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Translator's Preface xi

Preface to the First Edition of the Cbitkiue . . . ., xvii

Preface to the Second Edition ' xxir


I. Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Know- ledge 1

II, The Human Intellect, even in an unphilosophical

state, is in possession of certain coonitions a priori 2

III.— Philosophy stands in need op a Science which shall


Human Knowledge A PRIORI 4

V. Of the Difference between Analytical and Syntheti- cal Judgments 7

V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical

Judgments A PRIORI are contained as Principles . . 9

VI. ^Thb General Problem of Pure Reason 12

VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the

Name op a Critique of Pure Reason 15



§ 1. Introductory 21

Sect. I. Of Space.

§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 23

6 3. Transcendental Exposition of the conception of Space 25

§ 4. Conclnsions from the foregoing Conceptions 25

Sect. IL— Of Time.

§ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception 28

i 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time 29

7. Conclusions from the ahove Conceptions 30

» 8. Elucidation. 32

I 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Esthetic 35


Page PART SECOND.— TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. Introduction. Idea of a Tbanscendental Logic.

I. Of Logic in general 45

II.— Of Transcendental Logic 49

III.— Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and

Dialectic 60

IV. Of the Diyision of Transcendental Logic into Tran- scendental Analytic and Dialectic 63


Transcendental Analytic. §1 54

Analthc of Concbptionb. § 2 55

CHAP. I.— Of the Transcendental Cine to the Discovery of allPnre Conceptions of the Understanding.

Introductory. 6 3 5B

Sect. I. Of the Logical nse of the Understanding in gene- ral. §4 56

Sect. II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in

Judgments. § 5 58

Sect. III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or

Categories. § 6 62

CHAP. II. Op the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of THE Understanding. Sect. I.— >0f the Principles of Transcendental Deduction in ge- neral. § 9 71

Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Catego- ries. §10 77

Sect. II. Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Con- ceptions OF THE Understanding. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre- sentations given by Sense. §11 80

Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. ^ 12 81 The Principle of the Synthetical Unity 5f Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the XTnderstand-

ing. § 13 84

What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14 86

The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unit^ of Apperception of the Conceptions contained

therein. § 15 86

All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold contents of

them can be united in one Consciousness. } 16 ; . . 88

Observations. §17 88

In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18 90

coNTEirrs. VI

Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20 92

Transcendental Deduction of the nniyersally possible em- ployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23 97

Itesnlt of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under- standing. 6 23 101

Short view of the above Deduction 103


Analytic of Prityciples 103

Intboduction.— Of the Transcendental Faculty of Judg- ment in general 104

Transcendental Docteine op the Faculty of Judg- ment, OB Analytic of Principles.

CHAP. I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Un- derstanding 107

CHAP. II.— System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding 113

System op the Principles of the Pure Understanding. Sect. I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical

Judgments 1 lo

Sect. II, Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical

Judgments 117

Sect. III.— Systematic Representations of all Synthetical

Principles of the Pure Understanding 120

I. Axioms of Intuition 122

II. Anticipations of Perception 125

III. Analogies of Experience 132

A. First Analogy.— Principle of the Permanence

of Suhstance 136

B. Second Analogy. Principle of the Succession

of Time 141

C. Third Analogy. Principle of Co-existence ., 166 rV.— The Postulates of Empirical Thought 161

Eefatation of Idealism 166

General Remark on the System of Principles 174

CHAP. III.— Of the Ground of the division of all ohjects into Phse-

nomena and Noumena 178

Appendix. Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly, the Conceptions of Eeflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of

the Understanding 190

Bemark on the Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Eeflection 194


Page TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC— SECOND DIVISION. Tbanscbitdbntal Dialectic. Intbobuction.

I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance 209

II. Of Piire Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Ap- pearance .

A. Of Reason in General 212

B. Op the Logical Use op Reason 214

C. Op THE Pure Use OF Reason 216


Of the Conceptions of Pure Reason ,219

Sect. I.— Of Ideas in General 221

Sect. II.— Of Transcendental Ideas 225

Sect. III.— System of Transcendental Ideas 233

Book II. Or the Dialectical Pbocedubs or Pube

Reason 237

CHAP. I.— Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason 237

Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub- stantiality or Permanence of the Soul 245

Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralo- gism 251

General Remark on the Transition from Rational Psy- chology to Cosmology. . . i 253

CHAP. XL— The Antinomy of Pure Reason 255

Sect. L— System of Cosmological Ideas 256

Sect. II. Antithetic of Pure Reason 263

First Antinomy 266

Second Antinomy 271

Third Antinomy 278

Fourth Antinomy 284

Sect. III.— Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-Contra-

dictions 290

Sect. IV.— Of the Necessity Imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental

Problems 298

Sect. V.— Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems

presented in the four Transcendental Ideas . . . 303 Sect. YI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution

of Pure Cosmological Dialectic 307

Sect. VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problems . . 310 Sect. VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation

to the Cosmological Ideas 316

Sect. IX,-— Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason, with regard to the Cosmological Ideas 321



I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the

Composition of Phenomena in the UniTerae 322

II.— Solution.' of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of

the Division of a Whole given in Intuition 325

Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcen- dental Mathematical Ideas and Introductory to the

Solution of the Dynamical Ideas 328

Ill.-'Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their

Causes 330

Possihility of Freedom in Harmony with the Uni- versal Law of Natural Necessity 333

Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the universal Law of Natural

Necessity 335

IV.— Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality

of the Dependence of Phtenomenal Existences .... 345 Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason 349

CHAP. III. The Ideal op Pure Reason.

