὐτό, which shows that another kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in that.

Stallbaum’s view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αὐτὸν. 2. τὸ ἔννομον ἐλέσθαι. 3. τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθορὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθορὸν ἀπειρον. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—μαθεῖν πειράσθαι τι ποιήσων καὶ τὸ παντὶ πέρυκεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὶν ἰδέαν αὐτῆν εἶλαί ποτὲ μαντευτέον (64, 2) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of γένη, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τοιαύτα is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

∗ For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.
upon as synonymous with αἰτία)** as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.† As to the second class,—τὸ ἕμμετρὸν καὶ καλὸν is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὅντα; but I deny that τὰ ὅντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν, καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἑκατὸν, καὶ πάνθες ὑπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτὶ ταύτης ἐστίν. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The νοῦς which is αἰτία, (A), may be considered as πέρας, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the νοῦς which is πέρας, (B), may be considered as so far αἰτία, that it imitates the productions of the νοῦς which is αἰτία. But B is identical with the fourth class, or ἐπιστήμων, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg’s explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no thing, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties.

The Good which appeared most suitable for man was found in the combination of two human conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination universally we approach most nearly to the universal Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτρον, τὸ καλὸν, and all that evinces adaptation of one to another; Beauty in τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἑκατὸν, τὸ τέλεον, and all that is complete and harmonious in itself; Truth (subjective) in the νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: νοῦς ὅτι τὰ τῶν καὶ ἀληθεία ἐστίν, ἕτοι πάντων ὁμοίωτατον. (65, ν.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of πρεσβεία or ὀνόματι in any of them, as in the case of τάγαθόν, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

* Phaed. 97, foll. Tim. 30. a. Rep. 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that τάγαθόν and ὁ δημιουργός were held by Plato to be quite distinct.

† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.
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in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of τὸ μέτρον in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἰκανόν): and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of νοῦς, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along νοῦς has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of ἡθοναι had to be made, it was made not in νοῦς, which did not admit of it, but in the ἐπιστήμαι. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, c: Τῇ δὴ ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἀμα καὶ μάλιστ' αἱτίον x. r. ἦ. which is answered by naming τὸ μέτρον: with the further remark that from μέτρον καλλος necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as ἀλήθεια, but in the declaration of the verdict is called νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 63, 'Ὁ δὲ γ' ἡμετέρος λόγος x. r. ἦ.) is spoken of as necessary to the κράσις, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth "no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist"; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why ἀλήθεια is postponed to καλλος; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-
ment at the beginning of p. 65, Ὀὔκον ἐὰν μὴ μὲς δυνάμεθα ἴδεω τῷ γάθῳ θησέχα, σύντοιο κ. τ. ἦ.; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not What is the Good, but Where is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be in Measure, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the οὗ ἔνεκα, according to which the supreme aitia works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Sto-beus Ecl. Eth. ii. 6, 4, Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἄγαθον τὴν ἴδεων αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἔστι θεῖον καὶ θαυμιστών· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φυσικῶν καὶ ἱερωνίς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἔνοις δοκεῖ κατ' αὐτὸ εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἱδονήν. This division is expressly referred to the Philebus; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato's definitions, and dividing them under the heads τῷ γένει, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς εἴσεθι, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stallbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the nearest approach to the Idea, nor that the κοινοὶ βίος in its quality of ἰκανόν will come under the second denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to
what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascertaining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might be thought to have an equal right to the first place; but Plato seems to have confined this to the instances of antecedent suitableness, or of the modes of combination, and to have reserved for the second those things which owe their own excellence to such combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean, namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite properties of πέρας and ἄνειρον, and the distinction between Empirical and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Extracts from Böckh's Philolaus, and the fragments of Philolaus himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the bearing of the Philebus on the rest of the Platonic doctrines, the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribution to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine myself to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible the very words of the author, unencumbered by the additions of ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent transcribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second. Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism, without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend, in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows
that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the ἀπειρον of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the πέρας which is to bring these elements to a γένεσις is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

εὐδαιμονίζων ἤχλος ἔξεπληξέ σε.

and the latter with:

ἀπόλωλεν ἀλήθει, ἐπεῖ σὺ δυστυχεῖς;

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the Mnemosyne. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

1. Ὅσο δὴ, Πρῶταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλῆβου δέχεσθαι γνωτι καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρὰ ἐμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἣν δὲ μὴ σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λεγόμενος. βούλειν συγκεφαλαιώμεθ' ἐξάπτειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φιλῆβος μὲν τοινυν ἄγαθον εἶναι φησι τὸ χαῖρεν πάντων ζῶοις καὶ τῆν ἱδονήν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους έστι τοῦ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρὰ ἐμῖν ἀμφισβητήματι ἔστι μὴ ταύτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρεοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεινῦσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων

Πρῶταρχε] The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protarchus. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, ὅ is often omitted before the vocative, as in Parm. 136 δ.; Symp. 216 Α, 217 δ.; Ethyd. 296 ε.; Prot. 358 Ε, 359 Α.; Phileb. 12 Α, 28 δ. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in Gorg. 489 Α, 521 Α (where Callicles would fain let the conversation drop), Symp. 172 Α, 175 Α, 213 Ε.; Ethyd. 293 δ., 294 c, 295 δ. In Symp. 173 ε., if a second ἐπίπτεις is speaking (which is probable on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in Theodr. 261 Α, Soph. 220 δ, 234 δ, Ethyd. 300 Α, the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed. ἄγαθον] Not τάγαθον: for Philebus' assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

τέρψιν] Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἄρτη, ἀρτι, ἵδων; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ ταῦτα] not ἄγαθα εἶναι, but ἀμεῖνον γίγνεσθαι, which is equivalent to ἀμεῖνον εἶναι ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. I have no doubt that τῆς γ' ἱδονῆς is an interpolation. A still worse one is δυνατοίς, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable ΤΟ. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μεταχείπα a new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.
αδ ἔγγραυ, δόξαν τ' ὑθην καὶ ἄλλης λογισμοὺς, [τις ἑδο- 
C νις] ἑμείνω καὶ λόγῳ γρίφωσαι ἥματασιν, ὅσαπερ αὐτὸν ὄντων μεταλαβεῖν· τὸ [διάφως] δὲ μετασχεῖν ὑφελιστατον ἅπαν- 
tων εἶναι πάσι τοῖς οὕτω τε καὶ ἐσομένοις. μὲν οὐχ οὖν πεσ 
λόγονυ, ὡς Φίλιβο, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ο Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τῶν διδόμενον, ὃ Πρώταρχε, 

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίλος γὰρ ἤμιν ὁ καλὸς ἀπει- 
φίξεν.

ΣΩ. Αἱ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπων παντὶ τάληθ᾽ εῦ κεραν-

ثالثα;

D ΠΡΩ. Αἱ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ῥθι δὴ, πρὸς τοῦτοι διοικολογησόμεθα καὶ τάδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἥξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάδεσιν ἀπο-
φαίνειν τιν ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν ὑμαμένην ἀνθρώπους πάσι τὸν βίον 
eπαιδεύονα παρέχειν. ἃς οὐχ οὖντος;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χάρεσιν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ 

φρονείν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τι δ' ἔν ἄλλη τις χρείττων τοῦτον φανῇ; μὲν οὖν, 
Ε ἐν μὲν ἡθονὴ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἔγγραυ, ἢτοιμεθα μὲν ἀμφό-
τεροι τοῦ ταῦτην ἔχοντος βεβαιός βίον, κρατεῖ δ' ὅ τῆς ἱδονῆς 
12 τοῦ τῆς φρονήσεως;

Δέχεται. It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον is a proverb; and that the answer 'Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the passage quoted for the purpose (Gorg. 499, c) τὰ παρὸν εὐ ποιεῖν is the popular saying referred to. The oracle given to Mycelius δώρον δ' ἐν δῷ τις ἐπανει, "be content with your portion" is quoted indeed by the Paronomi-
graphers, but it is not alluded to here. I take this opportunity of restoring another proverbial saying to one of the so called Platonic Dialogues. (Amatores 134, b.) 'Ἐγὼ μὲν, οἱ Σώκρατες, φιλὸν 
tὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν γινώσκω. Read καὶ ὑν γινώσκω. See Laches 196, 

διάδοσιν] The place of this word and its redundancy, to say nothing of the technical character of the word itself, incline me to put καὶ διάδοσιν in brackets.

ταῦταν ἔχοντος] The common reading is ταῦτα, which is explained as referring to τὸ χρείττων φανῆς; but though ἔχειν might be used in such a sense, ἔχειν βεβαιός shows that a real pos-
session is intended,—that is, the ἔχει καὶ διάδοσις ψυχῆς spoken of above.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. 'Αν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικά μὲν φρόνησις την ἰδιόνυ, ἢ δ' ἱμώτατα; ταῦτα ούτως ὁμολογούμενα φατε, ἢ πιὸς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοί γον ὄνει.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ Φιλήβω; τί φης;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοί μὲν πάντως νικάν ἰδιόνυ δοξεῖ τε καὶ δόξει; οὐ δὲ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδοῦσθω, ὁ Διδυμός, ἥμιν τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐν ἐτι κέριος ἑν τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοῦν αντίκην.

ΦΙ. 'Ἀληθές λέγεις: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφροσύνη καὶ μαρτύρια Β' νῦν αὐτὴ τὴν Θεὸν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἣμεις σοι τούτων γ' αὐτῶν συμμάρτυροι ἡν εἰμεν, [ὡς ταῦτ' ἐλεγες ἡ λέγεις]. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἔτη, ὁ Διδυμός καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβων ἐξέσχισε ἢ ὅπως ἡ Θεόλη περισσότερα περαίνειν.

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the compendium for γνατός is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τὸν τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridiculous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The apocryphal passage in the Birds (v. 429) κρατεῖ δ' ἡ τον ἕρωτον, is worthy of φιλολογία ὑπερεξῆς which follows it.

Ἡ δ' ἡπτάσθαι] I formerly proposed τῆς δ' ἡπτάσθα, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

Δοκεῖ τε καὶ δοξῆι] Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, 'reditur, et vero easiam videndarum' we must believe τέ to be indispensable, though 'all the MSS.' (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

αὕτως γνώσεσθαι] Literally, yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please. 

Gorgias 505, c. Σω. Εἴπεν τι οὖν ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύμεν; Κα. Αὐτὸς γνώσει Παρτι. Ιον. 1356 Πυ. λαβών γιναι ταῦτα τῆς τεκοῦσαν ἐκπάνει. 'Ἰον. 'Ασιάδ' ἐπιθ. τοῦ πᾶσαν. Εὐρώτης ἐφ' ἄρσος; Πυ.: γνώσα τὰς αὐτοῦ.—for this is the true reading of that passage. See also Thucyd. Δ, 99, init., and Ἰου. Hell. v. 1, 34, where the men implicated in the bloodshed αὕτως γνώσες ἀπέλληλον ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης. 

ἀφοσίωμαι] I set myself free from the pollution; I disclaim all share in the guilt. This was done by a variety of trifling formal acts, such as pretending to spit, or, by the use of certain words. Hence, in the later Greek writers, to do anything for form's sake and without serious purpose, is δραίτι ὁ δικαίος ἢ ἄρσος ἀφοσίωμαι. In the Attic authors I know of no instance where the words are thus used without some accompanying notion of the discharge from a religious obligation or compliance with a religious ceremony.

[ὡς ταῦτ' ἐλεγες ἡ λέγει] A most unnecessary addition after τούτων αὐτῶν, or rather a false gloss, for τούτων αὐτῶν means τοῦ ἀφοσίωματι σε καὶ μαρτύρομεν τὴν σέν. 

Ἡ δῶσω ἀν ἑθέλη] A polite way of implying ἡ βις Φιλήβω.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Πειράτευν, ἀπὸ αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς Θεοῦ, ἦν ὁδ’ Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαι φησί, τὸ δ’ ἐλεύθεροτάτον αὐτῆς ὄνομ’ ἢδονήν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα.

C ΣΩ. Τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν δέος, ὁ Πρώταφη, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν Θεῶν ἀνόμασ’ οὐκ ἦστε κατ’ Ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὡς ἀείνη φιλον, ταῖτη προσφοροῦντ’ τὴν δ’ ἱδονήν ὅδ’ ὡς ἦστα ποικίλον, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑλπίον, ἀλ’ ἑκεῖνης ἡμῖν ἀρχομένως ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκο- πεῖν ἡνίκα φύσιν ἔχει. ἦστε γὰρ, ἀνοικίν ὑμῖν ὡτίος ἀπλῶς, ἐν τί, μορφᾶς δὲ δύτιον παντοίας ἐκηδεῖ καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνο- μοῖον ἀλλήλας. ἦδε γὰρ, ἱδονά μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολατά- νοντ’ Ἀνθρώπου, ἱδοθέα δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφρονοῦντ’ αὐτὴς τῷ σοφρονέιν. ἱδοθέα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνομαίνοντα καὶ ἀνοικίαν δο- ξον καὶ ἑλπίδον μετατ’ ἱδοθέα δ’ αὖ τὸν σοφρονοῦντ’. αὐτής τῷ σοφρονέιν’ καὶ τούτων τῶν ἱδονῶν ἐκατέρωθε πῶς ἔν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλας εἶναι λέγων ὑμῖν ἀνόμος φαινοντ’ ἑνδίκως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἄπαν ἐναντίον, ὁ Σώκρατες, αὐτὰ πραγμάτων, ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἱδονή, ἔχεται [μῆ] σομικάταιτον ἐὰν εἴη, τούτων ἀνέκειτ, πάντων χρημάτων;

ἀπ’ αὐτῆς δὲ] Some MSS. have δη’. It is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀξέχεμνος, or ἀετέον, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν δέος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare Cratylus 400, ε’ where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτην, by giving her a new name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

κελ[νη] This pronoun is here used in preference to ταῦτα, because the person is in her own nature remote and invisible. In the next sentence, ἄπ’ ἐκείνης is put for ἄπό τοῖς, on account of ἄπο ἑλπῶν, which makes ἑδονή ap- pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former proposition.

οὐσος ἀπλῶς] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the source of the satisfaction, συντ’ τῷ σοφρονεῖν, συντ’ τῷ φιλον, whereas their opposites are but the channels of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνόμοιον δεύον καὶ ἐπιθύμων μετοίκων.

πῶς γὰρ κ. τ. ἐ] We have above πῶς οὐκ ἂν σαλωτα, which is the ordinary construction. The μῆ is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ἩΔΟΝΗΙΟΥΧ.
ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὁ διαμόνη, [χρώματι] κατὰ γ’ αὐτὸ
tούτι, οὖν ἄδικος, τὸ χρῶμ’ εἶναι πᾶν: τὸ γε μην μὲλαν
tὸ λευκὸ πάντες γεννάσαμεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάρκειον εἶναι καὶ
ἐναντίωσατον ἡν τυγχάνει: καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [σχῆματι] κατὰ
tαῦτὸν γένει μὲν ἢστι πᾶν ἐν, τα δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ
τὰ μὲν ἐναντίωσατ’ ἄλληλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορώτατ’ ἔχοντα μιμαῖν
ποι τυγχάνει. καὶ πολλ’ ἐτερ’ οὖτως ἔχον’ εὐρήσομεν, ὡσε
tοῦτι γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πιάστε, τῷ πάντα τάναντιστὰ ἐν
ποιοτίᾳ. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μὴ τιτας ἰδονας ἰδοναίς εὐρήσομεν
ἐναντίᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. ’Ἰσος: ἀλλὰ τι τοῦθ’ ἤμων βλάψει τὸν λόγον;
ΣΩ. ‘Οτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτ’ ἄνόμια ὅνθ’ ἔτερον, [φύσο-
μεν, ἄνφαιε, λέγεις γὰρ ἄγαθω πάντα εἶναι τὰ ἱδεά. τὸ μὲν
οὖν μὴ ἢδεα εἶναι τὰ ἱδεα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀφροδήτει. κακαί δὲ
ὅντι αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄγαθὰ δὲ, ὥς ἢμεῖς σαμηνέν, ἰδοιῶς σὺ
προσαγορεύεις [ἄγαθ’ αὐτὰ] διοικοῦν ἄν ἄνομοι εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ,

[χρώματι] This addition is due to some blunderer, who made two sen-
tences out of one. Had κατὰ γ’ been the beginning of a new sentence we
should have had some conjunction. The same reason applies to σχῆματι. Any
one may see how much elegance is gained by their omission.

καράω! This is to be understood not of the number of differences, but of the
extent of some particular differences. Comp. Ἀριστ. 23, 5. ἐν πνεύμα μορίῳ
ζην.

φοβοῦμαι δὲ μη | Compare, among other passages, Rep. 451, Λ.; Πρὸδο
84, ν, φασί οὔτε μη διάκεισαι, and Arist. ἐν. 493, δεδοκα’ σ’, ὁ πρεσβῦτα, μή
πληγῶν δέει.

Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις | Because, my side
will say, you call all these, though un-
like each other, by a new common name.
This would be assuming a second ground of
agreement between them; for that
they agree in being pleasures is proved
by their common name of pleasure; but it
does not follow that they agree in
anything else, as, for instance, in being
good. But if Protarchus asserts that
they are all alike, and yet must con-

fess that they are not alike good, he
is bound to mention some other ground
of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot
be introduced as asking him for a proof
that they are ἄγαθά, but as wanting
to know, forasmuch as they do not agree
in this respect, in what else they do
agree. But the received text makes
him say: “You know they are not all
‘good, and you are ready to admit that
they are so far unlike; and yet you
‘call them all good’; which is so ab-
sured that I have changed ἵμως into
διόμως, and put ἄγαθ’ αὐτὰ and ἄγαθόν
ἐνα in brackets. The worse MSS. have
πάντα before σό. Had Plato written it,
he would certainly have placed it imme-
diately next to αὐτὰ; but it is due to
a misconception of the meaning, caused
by διόμως. I have supplied ὁν after
διοικοῦν, τε before ταῖς, and ταῖς be-
fore ἄγαθάς for obvious reasons. The
restoration of ὁν is necessary for the
sense; it was probably absorbed by the
following word.

τῷ λόγῳ | This belongs to ἄνομια;
for προσαγορεύεις implies ἵμως, and
the ground of the ἵμως is in the λο-
γος or description. It is worth while
to quote a passage from the Laws
which bears on this point, and which
has been suffered to remain hitherto in
a very corrupt state. Legg. 895, 896,
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

εἰ τίς σε προσαναγκᾶτοι, τι οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἐν τε ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίωσι καὶ ἐν тαῖς ἁγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἱδονὰς [ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Σόπρατες; οὔτε γὰρ τίνα [συγγραφή-σεσθαί] θέμενον ἱδονὴν εἶναι πάγαθον, εἰτ' ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέ- οντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἁγαθὰς ἱδονὰς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς [ἐτέρας] αὐτῶν κακὰς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φῆσεις αὐτὰς ἄλληλας εἶναι καὶ τινὰς ἐκατεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὔτι καθ' ὅσον γ' ἱδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλαι εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὁ Πρώταγχος.

οὔθ' ἢ ἡ ἱδονὴ ὑδαίνης διάφορος, ἀλλά πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσωμεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λέγεσθαι οὔδὲν ηλεθοῦσιν, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐρούμεν ἀπερ οἱ πάντων φαύλο- 

D τατοι τε περὶ λόγους ἔμα καὶ νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι δὲ μιμούμενον ἔγω καὶ ἀμιμούμενον ἕκανε τολμή 

λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιοτάτον ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοίω-

"Εστι (τι) που δῆλα διαφορούμενον ἐν ἀλλοις το ἐκαὶ ἐν ἀρίθμῳ. τούτῳ δὴ τὸ κατ' ἀρίθμον ὁνάμα μὲν Ἀρτιον, λόγος δὲ, Ἀριστέας τιπορούμενος εἰς ὅσον διδάσκα τοῦ λέγων . . . . Μᾶν οὖν οὑ ταύτων ἐκατερῶς προσαγορεύομεν, ἀν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενον τούτῳ ἀποδηδώμεν, ἀν τε τούτων τὸν λόγον, ἄρτιον ὁνά- 

ματι, καὶ λόγῳ, "δῆλα διαφορούμενον ἀριθμόν" προσαγορεύοντες ταύτων ὄν; . . . . Εἰ δ' ἐστι τοῦτο ὡς ὅτι εἶδον, ὁ ἄρ' ἐτι (τι) παρατύμη, ἢ ἰκανός δ' 

διέκειται ψυχὴν κ.τ.δ. (A little lower down after genomen supply φανερά γε.)

[συγχωρήσεως] | As εἶστι depends immediately on the participle θέμενον, if we retain συγχωρήσεως, we have two infinitives συγχωρήσεσθαι and ἀνέξε- 

σθαι with an equal right to a position which cannot belong to more than one, unless we suppose this to be Greek: νομιζόμενος φασίλην τοὺς ἄνδροις αὐτῶ- 

ς εντὸς συγχωρήσεως. Ἐτέρας is the supplement of a man who had never heard of τας μὲν τινας.

τιτρώσκειν] The MSS. have τίττρω- 

σκει. But it cannot be said that “these examples do not damage them”;} but only that they refuse to see it. Nor could a new independent clause be added by means of κατ... omin in place of οὖν.

πεισόμεθα] The common reading is πεισόμενα, but some of the better MSS. have πεισόμενα, and the best of all, the Bodleian or Codex Clarkianus, πεισόμενα. The common reading is probably the conjecture of a copyist, who felt that a future was wanted. It will not be expected that I should adduce any proof in support of so ob- 

vious a correction as that introduced into the text. The critic who approved of my correction, but at the same time wondered that, in finding it, I did not also find that κατ' ἐρούμεν was spurious, does not appear to have considered that σερέμετα is connected with πεισό- 

μετα, and φήσωμεν with ἐρούμεν. "We shall be in the condition of unpractised disputants, and talk their language". As φυλαστάτα does not refer to any other φυλατ- 

τής but that in the art of dis- 

putation, I have transposed κατ' from before περὶ to before νέοι.
instances through tarchus resume therefore, auTo'sv. determine. whether backing should expression, is tants, The cfoflrideig Yal jovv^ jitog zzovyv 7()v

neâtiroi toû ðéontos| Euthyd. 295 p, árχiûtôres et toû ðéontos. The latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it. ánakepwoûmeda| This figurative expression, which is properly used of backing a ship, has induced some to believe that expresos oîgîsesta is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, èpítete is used of the casting away of a voyager, not of the stranding of a vessel. Its use here is rather singular, but it probably means nothing more than having failed. Why ânax, is in the middle voice, and whether àvûyn is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read ântén.

tâs òmoinas| We must supply laôzís. The Scholastick explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Por- tarchus the unfairness of the feint through which he sought to elude Soc- crates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of èpís- stîmu, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is éleisv, and not aâlê- xek, els laôzís, it is better to read tâs àvûyn. With tâxh and iesos used separately the àvûyn is sometimes repeated even in prose. [âgadôv] As ðieroûsûmenos x. t. et contains the occasion—"which I men- tioned when I was asked what was The Good",—the word âgadôv is as super- ficious, as it is inelegant. âdios| It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of being worthy of the honour of disputing &c.; and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been ex- pressed by âdios diâlegosìa without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ârô âdios àvêîn toû. ìmîdos àpoloûmenos| It is not clear whether the original proverb was ð mî- õsos èlîwî or ð mûsos èpîlêlo. Pho- tius' testimony is in favour of the former: ù. èlîwî . . . 'Eplorêmîa èstî lege- õmeno àpâ èîgîsî x tîs legeûmenos mî- õsos tîs pàîdôs. The Scholastick on
ΠΙΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὔ μήν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴρ τοῦ σωθή

ναι. τὸ γε μήν μου ἵσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγον ἀφέσχει

πολλαὶ μὲν ὤδοι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθεν, πολλαὶ δ' ἐπιστή

μαί καὶ διάφοροι.

Β ΣΩ. Τὴν τοινυν διαφοράτης, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ

τοῦ ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενον, κατατάθετες δ' ἐλε τὸ μέσον, τοῦτον γιγνέσθαι μπρόσωπον, πότερον ὤδην τἀγαθιν δεῖ λέγειν ἣ ἐρώσιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι.

νῦν γὰρ οὔ δῆσον πρὸς γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεκροῦμεν, ὅπως ἄρε τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ πιστεύτα, ἢ ταὐτ' ὧν, ὧν, δ' ἀληθε

στάτω δεῖ τοῦν συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἅμαρ.

ΠΡΩ. Δεὶ γὰρ οὖν.

C ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοινὺς τὸν λόγον ἑν μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας

βεβαιωσόμεσα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοιὸν δή; ἂν χρημάτων πράγματα ἐκούση τε καὶ ἀκουσμένων καὶ ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε όσπέρτερόν τις.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πιστῷ σωφρονέ

ταυμαστών. ἤ γὰρ δὴ τὰ πόλλα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλά Ἱερ-

this place, with less probability, explains ὁ μ. ἀπόλλεσ, as used by those who find they are speaking to inattentive hearers; and he quotes the comic poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employing it, but without adducing the passages. I suspect from the otherwise unnecessary redundancy in Rep. 621, π μίσος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλλεσ, that the latter is the original form, and that the former is Plato's own coming. The allusion in this passage is to men suffering shipwreck and escaping on a raft. (Compare Thesdor 80, p.) And so the argument would, like a tale, come to nothing, and we should make our escape upon an unreason.

τολμώμεν] This word appears to be the main difficulty of a sentence which has perplexed so many critics and editors; but for it I should have adopted Winckelmann's conjecture, and inserted οἱ λέγοι after ἐλεγχόμενοι, but nothing can be determined with certainty till we know what ails τολμώ-

μεν. Either some other verb has been corrupted into this, and we might read καταται. δ' εἰς τὸ μ. τοῦ λόγου, ἀφιδι-

— or a whole line has dropped out. The words ἐλεγχόμενοι μηγνυσώσεως would seem to favour the latter supposition, for there seems to be an allusion to the practice of giving up one's servant to the judicial "question". τολμώμεν (ἐκάτεροι τὸν ἑκτυτόν λόγον παρέχειν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν) ἢ τὴν ζ. τ. ἐ. may serve to represent the sense of the missing clause.

ἡ τι τρίτον ἄλλο] The best MSS. omit τι; but the sense is incomplete without it. I believe the right reading to be ἢ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below.

τοῦτον τοινυν] We should have expected τὸν, for this λόγος has not yet been mentioned, but is now to follow. I am inclined to read τοῦτον.

"Let us by question and answer make good the λόγος, not of you or me, but τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου."
μαστόν λεξάθην, καὶ άχτιον εμφασιςαι τῷ τούτων διοτευγο-
ουν υπεμένοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ', οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τὶς ἡμ' Πρώταρχον, ἕνα 
γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς ἔναι πάλιν τοὺς ἡμ' καὶ ἐναντίοις 
ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ συμπρον τιθέμενος καὶ βαρύν καὶ κούριον 
tὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μύρια;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐφημαι τὰ δεδημενέα τῶν 
Ῥωμαστόν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλα, συγκεχωρημένα δ' ὡς ἐποι 
εἰσεῖν ὑπὸ πόντων ἦδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιοῦτον ἀπετεθαί, ποι-
δαριόδω καὶ ὄψια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ἐπολαιμ-
βανόντων γίγνεσθαι. ἐστί μηδὲ τὸ τοιάδε, ὅταν τὶς ἐκατον τὰ 
μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελθὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν 
ἐκείνῳ εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἠλέγχῳ καταγελὼν ὅτι τὸν 
ἄλλον δινάγχασαν φάναι, τὸ τε ἐν ὑς πόλλ' ἐστί καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ 
tὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

ῥᾶδιον ἄμφ.] Affording a ready ob-
jection against any one who advances 
either.

Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις κ. τ. ἐ.] Unless καὶ 
joints ἐναντίους μετὰ πολλοὺς, it is of 
no use in the sentence; I have there-
fore removed the comma from πολλὰν. 
The sense is as clear and well-expressed 
as could be desired. Do you mean, 
when a man says of me Protarhchus, who 
am one by nature, that I am again 
many and opposite 'me's', bringing for-
ward the same person as at once great 
and small, heavy and light, and so 
forth?

tῶν θαυμαστῶν] Rather θαυμάτων, 
Conjuring tricks. Συγκεχωρημένα μὴ 
δεῖν, given up and admitted to be such 
as men ought not to meddle with. ὡς 
ἐποίησιν qualifies πάντων. It is 
strange that one of the editors should 
not have known such a common usage.

ἐπὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιαῦδε The proper 
construction would have been either, μηδὲ 
tῶν τοιαύθεν (ἀπετεθαί δεῖν συγκο-
ροῦσι) or ἐπὶ οὖδὲ τὰ τοιαῦ (συγ-
κροῦσι, δεῖν αὐτῶν ἀπετεθαί). But 
as the very form ἐπὶ μηδὲ is col-
loquial, a certain looseness of syntax is 
permitted, and the reader is left 
to supply μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἠλέγχεσθαι, 
προσφέρεσθαι, (δεῖν συγκροῦσι,) or any 
other passive answering to ἀπετεθαί. 
Otherwise we must look on τὰ τοιαῦδε 
as interpolated.

μέλη] Legg. 795, ν, μελῶν καὶ με-
ρῶν. The MSS. and edd. all exhibit 
μέλη τι καὶ ἄμα μέρη, which, if it 
means anything, means that the μέλη 
and μέρη are the same, whereas it is 
plain that μέρη is added because the 
body cannot be properly divided into 
μέλη only. If it were μέλη τε ἄμα καὶ 
μέρη, there would be no objection to 
the word but its inutility. I have 
written ἄλλα, which is continually con-
founded with ἄμα by the copyists. In 
p. 17 ν, ἄμα ἔνοικον, the Bodleian and 
Vaticau have made the opposite mis-
take.

διομολογησάμενοι] Having made 
another admit. Properly, having ad-
mitted both to the other. Διομολογη-
σάμαι is to ὁμολογεῖ, what διαλέγεσθαι 
is to λέγειν, διακελεύσεσθαι to κελεύ-
σαι, διὰ and the middle voice together 
expressing reciprocal action. No one 
will regret to see συγκεχωρημένα in 
the next speech of Protarhchus banished 
from the text; the wonder is, who could 
have taken it into his head to put it 
there. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὰ συγκεχωρημένα 
δημοσύμεν, τὰ δὲ δεδημενέα, ὅταν 
δέχῃ, συγκροῦσιν.
ΠΡΩ. So with Elmsley for ένταυθον. η πολλή [ποιοδή] I once thought to be genuine, and therefore added ἐδε after μετὰ; I am now convinced that the word is neither appropriate nor genuine, but supplied by a copist who had in his head the well known passage in the Phaedrus 248, καὶ δὲ ἔνεγκε δή πολλή σπουδή κ. τ. ἔ. Then arises the great controversy as soon as we attempt to decide.—What else is needed? or what have we to do with the earnestness of the disputants, except indeed as a measure of their difficulty? But the difficulty being expressed, any other word is superfluous.

Πρώτον μὲν ὅπως When I endeavoured to explain this passage in a former edition, I maintained that there were only two questions proposed, although πρώτον, εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο made it appear that there were three. As the text then stood, it was impossible to see more than two questions, that beginning with πρώτον, and a second; for if εἶτα ... μένα ταύτα were considered as an independent question, and not rather as the beginning of that proposed afterwards, the question would have been, how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperishable should be nevertheless unchangeably one—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρώτον, εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μὲν after ἐμοίς. The first question is; have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεσις and διάλεξις, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it does so vary by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάντων ἀδιάκοπτωτάτων, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself. Parm. 131, οἱ ψυκαὶ ζητὰ ὑλοῦ τοῦ εἴδους η μέρους ἐκστων τὸ μεταλημένον μεταλημένει;—πότερον οὖν δρκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ ἐδος ἐν ἐκστω τοι τῶν πολλῶν τῷ δὲ δεῖ ὑποκατάσχειν τὰς ἀκρέας χαρὰς οὐσίαν ἄμα ἐκ νόμων ἀπὸ ἐννόησε, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ χαρὰς ἐν εὐθ.
en tois xynmomenous av kai atpeirous ete dieteoaimen kai pollla xevonvnon theton, eth' olhn avten authe chorie; o de panton echmateion sainoive av, tautoyn kai av ev em ev evi te kai pollois xynsoun. taut' esei ta peri ta toiau't ev O kai pollla, all' oxi epeine, o Protauchex, apafous aiporias at- tia mi kalos hmoloxhthena kai evropias [av] av kalos.

PR. Ovqovn xei toiv thmias, o Sxokrates, ev toiv pni xorion dikatoysiada;

SPI. 'Ox gyn evw fairov av.

PR. Kai pantas toin hmias etpolabe sghrofein sou toude to toainta Philbenov de isos xretistov ev toiv xyn [etpe- rosvanta] mu xinein ev keimenon...

SPI. Elen. pothen ovin tis [tauvthi] avxiti, pollhes ouvies D kai pantois peri ta amfropoymena xarchis; av evnede;

PR. Póthen;

SPI. Fasenv po toaint ev kai pollla upo logon xynm- menon periterf dexi pantai kai evxastov ton logomenon dei kai pala kai xyn. kai toint' ointi mu pantotai pou' ointi xosiato
evropias k. p. é.] Not dianta but etpi being understood, the construction with av is a barbarism. The sense is not conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less than its opposite. The appearance of av in the text is due to a repetition of au, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been expunged.

ta toainta] One would rather have expected taunt taunt, for this does not refer to the ev x. p., but to the proposed investigation.

Philbenov] The proverbial saying was mth xinei kaxhov ev keimenon: for kaxhov he puts Philbenov. We had better let well alone, and not ask Philebus for his consent. But epsewovanta thus placed before mth xinei would make it appear that the participle is a means not tou xinei, but tou mth xinei; and as it is quite superfluous, there can be little doubt of its origin.

[tauvthi] I have cancelled this word without hesitation. He is not going to begin a fight; but to begin a subject, of which the very beginning point is difficult to find, because almost every- thing is a matter of controversy. Bes- sides tauntis makhis is bad Greek.

Fasenv po) The construction is not f. p. év x. p. ù. l. tauntov xynmomena (Stallib.), for if Socrates had spoken here of the reconcilement effected be- tween the one and the many by dialectes, it is inconceivable that Pro- tarchus should answer, ev tis trpoxes esti kai xhyni tnv toaintai taraaxiav xhevn xeo tov logon eumenois po apexa- stei. Nor are the young men described as delighting in the discovery and ex- ercise 'of the synthetical and analytical processes', but on the contrary, in the sophistical employment of this contra- diction which is the inherent property (axiavon kai xyn xenon paxos) in all objects of conception, by which they throw into perplexity both themselves and others. Either therefore we must read taunt... mon, or sup- pose that pollex has by attraction af- fected the number of the participle, which, considering the presence of év, is most unlikely.

pauqetan] I formerly wrote pau-
In obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first aorist subjunctive with ς μη need excite our suspicion; whereas ς μη with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

πάντα κυνα λόγον] This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λύουν κυνα. But the expressions ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλών, and πάλιν ανελάττων, rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφύρων εἰς ἐν, and διαμερίζον are added to shew the application of the figurative words.

ὁλγον δ' οὖδὲ] This I have written in lieu of ὁλγον δ' καλ., which would mean nearly sparing. The repetition υὑδε-ὑὑδε was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted καλ. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of ς μ. τ. α.; but ἐπὶ β. γε shows that some bolder assertion has just been made, and justifies τ. α. ζ. In the next sentence I have added καλ, because Protarchus gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

διος δὲ] In this sentence Protarchus is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation". I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Εἰ τις ἔστι τρίτος καὶ μη-γχανή καλλία ὁδὸν ἄνευρέν is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for εἰ τις ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς, and what is the subject of ἄνευρέν? Σκι or ημᾶς cannot be understood; μὲν and δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protarchus are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of coaxing the difficulty out of the way? Σύ τε προσμυμο τούτο is quite proper as answering to τὴν ερ-ραγχὴν ἀπέλεξαν, but as the clause now stands it is an immediate reliance on ἄνευρέν, προσμυμο is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn ὁδὸν—ἀνευρέν as spurious, and μὲν as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, καλλίων ὁδὸς from Socrates' next speech, ἄνευ-ρέσακι from his next but one.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ.

13

ο λέγεισ, εἰ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανή τήν [μέν] τοιαύτην ταραχὴν μὴν ἕξω τοῦ λόγου εἰμινός πῶς ἀπελθεῖν, [ὅδον δὲ Β τίνα καλλίως τάσης ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀνεφείτη] οὐ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸς ὁ παρὸν λόγος, ὁ Σόκρατες.

Σ.Ο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὁ ποιῆσαι, ὡς φησιν ἡμᾶς προσεγγορεύων Φιλίππος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίως ὅδος οὐδὲ ἕν γένοτο, ὡς ἐγὼ ἐρασίς μὲν εἰμί ἀεί, πολλάκις δὲ μὴ ἥδη διαφημίσα ἐρημοῦ καὶ ἀποφορατεῖσθαι.

ΠΡ. Τίς αὕτη; λέγεσθοι μόνον.

Σ.Ο. Ἡν δὴ λέοντα μὲν οὐ πάντων χάλεπον, χάρισθαι δὲ παρ᾽ χάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ οὐσα τέχνης εὐμενέν ἀνεφείθη πώποτε, διὰ τάσης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἦν λέγοι.

ΠΡ. Λέγε μόνον.

Σ.Ο. ἦς Θεών μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποτέν ἐν Θεῶν ἐφύρη διὰ τίνος Προμηθέως ἢ μα γραφώ· τωτινῷ εἰς παῖδα καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, χρείαντος ὄντες ἢμῶν καὶ ἑρωτῶρ Θεῶν οἰκουντές, τὴν φήμην παρέδωσαν, ὡς ἐν ἥνε καὶ ἐν πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπεφέλεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐξαιρετον εἰς ὑπόκτην. χιέν οὖν ἡμᾶς 'τοῦ—Δ τῶν οὖσα διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἑδαν περὶ παντὸς ἐξά-

Θεών μὲν] In this remarkable passage everything seems out of its place. For εἰς ἀνθρώπους belongs not to δόσις but to ξήρησι, οὐ γε ξήρησι ought to be ὡς ἐκ των τελείω καταφαίνεται, the enellhele ποτέν can scarcely come first after such a break in the sentence, ἦς δόσις ἐκ τῶν ἔρπησι is also quite intolerable; add to this that if the gift was thrown from Heaven, it could not be sent διὰ τίνος Προμηθέως. Though I have thus stated why I can no longer stand by this reading, I cannot offer any certain emendation of it; but I believe that the following is not very far from our author's sentence. Σ.Ο. ἦς ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἑκατερον καταφαίνεται, ἦ δόσις ποτέν ἐκ τῶν ἔρπησι τοῦ, [Sch. in Marg. Προμηθεως] ἦ οἷος ηνατατά τοι πωλ·—I have supplied οἷος, which is necessary to the construction, and was absorbed by the preceding termination οἷος.
It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; 

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17 [καὶ πολλὰ] Ἰάστον καὶ βραχύτερον ποιοῦσα τὸν δεόντος [μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἕν] ἀπειρὰ ἐθές· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύεται· οἷς δια-

This may be possible by application to discover τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ὑπόσχεται τὸν δεόντος ὡς ὑπόσχεται τὸν δεόντος.
ΠΡΩ. Ἡ μὲν προς, ὁ Ἐὐχαρίτης, δοκεῖν σοι μανχάνειν, τὰ δὲ εἰς σαφήστερον δέομαι οἱ λέγεις ὑπόσχοντα.

ΣΩ. Σαφὲς μὲν, ὁ Ἡρώδεις, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γραμμασισίν ὁ λέγων, καὶ λάμβανε ἀυτὸ ἐν τούτοις οἴστερ καὶ πεπαῦδεσα. Β' ΠΡΩ. Ἡδές;

ΣΩ. Φωνῇ μὲν ἦμεν ἔστι που μὲν διὰ τοῦ στόματος οὖσα, καὶ ἀκτιοῦς εἰς πλήξει, πάντων τε καὶ ἐκάστων.

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδετέρῳ γε τοῖς ἐσμέν ποι οὐροὶ, οὗθ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἀπειρὸν αὐτῆς ἔσμεν οὗθ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἐν'; ἄλλῳ ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὅπως, τούτῳ ἔστι τὸ γραμματικόν ἐκάστων οὐσῶν ἦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύσεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴ καὶ τὸ μονιστῶν ὃ τυχάναι ποιοῖν, τούτῳ ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνῇ μὲν που καὶ τὸ καὶ ἐξεῖνη τήν τέχνην ἔστι σικεί [ἐν αὐτῇ].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἀνὸ δὲ θόμεν, βαφῇ καὶ ὀξῆ, καὶ τρίτων ὁμόσων.

η πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως σοφὸς ἐν εἰς τὴν μουσικήν εἰδῶς τάτα ὁμᾶ, μὴ δὲ εἰδῶς ὅς ἄτα ἐποίησε εἰς τάτα οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἤτα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ᾽, ὃ φίλε, ἐπειδὴ λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα

ἐν τούτοις οἴστερ| Either ἐπὶ στέρῃ, or ἐν τούτοις ἐν στέρῃ.

οὐδετέρῳ| The books have οὐδ᾽ εὐτέρῳ, which is inadmissible. οὐδ᾽ ἐν εὐτέρῳ for ἐν οὐδετέρῳ would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that wherein a man is skilled, he would say οὐδετέρῳ, not ἐν οὐδετέρῳ; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful.

Φωνῇ μὲν ποι] The text follows the inferior MSS., in reading καὶ τό—καὶ is so useful an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τὸ καὶ ἐξείνη a likely variation for a scribe to have made de iuo. I formerly thought that καὶ ἐξείνη must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὖτος and ἐξεῖνος, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of mention, but to that of interest, as in the beginning of the Euthydemus, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Of ξὲνος I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δός δὲ θόμεν ἐν αὐτῇ.

διαστήματα] These intervals are
nothing more than musical notes; ἓροι are musical proportions. See Plat. Timæus 36, n, and Cicero’s translation.

ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα κ. τ. ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα κ. τ. 4] The particle γὰρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τοῦ ἡγένου σοφὸς, and ἐμφανῶς γέγονας, is a poor verbal contrast, and the tenses are strangely chosen. ἐταν λάβῃς, ἡγένοις... ὅταν ἐς, γέγονας. Stallbaum translates the last word by “erader” which would answer to γέγονας ἅς. Ἐγένοι may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παρέλεγκτο in 46, ε. If the words ὅταν—γέγονας were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodleian in ὅταν τε for ἐταν δέ, and in τῶν ἐν ὀπίσω for τῶν ὄντων ὑπό τῶν. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἐγνώς τῇ ὑπὸ δίκης, ὁμικ. δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῇ ἐμῇ, in place of σὺ τε,—ἐγὼ τε, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflection will show that in such a case if he commenced with “and indeed whatever you take up”, he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ὅταν τοῖς, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ἐν than invent it. The Bodleian has also peri τοῖς which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.

τὸ δ’ ἀπερον] The reader will not fail to admire the skillful play upon the words ἀπερον, ἡλαγμον, and ἀνέρξου. Stallbaum compares Tim. 55, c, τὸ ἀπερός κόσμου εἶναι λέγειν γήγασις, ἐν τίς ὄντος ἀπέρος τινὸς δεξιά ὥς ἐπερον χρων εἶναι: and the oracle given to the Megarians, ὢμεῖς δ’ ὁ Μεγαρεῖς ὑπὲ τῇ τοῖς ὑπὲ τῇ τῇ τῇ τῇ τῇ τῇ τῇ. Οὐ τέ διωθεθοῦτο, οὐ τό λόγῳ οὐ τό ἀρχιμο. ***

Kάρμοι γ’ αὐτὰ ταύτα] Commonly Καλ

*** A sheet of the Editor’s MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda.

[Publisher’s Note.]
ΣΩ. Ὅρθως μέντοι ταῦτα ἡμᾶς, οὐ Πρώταρχε, ἡμῶν Φίληβος.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνον γε αὐτῷ.
ΣΩ. Ἀράσω ταῦτα, διελθῶν σμίκρον ἐτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὅσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὅποιον εἴ τις ποτε λάβαι, τούτον, ὡς ἐρα- μεν, οὐ δὲ ἀπείρου φύσιν ἐδει βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὗτοι καὶ τοῦτον τούτον, ὅταν τις τὸ άπείρων ἀναγιασθῇ τῷ πρώτῳ λαμβάνειν, [μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ πλήθος ἐκαστὸν ἔχοντα τι κατανοεῖν δει, τελευτῶν τ’ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἐν. πάλιν δ’ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸν λέγομεν λάβωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς; 
ΣΩ. Ἐπειδή ἴνα παραδοθῶν κατενώσειν εἴτε τις Θεὸς εἴτε καὶ Θείος ἢνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αιγύπτῳ Θεόθ’ τινα τούτον γενόθαι λέγων, πρῶτος τα φωνήσατα τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενώσεις ὡς ἐν ἄνετα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἑτερα φωνῇς μὲν οὖ, C φθόγγου δέ μετέχοντα τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι τρίτων δε εἴδος γραμμάτων διεστίσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα γράμματα ἡμῖν τὸ μετὰ τούτο διήρει τὰ τ’ ἀρθογγα καὶ ἄρωμα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήσαντα, καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τόν αὐτόν πρῶτον, ἦσος ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβῶν ἐν Θ’ ἐκάστῳ καὶ ἑκάσται στοιχεῖον ἑπονύμασε. καθορῶν τ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μᾶθοι, τούτων τοῦ δειμὼν αὐτοὶ λογισάμενος ὡς ὃν’ ἐνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν D πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐν’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὕσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπιφέρειξάτω προσεπιπ. 

ἐμι ταύτα γε αὐτά. The first change I have adopted from Bodl., which has καὶ μοι, the second from Coislin., which has ταύτα γε ὑντα αὐτα. Stallbaum has a strange way of explaining the misplaced auta—per se seorum spectata.

τούτων, ὡς ἐφαμεν *** ἐδε’ *** [μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ε.] *** Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἢ κ.] *** λέγων, πρῶτος *** τα τ’ ἀρθογγα] We should rather have expected τα ἀρθογγα τα κα άρωνα, but τε is sometimes moved from its place (cf. Elmsl. ad Iherald. 622), and in this place the hiatus is avoided by the change. The μέσα, which he describes above as partaking not of voice but yet of sound, are the liquids which stand midway between vowels and mute consonants. 

καθορὼν δὲ] Because we can have no true conception of φωνῇ except as distinct from φωγογα; nor of this again without also knowing both φωνῇ and τὸ ἀρων. 

μίαν ἐν’ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὕσαν is explained by Stallbaum as ὡς οὕσαν μίαν;  

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[Publisher’s Note.]
Phi. Ταύτ' ἐτι σαφέστερον ἔκεινον αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὥ πρώταχος, ἐξαιρον. τὸ δ' αὐτό μου τὸν λόγον νῦν τε καὶ συμφέρον ἐμπρόσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

Σω. Μόν, ὦ Φιλήμη, τὸ τί πρὸς ἐπος αὖ ταύτ' ἐστίν;

Φι. Ναί, τούτ' ἐστιν ὑπάλλακτον ἡγούμεν ἑνώ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

Ε Σω. Καὶ μήν ἐν' αὐτῷ γ' ἢδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὦ γε, πάλαι.

Φι. Πῶς;

Σω. Ἄρ', οὗ πετὶ φρονίσεως ἤν καὶ ἄδονής ἡμῖν ἐξ ἄρρητος οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὑπότερον αὐτοῖν ἀἱρετέων;

Φι. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σω. Καὶ μήν ἐν γ' ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι φαινειν.

Φι. Πάντων μὲν ὄντων.

Σω. Τούτ' αὐτῷ τοῖνοι ἡμῶς δ' πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, ἵππος ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλά αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ [πῶς μὴ ἀπείρα

he has illustrated this position of ὅς by Sophist, 242, c. πατὶν ὅς σύν ἡμᾶς, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose Arist. Clouds 256, οἷς Σωκράτης (sic) "ὤστεν πρὸς τὸν "Αριστ. ἦτος μὴν συνετεί. αὐτά γε π. ἀ]. This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. ἔλλειπεν, is left unperformed, is deficient.

τὸ πρὸς ἐπος] Ethyd. 295, c. ἐὰν μηδέν πρὸς ἐπος ἐποχρίσαντοι, i.e. nothing to the purpose.

Καὶ μὴν ἐν' αὐτῷ γ'] And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for. The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is καὶ μήν=γ', and Ἡ is continually confused with the componendum of καὶ, I have altered γ' into καὶ accordingly.

τῶς ἐστιν ἐν] The impudence of the interpolation in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ἡδήν and φρόνησι, he makes him enquire, how they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a how of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to point. But even τῶς ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ' ἀρίθμῳ κέχειται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (Phaedo 100, p. τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσία, εἰτε κανονικά, εἰτε ἐν σχήμα μία ἐν τῶς προσγεγομένην) for so that passage should be read. In our text I propose to read ἀπαιτεῖ τοὺς, καὶ ἐστιν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, τίνα ποτ' ἀρίθμῳ ἐμπρόσθεν κέχειται τοῦ ἀπείρα γεγονέναι. The reasons for interpolating ἐκάτερον and αὐτῶν ἔκκαστα are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἀπείρα; to accord with which ἔκκαστα was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as ἐκάτερον, and once as ἔκκαστα in such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.
Having unreservedly taken your place as your successor. Orators have shown the order of construction is, if you please, without any infinitive to follow. In Xen. Anab. IV, 1, el: the received text reads an, the first of which was added, unless there was some current saying which we could not be said to apply only to making presents. But for these very reasons a man could not be said to become a present. The addition is borrowed from a passage occurring a few lines below, where the reading of all authorities is, but this is said of a later period and one contained within our own dialogue (p. 16, a. v.). The present reference is to
his first consenting to hold the conversation, so that σαντ' ἐπέδωκας would be a ludicrous hyperbole.

τὸ προσφηδοσμένον ὀρθῶς [ἡ ἡγεμονικὴ γῇ] See Addenda.

tόλος ἡμῖν εἶναι i.e. the end and aim.

καθ' ἔτερον There cannot be a more feeble tautology than καθ' ἔτερον τα τρόπον πως ἄλλος. The first two words were added by a scribe who did not see that τα τρόπον belongs to οἷς τ' εἰ. 

τὸν ἑμῖν i.e., me, the threatened one, —poor me. Plat. Ep. 7. καθ' ἐκείνου τών ἐμὲ παρεμβείτω —i.e., Plato, who had apprehended mischief from Dionysius. Theoria. 166, 4, γέλωτα δή τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε—i.e., Protagoras, who complains of hard usage. 

τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλῃ ῥηθέν It has not been observed that this is said generally, and ἔκαστον πέρι has been mistranslated in consequence. The sense is, When men say 'if you please,' it does away with all fear in every case. I confess that I have no great faith in, the genuineness of ἐπειδὴ τοῦδ' οὐ. εἰπ.
The Bodleian has αὐτός, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coisil, is obvious.

The Bodleian has χαίτοι οὕτω γε ἔσω, which Orelli changed into χαὶ τισεύται γε ἔσω. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this something better, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τε, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but χαϊ—γε means "and besides", whereas χαίτοι—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must admit", which is the proper translation. I therefore retain τούτῳ from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[As τὴν διαφρασίν] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἴση of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαφράσις", (as though they had to look for the εἴση first, and then to begin διαφράσις into those very εἴση) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τοιν by itself and not as the article of εἴσην. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself to εἰς τὴν διαφράσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "εἴση for the purpose of διαφράσις", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαφράσις itself, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

The proverbial expression is, αὐτὸ δεῖξε, the event will make things clear. But we are told that both δείξει and δηλώσει are used in the same manner without αὐτό. The first occurs in Arist. Prog., 1261, where, however, μὲν may be the subject, and in Herodotus iii, 82, where δείξει follows the impersonal ἀπείξῃ. All the other instances quoted are of δηλοῖ or ἐνδιδοσε. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one. It is uncertain whether the thing which is to shew itself is the ἄλλο τι τρίην, or the correctness of Socrates' δοξα. ἐτι οὐδὲν ἐτι προσδημοσεῖται κ. τ. λ. In either case, what is the meaning of ἐτι σαφείτερον, where at present nothing is σαφεῖς? If it be said that ἐτι belongs to προτίνε, this is only admissible if εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθέν or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δὲ τῇ. I should prefer προτίνε δὲ, "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed".
Σ. Σχεδία τοίνυν ἐμπρόσθεν ἐν διομολογησόμεθα.
ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποία;

Σ. Τῇ τάγαθῳ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον [ἡ μὴ τέλεον] εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δὴ ποὺ τελειώτατον, ὡς Σώματες.
Σ. Τῇ δὲ; ἰκανὸν [τάγαθόν];
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ὅ; καὶ πάντων γ' εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὀνεων.

Σ. Τόδε γε μή, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαίοτατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς τῶν τοῦ γιγνῶσθαι αὐτὸ Θερεία καὶ ἐφετέα [βουλόμενον] ἐλεύν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ πεπάσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἅλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει [πλῆρ'] τῶν ἀπότελομένων ἀμα ἄγαθος.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτως ἀντιτείνειν.

Σ. Υποσώμεν δὴ καὶ πρόνωμεν τῶν θ' ἠδονῆς καὶ τῶν φρονίσεως βίων ἱδόντες χωρίς.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;
Σ. Μή' εν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἑνέστω φρονίσεις, μή' εν τῷ τῆς φρονίσεως ἡδονή. δεί γὰρ, εἰπέρ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστι τάγαθον, μηδὲν μηδένος ἐνι προσδείσθαι· δεόμενον δ' ἐν φαντ. τὸ-21 τερον, οὐκ ἔστι ποὺ τοῦτ' ἐτι τὸ ὄντως ἑμῖν ἄγαθόν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν οὐ πειράμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

[ἡ μὴ τέλεον] No one in his senses would ask "whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness". And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τάγαθον. For with τάγαθον we must understand ἔστι. But that the true construction is ἀνάγκη... εἶναι appears from the answer, in which all the MSS. give διαφέρειν. A third interpolation disfigures the clause ὡς τῶν τοῦ γιγνώ-σαν αὐτὸ Θερεία καὶ ἐφετέα βουλόμενον ἔλειν. Ἐφετέα is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. Ion 521, εἰ φιλεῖν ἐφετέα; but some one who did not know this, supposed αὐτῶ to be understood, and introduced ἄγα-θος is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that So-ocrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then repre- sent him introducing, as the sole ob- jects of men's care, other results pro-duced along with good things? I had once proposed to cancel τλῆν and to read ἀλλ' ἡ ἄγαθον. But this violent change is unnecessary. Antiquum obtinet. The intrusion of τλῆν has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence.

πλήν τῶν ἀπότελομένων ἀμα ἄγα-θος is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that So-ocrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then repre- sent him introducing, as the sole ob- jects of men's care, other results pro-duced along with good things? I had once proposed to cancel τλῆν and to read ἀλλ' ἡ ἄγαθον. But this violent change is unnecessary. Antiquum obtinet. The intrusion of τλῆν has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence.

πότερον used here and elsewhere as
ΠΡΩ. 'Αποφήγειν δή.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.
ΣΩ. Δέξαι ἂν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ δὴ τοῖς βιῶν ἀπαντά δό-μενος ἱδονὰς τὰς μεγάλας;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ’ οὖ; ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἂν σου προσδεῖν ἱροῖο, εἰ τούτ’ ἐχοὺς παντελῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩ. Ὄρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι [τα ἰναντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδέλφα, μόνοι μὴ δεοῖ ἂν τι; Β ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τι; πάνα γὰρ ἔχομι ἂν ποὺ τὸ χάριν ἔχων.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὖτω ζων ἀἐi μὲν διὰ βιῶν [ταῖς μεγάλας ἱδονάς] χαῖροις ἂν;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ’ οὖ; ΣΩ. Νοῦν δὲ γε [καὶ μὴν μὴ καὶ ἑπιστήμη καὶ δόξαν]

Πρώταρχε! seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέσταντα] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοὺς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ἱλαττές. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρο- νεῖν=φρόνησις. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=α. μνήμη of past things, β. δέξια of future. 3. τὸ λογίζεσθαι=λογισμός. 1. Consciousness or immediate Perception. 2. The Representative Faculty. 3. Inference, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one will compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέσταντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μᾶν μὴ δεοῖ ἂν τι. The MSS. have μὴ δὲ δεῖν τι. Several scholars have proposed to change δὲν into δοῦν, but they all appear to leave τι, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year 55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipzig Edition by C. F. Herrmann appeared in '54. Any one who has that Edition will see in Herrmann's Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγάλας ἱδονάς] Even supposing that Plato could use χάριν ἱδονάς in the sense of enjoying pleasures, the words τ. μ. ἑ. are nothing to the purpose, for the amount has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a continual state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δὲ γε] It has been shown above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning "Ὅρα δή," and that which occurs in the argument commencing with πρῶτον. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? "As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness." All that Plato wrote was Νοῦν δὲ γε μὴ κεκτημένον πρῶτον μὲν κ. τ. ἐ. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνησις, which is a part of νοῦς.
πού σε μηθ᾽ που μηθείς εστώ εστί τον νοῦ τον "οντα πάσης φλογίσεως.

ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὠσείτως μπήμε τὴν κεκτημένην ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε μηθ᾽ οὐκ ἐπεὶ ἱματεῖς μεμισθέως, τῆς τ' ἐν τῷ παρα-
χεύμα ὡδονίς προσπεπτοῦσι ποιήθην μὴν ὑπομένειν
δόξαι δ’ αὖ μή κεκτημένον [ἄληθῆς] μὴ δοξάζειν χαῖρειν καὶ
φοντα, λογισμὸν δὲ στερόμενον μηθ’ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς
χαρῆς εὐτατον εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ἔτη δ’ οὖν ἀνθρώπων βίον
ἀλλὰ τινος πλείμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα [σαλάττια] μετ’ ὀστρεύσιν ἔμψυχχ ἐστὶν σωμάτων. ἔστι τάτα, _tE παρά ταῦτα ἔξομεν ἄλ-

D ὅπως διανοηθήσωμαι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅν αἵρετος ἦμιν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφαίρεσιν παντάπασι με, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐτος ὁ
λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπως τοῦν μαθηταίζωμεθα, τὸν δὲ τὸν νοῦν μετα-
λαβόντες αὖ βίον ἵδομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τις δεξίατε ἐὰν αὖ ἐξ ἡμῶν φρονήσαι μὲν καὶ νοῦν
καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μηδὲν πάσαν πάντων κεκτημένον, ἠδονῆς
Ε δὲ μετέχον μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν, μηθ’ αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ
παράπαν ἀπαθῆς πάντων ὅν τῶν τοιούτων.

ποῦ σε μηθ’ που μηθείς εστώ εστί τον νοῦ τον "οντα πάσης φλογίσεως. But it is necessary to insert the pronoun, and Stattbaum was right in his first edition when he changed μηθείς into μήτε. There is no reason why μηθ᾽ μεμισθέως should receive more stress than μὴ δοξάζειν or μὴ λογίζε-

σαί; (for though we have μηθέ in this last instance, the "not even" or "also not" refers not to δυνατὸν εἶναι λ’, but to εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον).

[ἄληθῆς] The reason for putting ἄλη-

θη in brackets is that any δοξάζειν whether false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δο-

ζάζειν χαῖρειν, and, where there is no

νοῦ, there can be no δοξάζειν.

[σαλάττια] If Plato had cared to tell us that shellfish lived in the sea, he would not have done so by placing an adjective where it is out of construction. He would at least have written σαλάτ-

ττια ἐστι. Let us therefore leave the commentators to decide, when they can, whether the sense is ἔτσι σαλάττια ἐστιν ἐμψυχά, or ὦσι ἐμψυχά ἐστι σαλάττια.

μεταλαβόντες ἐστιν μερεράζων-

τες. Compare below 51, Α.

πάντων ὅν] I have supplied ὅν, which is required by the rules of the language. Not even an inferior writer would say, μηθ᾽ μετέχον ἄλλ᾽ ἀπαθῆς. The syl-

lable was absorbed by that which pre-

ceded it.
ΠΡΩ. Ουδέτερος δ' ήλιος, ο' Σωκράτες, εμισχε τοις αι-
φετός, ουδ' άλλω μή ποτε, ός εγιναί, φανή.
ΣΩ. Τι δ' ο ξυμαφότερος, ο' Πρώταρχε, εξ' αμφιφον συμ-
μχθείς κοινός γενόμενος;
ΠΡΩ. Ηδονής λέγεις καὶ τοῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];
ΣΩ. Ούτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἐγώγε.
ΠΡΩ. Πάς δήποτε τούτον γ' αἰφρόσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων
ὅπως εφούν, καὶ τιρός τούτοις γ' οίχ δ' ΜΕΝ, δ' ο' οὐ.
ΣΩ. Μαντάνομεν οὖν ὃ τι νῦν ἑστὶ τὸ ευμβαίνον ἐν
τοῖς παρόντι λόγοις;
ΠΡΩ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ότι τρεῖς μέν βίοι προστάθησαν, τοῖν
οὐν δ' οὐδέτερος ἰκανὸς οὖν' αἰφρός οὖν' ἀριθμῶν οὕτω ἡ
τίμων οὐδεν.  
ΣΩ. Μόν οὖν οὖν ἢδ' τούτων γε τέρα δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος
αὐτῶν εἰς τάγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἐν ἰκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πάσι
[φυτοῖς καὶ] ξώοις αἰφρός, οὔπερ δυνατόν ἢν οὕτως ἄει διὰ
βίου ζήν. εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλα ἰησιθ' ἦμων, παρὰ φύσιν ἐν την τοῦ
ἀλήθεις αἰφροῦ τέλεμαπεν ἄκουν ἐξ' ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης
οὐ εὐθαίμονος.
ΠΡΩ. Ἑοίκε γοῦν ταῦτ' οὕτως ἐξειν.
ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοῖν πάν τιν ἐν τῇ Θηλῇ τεθ' οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖ—C
σώσ ταῦτα καὶ τάγαθόν, ἰκανός εἰρήσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.
ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὁ Σωκράτες, ἐστί τάγαθόν,
ἀλλ' ἐξεὶ ποιν ταῦτα ἐγκλήματα.

ἐξ ἀμφοτεροῦ συμμίχθείς i.e., διὰ τὸ συμμείχες. This use of the participle is very frequent in Plato. Compare Rep. 506, ν. προαμοίμενος ἀγνοιαι γε-
λωτ' ὑφάλησον—i.e., διὰ τὸ προσυμμε-
ίχες. In the next sentence και προ-
νήσεως is a manifest interpolation.

καὶ πρός τοῦτος γε! This is com-
monly understood to mean and besides; 
but it is evident that nothing additional is 
stated. Stallbaum's defence of it, 
notio atque vis procedentis τας κοιν-
matur et augetur, is only true as to 
confirmatur, whereas augetur is the point 
in question. Schleiermacher under-
stands, in addition to those lives (the 
unmixed); but this would have been 
the text. Ανάγκης οὖν εὐθαίμον is one 
εξείλονς, and, besides, how can a man 
choose both contraries, the unmixed and 
the mixed together? I cannot uphold 
my own former solution of this dif-
iculty, for "in addition to my friends 
here" would be πρὸς τοῦτο. As some 
addition is intended, the only con-
ceivable addition to "every body will 
choose this life" is "and one and all 
will bear me out in saying so". This 
might be, καὶ προσνήσεται τοῖτοις γ' 
οὖν ὃ μέν, ὃ οὐ.
ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἂν, ὦ Φίλιππε, ὃ γ' ἔμοι· οὐ μέντοι τῶν γ' ἀληθινῶν ἀμα καὶ θέειν οὕμα νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλοις ποὺς ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικηφόρων πρὸς τῶν κοινῶν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶν [πτω] ὑπὲρ νοῦν, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύον ὅραν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρῆ πέρι Δ τί δρασμένον. τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτον βίον ἀπτύμησθ' ἂν ἐκάτερος οὶ μὲν τῶν νοῶν [ἀυτίον], οἱ δ' ἴδον, [εἰνα], καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἄγαθὸν τούτον ἀμφισβητῶν οὐδέτερον ἑπὶ εἰπ', τάχα δ' ἂν ἀυτίον τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν ἔδω. τούτοι δὲ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ πρὸς Φιληθηνον διαμαχῆθην ἂν, ός ἐν τῷ μετί τούτῳ βίῳ, δ' τί ποι' ἔστε τοῦθ' τ' λαβον ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγο- νεν αἰφέτος ἡμα τούτοις τούτοις καταλέγετον καὶ ἰομούτερον ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ τούτον τὸν λόγον ἔοιτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὖδ' αὐτὶ δευτερεύον ἴδομ' μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο. ποροφωτέρω δὲ ἔστι τῶν τριτείων, εἰ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἴδια τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὥς Ὁσιάραρε, ἐμογε δοξεῖ νῦν μὲν ἴδον' σοι πεπτωκέναι μαθασμεῖν πληγεῖσαι ἕπτ' τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγον: τῶν γὰρ νικηφόρων πέρι μαχωμένη κείται. τῶν δὲ νοῶν, ὡς 23 ἔοικε, λειτένων ὃς ἐμιφρόνως οὐκ ἀντετοιείτο τῶν νικηφόρων: τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐπαθέν ἂν, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύον στερηθείσα.

οὐκ ἄμφισβητῶν [πτω] It is difficult to account for πτω in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοῶς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the ζεὺς νοῶς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τῶν κοινῶν βίων: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοῶς? I now believe πτω to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τῶν ἐμμισβητῶν.

ἀπειρέθ' ἂν. See Addenda.

οὔτε—οὐδ' ἂν. Of this construction Stallbaum gives the following instances: Thuleb. 42, c; Laws 840, A; Rep. 608, B; ibid. 426, B; from which it appears that although οὔτε—οὐδέ is inadmissible, οὔτε—οὐδ' ἂν or οὐδέ γς is correct.

μετὸν] As you cannot say λέγεται ὅν, but λέγεται εἶναι, you would here expect μετέχειν, not μετὸν. But μετὸν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγοιτ' ἂγ μετὸν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in Laws 900, καν, we read: ζεὺς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὰν τῶν τοιούτων μετὸν ἱφόμενον.

νῦν μὲν] The Bodleian has no μὲν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this first bout and another, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτε- ρεύον—.

σοι πεπτωκέναι] σοι cannot belong to πεπτωκέναι, for ûπα σοι is the proper construction after τίτερων. Nor can it belong to πληγεῖσαι, for then Socrates the agent, and λέγει the instruments, would be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ἵππεπτωκέναι?
This furnishes sicciapetator el other
This argument".

Plato, who
in an infinitive
of this, as

The best MSS. have ράθιον; but the μέν after συγγραφεῖς appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have ράθιον πάντω κα' νῦν.

But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νῦν with φ. §. "we must now begin a new argument". Because the misplaced πάντω τι seemed an awkward desinence, some scribe brought the νῦν into the first sentence, and contrived χαθ as the beginning of the next.

This is a singular construction of δέν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the αλή μυχανή consists in έχειν β. ε., this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation, if you will. But is this tolerable even in common conversation, or is it the slipshod talk of uneducated men? Again we have another such pleasing negligence in βολή έτερα τῶν έμπροσθεν λόγων.

This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὐχοῦν χρή is the answer, and Πῶς γάρ οὕ; is Socrates' assent. Χρή is the answer to δέν...πορευόμενον...

Another proof of the spuriousness of αλής μυχανής.

Furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to show that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Surely it needed neither Heinsdorff ad Gorgiam, nor Schefeuer on Gregorius Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to shew that you can say either percuro videns, or video percurrens. It costs more effort διευ-

λαβέσθαι than τίς εύθετον.
ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νῦν δῆ λόγων.
ΠΡΩ. Ποῦα;
ΣΩ. Τῶν ἡδύν ἐλέγομέν ποι τὸ μὲν ἀπειρον δεῖξα τῶν ὑπόσιον, τὸ δὲ πέρας;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τούτω ὅτι τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο οἰκόμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον

Δὲ εἶ ἄμφοτεροι τούτοις ἐν τῷ ξυμισσόμενον. εἰμὶ δ', ός ἐκεῖνον,
ἐγὼ γελοίος τις [ἐξαν], τὰ τ' εἴδη διστάσας καὶ συναφθημοφε-

μενος.
ΠΡΩ. Τί φησί, ὄ γαθε;
ΣΩ. Τετάρτον μοι γένος καὶ προσδείναι.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγε τίνος.
ΣΩ. Τῆς ἔμμεγέες τούτων πρὸς ἄῤῥη ἐν τῷ αἰτέαν ὅρα,
καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τοὺς τρισὶν ἐξελεύνος τέταρτον τούτο.
ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδείησει διάκρισιν
τίνα δυναμένον;

ἔπειρον ἢ πέπασ] It is evident that the πέρας and ἔπειρον of 16, c, are dif-
ferent from those now brought forward. In
the former case they express the indef-
inite multitude of the individuals and
the definite number of species; in
the latter, the unlimited nature of all
quality and quantity in the abstract,
and the definite proportions of the same
in existing things. But in both cases
we find that the effect of the πέρας is
analogous; that knowledge in dialectics
and life in physics are the result of a
certain limitation.

πέπασ] Heindorf and Schleiermacher
are by no means to be followed in
reading πέρας ἔρων. As Böckh rightly
observes in his Philolaus, the opposite
power to the ἔπειρον is not that which
is limited, but that which limits. Un-
less we keep πέρας here clear from
the proposed addition, and cancel ἔρων
in two subsequent places, we make no
sense of the whole disputation.

Τοῦτον δέ τῶν εἰδῶν] I have adopted
Stallbaum's emendation, which the con-
text makes necessary. "Let us lay
down these two, as two of the Classes
required." But in the manifestly cor-
rupt sentence which follows, something
less weak and flat than γελοίας τις; σὺχ


LEXICON κατ' εἴδη δ', is wanted. The

Bodleian has ἔκνως τὰ τ' εἴδη. It is
probable that in the archetypal MS. the
text ran thus: ΓΕΛΟΙΟΣ ΤΙΚΑΝΟΣ,
i.e. γελοίας τις ἀνάρρω, and that some
scribe thought that in ΤΙΚΑΝΟΣ he saw

LEXICON. The other various reading τὰ τ'
appears decidedly preferable to κατά, for
he is endeavoring not to separate things
according to their kinds, but to point
out distinct kinds, and then to repeat
the catalogue of them. On the whole
there is little violence done to the
oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or
said improperly, in the reading: εἰμὶ
δ', ός ἐκεῖνον. ἐγὼ γελοίας τις ἀνάρρω-

πος τοῖς τρισὶν [See Addenda.
Μῶν οὖν] This question and the
answer given to it are of importance,
being introduced by Plato not only as
an example of the care which is re-
quise in every dialectic process to
leave no distinction unnoticed which
may help towards a complete classifica-
tion, but still more because it serves
to bring out in its full significance the
artίκα τῆς ἔμμεγέες. Had this latter
been a mere agent, one would expect
the counter-agent to be also mentioned;
but Socrates observing in his ironical
Σ. Τάξι '凡本网 \textit{οὐ} μὴν \textit{οἴμαι} γ' \textit{ἐν} τῷ \textit{νῦν. ἦαν} δὲ \textit{τί δὲν, συγγρώσει} τού \textit{μοι οὐ} \textit{μεταδιώκομε} [σέμπυτον \textit{βίον}].

ΠΡ. \textit{Τί μὴν;}

Σ. Πρώτον \textit{μὲν} \textit{δὴ} \textit{τῶν} \textit{τεττάρων} \textit{τὰ} \textit{τρία \textit{διελόμενοι, τὰ} \textit{δέ} \textit{τρίτων} \textit{πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ \textit{ἐκάτερον} \textit{ἐξισιμένων} καὶ \textit{διε-σπασμένων} \textit{ιδώντες, εἰς \textit{ἐπί πάλιν} \textit{ἐκάτερον} \textit{συναγαγόντες, νοή-σαι} \textit{τῇ} \textit{πατέ} ἵν \textit{αὐτῶν} ἐν καὶ πολλὰ \textit{ἐκάτερον}.}

ΠΡ. \textit{Ἐλ\textit{μόι} σαφεῖστερον \textit{ἐτί} \textit{περὶ} \textit{αὐτῶν} \textit{εἴποις, τάξι} ἰ '\textit{ἐποίην}.}

Σ. \textit{Δέχω} \textit{τοῖνυν} \textit{τὰ} \textit{δέο, ᾧ} \textit{προτιθέμεια, ταύτ'} \textit{ἐἶναι} \textit{ἐπερ 24 νῦν} \textit{δή}, \textit{τὸ} \textit{μὲν} \textit{ἀπειρον,} \textit{τὸ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{πέρας} [ἐχον]. ὥστε \textit{δὲ} \textit{τρόπων} \textit{τινα} \textit{ὁ} \textit{ἀπειρον} \textit{πολλὰ} \textit{ἐστι,} \textit{πειράσομαι} \textit{φράζειν} τὸ \textit{δὲ} \textit{πέρας} [ἐχον] \textit{ἡμᾶς} \textit{περιμενέτω}.}

ΠΡ. \textit{Μένει.}

Σ. \textit{Σύνεβαι} \textit{δὴ} \textit{χαλεπτὸν} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γὰρ} καὶ \textit{ἀμφίβιπτόσιμον} \textit{ὁ} \textit{κελεύν} \textit{σε} \textit{σκοτείν}, \textit{ὅμως} \textit{δὲ} \textit{σκότει.} \textit{Θερμοτέρον} καὶ \textit{ψυχρό-τέρον} \textit{περὶ} \textit{πρώτον} \textit{ὅρα} \textit{πέρας} \textit{ἐλ} \textit{ποῦ} \textit{ἐστι} \textit{νοῆσαι, ἦ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{μᾶλ-}

manner, 'that he does not think he shall want any such,' prepares us to attach a higher importance to the \textit{αἴτια} than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any \textit{εἴδω} \textit{διάκρισιν} \textit{τῇ} \textit{δυνά-μενον}. For these \textit{πτερίξ} are represented as forced into this conjunction with the \textit{πέρας}, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the \textit{αἴτια} but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed \textit{τινες} into \textit{τινά}, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing \textit{βίων}, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that \textit{πέμπτον} was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρία] More probably τὸ τρίτον \textit{i.e.} \textit{γένος: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελόμενα be the right word in such a sense as \textit{separating}, but \textit{πολλαξιέντες.} Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are bidden to take the \textit{χοινία} which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, \textit{πέρας} and \textit{πτερίξ}. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the \textit{χοινία} are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὸ δὲ \textit{τούτων}, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these \textit{γένη. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλὰ \textit{ἐξισιμένων} is like \textit{μέρι} \textit{διαφεύ. Polit. 283, d, and elsewhere. It is a variety of the ac- cusative of effect, like \textit{ὑψηλὸν} \textit{νάριν}, \textit{βραχὺ} \textit{συστέλλειν, σμικρὰ} \textit{κατακόπτειν etc.}

πέρας [ἐχον]} This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ \textit{πέρας} \textit{ἐχον} is that \textit{πτερίξ} which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the \textit{πέρας}; so that this description belongs properly to the third \textit{γένος.}

ἐλ ποῦ] εἰ ποῦ τι \textit{νοῆσαι ἦν} is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker
intends is, "tell me if you can discern." The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, EIIIOY ECTI NOHCAI, and as the Y looked very like Τ (with which it is continously confounded) he thought he saw ΙΟΤΕ; and out of ΙΟΤΕCTI he made ΙΟΤΕ TI. After this, νοησαί would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοησείς :item. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), εί and αί; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιπτέσθη—ἐπιπτέσθη—ἐπιπτέσθη with αί. A due consideration of ἔστερα ἐν ἑνόκτιον would have stopped the course of this corruption.

οἰκονομεῖ This is Stallbaum's correction for οἰκου. The words τοῖς γένεσιν are not to be taken with ἐν αὐτοῖς, in the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἔπιπτέσθη γίγνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

[καὶ] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in σφοδρότερον καὶ ἡσυχαίτερον, an expression which here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον σφοδρά καὶ ἡσυχά.

λάβοντε τὸ ποσόν] If they were to admit Quantity. As λάβοντε here = ἐλαβον, and not ἐλαβον, the optative ἔστην which rests on ἔστην in Boll. and ἔστην in Ven. is better than ἔστην (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of ἔστην.
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

γνων το διπλάσιον και πάν 6 τι περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμῷ-

β μῦ καί μέτρον καί πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενου καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο; ἡ πῶς ὑπὸ φής;

ΠΠΩ. Κάλλιστά γ’, οἱ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἶπεν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν εἰς τούτοις ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδεαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΠΩ. Σὺ καί ἐμοὶ φράσεως, ὡς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οἷν, ἂν πέρ γ’ ἔμαις εὐχαίρεις ἐπιφώος γίγνεν-

tαὶ τις ὑπίν.