Sect. I.— Of the Ideal in General 350

Sect. II.— Of the Transcendental Ideal 352

Sect. III. Of the Arguments Employed hy Speculative Reason

in Proof of the Existence or a Supreme Being 359 ^ Sect. IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the

/^ Existence of God 364

Sect. V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of

the Existence of God 370

Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illu- sion in all Transcendental Arguments for the

Existence of a Necessary Being 377

y Sect. VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological

/^ Proof 381

Sect. VII. Critiq^ue of all Theology based upon Speculative

Principles of Reason 387

Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure

Reason 394

Of the'lUltimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason 410


CHAP. I. ^Thb DisciPLmE of Pure Reason 432

Sect. I. ^The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dog- matism 439

Sect. II. ^The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics 449

Sect. III.— The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis 467

Sect, IV,— The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs 476




CHAP. II.— The Canon op Pukb Reason 482

Sect. I.— Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason . . . 483 Sect. II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter- mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure

Reason 487

Sect. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 496

CHAP. III.— The AECHiTBcax)Nic of Pure Reason 503

CHAP. IV.— The History op Pure Reason 515


The following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's Ktitii titer reinen Femun/t intelligible to the English student.

The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes, Kant was a man of dear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of

Verba praevisam rem non invita sequentur)

will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex- pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over- laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve


years to excogitate his Tiork, and only five months to wi^ite it. He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Eonigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso- phy, and to enounce ideas that were entirely to revolutionise European thought. On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter- mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy of comprehension.

A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint- ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary.

Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misappre- hended, or entirely neglected. Dugald Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy ^as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Nitach* and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the Enghsh philosophical public ; Richardson and Haywood " traduced"

A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles. By F. A. Kitsch. London, 1796.

t WiUich's Elements of Kant's Philosophy, 8yo.' 1798.


him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritlk, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserres to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics." All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapable of understanding him.*

The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS. translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise it, as he had perceived it to be incorrect. After having laboured through about eighty pages, I found, from tlie numerous errors and inaccuracies pervading it, that hardly one-fifth of the original MS', remained. I, therefore, laid it entirely aside, and com- menced de novo. These eighty pages I did not cancel, be- cause the careful examination which they had undergone, made them, as I believed, not an unworthy representation of the author.

'i' It is curious to observCi in all the English works written spe- cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Nitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators ; Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of ^* Beck's Principles of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his ** Translator's Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated his Preface out of selections from the works of Kant The same is the case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises," (2 vols. 8vo. London, 1798.) This person has written a preface to each of the volumes, and both are alm<^ literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in them as his own ; few being then able to detect the plagiarism.


The second edition of the Kritik, from which all the sub- geqnent ones have been reprinted without alteration^ is followed in the present translation. Bosenkranz, a recent editor, main- tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a VerachUmmhesaerung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, '* in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self-contradictory and mutilated work." I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho- penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passagea^in the second edition, whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455^— 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the outcry of preju- diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the ** sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound.

No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Bosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the *' third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. Bosenkranz has

* Of the present translation.


made a number of very happy conjjectiiral emendations^ the accuracy of which cannot be doubted.

It may be necessary to mention that it has been found requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre- sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im- possible to translate the Kritik with the aid of the philoso- phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim parc^ detorta. Such is the verb intuite for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for daa Mannig^ faltige der Amchauung^ by which Kant designates the yaried contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent.

Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics ^whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, the value of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad- vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself weU compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour.

J. M. D. M.


HuMAif reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented hy its own nature, hut w^ch it cannot answer^ as they transcend every faculty of the mind. .

It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. Tit hegins with principles, which cannot he dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are» at the same time, insured by experience. With these prindplea it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete,* because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles: which transcend the region of experience, while they arej regarded by common sense without dustrust. It thus falls into ! confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the | presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis- ' cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the \ limits of experience, cannot be tested oy that criterion. The ' arena of these endless contests is called Metaphifsic^

Time was, when she was the queen of aU the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap coiv- tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns^ forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba,

" Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natUque potens . . . Nunc tnhor exnl, inops.''*

TAt first, her government, under the administration of the

* Ovid, Metamorphoses*



dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative >

/continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her I

.^> ^^ I empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the ^

. -?* j reign «f anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who

^y^ I hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living,

\^^. I attacked from time to time those who had organised them-

I selves into civil communities^ But their number was, very

happily, small ; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to

the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices,

although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the

hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the

legitimacy of her claims established by a kind oi physiology of

the human understanding that of the celebrated Locke. But

it was found that, although it was affirmed that this so-called

qiieen could not refer her descent to any higher source than

that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily

brought suspicion on her claims, as this genealogy was

incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims

to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into

the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again

became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been

made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the

general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns

nought but weariness and complete indifferentism the mother

of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same

time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and

reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion,

obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort.