ΠΠΩ. Εἴχον δὴ καί σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σχολῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τῆς, ὁ Πρώταρχη, αὐτῶν φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

C ΠΠΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίω ἔχεις;

ΣΩ. Φράσσω δὴλον ὅτι. σὺ δὲ μοι συναπολογηθέρον τῷ

λόγῳ.

ΠΠΩ. Ἀδυί μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθέγγομεθα νῦν δὴ ποῦ τι καὶ ψυχρό-

tερον. ἢ γὰρ;

ΠΠΩ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθες δὴ ἐξορότερον καὶ ἐγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ Ψάττον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ συμ-

κρότερον, καὶ ὅτοσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤ-

tον δεχομένης ἔλεγον [eis ἐν] φύσεως.

D ΠΠΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπειροῦ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμίμην δὲ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετά ταῦτα τήν

αὐ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΠΩ. Ποιαν;

ΣΩ. Ἡν καὶ νῦν δὴ, δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν του ἀπειροῦ

ἀναγώγους εἰς ἐκ νῦ, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περιστειόδους συναγα-

καὶ πάν δ τι περ κ. τ. ὑ.] That is the triple, the quadruple, the third, the fourth, and so on with all multiples and all measures, whether in numbers or magnitudes.

[ἐς ἐν] τις ἐν τοῦ ἄνθρωπου "to place in a genus" is correct, and so likewise is τις ἐν τοῦ φύσεως, "to declare anything as belonging to a certain nature." But τις ἐν τοῦ φύ-

σεως is unexampled and inconceivable. Here again we have a specimen of that officious interference which has ruined so many texts.

γένναν] Not 'finiti genus' (Stallb.), a misconception which has led to a wrong view of the whole passage, but the whole race or family, το δεχόμενα τό πέρας. See the following notes.
Most "What ollovtat.

But this is not Plato's meaning. The deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of the things which contain the πέρας. For while we have πέρας corresponding to ἄπειρον, and ἢσος καὶ διπλάσιον τοῦ μέλι- λων καὶ ἢπτων, σφόδρα καὶ ήρμα, καὶ the like, we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ἠγρότερον and the other examples. These are supplied by Socrates further on in the passage beginning 'Αρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις." I leave this note as I find it in the first Edition, but I have two serious objections to make to it. 1. The passage beginning 'Αρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις regards the κουνὸν and not the πέρας, nor can any other enumeration of the πέρας itself be given, except what occurs above in Ὀικον τὰ μὴ δεξϊόμενα κ. τ. ἦν, and immediately after this passage, in Τῆν τοῦ ἢσον κ. τ. ἦν. 2. τοιῶν, whatever is added to it, implies that the thing has been done before. Moreover, although, as a general rule, after δέον you expect a negative, this is the result of circumstances, and not involved in the nature of the word; and it appears to me, that neither καὶ nor νῦν δὴ is compatible with οὐ συνηγαγομεν. "The very thing which we just now did" is so natural, and "the very thing which we just now did not do" so much the reverse, that I have not hesitated to cancel οὐ. It is true that one of my reasons depends on a disputed passage, to the consideration of which I now pass. τοιῶν δράσεως is interpreted by Stallbaum, "it will do as well." His example is taken from Εἰρ. 5, 322. τοιῶν δὴ οὖμι δράσεως αὖ καὶ τῇ ἔμην ἐμμούσῳ. But if any one will give himself the trouble to read the context, he will see that the sense required is this. "I offered no "advice to my own people, because I thought them incurable, and it was of "no use running into jeopardy where

PLATÔNOS PHILEBOS.

γεῖν, [οὐ] συνηγαγομεν. ἀλλ' ἢσος καὶ νῦν τοιῶν δράσεως. [τοιῶν ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταραφῆς κακείνη γενησεται.] [οὐ] συνηγαγομεν] "It may be asked, was there not a sufficient συναγωγη above in Ὀικον τα μη δεξιομεν κ. τ. ἦν? or if not, in what is the definition which follows better than that former one? I could get none to listen. I suppose "any adviser would do the same by my "company: οὐ δέσιμον ἀνατως ζηειν, "he would leave us to our own de- "vices." Of the passages quoted by Winckelmann, that from the Republic Πη —ποιεται τοιῶν, δυσκινητας ζηει καὶ δυσματως, needs no comment; that from Τθυκδιδες B. 2, ἄνοια σφρα καὶ ἐν τῳ ναυτικῳ ποιησεν το αὐτ, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but "Read, φρεις." "They think they will do as much by sea." That in Τθυκ B. 7. τοιῶν ἦση ἐποιει αὐτος κακων τα μηχομονες δια παντος καὶ μηδε μληγοσια is very much to the purpose, and shews that an infinitive is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not τοιῶν δράσεως, but τοιῶν ποιησεως. Another difficulty is presented by τοιῶν ἀμφω συναγομένων καταραφῆς κακείνη γενησεται. ΠΡΩ. Ποιαν καὶ πᾶς ιέγεις; ΣΩ. Τῆν τοῦ ἢσον κ. τ. ἦν: for beyond all doubt κακείνη refers to the third γένεα which they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking ποιαν to refer to κακείνη; and yet ποια is answered by Socrates as referring to the second. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων μ. ξ. γ. is an interruption to the argument. "We have (ορ have not) already told over the members of the πέρας family. Let us do it again (ορ let us do so now)." What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protarchus: "What do you mean by family? and what family?" Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protarchus should answer:—"I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we mix them, certain products will result!"—. How could he say this, if something about this combination had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἀπεργαζεται, at the end of So- crates' next speech.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τήν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὑπόση μαίει πρὸς
Εἰς ἄλληλα τάννυτει διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα,
ἐνθείσα ἄρθημόν, ἀπερχάσθεται. (τούτων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων συνα-
γομένων καταφανεῖς καὶ εἰς ἐγείρεται.)

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω γὰρ μοι λέγειν, μεγάλης ταύτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ’ ἑκάστων συμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοινν.

ΣΩ. 'Αρ’ οὖν ἐν μὲν νόσοις *** ἡ τούτων ὑθῇ κοινονία
τήν ἐγείρας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

26 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δ’ ὄξει καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείρους

Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου] Socrates describes the πέρας family as, whatever puts an end to the contradiction in opposites. For every Indefinite has two opposite extremes, μᾶλλον καὶ ἴστον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonized by the agencies belonging to the class of πέρας, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τὸν ἄριστον, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicharmus. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands halfway between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the "Philolaus" in the Appendix.

μαγνόσι τάσα] The MSS. and Edd. have μαγνός; an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Klitsch.

νόσοις] "The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c.
tούτων and ταύτα ταύτα are the γένε
τοῦ πέρατος, instances of the Limit, not
the πέρας and ἀπείρον, as Stallbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις or πέρας ἀπεργά-
σασθαί? On the other hand, we can say with perfect propriety that each limiting agent produces a Limit." When I wrote the above, if any one had asked me why these Limits were not mentioned by name, I could not have answered him. But I now see by other certain signs that this defect is chargeable upon our present text, which is very different from that of Plato. When Schleiermacher met with ταύτα ἔγγυγον, μεν ταύτα in the very next sentence, he was surprised that it was not rather αὐτή ἔγγυγομενή, (sc. κοινωνία) and proposed a transposition, which would not have mended matters; for the previous τούτων was still to be accounted for. But no one seems to have stumbled at the worst difficulty; namely that in οὐκ ἐν μέν νόσοισ, followed by ἐν δ’ ὄξει καὶ βαρεῖ, x. τ. ἐ., we have a most ludicrous attempt at antithesis. The same remedy will allay both this perplexity, and that caused by τούτων. There is a lacuna in the text, where I have indicated one. This the reader can fill up for himself; but the substance of his supplement must be as follows: ἐν μέν νόσοισ (τὸ ἅρμαν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν καὶ ἀρνὸν ἐν ἄλληλοις σταματάσαν, τὸ δὲ τεσσάρον καὶ τὸ μέτρον ἄδυτον ἔγγυγη-
τας,) ἀρνὸν ὀρθὴ κοινωνία x. τ. ἐ.
other, άρ' οδ ταύτα ἵγγενόμενα ταῦτα ἀμα πέρας τ' ἀπειρό-
σατο, καὶ μοναχὴν ἡμιτασαν ἐπειδῆ ἐνεστήσατο;
ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν ἐν ἑς χειμώνι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἤγγενόμενα τὸ
μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἀπείρων ἄφειλτο, τὸ δ' ἡμιτέρων καὶ ἀμα
σύμμετρων ἀπειρόσατο.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μήν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκόμοι ἐκ τοῦτον ὡς τε καὶ ὂσα καλὰ πάνιν ἢμῖν
Βέγονε, τῶν τ' ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἑχόντων συμμεθέντων;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι μηδὲ ἐπιλείπων λέγων, οἷον μεθ' ἵγητος
κάλλος καὶ ἴσχυν, καὶ ἐν ψυχάς αὐτῷ πάμπολλα ἐτερά καὶ
πάγκαλα. ἔχειν γὰρ που καὶ ἡμιτασαν πάντων πονηρὰν αὕτη
κατιδύσα ἡ η' θεός, οἵ καλὲ Φίλοβε, πέρας ἑχόνων οὐθ'

[Alternating with Greek text]

[Partial transcription in Greek]

...towards understanding the force of either of these words. The first seems false in fact; for although all music arises from this source, each several combination does not produce all music. And again why ξύματα, not άπασαν? There is one use of ξύματα which we often meet with in Plato; where, after speaking of a subordinate genus, he passes to a more comprehensive one: as for instance he would say τὴν ταχυ-
tικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ξύματαν. (Compare below; ἔρημον καὶ ἐ πον-
ηρὰ.) As for τελεστάτα, that will surely depend on the purity of the medium and the variety of the ποσά. But this attemperation of flat and sharp, and swift and slow, produces effects on recitation also, and on movement. The one good quality of all these is λειτύτης; and I venture to suggest, καὶ μουσικῆν ξύμa-
paσαν τε λειτύτης.

Μάλιστα γε] The best authenticated reading is Κάλλιστα; but the continual confusion of the two words is known to all who are familiar with paleography, and there cannot be a doubt which of the two is most appropriate here. In Phaedr. 263 c, for καθ' γούν ἀν, we must read μᾶλλον γούν ἀν. A few pages further on, the Vatican MS. has κάλλιστα for μᾶλλιστα, where the latter is obviously right.

τῶν πέρας ἑχόντων is correct: the par-
ticular proportions belong to the πέρας. Elsewhere they are called περτοῦσιν.

ἔρημον γὰρ που] There seems no occasion for ποντικας: it is no improbable that Plato wrote: γὰρ ποντικας.

ἡ σ' θεός] The notion that η' θεός is a personification of the third γένους as ὡρά κοινωνία is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to Philebus, which could only be made because his goddess was in question. It is so probable that η' was lost in consequence of its nearness to η', and it seems so necessary for the sense, that I have restored it connecturally.

πέρας ἑχόντων οὐθ' ἴδουν] πέρας οὔτε ἴδουν οὔτε πλησθοῦν ἓνον ἐν αὐτῆς, νόμιμον καὶ τέχνην πέρας ἑχόν-
tων ἔξοδο. Such is the reading of the Bodleian and the two MSS. which mostly agree with it. It is utterly cut of construction, and even Stallbaum appears to be only half in earnest in defending it. The inferior copies have ἑχόντων, which I regard as a conjecture, such as one often finds from the hands of the more recent scribes; nor are they always unfortunate ones. But of what use can ἐγώντα be to us? Law and order are the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to have it. I have therefore accepted ἐχόντων as right, but in its wrong place; that is omitted by accident, and then restored to a part of the text to which it did
IIAATONOS ΦΙΛΩΒΟΣ.

not belong, after the second πέρας instead of the first.

ἀποκαίσασα] Plato uses this word in Rep. 406, b, for to enfeeble. In comedy it occurs in the sense of to bore to death. There is no evidence of its being 'verbum palæstricum,' as Winckelmann supposes; at least, not in the sense he intends by his paraphrase, 'Dean Voluptatem rationibus et argumentis tandem usque percussam concidisse.' The sense is, and you say that she has enfeebled them (τάντας), but I affirm that she has saved them. Though if we durst insert γῆμας after αὐτὴν, the Aio te Aeaicida ambiguity of the syntax, which has led more than one scholar a strange dance, would be removed by the order of the two accusatives.

γένεσις] The Books have γενέσεως, and one editor informs us that πλήθους τῆς γενεσίας means οἱ πολλαὶ γενέσεις. If so, πλήθος τοῦ αὐτρώτου will be an equally elegant variation of οἱ πολλαὶ αὐτρώτοι. Till this is certain, it will be more prudent to take the word which has occurred so often, and always in the very same acceptation.

[γένη] This supplement, which I have put in brackets, is in the true style of the interpolator.

οὕτῳ πολλὰ εἰδέναι] This is a strange assertion after πέρας had been declared to contain 'every possible relation of number to number and measure to measure,' and the instances of it were said to be μυρία. I propose ὅτι, and οὕτῳ ἑδ. for οὕτῳ ἑδ.

γένεσιν κ. τ. 4] 'In order to understand this passage, it is again necessary to observe the same kind of distinction as was made in the case of πέρας between the λοτής, γῆμας, δι-

πλοῦν, on the one side, and the in-

stances of it in Nature on the other.

το τοῦτον ἐκγενέσθαι, is here equival-

ent to the instances; these are also included under the term γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, by which is implied that every existing thing arises from this combination. They are said to arise ἐκ τῶν μέτρων, from the proportions, or proportional quantities and degrees, αὐτρω-

γαμένον μετά τοῦ πέρατος, which are effected simultaneously with the πέρας
ΠΡΩ. Ἑμαθον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοὺς τοῖς τροι τέταρτον τι τὸτ' ἔραμεν ἕ ἐλναι γένος σκεπτεῖν. κοινὴ δ' ἡ σχέσις: ὅρα γὰρ εἰ' σοι δοξεῖ ἀναγκαύον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γενόμενα διὰ τὸν αἰτίαν γένεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοίης: πῶς μᾶρ ἐν χωρίς [τοῦτον] γίγνοσθε;

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦντος φύσις οὐδὲν [πλὴρ ὄνοματι] τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰτίον ὁρθῶς ἐν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἐν]

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ποιοῦμεν αὐτ' καὶ τὸ γενόμενον οὐ-化学品27 δὲν πλὴρ ὄνοματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δὴ, διαφέρον εὐθύσομεν. ἥ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἢρείται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν αἰτ' κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦμεν ἐπεκαλοῦθεὶ [γενόμενον] ἐκεῖνης;

ΠΡΩ. Πανύ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ἄρα καὶ ὁ ταύτων αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the πέρας enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated,— But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Limit." On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσις εἰς ςῆς. As every γένεσις must be εἰς ςῆς, understanding ςῆς in a lower sense as a γεγονημένη ςῆς, (see inf. 27, ς), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. ἐκεῖνον γένεσιν ςε would of course by attraction become ἐγένεσιν ὑπόνι. πρὸς τοῖς πρώ[...] τοῖς has been at last inserted before πρώς, invitis codicibus. χωρίς [τοῦτον] The attempts to de-

found τοῦτον are conclusive against it. χωρίς is used adverbially, ut sexcentiens. ὁρθῶς ἐν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἐν]. The sentence which ends thus, consists of two parts, the first in which Cause and that which makes are affirmed to have no difference as to nature, and the second in which the two names are said to be convertible. The first has been confused with the second by the intrusion of πλὴρ ὄνυματι, borrowed from below. This makes Plato say, "that there is no difference in their essence, except their name;" which is like saying, there is no difference in their stature, except their complexion. The second part is made ungrammatical by the intrusion of ἐν; for if ἐν ποιοῦν and τὸ αἰτίον are both of them subjects, λεγόμενα is indispensable. But what a clumsy way of saying, "that you can apply either name indifferently" is this? "The Maker and the Cause would rightly be called one." Nor can λεγόμενον ἐν εἴη be used for λέγοιτ ἐν with ἐν or with any name we may apply occasionally, but only where some declaration of a name to be permanently borne henceforth is intended.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γραγμένα καὶ ἐξ ὄν γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παράσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

Β ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δήμουσον λέγομεν τέταρτον, [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ιππανὸς ἔτερον ὑπὲρ ἑκείνων δεδηλωμένων.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν· ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως μὴ ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἐνδεδείγματο μήμης ἔνεκα ἑφέξεις αὐτὰ καταφημίσασθαί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν ἑπειρόσει λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔτερον δὲ τούτων τρίτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐδίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μικροτέρας αἰτίαν καὶ γεγένος τεταρτῆς λέγων ἄρα μὴ πληρεσθήσῃ τοῦ παθήσαι ὧν τί

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

[τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ιππανὸς ἔτερον οὖν] See Addenda.

ἔτερον γὰρ οὖν] The inferior MSS. have Λέγομεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the older MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγομεν than to ἔτερον. But if λέγομεν means anything, it means ἔπειτα λέγομεν (it could not be used for λέγειν τις ἐξετάστω), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the asent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἔτερον. ποιοῦν precedes, ποιούμενον follows, but ποιοῦν = αἰτία and ποιοῦμενον = δουλευόν κ. τ. ἐ. Therefore αἰτία and δουλευόν are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the ποιούμενον=γεγραμμένα, or their elements, and as ποιοῦν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the third, is γεγραμμένα, and for that reason he uses the expression δουλεύων εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ ἐξ ὄν γίγνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause from the other three Classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγομεν into λέγομεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protagoras would have to answer to λέγομεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἔτερον, by the adoption of both readings? For γάρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, n. 16, n. 17, c. 30, c. d. 32, c. 

ἄρα μὴ πλημμελείην] The Bodleian and its two followers have no μή. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is prima facie evidence in its favour; for, although μὴ and μὴ ποτὲ are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will shew the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: Phædo 64, c (twice) and Parmenides 163, c (in these instances ἀλλα τι makes the question negative) Phædo 103, c. Crito 44, e. Charmides 174, a.
The direct question is not, "to whom would the second prize belong" but, "to whom does it?" (πότερον ἔδωκεν γίνεσθαι ἡ φρονίμαις;). The dependent question should take the optative without αὖ. I have accordingly expelled αὖ, invitio codicibus.

μικτον ἐκεῖνοι As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτός ἐκεῖνος, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schütz. It may be objected: If all mixtures belong to the κακόν γένος, of course the μικτός βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shown that the κακόν γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely τῶν ἀπειρῶν ὧδε νῦν πέρατος δεδεμένων, unless he can first shew that this βίος is compounded of ἀπειρῶν and πέρας; his case is not proved. The answer to this objection is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of ἀπειρῶν and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἔδωκεν is of the ἄπειρον, νῦν is declared to be of close kin to ἀξία, the fourth Class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νῦν has more than one relation to τὰ γιγαντεῖα. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts matter to its ends, it appears as σοφία, and as such resembles the σοφία of the Universal νοῦς, which is ἀλήθεια. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.


\[ \Phi I. \text{ Λέγε μόνον.} \]

\[ \Sigma \text{. 'Ηδονή καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχετον; ἡ τῶν τὸ μάλλον τε καὶ ἤττον δεχομένον ἔστον;} \]

\[ \Phi I. \text{ Ναί, τῶν τὸ μάλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἢν ἡδονή πανάγαθον ἢν, εἰ μὴ ἀπειρον ἐνύγχανε περινος καὶ πλῆθει καὶ τῷ μάλλον.} \]

28 \[ \Sigma \text{. Οὔδε γ' ἄν, ὁ Φίληβε, λύπη πάγκακον· ὥστε ἄλλο τι νῦν ἐκείπτεσεν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπειρου φύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἁγαθοῖς. τούτο δέ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονός ἔστω. φρόνησον δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νόην εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προερημένων, ὁ Πρώταρχε τε καὶ Φίληβε, τῶν Θέτων οὐχ ἂν ἀσέβοιμεν; ὃ γὰρ μοι δοξεί σφαιρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσαι καὶ μὴ περί τὸ νῦν ἐρωτόμενον.} \]

B \[ \Phi I. \text{ Σειμίνιες γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ Θέον.} \]

\[ \Sigma \text{. Καὶ γὰρ στ', ὃ ἐταῖρε, τὴν σαντοῦ το δ' ἐρωτόμενον ὁμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.} \]

ΠΡΩ. \[ ὁρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὁ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῆς πειστῶν. \]

\[ \Phi I. \text{ Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σὺ, Πρώταρχε, προφητεύσαι λέγειν; } \]

πανάγαθον| πανάγαθον is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πανάγαθον in Soph. ᾿Εϊ. Ρ. 823, as good throughout, or as being all the good that is in the world, and therefore the only good, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be ὁλίγον τε χρίσον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker’s corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγκακον. In Philebus’ creed ἡδονή is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὔδε γ' ἄν, ὁ Φ.] Socrates’ just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus’ answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists, for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

σκεπτέον. It is likely that λεκτέον or ὑπολήπτεον is the right reading, either of which would require ως.

τοῦτο δὲ] The MSS. have τοῦτων δι᾽ ἀρχηγοῦ τοῦτον is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δὲ for δι΄, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο το ἄλλο τι. γεγονός ἔστω is somewhat unusual for ὁμολογήσων εἰναι.

ὁ Φιλήβε] The accidental omission of these words in the Bodelian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must have been rara avis.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε γινόν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀποφοί, καὶ δέομαι γ', ὡς Σώκρατες, αὐτὸν σε ἢμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτη, [ 하나님의] μη δὴ ἢμείς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαιρετάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξάμεθα τι.

ΣΩ. Παστέν, ὡς Πρωταρχε, οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπῶν οὐδὲν ἐπι- τάττεστι. ἄλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ ἐπεφ Φίλιππος, σεμνον [ἐν τῷ παιζειν] ἐθορούσα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστημήν ἐφομενος ὁποίον γένους εἶν.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι γ', ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μην ὅσιον. πάντες γὰρ συμμωνοῦσαν οἱ σο- φοί, ἔκαστος ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἢμῖν οὐρανὸν τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἵπεος ἐξ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλῆ ὄπως βούλει, μηδὲν μήκος ἢμῖν ἐπιλογίζο- D μενος, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεκθησόμενος.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἰπες. ἀξιωμεθα δὲ πως ὡδ' ἐπανερφώτωντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πάστεν, ὡς Πρωταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλοὶμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεῖον φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὀπὶ ἐκεῖνων ἡ τάναντα, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ζησὰν ἐλεγον, νοῦν καὶ ἔφονος εἰνα Θαυμαστὴν ὀντοτέουσαν διακυβέρναι;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τοῦν αὐτῶν, ὡς Θαυμασι Σώκρατες, ὡς μὲν E

[enance] μη δὴ... φθ. τι] The MSS. have ἢνα μηδέν. This μηδέν must be- long to φθεγξάμεθα, because μηδέν ἐξαιρετάνοντες would be the very con- trary of that which he dreads. But μηδέν and τι are incompatible, ex- cept in the combined form μηδ', εἰν τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [enance] μη δη, ἢνα having been supplied after μηδ', τι was corrupted. ἢνα δη and μη δη are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonale nature of the thing expected or feared.

Παστόν κ. τ. ἦ] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign of interrogation after εἶν. The words ἢν τῷ παιζεῖν are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the in- telligence of the hearer, and force σεμνύνον to stand alone, whereas σεμνύ- νον ἐξωρούσα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστημήν ἐφο- μενος is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

ὑπολογίζομεν] This properly is a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the ac- count of profit, such as ἵλυνοι, πό- νοι &c. ἀπεκθησόμεθα, I give offence.

Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Socrates offers to Protarachus the alternative be- lief either in capricious and haphazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as
that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protarchus to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδ’ ὅσιον εἶναι μιᾷ φαντάσι; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to what he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is left by itself, and οὐδ’ ὅσιον is pre-
dicated of θ…ὑ… λέγεις. This shews that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Boll. δ. μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν δή λέγεις: Cossl. δ. μὲν γὰρ σὺ τῶν λέγεις: Eusebius, δ. μὲν γὰρ δή τῶν λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γὰρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Euse-
bius’ ΜΕΝΕΑΡΔΗ I take to have been the first defection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΑΡΧΗ, and the ὑπὸ τῶν of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into ἔλεγεις. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐ-
tῶν is properly, Nothing like, and so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 271 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τι τῶν αὐτῶν) and περὶ Ἀντ. p. 302. Lips. 1825. We may here render it by Nothing of the kind, or Nothing like the fact.

The MSS. give ξυμφορέων MSS. give ξυμφόρεως. It is true we have ξυμφόρεως μέγις, Rep. 242, x., and in Sophist. 236, 11, πρεζίς τὸ ταῦτα ξυμφόρησαι—but as to the first ex-
ample, we have ξυμφήσας both preceding and following it, and as to the second, the whole clause is an interpolation. In Timaeus 72, 11, ξυμφόρησαντος may be de-
defended on the ground that the doctrine does not simply assent to their doctrine, but reasserts it with higher authority. Where assertion is intended, we find the form ξυμφήσας, so that practically it is an aorist of φασώκας, but for this very reason ξυμφήσας would seldom want any such inflexion. ξυμφόρησας in this place is to be looked upon as a present tense, like οἴωμεν, ἐγκνώρι-
νευῶμεν, μετέχουμεν.

The MS. generally agree in this reading. Schleiermacher reads οὐμολογοῦμεν, some worthless copies οὐμολογοῦμεν. But if we ad-
opt -ουμε or -ουμεν we must have the article, and the perfect is more correct, as Theodoret quotes it, οὐμολογούμενοι: and lastly, whether Anaxagoras be meant, or, as I suspect, some older seer or poet, it is not proper to speak of the first expounders of a dogma as οὐμο-
λογοῦντες. Some one may propose οὐμο-
λογοῦμεν, agreeing with, but this is said of things that agree, not of per-
sions. It is wonderful that no one has seen that ξυμφήσας is followed by a dative in its own right, and that ξυμ-
φόρησας, in whatever form you use it, introduces a tautology or a redu-
undancy.
ΣΩ. 'Ιδή δή, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τοῦτων νῦν ἦμιν λόγον ἀφρέτης.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.
ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἐπάντων τῶν ζῴων, πῦρ καὶ ύδωρ καὶ πνεύμα, καθορισμένον τού, καὶ γῆ, καθάπερ Β οἱ χειμαζόμενοι φασίν [, ἐνότα ἐν τῇ συστάσει].
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα: χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὅντως ὦν ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.
ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ᾽ ἦμιν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνως.
ΠΡΩ. Ποίον;
ΣΩ. "Οὐι συμφωνον τε [τοῦτων ἐκαστὸν παρ᾽ ἦμιν] ἐνεστι καὶ φαίλον, [καὶ] οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὄν, καὶ τὴν ὁδηγημεν σὺν ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχων. ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβὼν περὶ πάντων νόει ταυτόν. οἶον πῦρ μὲν ἔστε ποὺ παρ᾽ ἦμιν, ἔσει δ᾽ ἐν τῇ παντί.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Οὖν οὐκ ἅμιαν μὲν τε τὸ παρ᾽ ἦμιν καὶ ἀσθενεὶς C καὶ φαίλον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παντὶ πλῆθει τε θαυμαστῶν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάθος δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ ὀφθη.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλιστα ἀληθεῖς δ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; τρέψεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐκ τοῦτον] καὶ ἀφαίρεται τὸ τοῦ παντός πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἦμιν πυρὸς; ἦ τὸναναίον ἐν' ἐκεῖνον τὸ τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἀπαντᾶ ἵπποι ταῦτα;

[ἐνότα ἐν τῇ συστάσει] If this means the σύστασις of our bodies, it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe, it comes too soon. The question is, not whether we see the Elements in composition, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ τὴν τῶν ζωμάτων φύσιν is assumed as the general belief. He argues from the elements παρ᾽ ἦμιν, which we do see, to the same elements ἐν τῷ παντὶ.

[τοῦτων ἐ. π. ἦ.]] Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ᾽ ἦμιν . . . τοῦτων ἐκάστον παρ᾽ ἦμιν in one sentence, for this is virtually the case, since δότα depends on λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνως.

The sentence which I have relieved of this burden affords us the very ἐνεστὶ from which the interpolator helped himself above. "It is present here in small quantity and poor quality," and then the double nature of this φύσιν is shewn; it is impure and feeble in its effects. This connexion is spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, by the intrusion of καὶ.

[ἐκ τοῦτον] ἐκ τ. is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέψεται; when we omit the words, the sentence becomes ten times more elegant and forcible, ύπὸ being quite appropriate enough for the three verbs taken together.
ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἔρωτιας.

Σ. Ο' Ὑθὸς: ταύτα γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἵμαι, περὶ τε [ὑς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τῶν ἦλιων ἣδ' πάντων ὄσον ἠρώτησα διάγον ἐμπεροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρίνει.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ἤμαίνων ἀν ποτὲ φανεῖται;

Σ. Σχεδὸν οὖν ὅστισον. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετά τοῦτθ' ἐξῆς ἐπον. πάντα γὰρ ἤμεις ταῦτα τὰ τών δὴ λέξηντεν ἀρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκλίμα ναὶ ἄλλης ἠμαινῶν ἀν ποτε φανεῖται;

ΠΡΩ. Τὶ μὴν;

Ε. Σ. Ταύτων δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦτον ὅν κόσμον ἱέρομεν. [διὰ] τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τρόπων ἀν οἱ ἑπὶ του σῶμα, συνήθετον ὅν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθωτατα λέγεις.

Σ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τούτο, τρέφεται τε καὶ, ὅσα τῶν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἴπομεν, εἴποτε τε καὶ ἱερεῖ; 

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἔτερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅν ἄξιον ἐρω-

τήσεως.

Σ. Τί δὲ; τοῦτο ἀρ' ἄξιον; ἡ πῶς ἐρεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε το γαῖον.

Σ. Τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν σῶμα ἀρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἐχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Αἵτιν σῶμα φήσομεν.

Σ. Πόθεν, ὃ φιλε Πρώταγχε, λαβὸν, εἴπερ μή τὸ γε τοῦ
παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ἄν ἐγύγχανε, ταύτα γ' ἔξον τοῦτω καὶ ἐξί πάντη καλλίσταν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀφέν ὡς ὀδυμόθεν ἀλλοθεν, ὅ Σώφρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἰδοὺμέν γ', ὅ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέταρτα ἐκείνα, ἢν καὶ ἄλληρ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἀπασὶ τέταρτον ἔνω, τούτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἤµῖν ἡπὶ τὸν τε παρῆχον καὶ σωματικὸν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πνεύμασιν σώματος

what else could have given us our souls’?” and “The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection”. But the latter alone is intended. “If we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one”. πάντη refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οὐ γὰρ τοι] The subject of ἐπικε- λεύσαμεν is evidently Cause. But if so, there is no predicate to τέταρτα ἐκείνα. To remedy this, some propose to read ἐντα before τέταρτα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ἔντα τῶν τεττάρων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: “Seeing that these four are”—we should immediately ask “are where”? If παρ’ ἤµῖν, that could not be omitted. If everywhere, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated ως ἢττιν ἀπερεάν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ τ. ἐ. There can be no doubt that the four γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? So that the words τα τ. ἐκείνα are not an inter- polation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MS., for it omits παρῆ, and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which inter- vened between ἐκείνα and καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if ἢν had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what ἢν meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τα τέταρτα ἐκείνα ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἤµῖν μάκοις εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἀπασὶ τέταρτον ἔνω, τούτ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ’ ἤµῖν καὶ τ. ἐ.

[Ὑψηλὴ τε παρέχεν] He argues that αἰτία here below enjoys many and various appellations of σοφία (as we say σοφία παθοτρίβης, λατρείας, τέχνων, γαλακεύς, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of combining and repairing (συντελοῦν καὶ ἀκούομενον) and gives an example of each in σωματικῶν ἐμποιοῦν and λατρείαν (ἐμποιοῦν). It is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human ψυχή being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἀπερεάν, and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of human skill. And, pray, what human skill can be said ψυχῆν παρέχειν? But some Greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σῶμα, and thought it was a pity that the ψυχῆ being should be missing, and so by his ψυ- χῆν τε παρέχεν he killed all the sense of the passage. The application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. He does not say “there must be some other more effects elsewhere”; but “we know of certain effects; we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίτον καὶ τι- μωτάτων (i.e. the planets and the whole Heavens) and this must be an
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ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δὲ γ' ἐμῇ ἔρισει πεπορευσάς ἀπόχρωσιν, ὅτι νοεῖς ἐστι γενοῦσίς του πάντων αὐτίου λέξιντος. [τὸν τεττάρων Ε ἤ ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ.] ἔχεις γὰρ ἑκάτον νῦν ἡμῶν ἡδ' τὴν ἀπό-
χρωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐχοι καὶ μᾶλ' ἵκανώς· καὶ τοῖς κε ἀποκρινάμενος ἐλάδες.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γὰρ, ὥ Πρότασθε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἑνὸθ’ ἡ παιδία.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοῦς ἐκτοι, ὥ ἐκτάφη, ὥ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ δύναμιν κέατηται, σχέδον ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδῆλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καί μὴν ἢδονῆς γ' ὀσαύντως πάλαι τι γένος ἑφανή.

ΠΡΩ. Καί μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεινόμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφότερον, ὅτι νοεῖς μὲν αὐτίας ἢν ἐγγενῆς καὶ τοῦτον σχέδον τοῦ γένους, ἢδονή, δ' ἐπει-
φός τ' αὐτή καὶ τοῦ μήτ' ἀρχήν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος εἰς ἑαυτῆ-
ἀφ' έκατον ἐχόντως μηδ' ἐξοντός ποτε γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Μεινόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Αἱ δ' τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἢν ὅτ' ἐστιν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῦν,
καὶ διὰ τὰ πάθος γίγνεσθαι, ὅπωστε γίγνησθαι, ἰδεῖν ἡμῶς:
πρῶτον τὴν ἢδονήν· ὁπερὲ τὸ γένος αὐτής πρότερον ἐβασανί-
σαμεν, ὡστε καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύτης δ' αὖ χωρίς τὴν ἢδο-
νην οὔτε ἄν ποτε δυναίμεθ' ικανὸς βασανίσασαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταῦτη πορεύο-
μέθα.

γενοὐστης] This word is quoted from this passage by the lexicographers. It is not formed according to analogy, and offers no meaning but what γεν-
νήτης would have supplied. It may have arisen from a dittographia, γέ-
νους, γεννήτης—I once thought that Stallbaum's conjecture, when he put a stop after λέξιντος and supplied δὲ after τεττάρων, was undoubtedly right. I now see in the words τῶν τεττάρων ἤν ἡμῶν ἐν τούτῳ a marginal note, on which all correction is thrown away.

ἔχεις γάρ ought to follow immediately upon the statement of the ἀπόχρωσις, in place of being separated from it by this reference, which is itself quite su-
perfluous.

tαῦτα πρότερα] Namely, where it is to be found existing, and how it arises. Henceforth, pleasure is no longer con-
sidered as an abstraction, and belonging to the class of ἀπέρα, but as having come into being, and consequently as belonging to the καὶνά.
ΠΑΙΛΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν σοι καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

C ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἡμᾶς φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἱδονή γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δὲ γ', ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμησκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστα ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὡς θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούομεν δ' δὴ τῶν τετείρων τρίτων ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τὸ ἀπειρόν καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν ὧ καὶ ἕγιναν, οἷμα δὲ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

D ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δ' ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἦδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυπομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζῴωις, ἡμᾶς λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀληθῶν ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω λέγεις εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' ἀρμοντομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτής φύσιν ἔπληθος, ἱδονή γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δέι δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων δ' τι τάχιστα ἕκαθ' ἦναι.

E ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε ὄρθως λέγειν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέ- στερον δ' ἐτι ταῦτα ταύτα πειράμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσια που καὶ πειραμφη ὡδόστον οὐν- νοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν ποιν λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐθοδή δ' ἐπερίωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἱδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ἀποιώσης] The same word is again ὀδόν, and τῆς ἀναχώρησιν, I should be used below of the same thing, and there inclined to write πάλιν λυσίς, or ἐπι- also with πάλιν. The expression seems νιοσίς, which last is perhaps more like strange for a return to a natural state, the text.

On the faith of εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν
\[\Sigma. \text{Δήσως δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ λύσι [καὶ λύσις], ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἰγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ἐξαιρεθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις, ἣδον. διάκρισις 32 δὲ [γ’] αὐτοὶ καὶ [διάλογος] ἢ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πνεύμος πάθη, λύσι: κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἢ βίγονι πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψύξις, ἢδον.}

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

\[\Sigma. \text{Καὶ [βίγονι] ἢ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ἰγρο-}

τητος πτής, λύσιν, πάλιν δ' ἤεις ταύτων ἀπίστων καὶ διακρι-

μένων ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ὀδός, ἢδον. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἰς οὐ-

μετρίος δ' λόγος, ὡς δὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ἁπειροῦ καὶ πέρατος 

κατὰ φύσιν ἐμπυγνὸν γέγονος εἶδος, ὥπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρὸ- 

Βσεν, δένα μὲν τούτῳ φθείρισται, τὴν μὲν ψιθωρινὴν λύσιν εἶναι, 

tὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν οὔσιαν ὀδὸν, ταύτην δ' αὐτὸ πάλιν τὴν ἀνα-

χωρίσει πάντων, ἢδον.}

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστιν δωκεί γάρ μοι τόπον γ' τιν' ἑχειν.

[diálovou] This differs so little in sense from diákriscia; that it is useless, and moreover it answers to nothing in the antithesis. The opposites are diá-

kriscia = ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φύσιν = κατὰ φύσιν, πνεύμου πάλιν = ψύξις, λύσι = ἡδον. In this scheme the only word that suggests any scruple is ἀπόδοσις; a word which conveys no meaning un-

less we are told what is το τοποδιά-

μένον. That is to say, we want a ge-

nitive, and it must be the genitive of 

that which is opposed to πνεύμο. But, 

for this we need not look very far, 

for in the very next speech we have 

ῥίγος, where it is as much in the way 

as it would be serviceable here. It 

seems almost certain that we should 

read ἢ βίγονις πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ 

ψύξις, ἢδον.

[βίγονι] See the preceding note. But 

a more serious difficulty is offered by 

ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀπάντων, which is doubtful 

not only because of the preposition ἀπὲ, 

but also because the plural refers to 

nothing yet mentioned; nor does ταὐ-

τόν satisfy me, for, though ἐπὶ ταῦτα 

λόγων would do very well for the 

meeting of things separated, here the 

natural way is that of separation, as 

is plain from the nature of the case, 

and from the word διακρινομένων.

Platonis Philibius.
ΣΩ. Τούτο μὲν τοὶνν ἐν ἔδος τιθομέθα λόγις τε καὶ ἢδονής ἐν τοῖς τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκάτεροις.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τίθει τοινν αὐτής τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τοῦτον τῶν σκαθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἢδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἢδε καὶ Θαρραλέων, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λαυτηρῶν φοβερον καὶ ἄλ-γεινόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡσαῖ γάρ οὖν τοῦ τῆς ἢδονῆς καὶ λόγις ἔτερον ἐλ-δος, τὸ χωρίς τοῦ σώματος [αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] διὰ προσδοξαίας γιγνομένον.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οἷμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλαράνεια  ἕκατεροις γιγνομένον, ἠῶς δοξεῖ, καὶ

[ἐλπιζόμενον] It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant. Nor can we put τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπιζόμενον for τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπιζόμενος. But this variety does not satisfy the seicist; so he gives us a tautology in its place, by again repeating αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ! The γὰρ after ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες shews that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, p.

ἐν γ. τοῖς οἷμαι It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the προσδοκήματα alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of these as pure, and unmingled with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular εἶδος, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. ἐν τοῖς however manifestly means not ἐν τοῖς τοῖς προσδοκήμασι, but ἐν τοῖς τοῖς εἰδεσι, for it follows immediately on Protagoras’ ἔτερον εἶδος. But ἐκάτεροις cannot be so applied, because τοῦτα here involving only two εἴδη, each of them would be ἐκάτερον. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either εἶδος as unmingled with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plurals ἐλπιζόμεναι &c., if they do not refer to εἴδεσι, must refer to ἔλπισι τα καὶ ἢδονας; and by substituting this emendation for λόγις τα καὶ ἢδονας, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τοῦτα. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ὡς δοξεῖ, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmingled εἴδη; but in that case he would have said εἶναι εὑρωμεν or σα μοι δοξα εὑ-ρήσομεν or any thing sooner than ὡς δοξεῖ. If we adopt εἰς ἕκατερας γιγνομένας καὶ ἀμύκτως λύπαις τε καὶ ἢδονας, they will be the instrumental datives to ἐμφανεῖς ἔσονται. Perhaps ὡς δοξεῖ is merely a gloss to κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμήν, before δέξαν was added by way of explanation.

οἷμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν] The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation!
I Sraov reminded we here (livovyi...)

πΡΩ. Ὅρθότανα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη πη δεῖ διαπροσέθηναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιακόμημον.

ΣΟ. Πρότων μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξυνίδωμεν. [ὅσον] εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τῶν γενομένων διαφερουμένων μὲν [αὐτῶν] ἀληθῶν, Ε ἀνασώζομεν δι' ἡδονή, τῶν μίτῃ διαφερουμένων μητ' ἀνα- σομένων ἐννοούμεν πέρι, τίνα ποῦ ἔξειν δεί τῶν ἐν ἐκά- στοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῶοις, ὅταν οὗτῳ σχῆ, σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπτέ: ἀφ' οὐ πᾶσα ἁνάγκη πάν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῶον μητ' [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μήθ' ἤδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΟ. Ὅσον ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρὰ τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπομένου.

ΠΡΩ. Τι μήρ;

toῖς τοιούτοις, ὃς τοτε μὲν ΑFEther governing these several datives, the sentence requires ἐντες or οὗς; I have inserted the latter.

ὑστιν ἂντι| For the MS. reading ἑστιν ἐντες, which is a mere repetition of ἐντες, the nearest paleographical change would be ἑστι οὗ, the Υ and Τ being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἑστιν ἂτι, "on certain conditions". This I have admitted into the text.

διαπροσέθηναι| The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

τῶν γενομένων] τῷ λεγόμενον is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. in place of my τῶν γενομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but "what is commonly said". And again αὐτῶν refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, first that αὐτῶν is put for ἄξεσθαι (motive unknown) and that ἄξεσθαι are ζύγον, τίγγος, βρέχους and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ζύγον and the rest never perish, but the γενέσεις from them do, and it is these γενέσεις, if ἐμψυχεῖ, which feel the pain, or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and ofτος ἐστι of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

δεν τοῦτῳ σχῆ| I have put σχῆ for ἐχάνομαι, we want the aorist, and ἐχάνομαι here is as misplaced as if we should ask a man, Πῶς ὑγεῖς;

μήτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι] μήτε λυπεῖσθαι has no more right to τι than μήθ' ἕξεσθαι, and neither needs it.

ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη] ἡμῶν is the reading of the Coislinian and is much to be preferred to that of the Bodleian, ἡμῶν.
ΠΑΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Ἀγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμίων μεμνησθαι πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἱδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρῶν [μεμνησθαί ταύτης] ἐσοῦ ὡς μη [ἡ μη]. βραχῦ δὲ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπερασάμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοιοῦν.

ΣΩ. [Τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἐλομένῳ] βίον οίσθ' ὡς τοῖς τῶν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκολύτει ζῆν. Ἐφον γὰρ ποιν τῶν ἔν τῷ παραβαλή τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μῆτε μέγα μῆτε σμικρῶν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλλ' οὕτως ἐφονγῇ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἢ ἔκειν τῇ ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἵσως οὐδὲν ἀποκολύτει εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἔστι θεοτάτος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὖν οἰκός γ' οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεούς οὔτε τοῦναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γνημομενὸν ἔστιν. ΄λλὰ δὴ τοίον μὲν έκι καί εἰσάζῃς C ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εάν πρὸς λόγον τι ἢ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δεντερεῖα, εάν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεία δυνάμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσ-Θῆσομεν.

[μεμνησθαί ταύτης] Protarchus is to try and remember this, because it is an important fact; not because it is important to remember it. The change from ταύτης, which the author of this foolish supplement saw above to ταυτης, which he certainly wrote, would almost make one suspect that he meant μεμνησθαί for a passive. Just so in the Politicus, 286, c, we read, μη πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ μὲν κάτὰ τὰ τῆς μετερτησίς μέρος, τὸ τότε ἔφασαν δὲν μεμνησθαί πρὸς το πρέπον. But there the whole context shews that Plato wrote μεμνησθαί.

[Τῷ] . . . [ὁμώνῳ] This again has been borrowed from below, and placed here so that it makes ἀποκολύτει govern a dative. As to οὐδὲν ἀποκολύτει being used with the accusative suppressed, this is a common idiom. "It is quite possible to live the intellectual life in this manner."

Οὐκοῦν οὕτως I ought not to have followed two previous editors in preferring οὕτως, which rests on no good authority. The argument runs thus: "This neutral life is compatible with pure intelligence; for the man who chose the life of intelligence was obliged to forego all delight. In this way then (this being so) it would be the very life which he had already chosen, and it would also probably be the nearest approach to the life of the Gods." The transition from the philosopher to the Gods is marked by ἔξειν to ταί. The γε which has usurped the place of τε in the Editions, is absolutely without meaning.

ἐπισκεψόμεθα This is Bekker's conjecture for ἐπισκεψόμεθα, which occurs in all the Books, but is both less suitable in itself, unusual with εἰσάζῃς, which requires a future, and quite incompatible with προσΘῆσομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθοτατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γ’ ἔτερον εἴδος τῶν ἀπειθεῖαν ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λῆθης ἡν χάρις αὐτῆς ἑρεμεῖν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πάν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῶν περὶ τὸ σώμα ἡμῶν ἐκόστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβενώμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν πυγὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθὴς νείπαν ἐκάσαιτα, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀμφίφιον ἑόντα καὶ τὶν ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ξυπάθον ἔδειον τε καὶ ξυστὸν ἐπατέρω.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δὲ ἀμφίφιον ἑόντα καὶ τὴν πυγήν ἡμῶν θώμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀμφίφιον μὴ λανθάνειν, ὡς ὀρθοτατ’ ἐφόρουσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοινυν λειπθέντι μνημαίως ὑπολάβης ὡς λέγω λῆθης ἡνταῦθα ποῦ γένεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ λῆθης μνήμης ἐξοδος. ἢ δ’ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὐποῦ γέρων τοῦ δὲ μὴτ’ ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος ποι γίγνεσθαι φάναι τιν’ ἀποβολήν ἄτοπον. ἢ γὰρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοινυν ὄνοματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀναληπτέων] Ληπτέων alone is the opposite state. With this he contrasts that state of unconsciousness as to any proper verb. Παραληπτέων would be just as unsuitable as αναληπτέων; for they are not going to receive the information from others, but to learn it by observation. Nor is it at all likely that Plato would play on the word ἀναληπτέων, as denoting the proper function of μνήμη. I therefore conjecture πρότερον δὲν εἰς ληπτέουν.

κατὰ τρόπον] This is the opposite of ἀπὸ τρόπου. See below, 34, A.

ἐνταῦθα ποι] Somewhere here,—i.e., in the state we have been describing. μήτε γεγονότος ποι] I have adopted By λήθης γένεσις is meant a state of Stallbaum’s conjecture for ποις without forgetfulness arising out of a previous hesitation.
Protarchus does not such thing. He is hidden to use ἄναρχία in place of τὸ λεγόνται, and to keep λήγῃ in the same sense as hitherto.

γιγνόμενα “Πᾶσα γιγνόμενα Sydenhamus γιγνόμενα τεταρτ. Non video causarum.” Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthiae. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the joint participation in a certain state, the common effect of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

ποθ' η] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjectural reading of πᾶσα; the word ποτὲ adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogue.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅφθως λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ὡθ δὴ χάριν ἀπαντᾷ εὐφημοί ταῦτα, ἐστι τὸδε.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. Ἰν' ἃμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱδονὴν χαρὶς σῶματος ὅ τι μᾶλστα καὶ ἐναγγεῖατα λάβομεν, καὶ ἐμ' ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτ' ἐμφύτευ' ἐστιν δηλοῦσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγάμων τοίνυν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἦδη τὸ μέτα ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἱδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν τῇ μορ—
ΠΡΩ. Ὅμως ἠποτίξει τούτου τειχίσματος ἐναντίον ἐπιθυμίαν ἐναι, τι ποτ' ἐστι καὶ ποῦ γίνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Σκοπήμεν τοίνυν' οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολούμεν.
ΣΩ. Ἀπολούμεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτα γε, ὁ Πρώσαρχε, εὐφρότες δὲ νῦν ἔτητομεν, [ἀπολούμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ τὰῦτ' ἀπορίαν.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅφθως ἦμων· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτως πειρώμεθα λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Οὐκότι νῦν δὴ πείνη τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλ' ἔτερα τοιαῦτ' ἐφατεμεν εἰναι τινας ἐπιθυμίας;
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Πρὸς τι ποτ' ἀφ' ταύτων ἄνυπαντες, οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνι προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;
ΠΡΩ. Μά Άτ' οὗ χάριν ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁμως λεξεῖν.
ΣΩ. Ἐνεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀναλάβωμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δὴ;

"Ἰν' ἃμα] The reading of all the MSS., ένα μη', has sorely puzzled the editors; some have left it in despair, others have betaken themselves to τη'; but this particle is in contradiction to the superlatives which follow, and would be more appropriate to an attempt then commencing, than to a review of the ground already won. I once adopted δὴ, but with misgivings. I now see that INAMA was divided amiss, and so ΜΑ was changed into μη'. Ἀμα τοῦτο καλ ἃμα ἐχάσομαι is a very common formula. See below 41, 1, ἄμα παρακάτω καλ ἃμα γ' γενεῖσαι.

τᾶσαν [τῆν] μορφήν] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole appearance, the article has no business here.

ἀν νῦν ἔτητομεν] The common reading is Ἀπολούμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτα γε, ὁ Π', εὐφρότες δὲ νῦν ἔτητομεν. Ἀπολούμεν κ. τ. ἐ. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτα γε, nor is the first ἀπολούμεν, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the passage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἀπολούμεν, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circumstances δὲ would be untenable, for αὐτὰ ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.

"
"Δυστύ" There are two readings Δυστύ γέ που and Δυστύν που. As to the variety in the Bodleian έκαστον έ, we have but to turn it back into the uncial character and we see that it was simply another instance of Υ being mistaken for T, ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥΤΕΙ. Now if we try to make sense of Δυστύ x. t. έ, it can only mean, that something sometimes thirst, which is an incredible manner of expression, to say nothing of the perfect uselessness of γέ. If we try Δυστύ, we may by some effort obtain this sense, "We speak of thirsting as something", i.e. There is such a thing as thirsting. But then έκαστον loses all its meaning, and we are obliged further on to read κενούστον, whereas all the Books have κενούσται. This is one of those examples that in criticism nothing should be looked on as insignificant. Just as in one of the old Epigrams, I have shown that ἐν δὲ γ' ὄνων is ἐν δὲ ὑ' ὦν i.e. ἐν δὲ χαροθετώθων, so here Δυστύ ΔΕΓ was read as if it were Δυστύ ΓΕΠ. The rest was either invisible or neglected, and γέ was so supplemented as to become γέ που.

Πληρώσεως [γ'] ἁρα] The construction is ἁρα τι τῶν του δυστύντος εφάπτοτε ἐν τη' πληρώσεως. Some part, then, of the man who is thirsting is in contact with repletion. The γέ is useless, unless we change its place and read II. ἁρα ἐν γε τι.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἑφάπτεις οἷον, τῇ μνήμῃ δὴλον ὅτι τῷ γὰρ ἀν ἐπεὶ ἄλλῳ ἑφάπτειον;

ΠΡΩ. Σχέδον οὖν εἴδει.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὁ συμβέβηκα ἡμῖν ἐν τούτων τῶν λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἑπτάθυμαν οὗ φησίν ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος γλίγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πώς;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνοι παθήμασις ἐναντίον ἂν παντὸς ἥτοι μηδὲν τὰν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁμίῃ γ' ἐπὶ τοῦν ταῦταν ἄροσα ἡ τὰ παθήματα δῆλοι που μνήμῃ οἴσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασις ἐναντίον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγονος ἐπὶ τὰ ἑπτάθυμομέν' ἀποδείξεας ὁ μνήμῃ ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ἑξίμισας τὴν ἁ' ὁμίῃ καὶ ἑπτάθυμαι καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ἥτοι παντὸς ἀπέρριψεν.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ὀφθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἀνυψη ἄρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινήρ ἢ τὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῶ ὁ λόγος αἴρει.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἡτὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ γὰρ περὶ ταῦτα ταύτα κατανοῆσαι, βίον γὰρ εἰνός τι μοι φαίνεται βουλεύσαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποιοῦν περὶ βίον φράζεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσαι καὶ κενοῦσαι καὶ πάσιν ὡς περὶ συντριπτὸν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εὗ τις τοῦτον ἐν ἐπανέφη γνώμονας ἡμῶν ἀλγεί, τοτε δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡτὶ ταύτα.
ΣΩ. Τί δ', οταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνεται;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
ΣΩ. Ἀνά μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀληθῆ, μετηρεῖται δὲ τῶν ἱδέων ὅν γενομένων παῦσιν ἀν τῆς ἀληθείας, πληρώται δὲ μήπω τί 36 τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτοῦ ἐν μέσῳ κῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθῶς ὅλως ἢ χαῖροντα;
ΠΡΩ. Μά Δ', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοξίας τινὶ πόθῳ.
ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Πρῶταχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἴπες; ἢρ' οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι τις ἱδέων κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερῶς τοῦ πληρωθῆσεθαι καθέστηκε, τοτε δὲ τοναντίον ἀνεπιστῶς Β ἐξει;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα γε.
ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἔλπιζον μὲν πληρωθῆσεθαι τῷ μεμηρθαί δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἢμι δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Τότ' ἢρ' ἀνθρωπος καὶ τάλλα ζῶα ἱπτεῖται θ' ἀμα καὶ χαίρει.
ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.
ΣΩ. Τί δ', οταν ἀνεπιστῶς ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεῦξεσθαι πλη-
ρόσεως; ἢρ' οὖν τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἐν περί τὰς λύπας Σ πάθος, θ' οὖν καὶ δὴ κατιδὼν ψήθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεύεται, ὦ Σώφρατες.
ΣΩ. Ταύτη ᾿δ’ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τὸδε χρησμομεθα, —
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταῦτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἱδονὰς ᾗς
ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν’ ᾗ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ’ οὖ.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώφρατες, ἐν εἷς ψευδεῖς ἱδοναὶ ᾗς λύπαι;
ΣΩ. Πῶς δ’, ὦ Πρῶταχε, φάσοι ἐν ἀληθεῖς ᾗς ψευδεῖς,
᾿προσδοξίαν ἀληθεῖς ᾗς μή, ᾗς δόξαν ἀληθεῖς ᾗς ψευδεῖς;
ΠΡΩ. Λόγος μὲν ἔχω γεν’ ἐν ποι συγχωροῦν, τὰ δ’ ἔτερα
tαυτ’ οὖν ᾗν.
The word ξεινός is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. Soph. *Evang.* οὐ παίς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλὰ ἐξεινός αὐτός εἶ. In the *Republic*, Socrates addresses Glaucion and Adimantus as εἶ παῖς ἐξεινός τάνδρος. It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum's notion that Protarchus is addressed as the disciple of that man, meaning Philebus, is, I regret to see, repeated in his last edition. 

*All other long discourses*, except those which are to the purpose: ἡ καὶ ὅτανν ὁ. τ. ἦς, is equivalent to, or even short ones, when they are not to the point. 

ἀλλὰ περὶ τάντας I have substituted τάντα for the unmeaning τα αὐτά of the Editions. A little further on, I have restored πῶς δὴ φής; from Proterchus to Socrates. 

[ἐστιν] I have followed Stallbaum in bracketing this word, which arose from the scribe not understanding the adverbial use of ὅταν and ὅποι.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἔστι τι;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;
ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ γε, ὃ τὸ ἠδύνημον ἤδεται;
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντες γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκούν τὸ δοξάζων, ἂν τ' ὦθως ἂν τε μὴ ὦθως
Β δοξάζῃ, τὸ γε [δοξάζων] ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;
ΣΩ. Οὐκούν καὶ τὸ ἠδύνημον, ἂν τ' ὦθως ἂν τε μὴ ὦθως ἤδεται, τὸ γ' ὄντως ἤδεσθα δὴλον ὡς οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυει.
ΠΡΩ. Ναι, καὶ τοῦτο οὖν τούτως ἐξει.
ΣΩ. 'Οριν ποι' οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δοξά τι συνέδοξε τε καὶ ἀληθὺς ἦμιν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἢδονῆς μόνον ἀληθὲς, [δοξάζων δ' ὄντως καὶ χάρειν ἁμφότερα ὅμοιος εἰλήφεσθαι,] σκέπτεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀρα, ὅτι δοξή μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθαι συνέδοξοι τε καὶ ἀληθὲς, καὶ ἐγένετ' οὐ μόνον δοξὰ διὰ ταὐτ' ἄλλα καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκέπτεσθαι φης τούτω εἶναι;
ΣΩ. Ναι. πρὸς δὲ γε τοῦτοι, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράτατα ἥμιν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν πολ' ἄττα, ἢδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ μόνον ἄπερ ἐστὶ, ποιώ τινε τὸ δ' οὐ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ταῦθ' ἦμιν διομολογηθέντων.
ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.
ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὖν τούτῳ γε χαλεπών ἓδειν δι' οὐ καὶ ποιῶ τινε. τάλα γὰρ ἐπιστεύειν ὅτι μεγάλα τε καὶ σμικρά καὶ σφόδρα
D ἑκάτερα γίγνονται [, λύπαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί].

Οὐκούν τὸ δοξάζων [That which fancies, whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly, never loses its property of really fancying. It is an actual notion, though it may not correspond to an object. The same may be said of pleasure; the feeling is actually present, though the object is unreal. Thus there is no difference as to truth and falsehood between τὸ δοξάζων and τὸ ἠδύνημον. Unless indeed we say that pleasure is of such nature that it does not admit of any quality; but this is not so, for we speak of great and little pleasures, of good and bad pleasures, and so forth: then why not of false and true? I have removed the idle supplement δοξάζων, which betrays its origin by not knowing its place.

"Οτα" This is the reading of the best MS. for Τω. I have adopted it, and added σκέπτεσθαι as Baiter first suggested, but my σκέπτεσθαι is that already given to Protarchus. It would exceed the compass of a note to discuss the other changes which I have made, and the reasons for them are sufficiently obvious. Let it suffice to note that the disputants do not consider, nor have they any reason for considering, why both δοξάζων and χάρειν have the ἐντως, so that, had the sentence in brackets been as well expressed as it is clumsy, it could not have belonged to Plato.

σφόδρα ἑκάτερα [Violently the one or violently the other, as the gloss λύπαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί explains the words.]
ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. "Αν δὲ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὦ Πρώταχε, προσφύγηται τινι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἱδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τι μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ὅρθωτης ἤ τοιναντίον ὅρθωτητι τινὶ τούτων προσφύγηται; μὴν οὖν ὅρθω τὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐρωτεῦμεν, ἂν ὅρθωτῃ ἱσχύ; ταύτῳ δὲ ἱδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγμαίον.

ΣΩ. "Αν δὲ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἢ, τὴν δὲ-Εξαν τὸς ἀμαρτανόμενος γ' οὐκ ὅρθω ὁμολογητέον οὐδ' ὅρθως δοξαζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ παρὸς τῷ ἱδονή περὶ τὸ ἔργον ἂν λυπεῖταί ὅ τοιναντίον ἀμαρτανόμενον φωρίζωμεν, ὅρθω ἡ χρῆστην ἢ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτή προσόθομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖχ οἶδον τε, εὐπερ ἀμαρτάθηται γ' ἱδονή. 

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔσται γ' ἱδονή τοπλακάς οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὅρθως ἀλλὰ μετὰ πειθός ἢ μην γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν πειθός, τὴν δ' ἱδονήν αὐτήν 38 οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε προσείπου πειθός.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προσόθυμος ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἱδονῆς, ὦ Πρώταχε, λόγῳ ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὔδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἀπερ ἀκοῦω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὲς δ' ἢ μην οὔδέν, ὥ ἐταίρε, ἢ μετὰ δόξης τ' ἢ,

"Ἀν δὲ γ' ἀμαρτανόμενον" "If, when the object of a belief is misapprehended, the belief itself is wrong, shall we not also call that pain or pleasure wrong, which arises from a misapprehended object? If not, we must call it ὅρθη, χρηστή, and all manner of handsome names."

φωρίζωμεν] The Books have ἐφορίζωμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to gaze upon an error, but to detect it.

λέγομεν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture for ἔλεγομεν; the change was owing to TOTΕΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, which some copyists read as τὸ τέλεγομεν, supposing the imperfect to be required after τότε. When the bad fashion began to prevail of writing the words without the apostrophus, a practice which has led to endless corruption and confusion, this would become τότε ἐλεγομεν.*

Οὔδέν γε] The γε is added to οὔδείς and οὔδειν before πλὴν and its equivalents. Compare Ἰφ. Τ. 548 (564) οὔ-δείς με πλὴν καὶ ὀφείλειν σύμφωνα μεγάλων φόρων. Arist. Νυξ. 734. οὔδεν γε πλὴν ἢ. Pro- tag. 310, ὦ, Οὔδεν γ' εἰ μή.
ἀφῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονή τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἦμιν ἐγγυνημένης;

Β  ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμιχθῶν διάφερεσιν.
ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφοράς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ θεωρίᾳ ἐλθομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε ὅτι σοι φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἦμιν ἐστι μὲν ψεύδος, ἐστι δὲ καὶ ἀλήθες.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀστιν.
ΣΩ. Ἐπεται μὴ τάσις, ὃ τὸν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἄληθεὶ καὶ ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἦμιν καὶ C τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχορεῖν γίγνεσθαι ἐκάστοτε.
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλα.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἦμᾶς ὁδὲ περὶ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἤρομεθ' ἰσχεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἱδονῆς τενὶ πόρρῳθεν μὴ πάνω σαρφὸς [τὰ καθοράμενα] ξιμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαινὴς ἄν ταῦτ' ἀπέρ ὅρα.

καὶ τὸ δὴ δοξαζομεν ἐγχορεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ διαβολάζειν. This is interpreted as distinguishing one notion from another. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξαζέω, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of δη and δικ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δη which may be illustrated by Sophil, 234 c, ἄτε ποιεῖν ἀλήθει δε- κειν λέγοντα. καί τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σε- φάντασον πάντων ἀπευτ' εἶνα. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δη καὶ, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχο- ρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodleian, &c., to ἐγχερεῖται, but to undertake is surely less appropriate here than to be capable, for so we may render the impersonal ἐγχαρεῖ.
every-day occurrence is described. It is
diludicrous to see such words as
"What's that yonder by the rock under
a tree"? turned into bombast which we
cannot even translate, for φανταζόμενον
εστάναι is not even Greek.

Τι ποτ’ ἄρα] Iph. T. 387 (399).
Soph. Ajax 905. τίνος ποτ’ ἄρ’ ἔπανε χειρὶ δύσμας:
ἐπιτυχῶς δόξων] Chancing on the truth
in what he says. To this is afterwards
opposed παρενεχθεῖς, straying from the
mark, or swerving.

προσφύγοι] This is understood to
mean, He would say in addition. But
what he says here is no addition, but
a substitution. By changing ἐστὶ into
το, and adding οὐν to ἔγγυον, I think I
have restored the passage to its old
form and sense. "Looking upon it as
the work of some shepherds or other, he
would call what he described, a figure."

περὶ τούτου] The reading of the MSS.
is περὶ τούτων, in defence of which
one Editor quotes from Phaedo 58, A.
Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δικῆς ἐπίστευσε, and
refers to Heindorf's note on that pas-
sage. Heindorf's note is well worth
reading and so likewise is his note to
another passage in the same dialogue
to which reference is made. But it is
very unlikely that he would have looked
upon this as an example, or have de-
fended it. The analogy is merely ap-
πρω. τὸ ποίον;
σω. δοξεὶ τὸν ἤμων ὡς ψυχή βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεωκέναι.
πρω. δος;
39 σω. Ἡ μνήμη, ταῖς αἰσθήσεωι ἐξειπτύσσεσα εἰς ταῦταν, [καὶ] ἐκεῖνα ὑπὲρ ταῦτας ἄτατο τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἤμων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοτε [λόγους]: καὶ,

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain τὰ περὶ τῆς δικής as a change made from περὶ τῆν δίκην because of ἐπιστήμη. The main thought is περὶ τῆς δικής πυθόμασι; to which another is added, πυθόμασι τὰ γενόμενα, or, if any one likes it better, πυθόμασι τὰ περὶ τῆν δίκην. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Soocrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γνώμενα disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man ὃς τὰ φαινόμενα πλέον χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

'Ἡ μνήμη' The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταῦτα and φαίνονται, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that κάθεινά δὲ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what other things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the organ or power itself. When I remember this, or see that, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a πάθημα or Vision a πάθημα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that ἐκεῖνα τὰ παθήματα may mean those above-mentioned sensations or perceptions, and ἐπὶ τ. ἔστι, which are connected with these αἰσθήσεις. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call impressions? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write impressions upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators haste to the rescue, saying 'Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case', and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "inscribes true things, the results are true λόγοι". That is to say, that true λόγοι are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμματέως who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ὁ γραμματέως) also called the Writer (ὁ γραμματιστής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγοι are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?
ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ [τούτῳ τὸ πάθημα], δόξα εἰ ἀληθῆς
καὶ λόγοι εἰς' αὐτόν ξιμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἴμιν γιγνόμενοι.
ψευδὴ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἴμιν γραμματέως γραψῇ, τα-
ναντία τοῖς ἀληθεῖσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάν ὡς ὅν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τά ὁ-β
θέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχομαι δὴ καὶ ἑτερον δημιουργὸν ἴμιων ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, δε μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων
eἰκόνας ἐν τῷ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοιοῦτον αἴ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. "Οταν ἂς ὁφεις ἦ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τά τούτο
dοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα' ἀπειρογῶν τις τάς τῶν δοξοθέντων
καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὅρα πως. ἦ τοῦτον οὖν ἐστὶν θ
γιγνόμενον παρ' ἴμιν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφάδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Οὐκοῦν αἴ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες
ἀληθεῖς, αἴ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταύτ' ὅρθως εἰρήκαμεν, ἐτε καὶ τὸδ' ἐπὶ τού-
tοις σκεπήμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦτ' ἴ-
μιῶν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαίον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὖ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντεων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὑσαντίως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἴ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἱδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι Δ

τοῦτων γράφαι] τοῦτων can have no other
construction here except as agree-
ing with λεγομένων, which does not
want it, and is too far removed from it
to be taken with it, and not far enough
to require being repeated in it, or repre-
sented by it. It is also probable that
Plato would use a different verb for the
second artificer; and for these reasons I
venture to propose in place of τοῦτων
γράφει, που ὑγραφῆ.

Οὐκοῦν αἴ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἱδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι Δ

first, that they preceded the others, ὅτι
προγέγονοτα, and secondly, that our an-
ticipation was thus connected with future
time: ὃς ἐξωμαβιν . . . εἶναι γεγομέ-
νον. The scribes have turned this into
προγέγοντα' ἢ ν., and ὅτα ἐξωμαβιν.
Eleven lines above we have had ἔτι
γεγομένον, (not γέγονετας) something
that occurs; and in 42, Κ, we shall find
the same usage. So here εἶναι γεγομέ-
νον is not a mere periphrasis of γέγο-
νευ, but = εἶναι τὸ τῶν γεγομένων.
Another instance which I have seen
quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

Platonic Philebus.
Either of these is unsightly, tended, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: "You admit that mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they have no relation with the future." Secondly, Protarchus' answer Ἱφηδρα γε is a reply not to a question Πάτερον, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian who read Οὐκοῦν = igitur, and saw that it gave the opposite sense to that intended, thought of πάτερον as the nearest suitable word, in point of meaning, to that which he supposed to require his correction.
\[ \Sigma \]. Λόγου μή εἰσιν ἐν ἑυάστοις ἤμων, ὡς ἐλπίδας ὑνίων μαζὸμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

\[ \Sigma \]. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματ' ἐξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις ὅρας πολλάες ἐκατον χρυσον γεγομένον ἀφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἰδιναζ. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐρ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;  

\[ \Sigma \]. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἁγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγομένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεωριεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὐτὸ πολὺ ὀνειρισθεῖν, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μᾶλλον φατέον.

\[ \Sigma \]. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἰδοναὶ γ' οὐδὲν ἤττον πάρεις ἐξωγραφημέναι, πενεδεῖς δ' αὐταί ποιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήρ;  

\[ \Sigma \]. Ψευδεῖν ἢρ' ἰδοναίς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαῖρον—οἷς, οἱ δ' ἁγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

\[ \Sigma \]. Εἰσί δὴ, κατὰ τοῖς νῦν λόγοις, πενεδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἰδοναὶ, μεμιμημέναι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ ἠπάτη δ' ὑσαίως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

\[ \Sigma \]. Οὐκοῦν ἢν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως ἄει τῷ τὸ παράπτων δοξάζοντα, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονός μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομέ-νους ἐνστε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω γε.

\[ \Sigma \]. Καὶ ταῦτα γ' ἤς, οἷμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν δ ζεῦ δυντε καὶ τὸ πενεδὸς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.

ἐνεξωγραφημένον 'He sees the gold, and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτὸν into αὐτόν is indispensable; but the Editors have thought it more prudent to make αὐτόν mean himself, than to change a breathing.  

ἐντὸ τὰ γελοιοτέρα] Convev. 215, A.  

Polit. 293, e, ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχύνα. Horace, Epist. ii. 1, 265.  

ficto  

In pejus vultu proponi cereus.
ΣΩ. Τι οὖν; οὐχ ἀνταποδοτεῖν ταῖς λύσισι τε καὶ ἵδοναίς της τοῦτων ἀντίστροφον ἔστιν ἐν ἑκείνοις;
ΠΡΩ. Πώς;
ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄνειρος ἢ ἔτι τῷ το παράλλην ὅπως-οὖν καὶ εἰκὴ χαίροντε, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὐκ ὑπὲρ ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἱσοῦς πλειστάνως ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσιν ποτε γενήσεσθαι.
ΕΤΤΟΥ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὖνᾶς ἀναγκαῖον, ὃ Σόφρατες, ἔχειν.
ΣΩ. Οἰκοῦν ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐν ἔν περὶ φρόσω τε καὶ Ἡμων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐστι καὶ ψευδὴ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίοτε;
ΠΡΩ. Πάνι μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Τι δὲ; πονηρᾶς δόξας [καὶ χρηστάς] ἄλλους [ἡ ψευ-δεῖς] γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.
ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονάς γ', οἷμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινὰ 41 τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηρὰ πλὴρ τῆς ψευδεῖς εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάν μὲν οὖν τοιναντίον, ὃ Σόφρατες, ἐφημας.

τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔστιν] If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τοῦτων. The ἔστις (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shewn to be ἐν ἑκείνοις, that is in δέξας and to δέξεσθαι: and we are invited to attribute an analogous ἔστις to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων ἔστιν. The ἔστις also which we grant to these must be ἀντίστροφος to another, which is in those. This would lead us to read ἔστιν τὴν ἐν ἑκείνοις; but as to τοῦτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with it, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τοῦτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἑκείνας pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύ-σισι τε καὶ γένομαι, and frame the sentence thus: οὐχ ἀνταποδοτεῖν τὴν τούτων ἔστιν ἀντίστροφον ἑκείνοις; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other.

Τι δὲ; πονηρᾶς] Nothing is plainer than this sentence when we leave out the interpolations. καὶ χρηστάς is evidently out of place; and a little attention to γιγνομένας shews that γαρ ψευδεῖς is no better. The complete sentence would be ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν πονηρ-άς δόξας ἄλλως γιγνομένας (πονηρᾶς γαρ τῆς ψευδεῖς εἶναι);
Πάν μὲν οὖν τοιναντίον] The MSS. and Edd. have all Πάν μὲν οὖν τοιναντίον, which is not Greek. As μὲν οὖν, like ἴμμο, is used when one improves upon another's assertion, and this may be done either by adding to it, or by completely changing it, it denotes either assent or contradiction, according to the words which accompany it. Thus πάν μὲν οὖν implies that the answerer does not think the first speaker positive enough; it amounts, therefore, to a strong assent. But an assent is out of the question in this passage; so that nothing would remain but to join πάνω with τοιναντίον, which would be as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is very opposite to another would be in English.
σχεδόν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πάντων ποιηθάς ἂν τις λύτας τε καὶ ἤδονάς θείη, μεγάλῃ δ' ἄλλῃ καὶ πολλῇ σεμπιπτούσας πονηρία.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοῖν ποιηθάς ἤδονάς καὶ διὰ ποιηθίαν ὀύσας τοιαύτας ὡλίγον ὑστερον ἔρωμεν, ἐὰν ἐπὶ δοξῆς νῦν τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλάς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνύσας τε καὶ ἐγγυνομένας λεγέτων. τούτῳ γὰρ Ἰσως χρησὶ—Β μεθά πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅψυ γὰρ οὖχ; εἶπερ γ' εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ', ὁ Πρῶτοφυξς, εἰσι κατὰ γε τὴν Ἐμὴν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ὡς ἂν κέται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγχτον δή-που γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστόμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταί πρὸς τούτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ιομεν.

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἰπερ μεμνήμεθα, [ὁλίγον] ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς, ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπισφυμα ἐν ἡμῖν ὡς, C δήχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρίς τῆς ψυχῆς τοὺς παθήμασι διείληται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόνοι τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἢν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα-τος ἐναιτίων ἔξεων ἢ τότε, τὴν δ' ἀληθῶν ἢ τίνα διὰ πᾶθος ἤδονήν τὸ σῶμα ἢν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

τῷ ψευδεῖ] I have altered τῷ ψευδεῖ into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα] It is necessary to caution the reader against Stallbaum's translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἦν δὲ κέται is consequently made to mean so long as it continues. To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλῶς. But τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἔξεων) obviously refers to the preceding εἶδον κατὰ γε τὴν Ἐμήν, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ' ἡμῖν, and no less by κέται: for παρ' ἡμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and κέται, which is the passive of Κέται, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than εἶδον.

ἔξεων ἡ τότε] ἔξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἄλη, is the reading of the received text. The Boeck has however τοὺς for τὸ δὲ, that is, the copyist had before him ΤΟΤΕ and read it as ΤΟΥΣ. On this is founded the emendation ΕΞΕΩΝΗΤΟΤΕ. The
necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding A, as H was from its likeness to N. The continual confusion of ΔΗ and AN in MSS. illustrates both these phenomena. 

τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονήν] The best MSS. have τλῆς for ταῦτα, an error which arose from a confusion of A and Λ. But though the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of ἡδονή makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τῆν δ’ ἀλγηδόνα τὴν διὰ Τὶ Πάδος ἡδῆ ἐνῶν x. t. τ. The meaning of διὰ πάθος appears to be, through actual impression, as opposed to the pleasure of expectation.

Γιγνεσθαι is not this an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γιγνόμενον? If we read Φαίνεται, we shall get rid of the clumsy γιγνεσθαι. and we shall have a better correspondence to ἐστιν, and to Protagoras' Φαίνεται γοῦν. 

ἐστιν] The construction is εἰρηται 

ως δέχεσθαι, ἃτι ἐστιν,—where ὡς introduces the fact, and ἃτι the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted Phaedo 95, d. But there also the text is not trustworthy. καὶ ταξιτωρωμένη τε ὃς x. t. κ. has already excited the suspicion of Heindorf, though I do not assent to his mode of correcting it. By striking out ἀπαγώγην and by changing καὶ into Ἡ we clear away the two only difficulties. Then ἦν would take ἔστιν and ἀπολύσατο for the same reason that ἃτι takes εστιν.

Τὶς οὖν μηχανή ταῦτ’ ἐρωτός χρίνεσθαι;
ΠΡΩ. Πη δή καί πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τόδε τὸ βουλήμα ἦμιν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων· ἐν τοιούτῳ τις διαγνώσα [βούλεται] ἐκάστοτε, τίς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τις ἡδύτων καὶ τις μᾶλλον [καὶ τις σφοδρότερα], ἴδην τε πρὸς ἡδόνην καὶ ἱδυτή πρὸς ἱδυτη κρδόν μήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐστι ταῦτα τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὡθεῖ τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὅραν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀληθείαν ἀφαινῆτε καὶ ψευδὴ ποιεῖ δοξάζετε, ἢ ἐν λύπαις δ' ἁρά καὶ ἡδονάις οὐκ ἐστι ταῦτα τούτο γνώμουν;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ συμφώνῳ ἐμπρόσθε θέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον λέγετις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς 'μα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παράμισος ἀντιπλασίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

Et tóde τὸ βουλήμα] I have changed the reading and punctuation. τούτων ἐν τοιούτοις τις is certainly not elegant, but by explaining τούτων to be the pleasures and pains and ἐν τοιούτοις τις to be on such occasions, some of us may be brought to tolerate it. But τὸ βουλήμα τῆς κρίσεως διαγνώσα βούλεται brings its own condemnation with it. It may be said that there is no impropriety in the expression—"The will wills". But τὸ βουλήμα is not the will, but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς κρίσεως is the wish to judge. In the Laws 863, b, Plato declares Pleasure πράττειν ὃ τι περ ἐν αὐτῇς ἡ βούλησις ἐξελήσθη; but this expression though unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure cannot desire, and if he had said ἡ βούλησις, he would have been obliged to forego the main ground of opposition to ἡμᾶς, παῖσα τε ἀπάτης. In that passage I will take this opportunity of remarking that βιοῦσα χαί written copiously has been miscopied βιαίσαι. But how can the wish to judge judge? —and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Protarchus' answer — ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆς. By leaving out καὶ τις σφοδρότερα, the difficulty which beset τὸ μᾶλλον disappears. Compare above 37, δ', σφοδρά ἐκάτερα, which answers exactly to μᾶλλον ἱδύτη &c.

Ἐναντίον] This is perhaps the most beautiful of all the remarks in this admirable disquisition on pleasure. Formerly it had been agreed that notions, as they happened to be true or false, occasioned a corresponding difference in the pleasures and pains depending on them; but now it has been shown that pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves.

Ἀντιπλασίαν] Observe the imperfect: Were found to communicate their quality (of truth or falsehood) to the pains and pleasures.
Οὗν δὲ γ' αυταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθεν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἠμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἄλληλας, αἱ μὲν ἰδονὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζονας φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λέπται δ' αὖ δία τὸ παρ᾽ ἰδονὶ τοῦναντίον ἐκεῖνος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκῃ γίγνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, δοσὶ μείζονος τῶν ὀυσῶν ἐκάστεροι καὶ ἐλέηταις φαίνονται, τούτῳ ἀποτελομένος ἐκατέρωτον τὸ φανομένον ζ ἀλλ' οὖν ὑν, οὔτ' αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φανομένον ἔρεις, οὐδ' αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἰδονίας καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὄρθον τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς τολμήσεις λέγαιν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τούτων έξεσι ὄψομεθα, ἐὰν τῇβ' ἀπαντώμενε, ἰδονὶς καὶ λύπας φευγέοις ἐκταμιὲν ἡ τατάς φανομένας τε καὶ ὦσις ἐν τοῖς ξύοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δή καὶ πόσως λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴρθηται ποὺν πολλάκις ότι, τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων δια-φειομένης μὲν συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις καὶ πληρώσεις καὶ κενώσεις καὶ τοὺς ὄξεις καὶ φύσεις, λύπαι τε καὶ ἀληθονὲς καὶ ὀδόνας καὶ πάντα, ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει, ἐνυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναὶ, ταύτ' εἴρθηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δὲ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστήται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἰδονὶν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἤμιὸν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μιθὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἤμιὸν ἐ; 

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἐὰν γένοιτο, ὁ Σωκράτες;

Ἐ ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ὃ ὅν ὑν ἦρον, τὸ ἤρετάμα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ἀπὸ τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὖ κολύει ἐμὲ διερέσθαι σὲ πάλιν.

Οὗκοῦν, δεῖ ὅτι That much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap- which either appears greater than it really pearance, nor will you venture to call is, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.
ΠΡΩ. Ποιαν;
ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' ὄντι μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὥς Πρώταρχε, φήσο, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτ' ἀναγχαίον εἶσεν συμβαίνειν ἢμιν;
ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινοῦμένου τὸν σώματος ἐρ' ἐκάτερα φής;
ΣΩ. Ὅτειν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀδηλὸν δὴ τοιτὸ γ', ὁ Σῶκρατες, ὡς οὐθ' ἣδονη γίγνοιτ' ἀν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ποτ' ὄντ' ἀν τις λήτη.
ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἄλλα γὰρ, οἴμαι, τάδε λέγεις, ὡς 48 αὲὶ τῷ τοιών ἀναγχαίον ἡμῖν ἥμισυ, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν ἀεὶ γὰρ ἄπαντ' ἂν καὶ κατώ δει.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀέροισι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοξοῦσι γ' ὥς φαινόμεν λέγειν.
ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, μὴ φαίλοι γ' ὄντες; ἄλλα γὰρ ὑπεκ- στήκα τὸν λόγον ἑπισφέρομεν τοῦτον βοῦλομαί. τῇθ' οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ οὐ μοι ἑξίμηθεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀέγε ὅτη.
ΣΩ. Τάκτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἐστιν, φώμεν πρὸς τούτους. οὐ δ' ἀπόκριναι πότερον αἱ πάντα, ὅπως πάσχει τι τῶν Β ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχου, καὶ οὔτ' αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐδὲν πάσχον- τες, ἡ πᾶν τούλισσαν· ὄλοιν γὰρ τὰ γε τοιαύτα λέληθη πᾶν· ἡμᾶς.
ΠΡΩ. Ἠπαν δήσων τούλισσαν.
ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλὸς ἡμῖν εἴηται τὸ γὼν δὴ ἀμηδέν, ὡς αἰ μεταβολαὶ κατώ τέ καὶ ἀνό γιγνόμεναι λύπας τε καὶ ἱδο- νὰς ἀπεράντοντα.
ΠΡΩ. Τι μὴν;
ΣΩ. Ἡἡ ἐσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόνος μενον.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀδι γὰρ ἀπαντᾷ] The passages in Plato, from which we may learn a full account of this doctrine of Heraclitus, are Theatet. 179—80, Sophist. 243—50, and Cratyl. 402. It is here alluded to, because at first sight it would appear to exclude the possibility of that state of indifference to pleasure and pain from which Socrates is about to show another instance of a false pleasure, namely, where relief from pain (which is indifference) is thought and spoken of as positive pleasure. ὑπεκοτήναι] Soph. Ajax, 82. φρο- νοῦντα γὰρ κεκλήθης ἀν ἐξέστην ἔκκει. Τι μὴν] This generally amounts to nothing more than an asseent; but as its original meaning is What else? it is perfectly suitable here.
ΣΩ. Ἡδὲ λέγειν φαίνεται ἐμου' οὖτος τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.  
ΠΡΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἤμιν, ὄντινων βούλει, τίθει, καὶ ἠλύσαν ἐν ὑφότητες χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσὸν, τὸ δ' ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μυθετέρα τοὐτῶν.  
ΠΡΩ. Κείται.  
ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μυθέτερα τοὐτὸν ἐσοφ' ἤμιν ὀποῖς ἥτατερα γένοιτ' ἄν, χρυσὸς ἡ ἄργυρος;  
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;  
ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ὁ μέσος βίος ἤδε ἡ λυπηρὸς γενόμενος

[Οὐντινων βούλει] He is not speaking of the three lives in particular, but supposes any three things, to two of which names have been given, but the third is merely known as not either. The question then is, can it become either? See the next note.

[Γενόμενος] Commonly λεγόμενος. But when we consider how awkwardly this word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοιτ' ἄν, it seems scarcely possible to doubt that this is one of the many instances where λεγόμενος has usurped the place of γενόμενος. It would be childish to say ὁ μέσος βίος is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot alter its nature, and make it become pleasure.
δρόμος ἐν ποτε, οὔτε εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὔτε εἰ λέγοι, λεγεῖν, κατὰ γε τὸν ὄρθον λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξάζοντον αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπώνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν;

ΣΩ. Οἴκοιον οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγον ποι. ΠΡΩ. Κινόμενεις;

ΣΩ. Ψευδὸς γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρίς [τοῦ μὴ λυπέισθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἡ φύσις ἔκατερον. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρίς γ’, ἢν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ ἡμῖν ταῦτα εἶναι, καθά- περ ἄρτι, τοῖς ἡ δόξα μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, Β τινὶ δ’ ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ ἀγαθὸν ἢν, ἢδ’ προσ-

αγορεύσθαι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ νῦν τούτῳ, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ἔφωτομεθα ὡς’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνοι.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοίδε, ὃ Πρώ-

ταχεῖς, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δ’ αὐτοῖς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράπαν ἠθονᾶς οὐ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Διπλῶν ταῦτα εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγείς, δε νῦν οἱ περὶ Φιλήβου ἠθόναι ἐπνοομαξόσωσιν.

ἐπερ χωρίς] See Appendix.
Πότερον οὖν αἰσθανόμεθα] One alternative having been disposed of, the other is taken up: “If freedom from pain is not pleasure, is there such a thing as absolute pleasure?” And thus is introduced another question: “Is pleasure possible without pain?” I have added, in the Appendix, a translation of a passage from Kant’s Anthropologie, which may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους] This is generally understood of Antisthenes. The description applies very well to what we learn of him from Diogenes Laertius. οὐ τέχνη reminds one of the many sneers against the Platonic Ideas which are attributed to him and his friends. A disposition without meanness but harsh, is also in keeping with his character, though not with Plato’s general appreciation of the Cynics.
ΠΡΩ. Τούτως οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἦ πώς, ὁ Σωκρατείς;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ μάντεσι προσχρησθαί τισι, μονομενένοις οὐ τέργη ἀλλὰ τινι δυσχερεῖς φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς λιαν μεμισμότοις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ἴγεις, δότε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἑπιγωγὸν, γοίενναι, δ' οὖν ἡδονή, εἶναι. τούτως μὲν οὖν ταύτ' ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενοι ἐν καὶ ταλλ' αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα, αἰ γέ μοι δοξοῦσι ἡδονάι ἄλλης καὶ εἰς τεῦχε, ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοῦ τῶν λόγων σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτής παραθέμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρέθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδόθωμεν δὴ τούτως ὅσπερ ξυμβιβάζομεν, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἔχον. οἷον γὰρ τοιῶν τι λέγειν αὕτως, ἀγχομένως ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς, εἰ δουληθείμεν ὅσπον Εἰδοὺς τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οὖν τὸν σκηνοῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκηνότατα ἀποβλέπωντες οὕτως ἄν μᾶλλον συνοίσιμον η πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκηνότητα; δεὶ δὴ σε, ὁ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτως τοῖς δυσχεραίνοντις ἀποφίνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ' αὕτως ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρώτα μεγέθει.

ΣΩ. Οὗτοιν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἄρτινά ποτ' ἔχει φύσιν δουληθείμεν, οὖν εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπο-455 ἔλεπτον ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας καὶ αφροτάτας λεγομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν οὐ κατὰ συχροφοί τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἰ πρόχειροι γε, ἄλλης καὶ μέγιστοι τῶν ἡδονῶν, δὲ λέγομεν πολλάς, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐσιν αὐταί.

μεμωσηκότων] This is not a capricious change from the dative to the genitive, nor is to be taken absolutely, for then αὐτῶν would have been necessary; but it is in construction with δυσχερεῖς φύσεως—With the severity of men who have too much hated, &c.

ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτής] So that this very attractiveness of it is a trick and imposture, and not pleasure.

dυσχεράσματα is condemned by Pol-lux as bad Greek, and Lobeck observes that such compound verbs as ἀναπταύω, δυσκυμανω, and the like (where the noun from which the verb comes is already a compound), have no substantives derived from them. But ἄκαλα-στάματα in Aristoph. Lysist. 398 is a sound reading, and the sacriety of such formations would arise partly from the sacriety of the verbs, and partly from a fear of their length.

τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς The smallest pleasures. τὰ πολλοστὰ σκηνότητα, things having the smallest degrees of hardness. The word is formed like the ordinal numbers used to express fractions.

Ἀλλ' οὖν] The MSS. have Ἀρ' οὖν,
which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodleian and its fellows, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of 'Αρ' into 'Αλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that we conclude it is admitted, than to ask whether it is so. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: "Which are the greatest pleasures?" "Whether they are easily procured", does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αἵτω represents αἱ ἄκρωτα καὶ αφοροταται, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. 'Αλλ' oũ, αἱ πρόχειροι γε, δ' λέγομεν πολλάκις, εἰςόν αὕται: but we may go further and introduce αἱ περὶ τὸ σώμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ΑΠΙΕΠ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspicious parts already admitted. That is to say; a copyist had got as far as ΑΠΙΕΠ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped δ' λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑΠΙΕΠ. "Here is some gap", says a grammarian, "which we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are the most intense. 

προσγιγνωνται This is Stephens' emendation for προσγιγνωνται; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the Variae Leciones of even the best collations, and see the blunders committed in πρὸ and τὸ (i.e., πρὸς), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS. Pántos, ὑπόσα] The received text is Pánta ὑπόσα. I have written Pántos, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ἔδειξε alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be περὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἀπολογημένων decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stallbaum's explanatory paraphrase Pάντα εὐδάναι πάσχειν ὑπόσα δία τοῦ σώματος εἰσάξας πάσχειν shows an utter misconception of what brevity authorizes or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives καὶ the office of joining two coordinate clauses, leaves τε to join two sentences.
The Books have been cast in the form of a letter to a friend, and are written in MS. They are continually confounded. This I first learned from a note of Cobet in his Edition of a Fragment of Philostratus. I have since found another instance in Strabo xvi, 3, where we must read ὡστε ἐπιτείνωσαί τὸ παράδεισον "so that the marvel is intensified." Compare below 46, 6, ξύντασιν ἄγραν, and 47, 4, ἡ ἑπτάνει τε καὶ ἑνὸς τρῆναι τοιαῦτα. I am acquainted with the fragments of Eupolis and Telelides where συγγίγνεσθαι is coupled with μᾶζις and with φάγοισι; but they are merely comic expressions for enjoying, like Aristophanes' having an interview with grapes. Προτάσει συγγίγνεσθαι (Eup. fragm.) is a little more apposite, but συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς ἐξ ῆτὸ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡ ἕττον δεχομένων.

If any one still retains his belief that all the writers of our copies were scrupulous about the text, so as even to prefer nonsense to falsification (for doubtless there were some such) let him look at the words which follow διά κείμενον; and so ἡ ἑπτάνει is invented. Again τοιοῦτον by some blunder is read or written as τοιοῦτος; immediately one is at hand with a healing supplement, and upon its occurrence, while τοιοῦτον is utterly lost.

I have put this Alexandrian phrase in brackets.

οὗτοι ἡπτοὺς δὲς] I entirely agree with Stallbaum that it is, 'nodum in scripo querere,' to be dissatisfied with these words; but his own translation of them has led him to suspect another word which is equally sound. The sense is, You will presently prove it (that you understand me) no less (than you now

The common reading; but there is no authority but that of a worthless copy for νῦν. My impression is that οὗτοι should be οὕτω, which will make νῦν unnecessary.
lónos ἐξάστοιε, ὅ τοῦ Μηδὲν ἔγαν παρακελεύμενος, ὡς πει—Ε.Token: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρότων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἢ σφοδρὰ ἤδονῆ κατέχουσα περιβολήσας ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς· καὶ εἰ τε ταῦτ’ ὀφεῖς ἔχει, δήλον ὡς ἐν τινὶ πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς [καὶ τοὺς σώματος], ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ἄφετῇ μέγιστα μὲν ἤδοναι, μέγιστα δὲ καὶ ὁπνεύει, γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοὖν τούτων τινὰς προελομένων δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἤχοισας ἠλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναί μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶν νοσημάτων ἤδονάς, τίνα ποτ’ ἤχουσα τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ὡς οὖς ἐπιπομεν δυσχερεῖς μι-

σοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἴκον τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστοῖς τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ ὡς ταινία, οὐκ ἀλλὰς δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τὸν γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά-

θος ἢμιν, ὁ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φύμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἤδονὴ ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τούτῳ γε [ἀρα], ὡς Σωκράτης, ἐσκεῖ γί-

γνεσθαι τι κεκόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν ἄν Φιλήβου γ’ ἔνεξα παρετέμπη τῶν λόγων. B

profess it), for you will answer my ques-

tion.

περιβολήσας ἀπεργάζεται. The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extravagant and impetuous characters. It is here opposed to the staid and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

καὶ τοὺς σώματος] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ἀφροῖς, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἀρα] I have cancelled ἄρα as perfectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τούτῳ γὰρ through mistaking γὲ. Another came and turned γὰρ into γ’ ἂρ.

Οὐ μὴν ἄν Φιλήβου γ’ The Cois-

linian has μὴν which one Editor adopts and so affords to another the opportunity for telling the world that δὴ is never put after μὴν. A little attention to the sense would have been better bestowed than it is on such a truism. As the words stand in the Books, Socrates is made to say that he did not bring forward these instances about itch on account of Philebus. Probably not; but why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλή-

βος ἄ νολας should be troubled with the complaint? Or can he think it necessary to declare that it was not to make fun of him that he alluded to it? As this is out of the question, the only other reason for bringing Phile-

bus in at all must be that Philebus is fastidious, and will look upon him as
ἀλλ' ἂνεν τούτων, ὃ Ἱσόπαση, τῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύτας ἐπομένων, ἂν μὴ καταφρῶσι, σχέδον οὖν ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα διαφράσσαι τὸ τῶν ξυγγενέων.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἵτεὼν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς, τὰς ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ζωνονόσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοῖνυν [μιᾷς] αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὰς δ' ἀδ C τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνεφόσομεν λύσας ἱδονὰς μυκ-θεῖσας, τοτε μὲν ἤδονάς τα ξυγμιρότερα, τοτε δὲ λύσας ἐπι-καλομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῖσς;

ΣΩ. 'Οσπών ἐν τῇ καταστασίᾳ τῆς τῇ διαφρόφη γάνα-τι ἐμα πρὶν παρέχη, ποτὲ ψυχῶν θέρμαται καὶ θεριμανόμενον ἐνιοτέρ ψυχήται, ζητών, οἷμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ' ἁπαλλάκ-τευθα, το δὴ λέγομεν πικρόγλυκν [μεμιγμένον], μετὰ D δυσαπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὑστερον ἃνεσιν ὕβριαν τοιεί.

φορτώκες for making such nasty allu- sions. This is in keeping with the other traits of him in the dialogue; but then he must say: "For Philebus' sake I would not have introduced this topic, but I cannot do without it." And so the ΑΗ which helped Stallbaum to chastise Fischer disappears into ΑΝ, and as μην is the equivalent of μέντοι and γε is found in all the Books, I have adopted the latter particle also.

Οὐκοῦν [ἵτεών] In the Books Protar- chus' speech in continued down to ξυγ- γενεῖς: which arrangement makes the young man show the way and the phil-osopher follow it.

Εἰσὶ τοῖνυν] I have cancelled μιᾷς. Unless this be done, and ξυγνοῦσα be understood, the following clauses make downright nonsense. "There are bodily pleasures which mix in bodies, and mental pleasures which mix in the mind", is true and simple. But if you say there are mixtures— then one of each pair, either κατά τὴν σώμα ἡ ἂν δ. τ. σώματι, either αὖ-

tης τ. ψ. or ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ becomes quite meaningless.

ποτὲ] This word occurs twice in the Bodleian, both before and after ψυχῶν. It is properly cancelled in the second place, for being used in opposition to ἐνιοτέρ, it would be placed in such a part of the sentence as would mark that it is not used as a mere enclitic. Bekker's correction of ἄκρογλυκνον for ἄκρο γλυκύν is fully borne out by τὸ δὴ λέγομεν: but in recommending it he should also have advised the ex- pulsion of μεμιγμένον. For δυσαπα- 
λακτίας Hirschig reads δυσπαλλακτίας. But the departure from analogy is in favour of our reading, as a probable Atticism.

ξύντασιν] This is the reading of the best MSS.; the others have σύστασιν, which is irreconcilable with ἄγιαν, such an epithet being only applicable to a word signifying some active process. Besides, σύστασις after ἀγανάκτησις would be an anteclimax; for it is pro- perly used to denote the effect of sadness
ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ’ ἀληθείς τοῦ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόντιν αὐτὰ τιμεῖς ὁ μὲν ἐκ ἥπερ εἰσὶ λυπων τῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων πλεῖόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλεῖον λῦσαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γίγνονται, τὰς τῆς ψωφᾶς λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταῦτα εἰναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαρκλησίων. ὡσπερ δὲ ἐντὸς τὸ ζέων ἤ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαίνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνίσει μὴ ἑρίκυνται τις, τὰ δ’ ἐπιπλοῦσι μόνον διαχεῖ, τοτε δέ σφοντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τὸναντίον μεταβάλλοντες, ἀπορίας ἐνιοτέρ’ ἀμφαιῶν [ἡδονᾶς], τοτε δὲ τοὐναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἤξοι λύπας ἡδονάς ἐξερετοῦσιν, εἰς ὄπισθ’ ἕν δέσμῃ, παρέσωντο, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βίᾳ διαχεῖν ἤ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν τκαί ἰμιοῦ λύπας ἡδονᾶς παρατηθέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθείατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐχον δηλωσαι [αὖ] πλεῖον ἡδονῆ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἢμικῆγ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμημένον τῆς λύπης γαρκλησει τε καὶ ἱέμα ἀγανακτεὶν τοιεὶ, τὸ δ’ αὐτὸς τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλεῖόν ἐγκεκριμένον συνετεῖν τε καὶ ἐνιότε πιθανον τοιεὶ, καὶ in turning the mind back upon itself. Συνετείνειν is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure: it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (renatus morbor tempitant acuto) or the thrill of pleasure (pertinent gaudia pectus).

Δέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν] The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαρκλησιῶν from that described afterwards. I have put δ’ after ἐπίταται. The first case is that where ψυχῶν and τρίψεως are said διαχεῖ, because they discuss the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated, then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place: that is to say, by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible ἀπορίας, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling ἡδονᾶς. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause; they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure. This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῷ τὰς σ. β. δ. ἡ δ. συγχεῖν, ὡμοῦ λυπας ἢδονας παρατηθέντες: procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing (κυνηγεῖν καὶ τρίψει) what is congested (the accumulated heat), and determining what is dispersed (by inflaming the surface artificially).

Platonis Philebus.
παντοία μὲν χρώματα, παντοία δὲ σχήματα, παντοία δὲ πνεύματα ἁπατεργαζόμενα πάσαιν ἔκλητιν καὶ βοῶς μετ' ἀφρούνης ἀπεργάζεται.

**ΠΡΩ.** Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγεις γ', ὡς ἑταῖρε, αὐτὸν τε περὶ ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου, ὡς ταύτας ταῖς ἱδοναῖς τερπόμενος ὅπων ἀποθησάκας. καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ πανταπάσαις αἰεὶ μεταδίωκε τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον, ὅσω ἐν ἀκολοουθεῖσι τε καὶ ἀφρονέστεροι ὃν τυγχάνῃ καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύτας ὃ τι μᾶλλον αἰεὶ ζωνθεὶν εὐθαμονεύσατον καταφρεθιέται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὃ Σύμφατες, τὰ συμβαινοῦτα πρὸς τῶν C πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπεράσας.

παντοία μὲν χρώματα] It causes all manner of changes in complexion, and changes in posture, and changes in breathing, which produce the utmost excitement and shewing with delirium. Though I have retained ἁπατεργαζόμενα, and endeavoured to render it as above, it is rather as against Buttman's ἁπατεργαζόμενον than as believing in the genuineness of the word. The singular would mean that the excess of the pleasure by producing the changes in complexion, posture &c., produced the mental defects; which is no truer than that these changes cause them. But the very combination ἁπατεργαζόμενα ἁπατεργάζεται is unworthy of even a third-rate writer. I say ἁπατεργάζεται, for this is the Bodleian reading, and ἁπατεργάζεται is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, made by the corrector of some inferior copy, to avoid the inelegant repetition. As to πενύματα, no doubt the respiration would be troubled; as in the description of Hercules' madness, we read (H. F. 869) συμπνοὸς δ' οὐ σύναντις, ταῖρος ὥς ἐς ἐμβολὴν. But πενύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called παντοία. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dittography, and that the old text ran thus; παντοία μὲν χρώματα, παντοία δὲ σχήματα, πάσαι δ' ἔκλητιν καὶ βοῶς μετ' ἀφρούνης ἀπεργάζεται.

ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου] One class of MSS. has ἄλλον, the other περὶ ἄλλου. I have combined the two readings.

παντάπασιν αἰεὶ μεταδίωκα] The word παντάπασιν is not applicable to αἰεὶ, nor does it seem compatible with τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον, for while the first denotes thoroughness of pursuit, the other graduates the pursuit according to the moral condition of the man. As this whole speech is about what men say and think, what if Plato wrote thus: καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ πάντας φασὶ δὲν μεταδίωκεν τ. μ. ἀδήν ἐν ἀκολοουθεῖσι τις χ. ἐ. ἡ τυγχάνῃ?

τὰ συμβαινοῦτα] One Editor approves of Ficinus' translation, omnia quae apud multos in existimationem veniunt. But neither this rendering, nor what I once gave, that which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion, is in keeping with the Greek; for we have not ἐμβαινοῦσιν τοις πολλοῖς ὧν ἐμβαινοῦσιν ἀκτῷ τῶν πολλῶν. If this is equivalent to περὶ ὃν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐμβαινοῦσιν, the sense will not be unsuitable; but I know of no such phrase. Perhaps Plato wrote: τὰ συμβαινοῦσιν περὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀναφροντῶν δεξίων. I can offer no better rendering of εἰς δόξαν than, as far as belief. In the Euthydemus (305 b) we have it in this sense; νικηταῖρες εἰς δόξαν οἴστι ὑστια πάρει, "that they will carry off the prize of wisdom, as far as public belief is concerned". But this sense would make men's agreement a mere pretence or a delusion, which is not intended.
ΣΩ. Περί γε τῶν ἢδονῶν, ὁ Πρώταρχo, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σῶματος τῶν ἐπιπολής τε καὶ ἐντός [κερασθέντων]. ἦπερ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάνατον ἔμμαθέσθαι, λύτην ἡ ἄμα πρὸς ἢδονήν καὶ ἢδονήν πρὸς λύτην, ὡστ' εἰς μᾶς ἀμφότερα κράσιν ἔλεγά, ταύτ' ἐμπροσθε μὲν διψῆθωμεν, ὡς ἂντόταν αὐ τενοῦται πληρώσεως ἔπιθυμει, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενοῦμενος δ' ἀλγεί, ταύτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὖν ἀμαρτώμαθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς ψυχής πρὸς σώμα σας ἔχειν τιμής ὑπὸ τοῦτος πλήρει ἀμηχανίας οὐσὶ μίξεις μία λύτης τε καὶ ἢδονῆς ἐμπίπτει γιγνομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύσεις ὁμοστάτα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τοῖς ἢμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύτης τε καὶ ἢδονῆς λοιπῇ μία.

ντός [κερασθέντων] As it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word κεραςθέντων, which is borrowed from above, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left everything as the MSS. present it, not because it is all sound, but because the remedy will perhaps not appear so certain to some as to myself. He says: "I have indeed told you all about these cases where pleasure and pain are mingled in the body; as to those where the mind contributes the opposites to the body **** those we have formerly described; one fact however we did not then bear witness to, but we declare it now, that, in the innumerable examples of mind and body being thus opposed, there is always one and the same mixture of pleasure and pain." This is true; for, when he mentioned this subject before, it was not to point out this κράσις, but to show the nature of Desire. But in that part of his statement, where I have marked a gap, there occurs this phrase: λύτην τε ἐμα πρὸς ἢδονήν, καὶ ἢδονήν πρὸς λύτην. The λύτην of the mind is ἐπιπολής; and this he has fully described; but the λύτην, which is φρέσκος, he has never brought forward as co-existing with present bodily satisfaction. And yet ταύτα μὲν διήλωμεν looks as if he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have ὡστ' εἰς μᾶς ἀμφότερα κράσιν ἔλεγα, but this μίξεις μία is the very thing which he declares that he now points out for the first time. There remains ὁποτέν αὖ x. t. §. Stallbaum proposed at one time to change αὖ into ὃς, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite ὁποτέν πληρούταθα had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that Socrates cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialogue. I believe that of the words, περί δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΨΥΧΗ ἀλοκοτία has any claims to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical Περί γε τῶν ἢδονῶν x. t. §.; but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both ΨΥΧΗ ... ἔμμαθέσθαι and ὡστε ... λέγατ, viz. ἐπεί δὲ καὶ ψυχή x. t. §. "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of ὁποτέν αὖ κενοῦται, I conjecture ὁποτέν ἐν x. ἐμπίπτει γιγνομένη For ἐμπίπτει γεγυμένη I have adopted ξ. γιγνομένη, which I formerly advocated without knowing that it had been already proposed by others.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Φημὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴ πολλὰς λαμβάνειν σῶμα
κρασιν [ἐφαμεν].

ΠΡΩ. Ὑπὸς οὖν ὅτι τούτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

ΕΣΩ. Ὅργην καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθου καὶ θρήνου καὶ ἔρωτα
καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὀσά τιοῦτα, ἄρ' ὅτι αὐτῆς τῆς
ψυχῆς τίθεσαι ταῦτα λύτας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἠγογέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόμεν αὐτὰς ἢδονῶν μεστὰς ἐφθασμένοις ἀμηχανῶν;
ἡ δὲ ὑμινθερ' ἐπομενήσκεσσαί τοῦ

δι' τ' ἑσφαξε πολύσρονά περ χαλεπώτερα,
δὲ τε πολύ γλυκίσον μέλιτος καταλειβόμενον,

48 καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθους ἢδονᾶς ἐν λύταις οὕσας
ἀναμεμιμένας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὖς, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτα γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἢν ξυμ-

βαίνου γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς τε τροφικὰς ἡθωρίσεις, ἡταν ἡδα
χαίροντες κλάσοι, μέμνησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν τοῖς νομιμοίς διάθεσαι ἢδονά ἐν τῖς ψυχῆς
ἀρ' οἴσθ' ὡς ἔστι [καὶ τούτοις] μίξεις λύτης τε καὶ ἢδονής;

Ποία] The Books have Ποία, φης; to which the answer given is "Ἡν συ-

τῆν τ. ψ. α. π. λ. σύγκρασιν ἐφαμεν. Νο-

obody believes in Ποία, φης; and some have the courage to replace it by Ποίαν

φῆς; which is at least grammatical.

But there is no reason for φῆς at all, and if any one will compare the in-

stances where we have Ποία φῆς; Ποία

φης; and the rest, with the innumerable

examples of the mere interrogative pronoun or adverb, he will desire a spe-

cial reason for the departure from the ordinary expression; here no such reason

exists, and the presence of the verb may be easily accounted for in another

way. No exception has been taken to ἐφαμεν, and yet it is quite unsafe that

they have said anything as yet on this mixture, and Socrates declares as much in

the foregoing paragraph. But if ἐφα-


μεν is false, can we offer the place to

φαμιν? No; for until Protarchus as-

sents to it, it is no joint assertion. Again "Ἡν is μεῖν; and how can we have

μεῖν and ἐσυγκράσω governed both by

λαμβάνειν? A single correction (for I

attribute the interpolation to the false

reading) removes all these difficulties.

It is probable that the MS. had την

ἀτάτην, the rubricator having neglected
to put an initial Φ.

τὸ—δ' τ' ἐφήκει] Hom. II. xviii. 108.

I have omitted the words which all re-
cent Editors are agreed in considering
an interpolation, τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς

σφαλέοις τοῦ, standing after ἐφήκει.

[καὶ τούτοις] No τούτα have been men-
tioned, but the corrector was un-

familiar with so common an Atticism
as οὕτω τὴν διάταξιν ὡς ἐπι μιξὲς.

Nor is ἐν τοίνυν at all more intelli-
gible; there the neuters ὑπό τοῦ and σκο-

τευόστερον, which obviously refer to
ΠΡΩ. Οὗ πάντως ματαιώδεις; ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὗ ὄφθην, ὃ Πρώταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] Β ἐξονσέοιν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκόν οὖς γ′ ἐνοικὸν ἐμοὶ.
ΣΩ. Αδειμεν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοιούτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσοι σκοτεινοῦσιν ἄστιν, ἕνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δόσων καταμαθεῖν τις οὗς τῇ μίξῃ λύσις τε καὶ ἱδονής.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλέγοις ἄν.
ΣΩ. Τὸ τοι νῦν δὴ ἤρθεν ὄνομα φθόνον ποτέρα λύσιν τινα ψυχής θύρεις, ἢ πῶς;
ΠΡΩ. Ὀμεις.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ φθόνον γ′ ἐπὶ καιοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας ἱδομένος ἀναφανῇστα.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐ πῶς ὧν καὶ ὡς ἂν λέγομεν ἀβέλλησαν ἔξων.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ τοιοῦτοι ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἤτινα φρέσιν ἔχει.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.
ΣΩ. Ἐστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἔξως τινός ἔπειδην λεγόμενη τῆς δ᾽ αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τι τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχουν ἡ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἀδελφοίς γραμματῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Γνώθι σαυτόν λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης;
ΣΩ. Ἐρωτή. τοιοῦτον μὴν ἐκεῖνο δήλοις ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῷ δηλούσαντες οὗτον [λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γραμματος] ἄν εἰη.
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Οὗ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοιοῦ τοιχῇ τέμνειν.
ΠΡΩ. Πὴ φής; οὐ γὰρ μη δυνατὸς ὦν πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance.
"Εστι δὴ πονηρία] The genitive ζεῖσε τινός does not depend on πονηρία, but upon ἐπείδη. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after name of a particular habit; that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit. I have added τε after ἐστὶ. A subject to ἔχουν is indispens.

[Ἀγομένον ὑπὸ τ. γ.] It is better to bracket these words, as Beck recommended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke, as Stallebaum, with some violence to the language, has extracted from them.
Πὴ φῆς;] Here is an instance of what was mentioned above. Had So-

ocrates said not πειρῶ τέμνειν, but τέ-

μοιέν, the answer would have been ΠΗ; οὐ γ. μη δ. ὠ οὐ μη δι is supported by Plato Rep. 841. c. οὐ μη δις τι ἔστιν and by Xen. Hiero xi fin. οὐ μη διụται. The passage, οὐ μη—φῶμεν
ΠΟ. Αιβάς, καὶ δέσμαι γε πρὸς τὴν λέγειν.

Σω. οὐδ’ οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τε’ ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἔκαστον;

ΠΟ. Πῶς;

Σω. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλούσιως ἄτεροι ἦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμ.

ΠΟ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰςὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.

Σω. Πλείους δὲ γε, οὗ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δοξάζονσι, καὶ πάντα, ὡσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἄλληλείας.

ΠΟ. Πάντα γε.

Σω. Πολλ’ δὲ πλείστοι υἱεί, οἵμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἄρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίως ἑαυτοὺς, ὡς ἄντος.

ΠΟ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

Σω. Τῶν ἄρετῶν δ’ ἄρ’ οὗ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μετοίκων ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἑστι [ψευδοίς];

ΠΟ. Πῶς δ’ οὖν;

Σω. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ τὰν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὁρᾷς ἃν εἰτοι πάθος.

ΠΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

Σω. Τούτο τοῦτον ἔτι διαιρετέων, ἰδ Πρωταρχε, δίκα, εἰ

in Rep. 486, d, has been changed on the best MS. authority. I should doubt of the rest, but that they all refer to being able.

πλούσιωτερος The MSS. have πλούσιωτερον, which is indefensible. The construction of δοξάζομαι may be with εἶναι, in which case the subject of a reflexive sentence follows in the nominative, or it may govern a direct accusative, as in the next sentences.

καὶ πάντα And who, as to all things pertaining to the body, conceive themselves to be far above what they really are. Literally, ‘to be all things which pertain to the body in a degree beyond the reality which belongs to them.’ The neuter πάντα is put for masculine adjectives understood. See for examples my Prefatio ad Ionem p. xvii.

tο τῶν The Books have τούτων, which is utterly superfluous; nor could ἢν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ εἶδος without a repetition of the article.

ἀντεχόμενον One Editor says: Intellegendum relinquitur σύν. I myself was driven to a conjecture: ἀντίτεχνον δῦ, but fortunately I admitted it to be too audacious. These are the shifts to which we are driven by the dunces who inserted πέρι. I have no faith in ἰδεῖν, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία ἃληθής?
μέλλομεν τον παιδικὸν ἱδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἱδονῆς καὶ λύ-
πῆς ἔσεθαι μιξὶν.
ΠΡΩ. Πώς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα λέγεις;  
ΣΩ. Πάντες ὅποσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν Β
ἀνώτατος δοξάζοσι, καθάπερ ἐπιτάγων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων
ἀναγκάζομαι ἐπειδὴ τοῖς μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν,
tοῖς δὲ, οἷμαι, τοῦναντίον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.
ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοῖνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσιοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς μὲν
ἀνθεμείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελασμῶν τιμωρεῖσθαι,
gελοίους τούτους φάσασιν εἶναι τάλιθῃ φθέγξει τοὺς δὲ δύνα-
tοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φροβεροὺς καὶ ἱσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἑκθροὺς προσαγο-
ρείσαι ὁμότατον τοῖς καταύ λόγον ἀλοιπώσεις. ἄρνοια γὰρ ζ 
ἡ μὲν τῶν ἱσχυρῶν ἑκήρα τε καὶ αἰσχρὰ· βλασφημα γὰρ καὶ τοῖς
πέλας αὐτῇ τε καὶ ὅσιαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσὶν. ἢ δ' ἀσθενῆς ἡμῖν
τὴν τῶν γελοίων εὐλογε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.
ΠΡΩ. ὘ρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἱδονῶν καὶ λυ-
πῶν μίξις ἐν τούτοις οὕτω μοι καταφανῆς.
ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῖνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀγέ μόνον.
ΣΩ. Ἄπιη τις ἁδικὸς ἐστὶν που καὶ ἱδονῇ;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτω μὲν ἀνάγχη.
ΣΩ. Οὔχοιν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἑκθρῶν κακοῖς οὕτω ἀνίκοιν
οὖν φθονερῶν ἐστὶ τὰ χαῖρεν;
ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;
ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ γε τῶν φίλων δρῶντας ἐστὶν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυ-
πεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἁδικῶν ἐσείν;
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;
ΣΩ. Οὔχοιν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτε κακῶν πᾶσιν;
ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.
ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ

Iσχυροῦς [καὶ] ἑκθροῦς I have removed the conjunction, which made utter nonsense of the passage, and drove me to follow Schütz’s conjecture al-

The strong become strong; I have put τῶν enemies, the weak objects of laughter.  

The completion of the sentence would have been ἄρ' οὖ φρίτεσις γέλοιον εἶναι καὶ κακῶν; But instead of finishing the question, he breaks it into two, ἦ μὴ φωμὲν--; and Κακῶν ἀὐγ ὁμολογοῦμεν--; I have put τῶν φίλων in brackets. No addition was ever more perverted.
The MSS. seen, in the eyes of these men a gap have to be taken into account. 

[In τραγωδίαις] This could not occur without a corresponding mention of comedy; but the words are an idle addition. The unusual break after έν θορίους τε καί has one preposition too many. 

C is έν οίς έφαμεν είρησεν μηνύμενα τα τύν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. 

ΠΡΩ. Ναι.
λαβόντα δὲ | When I affirmed that λαβόντα ἄφηναι could not depend on πληθος χρόνον, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been choked with foolish comments that sooner than suspect ἄφηναι, I threw the construction upon ἀρ' ὑπάρχοντος ἄφηναι, confessing that ἄφηνα was out of its place, but pleading that there was no other possible way of accounting for these infinitives. But when we remove ἄφηναι μὲν, everything is right: what Socrates has said is a pledge, that it would be easy to say more, and a proof that having given this earnest he need not prolong the conversation by proceeding to the consideration of the other passions. ἄφηναι μὲν μυκτές δὲν μηκέναι is a strange combination to express ἄφηναι μὲ τοῦ μηκέναι; for while it is longer than the other, it is really more elliptical.

μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας | Will you make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as τέρρῳ τῶν νυκτῶν. Symp. 217, b; Prot. 310, b; Arist. Nub. i. μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, Rep. 621, b.

μεταλαβὸν | Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταταξῆς. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, d, quoting passages from the Parmenides and the Symposium where μεταταξῆς is correctly given. There is a passage in the Laws which
contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. Laws, 904, b. μείζων θ' θην ψυχή καθάς η άρετῆς οταν μεταβαλλη δι' την αύτης βουλήν την καὶ όμιλον γεγομένη ισχυρὰν, οπότεν μὲν αρετη τειχο προσμικαίον γήγεντα διακρισθείσας τοιαύτης, διακρισθείσας καὶ μετάλαβε τότον, άγνοι δὲν μετακομί-
σθείσα [εις μείζων τινα τότον έτερον]. Compare what has preceded: μεμηχα-
nητα δι' προς πάν τούτο τα ποιόν τι γεγομένον αεί τοιαν έδραν δει μετα-
λαμβάνον οικίζεσθαι, καὶ τινας ποι πότε τόπους.
[ἐνάν δ' αύτάς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλάς φαντασιάσεις appearing in many shapes, why?—συμπεπεραμένει βασικ, because they are adulterated with pains and relief.

Πάνω μὲν [οὖν] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὖν cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed δ' contained in μὲν, while οὖν characterises the answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certainly be γούν. We must either restore this—but γοὺν οὖν generally becomes σύκων—γε, or suppose οὖν itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὖν. Πάνω belongs more especially to δ' ήλια.

tα τε τούς τόμονσ As Hesychius defines the τόμον as a carpenter's instrument by which circular figures are described, ἐπίπεδα cannot be trianguli or quadrata (Stallb.). The order followed is an inverted one; the products of rules and compasses correspond to the εὐσύσχημα, and those of the τόρ-
νος to the peripheres.
πεδά τε καὶ στερεά καὶ τὰ τοῖς πανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἰ μου
μαθήματι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, εκεῖθερ
ἀλλὰ, ἀλλ’ αἰε καλὰ καθ’ αὐτὰ περικεῖται καὶ τίνας ἱθονὰς
οἵτινες ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κυρίευσιν προσφερέσθε καὶ χρῶ-
ματα δὴ τούτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἱθονὰς]. ἀλλ’
ἀρα μαθήματον, ἡ πός;

ΠΡΩ. Πειρόματον μὲν, ὡΣ Ὀμπρατες περιαθήσθη δὲ καὶ σο
σαφέστερον ἐτί λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγώ δὴ τάς τῶν φύσεων τῆς των λείας καὶ λοιμ-
πράς, τάς ἐν τι καθαρόν λείας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἔτεραν καλὰς
ἀλλ’ αὐτάς καθ’ αὐτάς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ἧθηρον ἱθῶνας
ἐπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τούτῳ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὅρμας ἔτοι μὲν τούτων θείων ἡγεῖς
ἱθονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίθηται ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις λίθας,
καὶ ὅπῃ τούτο καὶ ἐν δυν. τυχάνει γεγονός ἦμιν, τοῦτ’ ἕκει-
νοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἀπαν. ἀλλ’, εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εὐθ
δύο λέγομεν ἱθῶνων.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτως προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μα-
52 θήματα ἱθῶνας, εἰ ἀρα δικοῦσιν ἦμιν αὐτὰ πείνας μὲν μὴ
ἔχει τού μαθήματι μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνῃ ἀληθῶν ἐξ
ἀρχίς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ’ οὕτω ἐξενδοξεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ; μαθημάτων πληρωθείσων ἑών ὑσταρον ἀπο-
βολαί διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνονται, καθόρθες τινάς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλ-
γηθῶνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ τι φιμεί γε, ἀλ” ἐν τις λογισμοίς τοῦ παθη-
ματος, ὅταν τις στερεθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν.

κινήσεων] This is Van Heusde's cor-
rection for κινήσεων; the same scholar
also changed κινήσει to κινήσι: in the
passage above. It is strange that the
Zurich editors should not have adopted
these corrections.

φθόγγων] The feminine noun which
denotes the description of sounds, and
which has dropped out here, as is evi-
dent from the repetition of the article,
is perhaps ἤθες. Some propose φω-

vón in place of φθόγγον, but leave the
second τάς to shift for itself. It is
more likely that Plato would use φθό-
γγον, as he had done so before, and as
it is more comprehensive than φωνών.

λόγομα] For this all MSS. and Edi-
tions have λόγομαν; but Plato would
not speak of the real pleasures as things
called pleasures.

λογισμοῖς τ. τ.] The genitive does
not express concerning, but λογισμοῖς

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λογισμοῖς τ. τ.] The genitive does
not express concerning, but λογισμοῖς

ΣΩ. Καὶ μή, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γ’ ἠμείς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρίς τοῦ λογίσμου διαπεράνουμεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθὴς τοῖνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρίς λύπης ἤμιν λήθη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτ' ἐν τοῖς μαθημασίοις.
ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἥδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε ἐλναι λύπας ὁδηγεῖν καὶ σύναμος τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ολίγων.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἦν ὁ δήτερον;
ΣΩ. Ὅρκον ὅτε μετρὶος ἢδη διασκεφῆς χωρίς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἥδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχέδους ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγαθεῖσας, προσθέμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφορόν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάς καὶ ὅργανος γραμμάτειας οἰκαίης, τῆς τοῦ ἀπερίου τ᾽ ἔκεινον καὶ ἦπτον καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τέ σῶν ματος καὶ ψυχῆς σφετέρου ἐλναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν εἱμέτερον.
ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθωτατα λέγεις, ὦ Σέπηματε.
ΣΩ. 'Ει τοῖνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τὸδ' αὐτῶν διάθεσεν.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρή σάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἐλναι τὸ καθαρὸν τὸ πάθημα is what they do; so that the phrase should be rendered "in the account they take of the accident".
Οὐκον[η] I should have bracketed but left in the text the interpolations, by which this passage has been so long rendered unintelligible, but that there were other corrections needed, so that it would only have created confusion to put the new and the old together. προσθέμεν τῷ λόγῳ is surely not difficult to understand. Socrates wishes to add one more remark to this part of his subject. But some one who took no notice of τῷ λόγῳ must needs have it that some quality is to be added to some kind; so he inserts after τῷ λόγῳ the sentence ταῦτα μὲν σφοράς ἥδονας ἀμίκτως, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ τοινυντου οὐμετρίαν. But the λόγος is intent not merely on giving the names but on dividing into the several classes of τά ἔπειρα and τά έμετρα, and does not even use the greatness and the intensity as proofs, but says that all such as vary in their greatness and intensity belong to the ἀπερίου which itself pervades mind and matter, now less and now more. I will now mention the other changes I have made, ταῖς μὲν—τὰς μὲν, καὶ τὸ—κατὰ τὸ, σφοράν αὐ—σφοράν αὐ i.e. αὐτῶν, ἀπείρου χε—ἀπείρου τε, (the Bodleian has τε γε), [προσθέμεν αὐτας] after σφετέρου, ταῖς—ταῖς, the last with MS. authority. 

διάθεσις This is Van Heusde's emendation for διαθεισεν; it had been anticipated by the Venice MS. Σ, a copy full of conjectural variations.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν "i.e. in relation to truth. As this is the constant and only admissible meaning of these words, διαθείαν can only be retained on condition of our changing Τί ποτε into Τί πρότερον. Otherwise, we must change ἀλήθεια into καλ. The remainder of the sentence is faulty as to the arrangement of the conjunctions and articles. I would
The and ev I'va or compare to junct. XpCuf-iaTog (.dya, yevog, TO purs. YTaTOV
port. diavorjOto/Liev puol vmI ymI
in proved, many of many, and was note of the parts, Jirst
the...read the sordra polu te kai mega, kai to ickacov. Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient?

According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for polu 'm mega or polu kal mega are merely explanatory adjuncts of sordra; compare below me- gisoton te kal pleistot."

I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ickacov. On reference to the Introduction it will be seen that metropv which is just disposed of, and al'hpexa and kapllos are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that al'hpexeta- ton and kallosvon, kallov xal al'h-

avtopov, al'havtopov xal kallov are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere. For this reason I have written kal proo to kalov.

ai to mev ap' auton] Not whether but if, as is plain from the addition of do. If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.

[iva kadharon] This depends upon mu-
den epilastic. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of ickacov and vovs be deter-

mined. I believe the MS. eli tivn xris- tin to be a corruption, for it is unneces-
sary, and occasions an inelegant repeti-
tion. As the xrisis was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be deter-

mined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that eli tivn xrisan is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

akristaton] The ancient gram-
marians inform us that this is the su-

perlative of akristos, an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of akritis. I distrust them, but make no change.

allon muhenvos eneij] I have changed alx into allxw, which is absolutely ne-

cessary for the sense. We must not
ΠΡΩ. Ἀρέων ὅτι τὸ μᾶλλον εἰλικρινές ἦν.

ΣΩ. 'Ορθὸς ὅρ, οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθευότατον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἀμα ἐγγύς τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θέσομεν, ἀλλ' οὖ β' τὸ πλεῖότον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα γε.

ΣΩ. Συμφωνὸν ἢρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιμημένον πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκόστερον ἢρα καὶ μάλλον καὶ ἀληθεύστερον ἢν φώμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐρούμεν ὁρθός.

ΠΡΩ. 'Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὗ δὴ πολλῶν δεσμόμεθα παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἢτι τὸν τῆς ἁρδηνίς πέρα λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἢμιν αὐτόθι, ὡς ἢρα καὶ ἐξετάσα ήρδηνι σιμπλὰ μεγάλης καὶ Σ ἀληθῶς πολλῆς καθαρὰ λύπης ἢδὼν καὶ ἀληθεύστερα καὶ καλλικον γίγνετι ἦν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφώδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τὸ γε παράδειγμ' ἵσανον.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τοιώθε; ἢρα πεπρ ἁρδηνίς οὐκ ἀνακόμισθεν ὡς ἢι γένεις ἐστιν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἐστι τὸ παράτατον ἁρδηνί; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐ τοιτον τὸν λόγον επικεφαλοῦσιν μηδεῖν, οἵς δὲι χάριν ἐχεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαι σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανεργοτι, ὦ Πρώταρχε γιλε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρωτά μοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἑστὼν δὴ τινε πῦν, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ' ἢει ἐρημιμένον ἄλλου.

suppose that ἡ is omitted before ἐνετή: it would be as contrary to Greek usage to employ it after a descriptive relative, as after γε with the optative.

καθαρά λύπης] If it be unmixed with pain, which of course supposes that the other is not. τῆς ἁρδηνίς is in fact ἀληθεύστερα, but it is added because of λευκόστερον.

κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες] Trendelenburg understands this of Aristippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87, taught that all pleasure was in κόριτσις. But the school of Heraclitus and of Protagoras must have held the same doctrine. These could not, indeed, have formally denied οὕτα to pleasure, for that would have implied their concession of it to other things; but pleasure itself would probably be one of the examples by which they supported their argument.

Τι δή; Protarchus' answer is not germane to the question ὅρα οὐκ ἀνακόμισθεν. Probably the words belong not to Protarchus but to Socrates, who stops himself and says—τι δή; διαπερανομα Χ. τ. έ. To which Protarchus answers not by an ungracious Δέγε, but by τΩ φιλε, λέγε κ. τ. έ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation, ὦ Πρώταρχε φιλε.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τοῦτο καὶ τίνες λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον ἀεὶ περινός, τὸ δ’ ἐλλιπεῖς ἐκεῖνον.
ΠΡΩ. Λέγει ἐπὶ σαφέστερον.
ΣΩ. Παιδικὰ ποὺν καλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ τεθεωρήματι ἀμα καὶ ἐρατώς ἀνθρείους αὐτῶν.
ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.
ΣΩ. Τῶν τούτων τοινύν έπικότα δυοῖν οὖσι δ’ ἄλλα ζῆτει κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἐπὶ έκρω, λέγει σαφέστερον, ὁ Υόξρατες, ὃ τι λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν τι ποικίλον, ὁ Προτάρχης. ἀλλ’ ὁ λόγος ἐφεσχηκεῖ νῦν, λέγει δ’ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἑνεκά τοῦ τῶν ὄντων έστ’ ἀεὶ, τὸ δ’ οὐ κἂν ἐπάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γινόμενον ἀεὶ γίνεται.
ΠΡΩ. Μόνιμος ἐμαθὼν διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεξιθηραι.
ΣΩ. Τάχα δ’ ἔνως, ὥ σαι, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.
ΠΡΩ. Τι γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ. Αἴο δὴ τάδ’ εἴτεμα λάξομεν.
ΠΡΩ. Ποία;
ΣΩ. Εἴν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἔτερον ἐν.
ΠΡΩ. Αὕτε ἀποδέχομαι συν ταύτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.
ΣΩ. Ὁρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἑνεκα ποτέρον; τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἑνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἑνεκα;
ΠΡΩ. Τούτο, ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως ἑνεκα τοῦ ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ, νῦν πυνθάνει;

Τὸ τρίτον ἐς ἢ ἐρώ] The Books have ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἔτερον, out of which some have endeavoured to extract a miserable metaphysical joke. Protarchus had already asked twice for Socrates' meaning,—Πῶς τοῦτω καὶ τίνες λέγεις; and again Λέγει ἐπὶ σαφεστέρον. For ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι, compare above 16, c., τῶν λεγομένων εἴνας. The correction proposed by Hirschig in the Paris edition was made after I had communicated mine to him. I suppose that by this time he is convinced that Protarchus is for the third time telling Socrates to speak more plainly. It is true that he has only used λέγει σαφεστέρον once before. ἐφεσχηκεῖ The quotation from Parettenius in the Ektym. Mag. referred to by Pierson on Meris in v. ἑρεσχεῖς, is apparently decisive as to the orthography of this word. If Pierson had known that the oldest MSS. of Plato have the η, he would have pronounced with greater certainty in its favour. ἑρεσχεῖς seems to have been a later form.
The MSS. and Edd. have followed, γίγνεται without αν would have been correct; but with εστὶ we must have either αι γιγνεται or αει αν γιγνεται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than εστὶ, such as εσται or αναγκη ειναι.

'ΑΛΛ' οιν—γε! Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading 'Αρ' οιν. The conclusion follows so necessarily from that which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but the sure method of correcting it.

which is barbarous. Had έκεινα αυ εστι followed, γίγνεται without αν would have been correct; but with εστι we must have either αι γιγνεται or αει αν γιγνεται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than εστι, such as εσται or αναγκη ειναι.

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και μὴν οὐκ οἶτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς Εὔνεσεις ἀποτελομένων καταγελάσται.

ΠΡΩΤ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩΤΗΡ. Τῶν οὖσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς Εὐνέσεις, ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς Εὐνέσεις ἀποτελομένων καταγελάσται.

ΠΡΩΤ. Ποὺς δὴ καὶ ποῖον λέγεις; ΣΩΤΗΡ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἴροντ' ἂν τις τοῦθ' αἴρομενοι, ἄλλ' οὐ τὸν τρεῖτον ἐκεῖνον βιῶν, τὸν ἐν ο̇ μίτε χαίρεις μίτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἵνα δυνατόν ὁς ἐν τῷ καθαρότατα.

ΠΡΩΤ. Πολλὴ τις, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, ο̇ Σῶματες, ἀλογία ἔμπροσθενίσκει γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν τὴν ἣδον ὧς ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τιθῆται. ΣΩΤΗΡ. Πολλὴ, ἐπει καὶ τῷ ἔπι λέγομεν,—

ΠΡΩΤ. ἸΠΙ.

ΣΩΤΗΡ. Πῶς οὖν ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι μηδὲ κα-Β λὸν μηδὲ ἐν σώμαισι μηδὲ ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἢδονὶς μόνοις, ἀνδριαν δ' ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων τ' [ἀγαθῶν] εὖ λεγόντες, μηδέν τοιοῦτον εἶναι;

[ἐχαίς δὲ] The best MSS. have ἔχων. This error is of continual occurrence in infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigla of ἐ.

ο̇ αὐτὸς οἶτος] This is a bitter sneer at Aristippus, defining pleasure as a γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure. The difference between οἰ φιλάνθρωποί and οἰ ἀποτελομένοι is that between philosophers, and men who follow a certain mode of life. By understanding this difference we are enabled to do without my change of Σεις into Σέν, but I still doubt whether we do not require εὐδαιμόνων or μακρινῶν after ἀποτελομένων.

[ἀγαθῶν] "It is unreasonable to suppose that of all the things which belong to the mind such as courage, temperance, intelligence, &c. pleasure is the only one entitled to be called good."

Platonic Philebus.
ποίος τούτως δ' ἐτε τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀληθῶς δὲ, ἀναγκάζε-σθαι φανεῖ κακὸν εἶναι τότε, ὅταν ἀλήθινον ἄριστον πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντ' αἰ, διὸ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε, ὅταν χαίρῃ.

C tosoútf diaphéren pòs ἄρετήν;

ΠΡΩ. Παντ' ἐστὶ τάντα, ὁ Σωφράτες, ὃς δυνάτων ἀλο-

γώτατα.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνοι ἢδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πάσαν ἐπι-

χειρώμενον ποιήσασθαι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ὅσον συνιδόμενοι

σφόδρα ρατώμεν' γεναιῶς δὲ, εἰ τῇ τι σαβρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν

περικρούμεν, [ἔσσω] δι τῇ καθαρώτατον ἐστὶ αὐτῶν φύσει,

τούτο καταδύντες εἰς τὴν χράσιν χρώμεθα τῇ κοπνή τοῖς τε

toίτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἢδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτως.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀφθαλμός.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκόν ἢμιν τὸ μὲν, οἷμα, δημοφυγίκον ἐστὶ τῆς

This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add ἀγαθά, you beg the question. Philebns could not say that of all ἀγαθά this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

α τῇ τι σαβρὸν ἔχει] The verb σά-

βο, to strain or percolate, has the same relation to σαβρός as σήπα to σαπρός. Hence the proper meaning of the word σαβρός is, that which suffers anything to run through it; it is therefore used of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring a vessel in order to ascertain its sound-

ness, is περικρούμεν (with coins κατω-

γίζων); and then it was said either ὑπὲρ or σαβρὸν 

βρυμένοι — ἡχεῖν — φυλέ-

γεσάι. The conjecture on this place, 

σαβρὸν ἡχει, is not admissible, for if 

this had been the meaning, the future 

must have been used.

δ τῇ καθαρώτατον] The common

reading is ἦμις δ' τῇ καθαρώτατον —

But ἦμις χρώμεσα is barbarous; and if 

we desired to retain ἦμις, no change short of the following would be really suf-

ficient: ἦμις δ' καταδύνειν, καταδύνεις ὅδ' — χρώμομεσα.

ἐς τῆν κράσιν] Stallbaum has un-

successfully defended χράσιν against 

Schleiermacher, who proposed χράστον. 

There is no question of the comparison 

at present, but of the admixture, in 

order to which, as Socrates had already 

observed (52, έ), it is necessary to have 

each kind in its purest state. χράσια: 

μέρεσιν εἰς χράσιν is as elegant as χρά-

σια μ. εἰς κράσιν (τῶν μερῶν) is the 

reverse.

Οὐκόν ἢμιν] If we would under-

stand the drift of this question, we must 

divest ourselves of any notion that 

Plato is intending to establish a formal 

classification. His sole object is to show 

that there are two elements in ἐπιστή-

μη, namely the production of tangible 

results, and the information of the mind. 

The latter is not pointed out for its 

own sake, but to give relief and de-

finiteness to the former which is its 

opposite; and the former is mentioned, 

because it enables him to introduce 

music and several other arts under one 

head as χειροτεχνία. This explanation 

disperses of the suspicion about some 

portion of the text having been lost, 

and fully accounts for the fact that So-

rates never returns to the head of arts 

περί παντόθεν. But why does he choose 

the arts which he calls χειροτεχνία as 

the subject of particular enquiry? Be-

cause in these again there is a twofold 

element; the element of certainty de-

rived from the mathematical sciences 

under which they work, and the em-

pirical element. Now as one of these is 

scientific (ἐπιστήμης ἐξήκομεν) and 

the other not, it is necessary to show 

this, as determining the greater or less
pureness of these parts of Intellec, as they had already sought out the greater or less pureness of the several kinds of Pleasure. As for the text, περὶ τὰ ματηματα is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. ματηματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge περὶ τὰ ματηματα is a knowledge περὶ τὴν παιδείαν. Sydenham saw that, χειροτεχνικς being an adjective, you must understand either τέχνις, which would be ridiculous, or ἐπιστήμης; but no ἐπιστήμης have been mentioned, (only ἐπιστήμη in general) so that there is nothing to justify the omission of ἐπιστήμης here. These reasons seem to have been quite beyond the discernment of Stallbaum, who dismisses Sydenham with an authoritative "male", and one of his usual non-apposite quotations. Thirdly I have written πρῶτα for reasons very obvious and very little regarded. In place of σύτων, which is unmeaning, I have put σύ which marks the second distinction. Χαζαρώτατα has been already changed into καζαρώτατα before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is καζαρωτατη would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing.

This combination is not Greek; and the second half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense. Φαυλὸν μὴ δή This is the form of simple assest; if, in place of repeating φαυλὸν, he had said φαυλοττον, μὴ οὖν would have been added; if his assest had been restricted, γον. There is also a shade of difference between μέν τοι the old reading, and μην δη the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assest.

Τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειραγμένας] The pro-
ΠΡΩ. Δαγκαϊότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ο ὑσότον μεστή μὲν ποιον μυοσκή πρὸς τοῦ λέγεται ἀριστοσμοῦ, καὶ λέγεται τοῦ μέτρου τούτου ἄλλα μελέτη στοχασμοῦ, καὶ λέγεται αὐτὴ καὶ αὐθητική, τοῦ μέτρου ἐκάστης χορῆς τῆς στοχασμάτων ἥρεμον πολὺς μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, συμφόρον δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Αληθέστατα.

Β ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπηρείην τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εδρήσομεν ἐχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνω γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δὲ γε, οἷμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὑγιάνοις χρωμένην, τὰ πολλὰ ἐκρίβειαν αὐτή πορίζοντα τεχνικῶτερα τῶν πολλῶν ἔπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Κατὰ γε ναυτηγίαν καὶ καὶ ὀικοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολιτείᾳ τῆς τεχνίτης ἤμαρτον, καὶ ἃ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲν ἐρευνῶμεν ἐν τοῖς πληροφορίαις τῆς παλαιάς. Εἰς τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ οἰκεῖον μελέτην, ὃποιον ὕστα, καὶ ἀρχαῖοι τῶν πληροφορίων ἂν ἔχωμεν, ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἄκουσθι.
κανών] κανών is the rule for measuring straight lines; τόρος for curved; διαβήτης the cross pieces, (in shape of a compass stretched out,) from the angle of which the plumb-line depended; στάχη the plumb-line itself; and the instrument for reducing warped timber to straightness. If this is correct, it is much less κεχυμευμένον than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was an instrument for taking the angles of curves. It is scarcely necessary to say that κεχυμευμένον has nothing to do with the workmanship, though Stalbaum translates "&c. factum".

Διλλήν, τὴν δ' ἄλλην] This is a common ellipsis for τὴν μὲν δ', τὴν δὲ δ'. Compare Laws 862, n. which I quote for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ μὲν βλασφὲν ἄβλαβῆς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνάταν ποιητέον, τὸ τε ἀπολύμενον σώζοντα, καὶ τὸ πεσόν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάλιν ἐξορθοῦσα, καὶ τὸ ἔκαστον ἣ ὑποστηθὲν ὑπὲρ ἄλλην γῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀπολύμενον ἐξελάβειν τοῖς ὁρώντα καὶ ταῖς πάσχοντι (παρέχοντα) ἔκάστου  ἐκ διαφορὰς εἰς φιλλέν περιφερέον ἀεὶ καπιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ σμικρῷ δρῷ οὐ σμικρῷς ὅρας is the common reading. But this is out of structure, and if any one wishes to understand ἡτοι, he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to Πη ποτὲ διορισμένος—The word αὐτοῖς three lines below was supplied to give a case to συναισθήσειαν, and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not, A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B.
>No

The about

μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μωρίων μιθημάτων ἀλλήν ἁλ-

λῆς διαφέροναν τις ἡσαί.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις οὐ συμφωνὶ διαφορὰν τῶν

περὶ ἁρμίων τενταχοντων, ὡστε λόγον ἔχειν οὐ' αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴ καὶ

κατ' ἐμπορικὴ τῇ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμῷ

57 [καταμελετομένων]; πότερον ὡς μία ἐκάστα λεοτέον, ἦ δύο

τεθύμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοὺς πρόσθεν ἐπομένος ἐγών', ἄν δύο κατὰ τὴν

εὑρῇ ψήφον τεθέν ἐκάσταρ τοὺτων.

ΣΩ. 'Ορμῶς, οὐ δ' ἔνεκα τοῦτα προηγεγάμεθ' εἰς τὸ

μέσον, ἄρ' ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλόμην ἂν ἀποφήμασαι τὸ τῶν

ἐρωτόμενον.

ΣΩ. Αὐσεὶ τοῖνυν ἐμοιγ' οὖντος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἦτον ἢ ὅτε

λέγειν αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενα, ταῖς ἱδοναῖς ἱετῶν τάνταστροφον ἐν-

Β ταῦτα προβεβηκέναι σκοπῶν εἰ ἄρ' ἔστι τις ἐπερας ἀλλὰ κα-

θαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμης, καθάπερ ἱδονή ἱδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τούτο γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἔνεκα τού-

των ἐπικεχήφθηνεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὖν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐμπρόσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις

αἱ μὴ μονάδαι Εxcept a man shall consider no monad to differ from any

other single monad out of all innumerable

monads. There is an intentional redu-

dancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα

—μονάδος, μυθεμιόν—ε. τ. μ., ἀλλην

—ἀλλης) in order to mark the perfect

indifference of every monad from every

other.

τενταχόντων] Rep. 521 ε, Τim. 90 β, who give their time to Arithmetic.

Τί δὲ λογιστική] In this passage I have changed τῆς ν. φ. γεωμετρίας τε

καὶ λογισμῶν, so as to render the sen-

tence complete. This is far better than

supplying διώκας, which would make

Socrates first ask whether two things
differ, then whether they are one, and

again whether they differ. The only

question that can by any possibility

be asked as introductory to the other

two is “How do these stand to each

other”? The word καταμελετομένων

is nothing but a wretched attempt to

bolster up the construction by making

a genitive absolute of it; and for this

purpose some one has borrowed the

remarkably elegant word from its con-

text above and used it where it means

about as much as would ταυτομένων.

τανταστροφον] I have added the ar-

ticle which is necessary to the sense.

τανταστροφον τι is not to be thought of.

The case of ήδονα has been already
determined, and the corresponding case

is to be sought in νος.

προβεβηκέναι] This is Schleierma-

cher’s emendation for προεβληκέναι; it

is obvious that no πρέβληκμ is put for-

ward.

Τί οὖν] In this sentence the Books

turn two distinct questions into one
question asked twice. I have removed ἵνα ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες ὑφο- 
προῦσας ἀποκρινομέθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὀλίγην—
ΠΡΩ. Ἄρα τοῦτον; 
ΠΡΩ. 'Ως εἰσὶ δὲ αἰ χθηματικοὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταῦ-
τας ἀλλ' ὁμοτι σο νταῦτα ἐξετάζεμεν συχνα, τῆν διδυμότητὰ ἔχου-
σα ταῦτα, ὃνοματος 3' ἐνός κερκικομέναί.
ΠΡΩ. Άδιδομέν τεπῇ ἀγαθῇ τούτων, ὅση φης δεινοῦς ἐρ- 
να, ταῦτα τῆν ἀπόρρησιν, ὃ Σώφρατες. 
ΠΡΩ. Ταῦτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μᾶλλον' 
einitai.
ΠΡΩ. Πάν ν μὲν οὖν.
Δήλον ὅτι τὰς ἄντρας ὅπως δῆλον ὅτι ὁ Πρώταρχος, ἀναίνοις ἐν ἔντος διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἶ τινα πρὸ ἀντὶς ἀλλήν φιλαμένην.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην ἄφθος ἄφεις ἢ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὃς Πρώταρχος, ἀναίνοις ἐν ἐν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἶ τινα πρὸ ἀντὶς ἀλλήν φιλαμένην.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνη δὲ ταύτην αὐτῷ δέι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Δήλον ὅτι πᾶς ἂν τὴν γε νῦν λεγομένην γυνίαν, τὴν γαρ περὶ τὸ ὄν [καὶ τὸ] ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύτων ἀεὶ περικτικὸς πάντως ἐγών ὁμιᾶ ἤρεις ἢ ἡμίπεπλετός, ὅπου νῦν καὶ συμφώνων προσφητησα; μερῷ ἀληθεστατῶν εἰναὶ γνώσιν. σοὶ δὲ τί; [πῶς τούτῳ, ὃ Πρώταρχος, διακρίνοις ἄν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἡμωνον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γογγίων ἡ ταύτην, ὃς ἢ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι ποιαν τεχνών. Β πάντα γαρ ἡ' αὐτῆς δοῦλα θ' ἐξόντων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίου ποιοτοίον, καὶ μερικῶν ἀρίστων ποιῶν ἡν τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν ὅ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δ' ἐπεινοι οὐκομήν ἦν ἐκπληνία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τό δ' ὅπλα μοι δοκείς βουληθεῖς εἰπεῖν αἰσχροθείς ἀπόλλειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω νῦν ταύτη ταύτη, ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἀλλως ἐγώ τοῦ μῆ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τό ποιῶν;

Δήλον ὅτι πᾶς ἄν] For this emendation we are indebted to W. H. Thompson. The old reading was Δήλον ὅτι ἢ πᾶς. There can be no doubt that the phrase περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως is incorrect. τὸ ἐντὸς would be rightly placed where the question was about the meaning of the word, but here we are considering the objects of a given science. But the object of Dialectic is Truth, and Truth is found either in that which is absolute (τὸ ὅν ὄντως), or in that which is invariable, because it is the effect of the absolute; and this latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταύτων ἀεὶ περικτικός (γνέφεσθαι). To make τὸ ὄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταύτων ἀεὶ περικτικός, mere explanations of τὸ ὄν, as one Editor has done, betrays great looseness of thought.

σῷ δὲ τί; [πῶς τούτῳ, ὃ Πρώταρχος, διακρίνοις ἄν;] I have made separate sentences: σῷ δὲ τί; answering to ἔγωγε σῷς and πῶς τ. δ. ἕν; to the general question. But πῶς διακρίνοις ἁν is so contrary to the usual order, and a second quotation of a more vague sort following the only question to the purpose is so unworthy of our author, that I cannot but look on it as a later addition.

πολλάκις] I cannot say what should be done with this word which is quite incompatible with ἐξέστη. Nor can I propose anything certain in place of δ' ἐκόντων, of which the sense seem as necessary as the mode of expression is objectionable. But it is not unlikely that the right reading is δ' ἐκόντων αὐτῶν.

Τῷ δπλα] This is a play upon the word τὶςεσθαι, which Protagoras had used merely in the sense of advancing an opinion; but Socrates, taking up the words ἐναντία τὶςεσθαι, replies, Ἡσοῦκες if you were going to say ὅπλα, but you were ashamed, and dropped the word, τῷ δπλα ἐναντία τὶςεσθαι is in ace stare, as in Herod. 1. 62, καὶ ἀντὶς ἐξέστα τῷ δπλα. There is a further play upon ἀπολλεῖν; for ἀπολλείπειν τῷ δπλα would properly mean to desert, but here it is merely to forego or give up the word.
[διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστῃ I once attempted to defend this construction by such examples as that of Aristophanes (Wasps 666) τοὺς "οὐχι προδότους κ.τ.λ." There never was an interpolation which more clearly betrayed itself. If Plato had used any such word as διαφέρει, he would have made both grounds of comparison, certainty as well as general merit, depend upon it.

[ἐξήτουμεν] MSS. and Edd. give ἐξη- 

tούμενι.

πρὸς χρειάν] These words are to be taken as governing τοῖς ἀνύποτοις; to surpass as to their use to men.

κρατεῖν δ’ ἢ ἐπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγμα
tεῖς] The reading of the MSS. and Edd. is ὑπάρχειν (for ὑπερέχειν) and κρατεῖν, ἢ δ’ ἐπον. This has been adduced as an instance of the ἁνυκλού

ζαιν, and it will be well to look closely into it. The case of πραγματεῖς, according to this supposition, will be owing to a construction intended to be analogous to that of τῷ μὲν ἢ. ύ. τέχνῃ —δεδομένως, which construction is lost or changed by reason of the long parenthesis, so that, when this ends, a new construction, ταύτην ἐπομένη, is substi-

tuted. A conclusive answer to all these subtleties is, that not only the construction is different, but the sense is altogether unlike. For in the first part, if completed, we should expect if you assign, or you ought to assign, or something which implies a claim for νοῦς: but in the second part there is a call on Protarchus to declare what he really thinks about νοῦς (ταύτην ἐπομένες κ. τ. ἔ.) Another objection to the pas-

sage as it stands is the awkwardness of δεδομένως ὑπάρχειν κρατεῖν, which means δεδομένως κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All these difficulties are removed by so simple a process that I have not hesi-

tated to introduce it into the text, and to change the punctuation accordingly.

καὶ νῦν δὲ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες] For καὶ νῦν δὲ I have written καὶ νῦν δὲ, as opposed to οὐχ ἐχθρόν πω. There is some corruption in σφόδρα διανοη-

θέντες, for διανοηθέντες cannot be used in the sense of διακοπεῖν.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ καλεῖν, οἷμα, συγχωρῆσαι τιν' ἀλλιν ἐπιστήμην ἡ τέχνη τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχοντας, ἀλλος ἐν τῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐννοοῦσα τὸ τοιόῦτο εἴρημα ἔλεγες νῦν, ὥς αὐτὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηται, πρῶτον, ὅτε τὸν μὲν δόξας χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζηοῦσα ἡγεταμένας; εἶτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἠγετεῖται τις ζητεῖν, οἷσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ἀπῇ τῇ γέγονε καὶ ὅπῃ πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπῃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαίμαν ἄν ταῦτα, ἦ πῶς; 

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ἄνει, περὶ δὲ τὰ γνώμενα καὶ γνησίως καὶ γεγονότα ἤμων ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήγαγεν τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτος οὖν τι σαφῆς ἤν φαιμέν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀλήθεια γίγνεσθαι, ἄν μὴ ἐσχε μηδὲν πώποτε καὶ ταῦτα μήδ' ἔχει μήδ' εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει; 

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς; 

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκηπμένα βεβαιότητα μήδ' ἣρτινοῦν πῶς ἄν ποτε βεβαιον γίγνοντ' ἤμων καὶ ὅμων; 

ΠΡΩ. Οἷμα μὲν υδαμοῦς.

πεπόνηται] This word and ἡγεταμένως (Schüll's correction for ἡγεταργένως) explain each other. He is evidently speaking of pursuits which require great assiduity; but what these are it would be difficult to say, if we retained the old reading ἄνει περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηται. This has been explained by a reference to the passages in the Phaedo, where τὰῦτα is used of visible things; but this would at least include τὰ περὶ φύσεως ζητεῖν, which is here spoken of as a distinct branch. By means of this change we have the arts mentioned first, because they are the subject; but as the following remark turns on the means employed, it is convenient to mention the persons who follow the arts, to avoid the awkwardness of saying that the arts themselves ζητοῦσαν δόξας, ζητοῦσιν τὰ περὶ δόξαν.

ηγεται] If the physicist mistook what φύσες was, and while supposing that he investigated it was searching out something else, ζητεῖται would be appropriate. But nothing more is meant than the usual enquiries of the Ionic Philosophy, and no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύσις or of the investigation of it. I therefore propose ηγεται. For while in the handicrafts above mentioned he speaks of those who labour at them, he speaks of physical investigations as things in which men choose to engage. The sense of ηγεται is born out by ἀνήγαγεν τὸν πόνον. In explanation of this latter phrase I observe that in those well-known combinations πέλεμος — πόνον — κόσμον — νηπίοις αὐξάνοντα, ἀναγεννήθαι may be used in place of the other verb. Some who did not notice this have proposed unnecessary conjectures. Compare Phædrus 233 c, 243 c, Laws 921 a and b.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂρα [νοὺς] οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀληθέστατον ἔχονσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἔμε καὶ Ἰοργίαν καὶ Φίλιμβον χρῆ συχνὰ γαίρειν ἔσσαι, τόδε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποίος;

ΣΩ. 'Ος ἂ περὶ ἐκείνα ἐνοῦ ἢμιν τὸ τε βέβαιον [καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὁ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρίνες, περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁσανώς ἀμικτάτα ἔχοντα, ἦ [δεύτερος] ἐκεῖνων ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἐστὶ ἐγγενές: τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δεύτερα τε καὶ ὑπερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὄνοματόν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἀν' οὐ τοῖς καλλιστοῖς δεικασόμεν τοπονείμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκνοῦν νοοὺς ἐστὶ καὶ πρόνοιας ἀεί ἄν τις τιμήσει δ' μάλιστ' ὀνόματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

Οὔδ' ἂρα [νοὺς] οὐδὲ τ. ἢ. We should have expected οὔτε .. οὔτε. But if there is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague, there is some νοοὺς, for all ἐπιστήμαι are parts of νοοῦ and are discussed as such. The νοοὺς of the text is plainly the opposite of that of Anaxagoras, and throws all things into confusion. The scribes were not familiar with the idiom which we meet both in Homer and in the Attic writers, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ, οὔτε ἀρ' οὔτε. In the 5th Epistle of Synesius our modern texts have οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὀμιχος ἦν ἔχοντι; but in my collations I find that the best MSS. have οὔτε γὰρ οὐδ' ὀμιχος ἦν ἔχοντι.

Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἔμε] See note on 20, 7. The article here has a depreciating effect. It has, in fact, the force of turning the first and second persons into a third, or more properly still, of abstracting the individual from his personality, and making a mere somebody of him.

[kαὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] These words are spurious. For βέβαιον cannot be separated from ἀληθὲς, since the want of truth in physical knowledge has been declared to arise from the instability of the objects. Again καθαρὸν is so nearly the same as εἰλικρίνες that it could not occur unless in close proximity to it, and the only place for εἰλικρίνες is that which it occupies as a quality deduced from the other two; and as τὰ ἀεί—ὡςπότεστ' answer to βέβαιον and ἀληθές, so does ἀμικτάτα answer to εἰλικρίνες.

[δεύτερος] The Zurich Editors have changed this into δεύτερος, which is at least more rational than Stallbaum's defence of it as a parenthetical proverb with πλοῦς understood. It is incredible that Plato should make two δεύτερα to one and the same first. It is therefore a waste of time to enquire how δεύτερος should be corrected.

ἄττ' ἄυ] The common reading is ζ' ἄν. It is evident that this is no place for γε. The confusion between the two readings is of very frequent occurrence.
Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be verissima, yet as the authority who states this bids us take ἔστιν καλείσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of ἔστιν καλεῖς) and talks strange stuff about ἀπεριβομένα and ἐνίκησε, we cannot throw off all suspicion of its unsoundness. If ἀπεριβομένα could mean accurately proved to be (not accurately made) there would be some handle for the infinitive καλείσθαι. But as this cannot be, and likewise for other reasons, which good scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read ἔστω ἀπεριβομένος κείμενα καλείσθαι.

[ἐνδιπήσημον] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are ἔστοι καὶ ἐνεμνησθησαν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς.
καὶ ἥδη, ἐνὶ τιν [καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθὲντ' ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δ' ἐν μὲν οὐ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δόο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ Β ὄνοματα, καὶ τὸ τ' ἄγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἥδι διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύ- σιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἄγαθον μοίρας τῆν φρόνησιν ἡ τῆν ὑδωρὶν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἢν τὰ τότε λεγό- μενα, ὁ Προτάρχης;

ΠΡΩ. Ῥηόδα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδειν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἢν ξυνομο- λογοῖτο,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθον διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΠΡΩ. Τίνι;

ΣΩ. Ῥω ταφεῖν τούτ' ἀεὶ τῶν ἔσον διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδένος ἐσέρον ποτ' ἐπὶ προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἵκα- νόν τελεστάτον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅτιο μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδειν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐσάερον ἐκα- τέρον ἔντες εἰς τῶν βίων ἐκάστων, ἀμίκτῳ μὲν ἑδωρὴ φρο- νίσει, φρόνησιν δ' ὀσάυτῳς ἑδωρὴς μηδὲ τὸ συμπότατον ἔχοισαν;

ΠΡΩ. 'Ην ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἴκανόν ἐδοξεῖν δ εἶναι τῷ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἶ δὲ γε παραπληκεῖτεν τι τότε, νῦν δοσισοῦν ἐπανα- λαβὼν ἐσάερον ἐπίτατο, μὴμερι ταῖς φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἴδεας τεθέμενος, καὶ σκοποῦν εἰ- τας ἄνευ τούτων δεξαι' ἐν οἷ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι ἡ γίγνεσθαι, μη ὅτι δ' ἡ ἡ ἑδωρὴ, εἶθ' ὡς πλείστην εἶθ' ὡς σφραγιστήν;

[καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] These words which the scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with the same compendium. ιας was taken for separate τοι from τούτῳ and leave ἑνιδὲ without a noun expressed or implied it was meant for ἑνιδὲ is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὐ, δόο δὲ. 

ὁ παραπληκεῖτεν—θέντες—We made the experiment of placing, &c. Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (21, 1) ἐν σοι περισσότερον ξύνες ταυτὰ. 

μη δὲτι δὴ γ' ἑδωρῆν] This formula
occurs in several Attic writers. Plato and Xenophon sometimes use merely μῆς ἢ τί and sometimes add δὴ only. In the cases where γε is added, it is found sometimes before δὴ, sometimes after it. Compare this passage with one in Demosth. against Conon, μὴ δὲ γε δὴ, and with one in Politicus, μὴ δὲ δὴ βασιλεὺς γε. 

[ὄμη τῷ ἥδονῷ] I bracket the insertions which make nonsense of a question put by Plato with the utmost subtlety. In the words given to Protarchus, the part which purports to be the answer is no answer at all; and his objection to the repetition of the question looks like an addition contrived to mask a corrupt sentence. Protarchus' answer ought to be ἢται ταῦτα, or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν η' ταῦτα γε.
in his Preface, observes that this is an allusion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which consisted of water and honey. Compare Esch. Eum. 107, Soph. Ed. 471, and 471, with the Scholiast.

'Ἡν ἢμιν] I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὁς οἴομεν is quite hope-

less, and we have nothing whereby to decide our choice between ἄληθες τοις ἁμοίον or (following the Bodleian which omits μάλλον), ἄληθεστέρα ἁλης ἀληθεστέρα εἶναι.
Many notes have been written in defence and explanation of these words. If they are correct, we must understand by them, using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles. But as it is not the manner of using but the things used, which are here in question, we might read ἐμπιστήματα, and omit καὶ: "Using, in building and in other things, patterns like the circles, i.e. divine."

μυσταγγεῖας] Hom. Ι. 4. 458, "Ὡς θετο ἥμαιραι ποταμοὶ κατ᾽ ἐσχατοὶ δέοντες ἐκ μυσταγγείων συμβαλλέτων θόρυβον ὤφα

οἷς γὰρ διενοθημένοι] It is vain to
Tάς γ' ἀναγκαῖας δήμουσθεν These words are commonly given to Pro- 
tarchus, but Ficinus had long ago 
seen that they belong to Socrates. Van 
Heusde thought them spurious. Stall- 
baum defends them on the ground that 
δημούσθεν in asseverando hæud infre-
quens. No doubt; but with an appeal 
to another for his assent. “Must we 
look for any coherence in this passage 
so long as we retain ὤς γάρ. The 
sense requires οἷς γάρ. For the parts 
of the true sciences, with which we first 
proposed to mingle them, were not suf-
ficient for us. I have also changed the 
place of πρῶτον, which commonly fol-
lores μέρις, where it has no meaning. 

ΠΡΩ. Αλλά ηδονάς λέγεις.
ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γ' ἀσφαλείαν πρότασις τῆς 

Διαλεγόμενον δὴ, τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἢ γ' οὖν ἐἰ μὲν 
tινες ἀναγκαία, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ἐξιμικτέων καὶ ταῦτας;
ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;
ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἦν γ' ἀναγκαίας δήμουσθεν δ' αὐτὸς καὶ τὰς 

οἷς γάρ, ὡς Πρώταχε, διερωτῶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς 

λέγομεν καὶ τὰς φρονίσεις, διαπληκτακάτους τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀλ- 

Β λύλων περὶ,—
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιόν;
ΠΡΩ. Ὅθε φίλαι, εἰδώ ἡδονὰς ἵμας χρή προσαγορεῖν εἰτ' 

καὶ ποὺς ποιοῦμεν;
νήσως, ἡ πάσης χορῆς [τοῦ φρόνημα]; οἴμαι μὲν πρὶς ταῦτα τοῦ' αὐτῶς ἀναγχαίοτατον εἶναι λέγειν,—

ΠΡΩ. Το ποιόν;

ΣΩ. 'Otει, καθάπερ ἐμπρόσθεν ἔφθηθ', τὸ μόνον καὶ ἕρι-

μον [εἰλικρινεῖς] εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πάντες ἁμαρταν ὧν' ὁφε-

λίμον πᾶντον γε μὴ ἠγούμεθα γενόν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθήν ἔνος

συνοικείν ἦμιν τὸ τοῦ γνωσθέντων τὰλα τε πάντα καὶ ἀντί

ἀν τὴν ἤμων τελέως [εἰς] δύναμιν ἐκάστης.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ χαλάς  ἦ' εἰσόμετα τὰ νῦν, φρόσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. πάλιν τοιν περὶ τοῦ, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ

τὸν νοῦν ἀνεφοτητέον.] 'Αρ' ἢδονιν τὸ προσδείσθ' ἐν τῇ ἐξη-

κράσει; φαίμεν ἂν αὐ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνεφοτη-

τεσ. Ποιόν, φαίειν ἂν ὦσε, ἢδονων;

ΠΡΩ. Εἴποις.

D ΣΩ. 'Ο δὲ  γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστίν οδε. Πρὸς
tαῖς ἀληθέσιν ἐκείνας ἢδοναῖς φρόσομεν ἄρ' ἔτι προσδείσθ'

ἡμίν τὰς μεγίστας ἢδονας ξυνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδρότα-

τας; Καὶ πῶς, ὃ Σῶκρατες; χαίειν ἂν, ἂν ἄρ' ἐμπιστομετά

tε μυρ' Ἦμων ἔχωμε, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσα

[διὰ μανικᾶς ἢδονᾶς], καὶ γίγνεσθαι τε ἤμιν τὴν ἄρρην ὦι

Ε ἔδω τὰ τε γνωρίμεν ἤμων τέκνα ὑπὸ τὸ πολὺ, ὃν ἀμέλειαν

λίθην ἐμποουόντοι, παντάκεισι διαφημίουσιν ἀλλας δ' ἢδο-

ναῖς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἤμιν νό-

have μ. φ. πάσης; ἡ χορῆς τοῦ φρόνειν.]

There seems no ground for the omission

of μᾶλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in

φρονήσασας τοῦ φρόνειν, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the

alternative "either with all or without any". For these reasons I have preferred μετὰ

φρονήσασω, ἡ πάσης χορῆς. In the

next paragraph εἰρηκρινὲς is obviously an

interpolation.

ἀφ' τῆς] The MSS. have some

τῆς αὐτῆς, others αὐ τῆς αὐ τῆς. The

reason for this answer of the Pleasures

is that they like that which appreciates the

nature of each of themselves. I have

therefore written ἐκάστης and cancelled

eis.

[τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνεφοτη-

τεν]] The verbal is plainly out of

keeping with φαίμεν ἂν, and both the repetition

of νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more

the would-be variety in "we must ask", "we shall say, asking", is most clumsy.

Another conclusive reason against the

genuineness of these words is the po-

sition of αὐ; for the opposition com-

mones at πάλι, and there was nothing

to prevent the author writing τὴν φρό-

νησιν αὐ καὶ τὸν νοῦν. But the simplest

argument is, that if Plato had written

τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνεφοτη-

τεν, he would have had no motive for ad-

ding anything whatever to φαίμεν ἂν.

[διὰ μανικᾶς ἢδονᾶς]] This is no doubt a

true explanation; but who would ever

dream of saying αὐ τῇ γαρ ταράττουσιν

ἡμᾶς διὰ μανικᾶς ἢδονᾶς?
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΙΒΟΣ.

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μή, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας ταξιν μεθ' ἵμειας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ καὶ ἐκμπάθας ἀφετής, ὡσπῶς καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ μεγάλων αὐτῆς ἐξαναλούσιοι πάντη, ταύτας μίγνυ τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας τολῆ πολλῆ ποιήγοντα τῷ μὴ μηνέν τού βουλόμενον τὸ καλλιότερον ἢδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοῦσίν μιξίν καὶ χράσεν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πει-64 ὀφθαλμόν, τι ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπω καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέρικεφ ἀγα-θών καὶ τίν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντεύτων. ἄρ' οὖν ἐμφάνονς ταύτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἐκατὸν τὸν νῦν φησίμεν ὑπὲρ θ' αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὃθ' ἀποφράσθηκα τὰ νῦν ὑάληνα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν ὄν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλη μή καὶ τόδε γ' ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἢν ποτὲ γένοιτο οὐδ' ἢν ὕμ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιον;

ΣΩ. 'Ωμ' μὴ μίξομεν ἀλῆθειαν, οὐκ ἢν ποτὲ τοῦτ' ἀλῆθώς γένοιτο οὐδ' ἢν γενόμενον εἰτ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ὄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλ' εἰ τινός ἐπὶ προσδεί τῇ συγκράσει ταύτη, λέγετε ὅτι τε καὶ Φίλιππος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεῖ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἁρξαν καλῶς ἐμψυχον σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπεργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοῖνοι, ὁ-Σωκράτες, οὕτω λέγε δεδοχ' ἰδια.

ταύτας μέγυν· τάς] All subsequent Editors have adopted this brilliant conjecture of Van Heusde for ταύτας μέγυν τάς.

καὶ τιν' ἵδεαν αὐτὴν' Of the various changes which might be proposed for the removal of the difficulty which this sentence presents, I think the most probable would be καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἵδεαν αὐ-τήν ἔλαι ποτε μαντεύτων. Compare ἀπο-φιλιπ, 252, λ. ὀς κατ' εἰδῆ τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταύτα ὄσοντα ἐγγεντα εἶναι φαι-

'χόντως ἑαυτὸν' This is a playful allusion to the phrase νοῦν ἐγγύτως.

κόσμος τοῖς ὁσώματος ἀρξαν] Socrates speaks of his present argument ὡς γών λέγοντας, that is the speculation concerning combinations and what admits of them, as concluded; he compares it to the invisible power which orders the world, because it is capable of regulating man's life. Nothing can be simpler or clearer than this passage, and yet it has been twisted into the most absurd fancies, such as the following: Descripta est adhuc mixtionis ratio, atque ostent-}

sum, quonam ejus elementa esse debeant, ita ut τὸ πέρας, τὸ ἄπειρον, et τὸ ἔμμιμογόμενον in mixtione ista jam nunc conspiciantur. (τὸ ἔμμιμογόμενον in mixtione, would imply that τὸ ἔμμι-

μιμογόμενον is something different from something in mixtio; if so, it is τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρας.) And again: Quippe volupatatis constitutum veluti corpus, sapientia vero

ψυχήν. Of all this metaphysical cob-web not a single thread belongs to Plato.

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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

C  ΣΩ. Ἄρε, οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἢ δὴ προθύρως [καὶ] τῆς οἰκήσεως ἑφεστάναι [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ὅσος ὄρθως ἂν τινὰ τρόπον φαίμεν;
ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γούς δοζεῖ.
ΣΩ. Τί δὴ τῆς ἐξημικυίας τιμιωτάτων ἁμα καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτίων εἶναι δόξειν ἢν ἢμιν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλή τῆς τοιαύτης διάθεσις; τούτῳ γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴδε γὰρ ἔτει [τῷ] νῦ προσφυγόστερον καὶ οἰκείοτέρον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξινεύστηκεν.

D  ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς; τούτῳ γὰρ εἰς τὴν χρίσιν ἢμιν ἑστὶ ἔκπορφοτάτων.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐξημπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλέπον ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δὲ ἢν ἡ πανέος ἀξία γίγνεται ἡμιούν ἢ τὸ παρὰπαν οὐδενός.
ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;
ΣΩ. Οὔπερ ποιοῦ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπων ἄγνοιει.
ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποιοῦ,
ΣΩ. Ὅσι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ἐξημιέτους φύσεως μὴ τιχοῦσα ἡμιούν καὶ ὁποιοῦς ἐξηγησις πᾶσα ἡ ἀράγχη ἀπόλλυεν τὰ τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὔτε γὰρ χράσις, ἀλλὰ τὰς Εὐκαρπιῶς ἐξημπορησμενήν ἀληθῶς ἢ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοτ' ὁντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐξημοφά.
ΠΡΩ. Ἀλήθεστατα.
ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ κατατέρεγην ἢμιν ἢ τάγαθον δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ἐξημιέτορα κάλλος ὁμιτρόκας ἢ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ἐξημβάλει γίγνεσθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀληθεύτων γ' ἐφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ χράσει μεμίχθαι.
ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γα.

65  ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μὲν δυνάμει' ἰδέα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν [ἡμεῖς-σου,] σύντροφοι λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ἐμετρεία καὶ ἀληθεία, λέ-

[καί] By cancelling this word we arrive at the right construction, ἀκοῦσα τοῖς προδύρῳς τῆς τάγαθοον ὀκλησεως. τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου seems to have been inserted after this intrusive καὶ had made τῆς ὀξησεως seem to be without an owner.

[ὕμφρονα] Observe the play on the word ἐμπιστοφημένη.

[μετρίωτος] This answers to ἀρετή, and ἐμετρεῖα to κάλλος.

[λαβόντες] This has nothing to do
And the vote is not mentioned. 

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶτατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδὴ τοινυν, ὁ Πρώταρχε, ἵκανος ἤμιν γένοιτ' ἢν ὄστισον κρίτης ἱδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονίμεσως, ὑπότερον αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἄφιστον ἕνεγκεστέρων τε καὶ τιμιότερον ἐν ἀνθρώπω-Β ποὺς τε ἔστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δήλον μὲν, δεμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεύθείν ἑλείον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον τοινυν τῶν τριῶν περὶ τὴν ἱδονήν ταύτην καὶ τῶν νόον κρίνομεν. δει γὰρ ἰδέαν ποτέρφι μᾶλλον [ἕνεγκεστέρων] ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἀπενεμοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ναι. πρῶτον δὲ γ' ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὁ Πρώταρχε καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέπας εἰς τριά, νοῦν καὶ ἀληθείαν καὶ ἱδονήν, τολίν ἐπισχόν χρόνον, ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ, πότερν ἱδονήν ἕνεγκεστέρων ἣ νοῦς ἀληθείας.

with catching, though the scribe who interpolated ἁρπεύσαι thought so. The infinitive can be understood as λαβεῖν. No ἰδέα can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on τάγαζον. We have in fact found it; and we form our notion of it, (compare ἐπείδαι λαβές, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as of is quite inappropriate (else we should also read ὅν μᾶς), I have written σύντρισι, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, Measure, and Truth, I have changed συμμετρία into ἐμμετρία. τούτο is manifestly τάγαζον, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ἔνιμφει, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For τάγαζον is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τὰ ἐν τῇ ἔνιμφει does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the triple conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the cor-

rupt ὅν ἐν. Indeed it is not so cer-

tain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἐν in αὐτοσαμεῖμεν' ἐν, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that αὐτοσαμεῖμεν' αὐτῶν was to be read, and that some word like παρουσίᾳ had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is ἄγαζον in κράσις, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But κράσιν, κάλλος, ἀληθεία must be present at all κράσισι; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that ἁγαζὸν is the cause of their presence in the κράσις, and that the κράσις is good (τοιαύτην) because of the Good that causes it. [ἔνηγκεσι] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ὃς. But although Socrate- tes afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πάτερον ἤδονῆ ἕνεκέστερον—It is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb ἀπονεμοῦμεν. "To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?"
ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνον δεί; πολὺ γάρ, οἷς, διαφέρεισιν, ἢδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἢδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τάφροδίασι, οὗ δὴ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπισκεφέειν συγγνώμην εἶλήττα παρὰ θεῶν, οὕς καθότεροι παίδων τῶν ἢδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ἀλήθειον κεκτημένον νοῦς δὲ ἦκε ταῦτα καὶ ἀλήθεια ἐστίν ἡ πάντων ὁμοίωσις ταύτων τε καὶ ἀληθεσταῖον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετά τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψια, πότερον ἢδονὴ φρονήσεως ἡ φρονήσις ἢδονῆς πλεῖον κέχρηται;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐξεκέρδων γε καὶ ταῦτα σκέψιν προβεβλήματι. οἷς μὲν ἢδονῆς καὶ καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὑπόν περικός ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἀνίκα, νοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδὲ ἀν ἐν ποτε.

Ε ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἰρήκας. ὡμοὶ δὲ ἔτι λέγε τρίτον. νοὶς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείλισε πλεῖον ἡ τῆς ἢδονῆς γένος, ὡστε εἶναι καλλίον νοῦν ἢδονῆς, ἡ τοπικοῦταν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοὺν, ὃ Σώματες, οὔ- 

deis πόστορ' οὔθ' ὑπαρ οὔτ' ὑπαρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' εἴδεν οὔτ' ἐπενοίησαν οὐδαμὴ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγανόμενον οὔτ' ὑπαρ οὔτ', ἐσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡθωνᾶς δὲ γε ποῦ, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, οταν ἤδομεν ἢδομένον ὀντινοῦν, ἡ τὸ γελοῦν ἔτει αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ ἐνπάντων αἰσχρόν ἐποίησον ὀρώντες, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχρομεθα καὶ ἀφανιζότες ἰδιότητα δὲ τί μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὄραν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντῃ δὴ φράσεις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων [πέμπτων] καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἢδονὴ κτῆμι οὖν ἔστι πρώ-

ἀμετρώτερον .. ἐμμετρώτερον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS. Buttmann, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἀκοστέρος, σφοδρότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider εὐτεκνώτερος and such like as licenses taken by the Attic poet in unusual words, is content to await a fuller induction. The presence of these forms in a MS. which has preserved so many Atticisms is a part and no small part of the kind of proof which he wanted. Τ' Ἀλλ' οὖν] Here again the MSS. and Edd. have Τ' Ἀλλ' οὖν, which is evidently out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and where the only answer made by the next speaker is Ὀρθῶς. [πέμπτων] ὃν ἀγγέλων φράζειν is the same as ἀγγέλων πέμπτων φράζειν.
Comp. Eur. Alectost. 737, 738. But ἢ τοιαύτα [χρή] The MSS. are divided between τοιαύτα χρη and χρη τοιαύτα, the former, which alone makes sense, being supported by the inferior MSS.

τὴν ἄδειον πῦρ ἐστιν φύσις] I have discussed the proper reading and interpretation of this passage in my Introduction. With regard to the expression τὴν ἄδειον φύσιν in place of ἀγάλματιν, which he has all along been employing, it is not difficult to see that Plato here, knowing that the mere argument is virtually at an end, breaks loose from dialectic trammels and allows his enthusiasm full play. It is to be noticed that he uses the word ἄδειος which to a common hearer meant only perpetual or eternal, in a further sense with which his scholars were familiar, of the invisible or undiscoverable. That for the sake of which all things are is the end, and being the end it cannot be explained, as other things are, by that to which it belongs, or of which it is the effect; but its name is also its definition. It is, and there is nothing beyond. τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this νοῦς owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realization.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right place here, it is of no use lower down; but it seems better placed there than here.

ἐπιστήματι The MSS. have ἐπιστήμη-μας, ταῖς δὲ. The scribe was put out by the want of ταῖς μὲν, but it is understood in ταῖς δὲ, according to a common idiom.
οιδέν λοιπὸν πλὴρ ὁσσερ νεφάλην ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.

ΣΩ. ἦθι δὴ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξεξῆθημεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, ὃ Σῶματες; ὃς Φίληβος τῷ γαθῶν ἐπίθετο ἤμιν ἴδονὴν εἶναι πάσαν καὶ πάντη; ὃς γὰρ ἔσκαξε, ἔλεγες ἀφίλος τὸν εὖ ἀρχὴς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

Ε. ΣΩ. Ναι, τὸ δὲ γε μετὰ τούτῳ ἐπούμεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιῶν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διεκλήθεται, καὶ δυσχέραινας τὸν Φίληβον λόγον ὅμόν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλον πολλάς μυρίων, ἐπον ὡς ἴδονης γα νοῦς εἰς μακρὰ βέλειν τε καὶ ἀμεινὸν τῷ τὸν ἀνθρώπων βίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύον δὲ γε καὶ ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι πολλά, ἐπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τὸν δευτερείον νῦν πρὸς ἴδονὴν ἕνωσιαμοχύμην, ἴδονή δὲ καὶ δευτερείον στεφθῇσθαί.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴπες γὰρ ὄνν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γε πάντων ἱκανότατον τοῦτον οὐδέτερον [ἰκανὸν] ἐραΐνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπῆλλακτο καὶ ἴδονή μὴ τι τάγαθον γ᾽ αὐτὸ μηδέτερον αὐ-

tὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι] A common proverb for adding the finishing stroke to any performance. The third libation was offered to Ζεὺς Σωτῆρ.

Ποιον δή] If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text. The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φίληβος ξ. τ. ἐ. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποιον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὡς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γὰρ to the second ὡς, and for παντελῆ, which is absurd, put πάντη.

[ἰκανὸν] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Coslinian πάντων ἱκανότατα ἐφάνη was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὐδέτερον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, retained ἱκανότατον, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt.

ἀπῆλλακτο] This confirms my conjecture on Thucydides 1, 138: where
he says in speaking of the character of Themistocles: χρίνι τοις ἵκανον σύν αὐτάκτιος. "He did not shut himself up from men capable of judging." For which, if it be written οὖ, καίν would be no way inferior to that in the text.

comparison. For by following pleasure.

by the MSS. in a passage of the Euthydemus.
PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

TRANSPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydides or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in those parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the omission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in
the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the Plutus vv. 119-20.

_Πλ._ Ὅ Ἵν ς μὲν οὖν οἶδ᾽ ὡς . . . . . . . . ἕ μ᾽ εἰ

πῦθοιτ᾽ . . . . . . . νῦν δ᾽ οὐ τούτῳ δοῖ;

The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words ὁ τοῦτων μῶρον and the second with ἂν ἔπιτριψε. The result is that you are obliged to take ὁ μῶρον for τὴν μωρίαν, that the speaker must be understood to say τοῦτων of those whom he is addressing, that Τούς is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with ἂν ἔπιτριψε, and the second with τοῦτων, and you get

_Πλ._ Ὅ Ἵν ς μὲν οὖν οἶδ᾽ ὡς ἂν ἔπιτριψε μ᾽, εἰ

πῦθοιτο τοὔτ᾽. Χρ. δ᾽ μῶρος, νῦν δ᾽ οὐ τούτῳ δοῖ;

In the Heraclidæ of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

_Θεράπων._

-ἡμιστα πρὸς σου μῶρον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἔπος.

_Ἰόλαος._

καὶ μὴ μετασχεῖν γ᾽ ἀλκιμον μάχης φίλοις.

_Θεράπων._

* * * * * * * * *

_Ἰόλαος._

τί δ᾽, οὐ θένοιμι κἂν ἐγὼ δι᾽ ἀσπίδος;

_Θεράπων._

Θένοις ἂν, ἄλλα πρόσθεν αὐτὸς ἂν πίσοις.

_Ἰόλαος._

οὐδεὶς ἐμ᾽ ἐχθρὸν προσβλέπων ἂνέξεται.

_Θεράπων._

* * * * * * * *

_Ἰόλαος._

ἀλλ᾽ οὖν μαχοῦνται γ᾽ ἀριθμῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσοι.
Therasiakes.

σμικρόν τὸ σὺν σήκωμα προστίθης φίλοις.

I have written μαχοῦναι for μαχούμαι because Iolaüs is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. "Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number." If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer σμικρόν κ. τ. Ἐ. But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὦψει τραύμα, μη δρόσης χρός.
2. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅ τᾶν, ἡτίς ἦν δόμη σέθεν.

If we ask the merest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last boast would be to tell him, that looks do not wound, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, "It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends". Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmsley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the Iphigenia Taurica v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflection.

καὶ μὴν ποθεῖνός γ' ἠλθες ἐξ "Ἀργοὺς μολὼν.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, "You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here": after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,
I. φυγάς δ’ ἀπίφας πατειδός, ἥ πολὺς τύχῃ;
O. φεύγω τρόπων γε ἡ τίν’ οὐχ ἐκαν ἐκαν.
I. καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ’ ἥθες εἷς Ἀργοὺς μολὼν.
O. οὖκ οὖν ἐμαυτῷ γ’, εἰ δὲ σοι, σὺ τούτ’ ὁρα.
I. ἀρ’ ἄν τί μοι φράσεις ἄν ἐγὼ θέλω;
O. ὡς γ’ ἐν παρέGERη τῆς ἑμῆς δυσφορίας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the some reason, to such a line as this (Ion 1295)

Μελές οἰκεῖν τὰμ’, ἐμοῦ βιχ λαβῶν,

the retort

κατείσα τοῦ μέλλειν μ’ ἀπέκτεινες φόβωρ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines πατός γε—Χρυνός contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the Euthydemus (305, c. ð) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. 31), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οὔνται δ’ εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν ἄν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοίς, | ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἵδιοις λόγοις ἄταν ἀποληψθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεις ἔσθαι. | ὅστε (τοῦ) παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκίμειν ἐμποδοῖν σφαιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἡ τούς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπως. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀλήθειας σφαὶς σοφωτάτοις, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the Ion quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-
position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the *a priori* probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would willfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to show that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which shew that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in *Laws* 710, 1, the words τοῖς δὲ ἐγχρωστῶς are an antithesis invented to answer to τοῖς μὲν ἀχρωστῶς, and that τοῖς μὲν ἀχρωστῶς itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance *which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure*, ὃπερ εὐθὺς παιδὶ καὶ θηρίοις, τοῦ μὴ ἀχρωστῶς ἐξειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, ξύμφωτον ἐπανάθει. I have also mentioned a passage in the *Phaedo*, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (χαίρειν ἐφ' ὑμῖν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης όρμηθέντα) the other
tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See Phædo 101, n.

In *Laws* 841, b, we read, τὸ δὴ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντα τι καλὸν παρ' αὐτῶις ἐστο [νόμιμων] ἔστι καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθέν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δράν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that not to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato's pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρῶν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μὴ δράν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλὸν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δρῶντα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὔτω τὸ τε (vulgo τοῦτο) αἰσχρῶν αὖ καὶ καλὸν δευτέρας ἢ μὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γενόμενον κέωτο.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the *Symposium* (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιτέφειν ὑμῖν (*Laws* 817, c) should fail to see that έκάσειν had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in *Theaetetus* 171, c, to add τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγχωρῆσαι, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσει, μᾶλλον δὲ γ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὀμολογήσει.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes *in Midiam*, which I quote instar omnium as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, ά. εἰδ' ύμεῖς τὸν οὕτως ὁμόν, τὸν οὕτως ἀναφάνων, τὸν τηλικούτας δίκαιας λαμβάνοντα, ὃν αὐτὸς ἢδικησάται φησὶ μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἢδικητῷ γε) τούτον ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα των πολιτῶν ἀφήσετε, καὶ μηθ' ἐφοτής, μηθ' ἑρθόν, μηθ' νόμον, μηθ' ἄλλον μηθεῖνος πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον οὗ καταψηφιεῖσθε; οὐ παράδειγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which
our copyists have garnished with ἀφήσετε and οὐ καταψηφεῖσθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιούμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. Σ, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν οὐτως ἀγνωμονά is nothing but a foolish dittographia of τὸν οὐτως ὁμόν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to φησι.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the Philebus it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sophocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one’s ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere οὐ μονθάνω. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the Cretans. Euripides had written φοίνικογενοὺς τέκνον Εὐφώπης, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυρίας. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Anapæstic metre required another syllable. This was soon found; and so from that day to the Epistola ad Millium, and from it to our own they write or print, φοίνικογενοὺς παῖ τῆς Τυρίας τέκνον Εὐφώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the Iphigenia Taurica. In v. 464, Iphigenia prays, δέξαι δυσίας, ὡς ὃ παρ’ ἡμῖν νόμος ὅχ’ ὀσίας ἀναφαίρει. Some commentator thinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ’ ἡμῖν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, Ἑλληνιστ. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person
discovers that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient
dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further
trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have Δέξαί ὑ
ςίας, ἢς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐκ ὅσιας Ἑλλησίτι διδοὺς ἀναφαίνει.

A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given
from the Medea vv. 734, foll.

πεποίθα, Πελίον δ' ἐξθρός ἦστι μοι δόμος
Κρέαν τε τούτοις δ' ὑπῆκουσι μὲν ἄγειες
ἀγούσιν οὐ μεθε' ἄν ἐκ γαίας ἤμε.

λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεὼν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἄν, κάπισκηνεύμασιν
οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενή,

τοῖς δ' ὁλόθρος ἦστι, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

Elmsley's note on κάπισκηνεύμασι is as follows. "κάπισκηνεύ-
ματα legit Scholiasta. ἑπικηνεύματα γάρ εἶσι τὰ διὰ τῶν κη-
φρημάτων μικρόμενα πρὸς φιλίας. τῇ δὲ εὐθεῖας ἀντὶ δοτικῆς κέχρη-
tαι. Εἶδε γὰρ εἴπειν, καὶ τοῖς ἑπικηνεύμασιν οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο. Ἀπ-
δύνομε δὲ φησιν ἔλλειπεν τὴν διὰ. διὰ τὰ ἑπικηνεύματα. Paullo
ante legitur; µὴ ὄμόσας δὲ φιλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἑπικηνεῦ-
ματος. Θέλει εἴπειν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἑπικηνεύμασιν. λέειτε δὲ ἡ διὰ,
Latet hic aliquid quod extricare negueo." Let us take account of
the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθε' ἄν,
which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson's note
is an excellent one, the question still recurs, "why not ἕµοο
after the nearer verb?" For ἀνώµοτος in the best MSS. there
is ἐνώµοτος, but this old Scholium by its µὴ ὄμόσας δὲ supports
the former. Then we have κάπισκηνεύμασι in the text, but the
scholiasts most Certainly read either κάπισκηνεύματα, or τάπι-
κηνεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in
the Scholia σοῦ ἄν πίθοιο, which, as Dindorf observes, is the
contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern edi-
tions have adopted Wyttenbach's τὰς ἄν πίθοιο. But if we look
at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ
τοῦ ἑπικηνεύματος, we observe a new combination, which
proves that τάπικηνεύματα must have been so placed that it
could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἀπὸ κοινοῦ
to the two optatives γένοι' ἄν and σοῦ ἄν πίθοιο; but this would
be impossible if the verses ran thus:

Platonis Philebus,
Then the verses must have been so arranged that while

"οὐχ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρονεύματα"

made one line, "φίλος γένοι' ἄν" followed in such a way as to admit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in fact the key of the enigma. "οὐχ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρονεύματα" should have followed immediately on ξυγεῖς. But it was left out, and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page. From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately after "φίλος γένοι' ἄν": after which "οὐχ ἀν πίθοιο, which still remained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the meantime the sense contained in "οὐχ ἀν πίθοιο" could not wait for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line de suo, and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage therefore should be restored thus:

πέπωθα. Πέλλον δ' ἱχθός ἐστι μοι δόμος,
Κρέαν τε τούτοις δ' ὄρκιοι μὲν ξυγεῖς
οὐχ ἀν πίθοιο τάπικηρονεύματα·

λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεών ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἄν, τάμα μὲν γὰρ ἁσθενῆ,

τοῖς δ' ὀλβὸς ἐστι, καὶ δόμος τυραννικὸς.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric ἢ γά τυ μοι τι πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking interpolations in another Dialogue of Plato which has fared pretty nearly as ill as the Philebus, viz. the Politicus. 286, α. μάλλον ἢ περί τά μείζω. 286, β. ὄνομαρσί (read ἴππης). 286, ν. δείν (read μεμείρεθαι and compare 284, ι.). 287, α. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, ο. καὶ ἑγκύροις καὶ ἀπόκροις. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should be arranged thus. προσφέρομενος. — Ν. Σ. καὶ μάλα γε ὄσχνον εἶδος. Ξ. καὶ τῇ ζ. γε — ἐπιστήμη. Ν. Σ. πῶς γάρ;) 288, c. προσαγορευθέν. 293, α. ὁθεδή (read οὑ ἀν γίγνεται). 293, ν. ἴηούμεναι (comma after ἀριστοτεκα). 295, ν. παχυτέρως. (The structure is: θῆσει τό τοῖς πολλοῖς προσήκον, καὶ τό ὄς ἐπὶ τό πολύ, καὶ τό πως ούτως. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόμοιν.) 295, β. παρά των ἐλπίδα. 295, ν. ποτὲ νομοθετήθεντα. 297, β. οἴοι τε ὅσι. 298, α. ἀναλόματα. 299, ξητεῖν. 303, ξ. λείπεται.
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the Philebus where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person’s mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the Epistle prefixed to my Euthydemus. I will now bring forward two or three more. Pol. 287, ε. mentioned above under the head of interpolations. Pol. 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἐκείνων. Ξ. Τὴν δ’ εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν . . . σὺ γ’ ἢ μὲν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ὄρχειν; Pol. 306, α. πάντως γε μὴν ὧντεν is a part of the Stranger’s speech. Laws 811, β. πολύμαθαν. πᾶς οὖν . . . νομοφύλαι; ΚΑ. Τοῦ πέρι λέγεις; ΑΘ. Τοῦ πρὸς τί π. . . ἀποκολύοι. ΚΑ. Λήγε καὶ µηδὲν ἀπώνει λέγεις. In Euripides’ Ion 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: Πν. λοβὸν νῦν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκνώσαν ἐκπόνει. Ιον. πᾶσαν δ’ ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ’, Εὐρώπης θ’ ὀροὺς; Πν. γυνάει τάδ’ αὐτός.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δὲ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δὲ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed

’Ἀσιάδ’ ἐπέλθων πᾶσαν, Ἐυρώπης θ’ ὀροὺς;

into πᾶσαν δ’ ἐπελθὼν ’Ἀσιάδ’. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. Ἐπελθὼν would mean that he was to look for his mother after he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἔπιων.

FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Τὸ τοίτον ἐπέφω and τὸ τοίτον ἐτ’ ἐρῶ would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. De Lysia, 7. the words θὰν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄν δρασά, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland’s time read, οὐθὲν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρὰς αἰτοῦσα εἰ παθεῖν. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the Politicus 290, β. ἦν· τοῖναι νοι ὁκουµέν οἶον γείτονος ἵνα οὐκ εἰπτεσθαι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γείτονος into γέ τινος, but no one has yet pointed out that ΟΙΟΝ ΓΕΙΤΟΝΟΣ is a mere blunder for ΟΙΟΝΕΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson’s correction of ἐγνώσμεθ’ ἐξ ἱσοῦ κἀν υἱότατος κακοίς, and Bentley’s of μὴ τινα φάναι τὰ Ἐριχέπεια.
OMISSION OF OT.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of οὐ is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel's Phanissae. Androm. v. 103 'Ιτώ αἰπεινη: μονωδία ἐστι 1 τὸ δὴ ἐνὸς προσώπου θηρνοῦντος· ἀστε τὸ "Ἀσιάτιδος γῆς σχήμα" 2 μονωδία ἐστι. τραγωδία γάρ καὶ ὅν καὶ οὖν ἐδει οὔτε τὰ ἐν θεορομομένη ἕξομενα, οὐ θηρνεῖ γάρ. Read, 1) ἐστιν ὁδῆ, 2) οὐ μ. ἢ, 3) οὖν ἐδει. At other times οὐ is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author's drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote σοὶ γάρ. In Thuc. π. 43, οὐ γὰρ οἱ παραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδοίον ἀν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἐλπὶς οὐκ ἔστι ἁγαθοῦ, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

ΓΑΡ ΟΤΝ.

I have asserted that γὰρ οὖν is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in Agam. v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus' shipwreck adds

γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἀξίστα· Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολείν.

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping τεὶ δ' οὖν that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for προσδόκα μολείν ought to be either προσδόκα μολειόθεαι or π. μολείν ἀν. The emendation is obvious: 'Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance''

Μενέλεων γ' ἀν οὖ πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολείν.
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EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S PHILOLAUS.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that they told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few
fearable sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the ἀνυσματικοὶ and the μαθηματικοὶ, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicharmus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hipparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophising in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that he first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato's instance bought for a hundred minae, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older
authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay *De Dignitatem Socratis,* ) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolemy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minae, and with its contents composed the *Timeus.* Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the silographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the moneys for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his *Timeus.* It is true that Iamblichus, Synesius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of *Timeus* the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the *Timeus* and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the *Mimes* of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as
the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian minae. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato's time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato's first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the seeresy of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Caesar in his work περὶ ὁμονύμων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων, quoted by Diogenes: Τούτων φησὶ Αιμήττηος ἐν Ὀμονύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως.
After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the *Phaedrus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the *Gorgias* however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the *Phaedo*, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only; yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the *Gorgias*, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat uncronomious handling of the *divine man*. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the *Gorgias* as well as in the *Phaedo*.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Locrian Timaeus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, περὶ κόσμου, περὶ φύσεως, περὶ ψυχῆς. And these he further identifies with the *Bacchae*, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of
Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy, since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceptible in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,
from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world Kosmos: and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Dorians and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Moravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean orgies. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses.

From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, διάνοια, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,
though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

* * * * *

2. Πεπαλώντα does not mean limited as some have understood it but limiting, what Plato in the Philebus calls πέρας limit. ** It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the limiting and the unlimited. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. ** But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the even number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his Physics iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, ἀπειρον, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναπολαμβανόμενον καὶ ύπὸ τοῦ περίττοι περαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὕσι τῇν ἀπειρίαν, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. ** Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the even and by the limiting meant the odd? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.
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But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held one to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. ** In the same way Plato in his Philebus sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, τὸ γιγνόμενον, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, ἕν and ἀπειρόν, out of which two the πεπερασμένον is produced. (Aristotle Metaph. i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (ἡ ἄδομος δύας). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. **
[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus' work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (Καὶ πάντα γα μᾶν α. τ. ἕ) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1 : 2, 2 : 3, 3 : 4, 8 : 9, 243 : 256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, ἕστι γὰρ ἄμονία πολυμιγέων ἐνωσις καὶ διχὰ φρονεώνων σύμφρασις (of the Dorian nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning Περὶ δὲ φύσιος—] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus' harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave "harmony", as Aristotle does (see Plutarch's treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1 : 2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (ἐτερον) or Many (πολλά,) which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented
in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. ** The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is \( \text{συλλαβά} \) καὶ \( \delta' \) \( \text{δέκα} \). \( \text{συλλαβή} \) is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρώτη συλλήψις φθόγγον συμφάνων. \( \delta' \) \( \text{δέκα} \) is the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since \( 3 : 4 \) with \( 2 : 3 = 1 : 2 \), as we see from these numbers \( 2 : 3 : 4 \), Philolaus says that \( \text{συλλαβά} \) καὶ \( \delta' \) \( \text{δέκα} \) is the magnitude of harmony, because \( 2 : 4 \) is harmony, \( 2 : 3 \) is \( \delta' \) \( \text{δέκα} \), and \( 3 : 4 \) is \( \text{συλλαβά} \). But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is \( 8 : 9 \), as the following numbers shew, \( 6 : 8 : 9 \). For \( 6 : 8 \) is the Fourth, \( 6 : 9 \) is the Fifth, and the difference is \( 8 : 9 \) or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the \( \upsilonτάγη \) to the \( \muέση \) a Fourth, but from the \( \muέση \) to the \( \nuτή \) a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning \( \text{Αρμονίας δὲ μεγέθος}. \)

** Philolaus. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. 1, 2.

Theorhein δεί τα \( \varepsilon \)γά καὶ ταν \( \varepsilon\)σιαν τω \( \alphaριθμο\) καταν \( \deltaύναμιν \) ἀ τις \( \varepsilon\)ντιν ἐν τῷ \( \deltaέκαδι \). Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελεῖς καὶ παντοεργός, καὶ θεία καὶ οὐρανίῳ βίῳ καὶ ἀληθοπινὸν ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγέμων κοινονοῦσα . . . , \( \deltaύναμις \) καὶ τὸς \( \δέκαδος \). "Ἀνέυ δὲ ταύτας πάντ' ἀπείρα καὶ ἄθηλα καὶ ἀφανή. Γνωμονικὰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀρχαμονικα καὶ διδασκαλικά τῶ ἀπορουμένῳ παντὸς καὶ ἀγνουμένῳ παντὶ. Ὅν γὰρ καὶ ἡς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποτ' αὐτά, οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ' ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχαμος καὶ ἡ τούτω ἐσοία. Νῦν δὲ οὕτως, καταν ψυχὰν ἀρμόσδον αἴσθησι πάντα, γνωστὰ καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλάλιος κατὰ γνώμονας φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, ἀσωμάτων καὶ σχέσιν τοὺς λόγους χωρὶς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τῆ ἀπειρῶν καὶ τῶν περαινόντων. "Ἰδοίς δὲ καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαμιονοῖς καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τῶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τῶν δύναμιν ἱσχύονων, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἤργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντὶ, καὶ κατὰ τὰς δαμιουργίας τᾶς τεχνικῆς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τὰν

Παρ' ὁ καὶ ἀρχαρτος καὶ ἀπαταπόνατος διαμένει τόν ἀπειρόν αἰῶνα. Οὕτε γὰρ ἤτοι οὖν ἄλλα τε αἱ αἰώνα δυναμικοτέρα αὐτάς εὐφρατεῖται, οὔτε ἐκτοσθεν, φθείραι αὐτὸν δυναμένα. Ἀλλ' ἂν ὁ δὲ τὸ κόσμος ἐξ αἰώνως καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνός ἢ τοῦ συγγενέως καὶ κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀνυπερθέτῳ κυβερνόμενος. Ἐξει δὲ καὶ τάν ἀρχάν τάς κινάσις τε καὶ μεταβολάς τὸ κόσμος εἰς ξών, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγούμενος ἢ ἑρχίςδουν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμεταβλητόν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβαλλον ἀπό τὰς τὸ δὸν περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι σελάνας περαιούται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τὰς σελάνας μέχρι τὰς γας. Ἐπεὶ δὲ γε καὶ τὸ κινεῖν ἐξ αἰώνως εἰς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεόμενον ὡς τὸ κινεῖν ἄγει, οὕτω* διατέθεασθαι ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀείκιναντον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὸς εἶμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν νῦ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκομα πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιον καὶ μεταβολάς καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὰ δυναμεὶ καὶ ὑπερέχουν, τὸ δ' ἄστερον καὶ καθυπερεχομένου. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀεὶ θέου καὶ τοῦ δὲ ἄλλῳ μεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμου. Αἐτο καὶ καλὸς ἔχει λέγειν κόμπον ἢ μὲν ἐνεχείον εἰδώλιον θεὸν τε καὶ γενέσιον κατὰ συνακολουθήσειν τὰς μεταβλητικὰς φύσιος καὶ μὲν ἐς ἀεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀσφύτως ἔχον, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. Καὶ τὸ μὲν φθοραὶ ὄντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφὰς σώζεται, τὰ γοῦν πάλιν τὰν αὐτῶν μορφὰν ἀποκαθίστατα τὸ γεννήσαντε πατέρι καὶ ἑμιούργῳ.


Ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἡ περαιούντα, ἡ ἀπειρά, ἡ περαιούντα τε καὶ ἀπειρά· ἀπειρά δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ εἶμη. Ἐπεὶ τοινυν φαινεται οὔτε ἐκ περαιούντων πάντων ἐόντα, οὔτε ἐς ἀπειρόν πάντων, ἐδολὸν ἐντ' ἀρα ὅτι ἐκ περαιούντων τε καὶ ἀπειρόν 0 τ' τὸ κόσμος καὶ

* i.e. ὁμολογεῖν.
APPENDIX.

145 in a dito yuQ aQi&iAog g)ccv£Ovtai. TcJ ysvijad^ai,

kal πάντα γα μάν τα γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμούν ἠχοντι. οὐ γάρ οἶνον
te οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἅνευ τοῦτο. Ὅγα μὲν

ἀριθμὸς ἦχει δυὸ μὲν Ἠδία εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄριστον, τρίτον δὲ ἄπ',

ἀμφότεροι μικρότεροι, ἀρτιοπερισσόν. Ἐκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἴδεσι πολλαὶ

μορφαὶ, δὲ ἑκαστὸν αὐταὐτῳ ἰδημαίνει. Περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας

οὐδὲ ἦχει· ἀ μέν ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων ἀδίος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὸ μόνα,

φύσις θεία ἔντι, καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπινὰν ἐνδέχεται γνώσιν, πλὴν γα ὅτι

οὐχ οἶνον τ' ἦς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐντόν καὶ γιγνωσκομένων ὑφ' ἀμών γε-

gνηθήσαι, μη ὑπαρχοῦσα τάς ἐστὸς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνεστα

ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπειρών. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρ-

χαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν οὐχ ὁμοια ὁδὲ ὁμόφυλο εἴναι, ἢδη ἀδύνατος τ' ἐς κα

ἀυτοὶς κοιμηθήμενα, αἱ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπηγένετο, τι τινι ἁμα τρόπῳ ἐγέ-

νετο. Ἐ τῶν ἀν ὄμοια καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδείνον, τα

δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοτελὴ ἀνάγκα τα ὑπαντά ἀρμονίας

συγκεκλεῖθαι, αἱ μέλιντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεται.

Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος ἔντι συλλαβᾶ καὶ δι' ὀξείαν. Τὸ δὲ δὲ ὀξείαν

μείζον τὰς συλλαβὰς ἐπογοῦ. Ἐντι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐς μέσου συλ-

λαβα, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσος ποτὶ νεάτων δι' ὀξείαν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίτων

συλλαβα, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάτας δι' ὀξείαν. Τὸ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μέσας καὶ

τρίτας ἐπογοῦ. 'Α δὲ συλλαβᾶ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δὲ ὀξείαν ἡμιο-

λιον, τὸ διὰ πασῶν δὲ δίπλοον. Οὔτως ἀρμονία πέντε ἐπόγοια καὶ

δύο διέσεις, δι' ὀξείαν δὲ τρε' ἐπόγοια καὶ διέσεις, συλλαβᾶ δὲ δύ' 

ἐπόγοια καὶ διέσεις.—

Platonis Timæus, 35 λ.

Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ δεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχύνης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐ

περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον εὐ ἄμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνε-

κερασών οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς δὲ ταύτου φύσεως αὐ τό τοι καὶ τῆς ὅτε-

γον* κατὰ ταύτα. Καὶ ἐννυστήσαν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ το ἀμερίσῳ ἀντίων

καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. Καὶ σαία λαβῶν οὕτα αὐτὰ συνε-

* Commonly ὅτεγον. Καὶ ταὐτα ταὐ-

Platonis Timæus.

The soul of the world is the

ta. I have altered the text according

πέρας of the whole and of all its parts;

to the evident requirement of the sense.

and we here see that this soul partakes

The passage itself has been appended

Philebus. The soul of the world is the

to the opposite ὅτεγον, τὸ ἐν καὶ ταύτων

as serving to illustrate the πέρας in the

and to ἀπειρον καὶ ὅτεγον.

Platonis Philebus.

10
APPENDIX.

κεφ.διστο εἰς μᾶλ πάντα Ιδέαν, τὴν Θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον ώσαιν εἰς ταύτων ξυναμόττων βις.

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρχιτέκτον. Στοβ. Εκλ. i. 35, 2.

'Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχαὶ ἦμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοίχιαν ἐξοίσιαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὁριστῶν, ἔτεραν δὲ τὰν συστοίχιαν ἐξοισιὰν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀσφάλτων. Καὶ τὰν μὲν ὤστεν καὶ λογὸν ἐξοισιὰν καὶ τὰ ἐντα κρίμας συνέχεια, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐντα κρίμας καὶ συν- τάσσειν: πλαταιάζουσαν γὰρ ἄεί τοίς γινομένιος εὐλόγως καὶ εὐπρόνως ἀνάγειεν ταύτα καὶ τὸ καθ' ὅλων ύστερος τε καὶ ἰδέας μεταδίδομεν: τὰν δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἀφροτὸν καὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐς γένεσιν δὲ καὶ ωσίαν παραγήνεισι διαλέγεις, πλαταιάζουσαν γὰρ ἄεί τοίς πράγμασιν ἔξομοιον αὐτάς· 'Ἀλλ' ἐπείπερ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαιροῦμενα τὰ πράγματα τυφλάσκειν, τὰ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθο- ποιοῖ τὸν δ' ἦμεν κακοποιοῦ, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγους ἦμεν, τὸν μὲν ἕνα τὰς ἀγαθοποίας φύσις, τὸν δ' ἕνα τὰς κακοποιοί. Διὸ τούτο καὶ τὰ τέχνα καὶ τὰ φύσει γνωρύκειν δει τούτων πράττον μετεληφθὲν, τὰς τε μορφὰς καὶ τὰς ύστερας. Καὶ ἀ μὲν μορφὸν ἔστιν ὁ αὐτίς τοῦ τόδε τι ἦμεν· ὁ δὲ ὀσία τὸ ὑποκειμένου, παραθέρωμεν τῶν μορφῶν. Οὔτε δὲ τῇ ὀσίᾳ ὅσον τε ἐστὶ μορφὰς μετείμενος αὐτὰ ἐς αὐτὰς, οὔτε μᾶς τὸν μορφὸν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὀσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖαν ἐτέρας τινα ἦμεν αἰτίαν των κινάσιον τῶν ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τῶν μορφῶν, ταῦταν δὲ τῶν πράτταν τὰ δύναμι καὶ καθυπερτάταν ἦμεν τῶν ἀλλῶν· ὀνομάζομεν δ' αὐτάν ποθόκεις Θεόν· ὅστε τρεῖς ἀρχαὶ ἦμεν ἤδη, τὸν τε Θεόν, καὶ τὰν ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν μορφῶν. Καὶ τὸν μὲν Θεόν τεχνάτα καὶ τὸν κινεόντα, τὸν δ' ἔστω τῶν ὅλων καὶ τὸ κινεό- μενον, τῶν δ' μορφῶν τὰν τέχναν καὶ ποθ' ἄν κινεώτε τῷ τοῖς κινεόν- τος α' ἐστο. 'Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κινεόμενον ἐναντία θεατοῦ δυνάμεις ἤςχει τὰς τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμόγας τίνος δείκτα και ἐνώσισι, ἀνάγκα άριστομένοι δυνάμεις καὶ ἀνάλυγοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριστή- μοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς δεικτήμενα παραλαμβάνεις, δ' καὶ συναρμόζαι καὶ ἐνώσαι τῶν ἐναντίοτοτα δυναστείας ἐν τὰ ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων ποτὶ τῶν μορφῶν. Καθ' αὐτῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄσοι ὁ ἔστω κεφαλῆς ἐστι, κα- νάθεσα δ' αὐτῶν μορφῶν ἐμμορφός γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἔχομαι τὸν τὰς συντείχος. Ὁ ομοίως δ' καὶ τὸ δ' ἂν κινεώτε τὸ κινεόμενον ἐστὶ τὸ πράττος κινετή. ὅτι ἄναγκα τρεῖς ἦμεν τὰς ἀρχαῖς, τὰν τὸ ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τῶν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ εἰς αὐτῷ κινατικὸν καὶ πράτους τὰ δυνάμει: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον ἦμεν δεῖ ἄλλα καὶ νόω
We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act (that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of this change there is a succession, such as belongs to the connection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an expansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive. But we may already infer, a priori, that the former alone can take place. For time carries us from the present to the future, and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about to enter, only that it is another, can alone be the cause of pleasurable feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the antagonism of the two.

Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?
Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.
ADDENDA.

My friend Mr E. R. Horton, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, a) he is inclined to read * τοῦναντίον. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The contrary intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, κύριος ἄν ἔλθῃ, but only to the subordinate phrase τῆς π. Σ. ὀμολογίας. The alternative is not between being κύριος, and not being κύριος, but between being κύριος of the agreement and κύριος of the disagreement.

p. 13, b. Mr Horton reminds me of Dr W. H. Thompson's conjecture ἐνορῶν in place of ἐνών. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

* [My later view of the expression ἐνορῶν is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an ὀμολογία between Socrates and Protarchus. Cf. ὀμολογισμῶμεθα καὶ τόδε, ταῦτα οὕτως ὀμολογούμενα ποτε, ἡ πόες; (11, p, e and also 20, c). τούτων τῶν τόν λόγον ἐτι μάλλον δι' ὀμολογίας βεβαιωσῷμεθα. (14, c). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Socrates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, δεξεῖ καὶ δεξία (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, αὐτὸς γνώσει. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twits him. "Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over."—St. Paul's expression in 2 Cor. i, 24: τίς δ' θεοῦ κυριεύσωσιν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως is closely analogous. The word ὀμολογία itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). διδάχωντες τὸν Θεόν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὀμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

E. R. H.]
be, asked to show why he calls *all pleasures good*, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of ἰδοναί. As this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, ἀγαθόν εἶναι is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit ἀγαθόν εἶναι, προσαγορεύεις is necessarily to be construed with τί ταυτόν εἶνόν: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: τί ταυτόν ἔνορθον, π. ἤ. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, ἔνορθο ἐν σοι τοῦτο, without adding some participle.

p. 17, d. ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα. "Is not one of these de trop?" E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word ἐνόναι under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert ἐνόντα without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found γιγνόμενα. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

Mr Horrox also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read μάθης for πάθη. Now we do not want a verb, for λάβης may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be μάθης, for μανθάνω ταύτα γιγνόμενα is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want πάθη, because otherwise τοιαύτα would imply διαστήματα, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term πάθη.
ADDENDA.

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It is also proposed to read ἐννοησ, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place ὅταν λάβησ ... καὶ ἄμα—would certainly need ἐννοησ, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with γάρ, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at ἐπονομάζειν. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all ἄπειρα, and so whenever you learn A, (λάβησ), or detect B, (ἐλησ), σοφος ἐγένου—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading ἐννοησ you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (καὶ ἄμα ἐννοείν ν. τ. ἕ.) and what we are counselled to do in order to get σοφία, (ὅταν τ' ἄλλο,—ἐλησ,) and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between λάβησ and ἐλησ is a real one, but that between σοφος ἐγένου and ἔμφρων γέγονες is a very palpable verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place, for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between ἐγένου and γέγονες, so in Euthyd. 287, ν, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. Οὔτω Κρόνος εἰ, ἥστη ἓ το πρῶτον ἐπομεν νῦν ἁναμίμησει, καὶ εἰ τε πέρεσιν εἴπον [ἢ νῦν ἁναμηνοθήσει]. I referred to this passage in my Letter (page 11), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the Euthydemus, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, d. [τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας].
276, b. Read ἔθωρυβησαν for ἀνεθωρυβησαν.
277, d. [καταβαλὼν].
281, a. [τῶν ἀγαθῶν] and [το ὀρθὸς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρησθοῖ] The genitives πλούτου etc. are governed by ήγομένη.
281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, a and b. This is one of the places where from not perceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of restoring the syntax. Read: Καὶ παρὰ πατρὸς γε δήπου τοῦτ' οἴόμενον δείν μεταλαμβάνειν πολὺ μάλλον ἦ χρήματα, καὶ παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ' ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φιλοκόντων ἣραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ἔξενον καὶ πολιτῶν, θεόμενον καὶ ἱκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδίδοναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οἶδε νεμέσητον ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι. This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied ἐθέλοντα has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of ἔνεκα τοῦτον ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἣραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ.

282, b. Read: οἶν έπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι.

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, b. The Sophist wishes to prove ὅτι οὐδεὶς λέγει τα μὴ ὄντα, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. τα μη ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν. 2. τα μη ὄντα οὐδεὶς ἄν ποιήσειν. 3. οἴ λέγοντες πράττοντι τι. 4. οί πραττόντες ποιοῦσι. 5. οἴ λέγοντες ποιοῦσι. 6. οἴ λέγοντες τα μη ὄντα, ποιοῖν ἄν τα μη ὄντα, τούτο δὲ ὀμολόγηται ἄδικαντον εἶναι.

From this it follows that the words "Ἀλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τα γε μη ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν; Οὐδαμοῦ. are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: and likewise that Euthydemus' question is simply this: "Εστιν οὖν ὄπως τα μη ὄντα ποιήσειν ἃν καὶ ὀπίσθως;"

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, ἀφιμένῳ, 298, d, βοιδίων or κοβίων, 302, b, ἔφευγον τε, 290, b, τούτῳ ὁ ἀν θηρεύωνται, and τούτοις ἃ θηρεύειν, (for πόλιν θηρεύονται read either χιερόσωμαι or θηράσωμαι.) 278, d, οἴον αὐτῷ ὑπολαμβάνοι, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, b, οἱ [Θεοῖ], as this may arise from a two-fold reading COI and ΘOI, but in 303, b, the words ὡσοθ' ὀμολογεῖ—σοφοὺς, are so manifestly a false interpretation of οὗτο ὁτεῦην, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, λ, ὡσ' οὐκ ἔχω ὁπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπι
ADDENDA.

153

φιλοσοφίαν. Crito's faith in philosophy is already shaken by
Isocrates' sneer, and by his own impressions about these ἐρωτηματικοί. Otherwise Socrates' exhortation not to care about the men, but
to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarassment
is ὅποι προτετήγη τὸ μειρώκιον, πῶτερον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ᾗ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἐπιτηδεύμα.

I will end this digression vinea mea cadendo. To make the
question tally with the answer in 304, ε, I formerly edited ἀ πε-
φαινοντο, but this is applicable only to γνώμας, and by no means
the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the
question is rightly given in the received text: τι σὺν ἐφαινοντό
σοι, "well, what did you think of them"? The answer however is
corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true
reading to be: Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἥ δ' ὅς, ἥ ὅτι περ ἀεὶ δὴ τις τῶν τοιοῦ-
tων, ληροῦνταν καὶ περὶ σοῦ δῆνος ἄξιον ἀναξιαν σπουδήν ποιομέ-
nων; "What else should they look like but what every one of
the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers
etc."

p. 16, e. τότε δὴ δειν] For τότε δ' ἦν, the reading of most MSS., the
Bodl. gives τότε δὴ δει. For the Bodl. δει, δειν has been substituted in
the text.

p. 17, e. ἐλλόγιμον] The meaning of ἐλλόγιμον and that of ἐνάρτιμον are
so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word
is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression
by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, ἄτ' οὐκ ἐλ λόγον, οὐδ' ἐλ ἄρτιμον
οὐδὲνα . . . ἀπόδοτα. But, as the importance of πέρας is uppermost in
the writer's mind, any addition to ἄρτιμος weakens the effect which he wishes to
produce. For this reason I look upon the words καὶ οὖν ἐλλόγιμον with some
suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that λόγος and ἄρτιμος are by
no means equivalent, and that Shakspeare illustrates the difference when he
says that certain offences "stand more for number than account", and that the
Tragic ἄρτιμος ἀλλοις and the Horatian 'Nos numerus sumus' shew that ἄρτι-
μος is rather the antithesis of λόγος than its equivalent. But in this passage
who can doubt that the idea which ἐνάρτιμος presents is identical with that
presented by ἐλλόγιμος? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, A. τοῦτον, ὡς ἐφαμέν] The Books read φαμέν. But Socrates is
comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses
λάβοι with the former, and ἀναγχασθῇ with the latter, according to the com-
mon rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, A. δει] I have substituted this for the δει of the MSS., to accord
with λάβοι and ἐφαμέν.
ADDENDA.

p. 18, b. *μη ἔπι τά εν κ. τ. ἑ.] I have placed the absurd supplement *μη ἔπι τά εν κ. τ. ἑ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the discovery of the Alphabet. We want σιΞ or some equivalent to accompany κατανοεῖν, and we require that πλήθος should have number, i.e. be definite, and not that number should have πλήθος, which every number above one has in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote φριμον αφ' τινα πλήθος ἐκατόν ἔχον κατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, b. 'Ἐπαθή [φωνήν κ. κ.] Unless we reject the words φ. κ. κα. as a supplement of some exponent, we have a mass of words without any construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. The word κατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there is no act τοῦ κατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φωνή, nor indeed of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φωνήν ἀπειρον κατανοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is κατανοεῖν τά φωνήντα.

p. 18, b. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω αφ', and hold ξε, the reading of most MSS., and αφ' that of the Bodl., to be mere grammatical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement had thrown out of gear. ὁ λόγος λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the passage from the Republic 360, δ, affords no example of it. We ought there to read ὁ ὑπ' τοῦ τακτοῦ λέγον λέγον, "the advocate of this view." For πρῶτος τά φωνήντα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after that the Liquids."

[p. 19, d. τὸ προσφηθήσθαικανον ὄρθως [κ. ἢ. γ']]] The interpolation here is similar to that in 11, b.

p. 22, d. αἰτίωμεθ' ἕν] αἰτίον and εἰναι have been put in brackets, the sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, d. πρὸς τοῖς τριστήν] Here as well as below in 26, e, the article has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, c. ἀνέμισας μ'] The pronoun μα is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, e. [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς [κ. ἔτρον ἐν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here bracketed, as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, ἐγινόμενον has been dealt with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, A. εὕρε τὸ χωρίς] The Editor has omitted to state his reasons for bracketing τοῦ μη λυπευόμεν καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. He has evidently regarded the clause as a gloss on ἐκατέρου. An alternative correction of the sentence might be proposed, viz. ro retain the bracketed words and cancel ἐκατέρου.

E. R. H.]
ADDENDA.

p. 14, v. ἐπεῖ μηθὲ τὰ τοιάδε] I have tried to make excuses for this phrase, and to explain the whole passage as it stands. But I cannot reconcile myself to the text for many reasons. (1) Though we may say συγχωρῶ μή δέν ἀπεσεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, we cannot say τάτα συγχωρεῖται μή δέν ἀπεσεῖ αὐτῶν, and still less ἀπεσεῖ τῶν τοιούτων. (2) συγχωρημένα ἐστι not the same as ἀμολογεῖται, and cannot mean that we admit something concerning certain things, but that the things themselves have been given up, admitted to be true, because we wish to get rid of them and their propounders. (3) The words μή δέν τ. τ. ἀπεσεῖ seveρ ὑπὸ πάντων from the rest of the clause and from the participle ὑπολαμβανόντων, which is a great offence against elegance. (4) ὑπολαμβανόντων needs an accusative, such as αὐτὰ or some equivalent. (5) ἐπεῖ μηθὲ is only appropriate when a preceding assertion is upheld a fortiori on the ground of a statement which follows. But Socrates' instance is neither weaker nor stronger than those of Protarchus, but a mere addition of something akin to the foregoing. (6) There is no good defence to be made of μηθὲ, unless we read τῶν τοιούτων, and even then the sentence is rendered very clumsy by the intervening παραδερώθη κ. τ. ἐκ, which separate μή δέν from μηθὲ. These grounds lead me to the conclusion that the passage is interpolated by some one, who not understanding the artificial turn of the sentence, supposed it to be suffering from some omission. If we leave out μή δέν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπεσεῖ and ἐπεῖ μηθὲ, τὰ τοιάδε becomes the accusative to ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, and gives a kind of unexpected addition to Socrates' speech. This contrivance was adopted in order to introduce an additional example of ἐν καὶ πολλά, without resorting to a tedious and formal introduction of new matter.

p. 24, n. In my former edition I left ἐνέμνησάς, as I found it, without an object. But it may be doubted whether we should read, 'Ἀλλ᾽ εὖ γε, or Ἀλλ᾽ εὖ τε. Εὖ γε as a mere exclamation is well known; but here εὖ is an adverb joined with two verbs, and it does not begin the sentence. I am decidedly in favour of εὖ τε.

p. 27, n. I am responsible for τῆν αἰτίαν appearing in brackets. The reason of this is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious why I have preferred λέγωμεν, according to which reading δεδηλωμένον should have been followed by a mark of interrogation, to λέγομεν which is the reading of the Bodleian. The passage as I have printed it is far from satisfactory; and I have great misgivings about this double question and answer, and fear that this λέγωμεν, or λέγομεν, is a mere Will o' the wisp, which has led me into a false conjecture. For if this word is a gloss, we see at once why the oldest MS. has nothing to correspond to it in the answer, whereas the revisor of some later copy would see that it must have an answer, and so one gloss would beget another. If we continue the structure of the preceding speech Οὐκόν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἔξω ὁμ. γίγνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένε— the natural sequel would be Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταύτα δημιουργοῦν τὸ τέταρτον (sc. παρέχεται ἡμῖν γένους) ὡς ἔτερον κ. τ. ἐκ. To this Protarchus needs only to answer with the Bodleian, "Εἴτερον γὰρ οὖν.—"Ὡτετο υπὸ σοφίας ἡλικίων συνέδει χιλιὸν.

p. 62, n. εἰ δὲ γε καὶ—καὶ νῦν δὴ] νῦν only admits of one καὶ, and the other is a mere repetition occasioned by the interrupting sentence. But if the
second καὶ is superfluous, δὲ is something worse, for whether we join it to νῦν or to εἶ, it changes the sense of either, so as to make it quite unsuitable to this passage.

p. 63, n. ἀλλήλων πέρι] That is ἔκατέρως τῶν ἐτέρων πέρι. But this is a very slovenly substitute, and moreover we have a most suspicious stranger in φρονήσεις. The plural is used for thoughts, intentions and dispositions. But here we want only the equivalent to νοὺς, and therefore the singular noun. When Plato introduces plurality to match with the plural ἕδοναί, he speaks of ἔπιστήμα, μαθήματα or τέχναι. Again αὐτὰς ought to belong to φρονήσεις as well as to ἕδοναί, but its place renders this impossible. As the address first proposed is made to pleasures only, there can be no doubt that καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις and ἀλλήλων πέρι are as unnecessary as they are incorrect. I should therefore now not scruple to edit the text thus: Ὡν ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτάν χρὴ, τὰς ἕδονας δὲ, διαπυνδακινόμους τῷ τοιώδει. Further on I can propose something better than what I offered in my note, namely, this: μόνον οὐκ ἂν δὲξασθέν οἷκέν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάντας [ἡ χώρις τοῦ φρονήσ]v; “Would you refuse to dwell with any intellect whatever?” In the answer to this question, it now appears to me that τελέως εἰς δύναμιν “as thoroughly as possible” is added, to imply that the clearer the consciousness, the fuller justice is done to pleasure. But τάλα τε πάντα (or rather τὰ τ’ ἀλλά πάντα) requires αὐτὸν ἡμῶν in the opposite clause. Perhaps we should read, καὶ αὐτῶν τιν’ ἡμῶν τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἕκαστην. “Any one of us, each to the utmost possible degree of completeness.” This use of τις followed by ἕκαστος can be supported by examples.

p. 63, e. Expel ζευκ. κατ’άπερ ὀπαδοί should be taken together. The structure is: ὀπόσα γιγνόμενα κατάπερ ὀπαδοί τῆς ἐμπίστευσης ἁρετῆς, εὐνοικολογοῦσιν αὐτῇ πάντη. But in the text I think that αὐτῇ is either misplaced or altogether foreign. As to τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτὲ μαντεύτων, nothing more seems wanting than the article; τίνα τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν. He adds αὐτὴν to contrast the Idea itself, or the absolute Good, with the foregoing (relative) Good ἐν τ’ ἀνδρόμπρο καὶ ἐν τῷ πάντι.

p. 64, c. Read προσφυγεύστερον ὄν.

p. 64, d. As ἡπισοῦν and πᾶσα cannot both be retained, which is the intruder? Certainly ἡπισοῦν, which the scribes have repeated from above; for it so separates τυχοῦσα from ὀπασιοῦ that they cannot be taken together, so that the adverb is left to itself. Read, τυχοῦσα ὀπασοῦν ἐ. πᾶσα.

p. 64, e. It is strange that such expressions as μετριότης ἁρετῆ γίγνεται or ἐξυμετρίᾳ κάλλος γίγνεται should have passed so long unchallenged. Moderation cannot become Moral καλὸν or ἁρετῆ, nor Symmetry Physical κάλλος, else they would cease to be Moderation and Symmetry. Read, μετριώτητι καὶ ἐξυμετρίᾳ.

Ibid. αὐτοῖς] with what? If with τό μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ἐξυμετρεῖ, the author should have said τούτῳς. But the Boeotian has ἑκατότι, a word often confounded with ἐκάτοτος, which would yield a good sense. See 64, n. 65, A. Protarchus should have answered to λέγωμεν: but ὃς ᾠδότατα μὲν οὖν is an answer to one of two dependent clauses ὃς ᾠδότατ’ ἐν αἰτιοσαμιδέα. This fact renders λέγωμεν ὡς very suspicious, but I question whether αἰτιοσαμιδέα can govern αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.
ADDENDA.

p. 65, b. *Δήλων μὲν* is not only indirect, but also bald, and quite contrary to Plato's practice. But ἵμως δ' οὖν certainly belongs to the same speaker as *Ἡθη τοῖς κ. τ. ε.* Besides, the colour of the phrase *βλέπον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεύθην* is suited to the person conducting the dispute, and to no other. But whoever says this, must certainly have said something more; such as, that it is better to continue the argument in *its several particulars.* Now, if we add καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον to *βλέπον,* we not only gain this improvement, but we are also able to remove the objection, which all must feel, to *χρίσθημα without a case.* Repeat ἔκαστον, and all difficulty ceases. Read: *Ἡθη τοῖς κ. τ. ε., ὁ Π., ἵκανος ημῖν γένοιτ' ἄν ὀστισοῦν κριτῆς . . . . καὶ θεοῖς. Ημῶς δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεύθην βλέπον καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον. ἔκαστον τοῖς κ. τ. ε.—*

p. 66, d. Read διαμαρτυρόμενοι. I must ask the reader to take no notice of my proposed change of the passage beginning *Ποῦ οὖν δή*—and ending at δει λόγον. The received text is correct in everything except παντελῆ for which I read πάντη. It should therefore have been printed thus: *ΠΡΩ. Ποῦ οὖν δή; *ΣΩ. Ψυχῆς . . . . πάντη καὶ πάντη. ΠΡΩ. Τά τρίστοι . . . . ως ἔσκας κ. τ. ε. The apparent abruptness of Socrates' answer is explained by what follows: *Ναλ. τά δέ γε μετά τούτ' ἀκοῦμεν. Everything in this part of the dialogue is intended to shew that Socrates is in haste to sum up and conclude. The meaning of Protarchus' answer is; *"Then, when you spoke of repeating a third time, it was the old argument that you meant us to repeat."* But although this passage is nearly correct as the MSS. present it, the same cannot be said of what follows: *ἐγώ γὰρ δὴ κατεύθων ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τόν Φιλήμβου λόγον οὔ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς κ. τ. ε. It is quite foreign to Plato's intention to represent Socrates as discerning from the first the nature of the argument which he is to pursue. He follows the λόγος whithersoever it leads him; and therefore even if ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα meant the general argument, κατεύθων cannot be applied to it. The most that he admits afterwards is a *suspicion* that there might be other claimants to the name of Good (ὑποτετευόν καὶ ἀλλα εἶναι πολλά). And now we see why the oldest Manuscript has ἄπερ νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας—. Here we find the confusion, caused by some ancient misplacement of δυσχεράνας, in its undisguised condition. But if we try to conceive what must have been the appearance of the text before this displacement arose, the most probable supposition is that δυσχεράνας occurred where κατεύθων was afterwards contrived to fill up the place of the missing participle. For these reasons I propose, *ἐγώ γὰρ δὴ δυσχεράνας ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελήλυθα, τόν Φιλήμβου λόγον οὔ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλακισμύριων κ. τ. ε.* "For I as you know (ὅτι) disliking the saying which I have just repeated (Ψυχῆς τάγαθιν ἐτίπητο κ. τ. ε.) which is the saying not of Philebus alone but of many thousand others &c."*

p. 67, a. Remove the brackets from ἤκανον, and read with the *inferior MSS. ἤκανοτατα.* I was misled by the Zurich editors, who in spite of common sense invariably adhere to the Bodleian MS. The play on ἤκανον ἤκανοτατα is quite in the manner of the author.

CORRIGENDUM.

Page 115, Line 8 (of notes). For *quonam* read *quaenam.*
CORRIGENDA.
(See also Page XXVI.)

Page Line

For nonsence read nonsense.

" 16.
For ἔφ. δ. μέμερσα, read ἔφ. [δεῖν] μεμερσά. See p. 130.

" last.
Correct from p. 151.

V, last.
For substitution read insertion [the Editor’s original word]. ἀρειστάτε (ἀρ = ἀνήρ, ἄρος = ἀνδρός) is changed into ἀρειστάτε by the insertion of χ.

1 4
For 1. read ΣΩ.

4 12 (of notes) For ‘source’ read ‘sources’.

8 16 For ἀναρώπους read ἀναρώπως.

" 10 (of notes) For ἐκάτερος read ἐκάτερος.

34 last but 2 (of notes) For ποσὸν read ποσὸν.

71 5 (of notes) For καλ τίς read καλ τίς.

75 1 (of notes) For Appendix read Addenda.

92 last but 5 (of notes) For εἰλημνεῖς read τὸ σφόδρα.