/^TPor it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such

inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.

^Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much theyi

/ ' ' may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular I

1 style and by changes on the language of the schools, un< i

.' avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and proposjdons, '

which they profess to regard with so much contempt^ At

the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world

of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which

we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phsenomenon that

well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not

the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the

*^e very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age,


age, which refases to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge. It is^ in fact, a call to reason, again to nnderteke the most laborioas of all tasks that of self-examinatioj^jiid'to establish a tribanal, which may secure it in its well-^Rmndtd claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the Critical Investigation of Pure Reason,

I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the finculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of,'"'"' experience ; in other words, the solution of the question re- garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as weU as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles.

This path ^the only one now remaining has been entered upon by me ; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, dis- covered the cause of ^and consequently the mode of removing all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind ; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these ques- tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies

and of the decay of profound sdence. But I do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as Maihematics, Physical Science, &c., in the least deserve this reproach, hut that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were hut firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a pro- found habit of thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which every thing must be subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority . of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the ^' subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere- rest>ect, which reason accords only to that which baa stood the test of a free and public examination.'^

-^ b 2


,;. and deBires, had expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the « exercise of magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither^do these come within the compass of our mental powers ; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been thorough- ness ; and I make bold to say, that there is not a single meta- physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least ^ the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ;^

(and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in- sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi-^ ciency in the case of the others. > " While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when ''^ he hears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant ; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philo- sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de- monstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience ; while I humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. . Instead of any such attempt, I confine myself to the exami- nation of reason alone and its pure thought ; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple , operations of reason ; and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the . aid furnished by experience.

So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary

in the execution of the present task. The aims set before us

are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the

nature of cognition itself.

The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical in-

Suiry. As regards the ybrm, there are two indispensable con- itions, which any one who undertakes so difficult a task as


that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to MSI. These conditions are certitude and cleamesM.

As regards certitude, I have fully conyineed myself that, in this sphere of thought, ojffmon is perfectly inadmissible, and that eyerythiug which bears the least semblance of an hypo- thesis must be excluded, as of no value in snch discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary ; much more is this the case with an at* tempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the standard and consequentiy an example of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I hare succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with- out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may be- come tj^e innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise pro- dace, ^he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not con- cern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing ^om the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his jndjgment of the work as a whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.

I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and hmits of its use, than those undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title oi Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding ; and they have also cost me by far the greatest labour ^labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two sides. The one re^ «k lates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective validity of its a priori conceptions ; and it forms for this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition that is, from a subjective point of view ; and, al- though this exposition is of great importance, it does not be- long essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the


grand question is, what and how mnch can reason and nnder- standing, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible ? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some sem- blance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at hberty to hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him, that, if my sub- jective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.

As regards cleames8, the reader hal a right to demand, in the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clear- ness, by means of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of inteUigibility. This was essential to my purpose ; and it thus became the* accidental cause of my in- abiUty to do pomplete justice to the second requirement. I have, been almost always at a loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems vnth which I should be engaged ; and, as I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if de- livered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consider- ation also, that the present work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abb^ Ter- rasson remarks with great justice, that if we estimate the sise of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book— -^Aa^ ii would be much shorter, if it were not so short. On the other hand, as regards the com*


preliennbility of a system of speculatire cognition, connected under a single principle* we may say with etfoal justice many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been in- tended to be so very dear. For explanations and ezamplety and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of partg, but they distract the attention, dissipate tlie mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and em- bellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its arti- culation or organization, ^which is the most important con- edderation with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.

The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co- operate vnth the present author, if he has fbrmed the intention of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him. Meta- physics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion and with little labour, if it is united, in a short time ; so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us hj pure reaaouy systematically arranged. No- thing can escape our notice ; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this com- pleteness not only practicable, but also necessary.

Tecum habita, et nCris quam sit tibi carta Bopellex.*

Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature,^ The content of this work, (which will not be half so long,) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique, which

* Pernni.

t 1q contndistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was never published. See i^age 509.— Tr.


has to discover the sources of this cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a judge; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a co^ labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually discovered ; and, while the syntheeie of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the pro- posed work, the same should be the case with their analysis. But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.


Whethxb the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason, advances with that undeviating certainty which characterises the progress of science^ we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow ; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invari- ably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and com- pelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure thiat they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress, and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circum- stances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results, even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.

That Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earUest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it hxifi been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the modems have thought to enlarge ita domain by introducing psgehologieal


discussions on the mental ftumlties, such as imagination and wit, metaphysical discussionB on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the ohjects (Idealism, Scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies : this