PLATO
EUTHYPHYRO • APOLOGY
CRITO • PHAEDO
PHAEDRUS

Translated by
HAROLD NORTH FOWLER
PLATO, the great philosopher of Athens, was born in 427 BC. In early manhood an admirer of Socrates, he later founded the famous school of philosophy in the grove Academus. Much else recorded of his life is uncertain; that he left Athens for a time after Socrates’ execution is probable; that later he went to Cyrene, Egypt, and Sicily is possible; that he was wealthy is likely; that he was critical of ‘advanced’ democracy is obvious. He lived to be 80 years old. Linguistic tests including those of computer science still try to establish the order of his extant philosophical dialogues, written in splendid prose and revealing Socrates’ mind fused with Plato’s thought.

In Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, Socrates and others discuss separate ethical conceptions. Protagoras, Ion, and Meno discuss whether righteousness can be taught. In Gorgias, Socrates is estranged from his city’s thought, and his fate is impending. The Apology (not a dialogue), Crito, Euthyphro, and the unforgettable Phaedo relate the trial and death of Socrates and propound the immortality of the soul. In the famous Symposium and Phaedrus, written when Socrates was still alive, we find the origin and meaning of love. Cratylus discusses the nature of language. The great masterpiece in ten books, the Republic, concerns righteousness (and involves education, equality of the sexes, the structure of society, and abolition of slavery). Of the six so-called dialectical dialogues Euthydemus deals with philosophy; metaphysical Parmenides is

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PREFACE

The Greek text in this volume is based upon that of Schanz, and all variations from his readings are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In some cases deviations from the reading of the manuscripts have been noted, even when adopted by Schanz. In the introductions to the separate dialogues no attempt has been made to discuss the philosophy of Plato or to do anything more than to supply such information as is needed for the intelligent reading of these particular dialogues. For further discussion and information the reader is referred to the General Introduction by Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Harold N. Fowler.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Plato was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of his master's
thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracuse Sophron,—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of "beautiful," "good," "large" and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher
hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognised theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the Clouds (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to
know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in
a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus, and Gorgias. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the Socratic discussions among the elect of the new
The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the Gorgias. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the Republic, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The Meno and Gorgias set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the Cratylus and Symposium, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest
powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organisation of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is brought to enhance the discourse of reason.
Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the Theaetetus and Parmenides, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The Parmenides corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all particulars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.
Plato is here at work on his own great problem:—If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many
physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the *Laws*, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the *Republic*: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the *Timaeus* a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealisable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.
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Surveys
EUTHYPHRO
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

The *Euthyphro* probably owes its place at the head of the list of dialogues to the fact that it is the first of four dialogues dealing with the trial and death of Socrates. It is probably one of the earliest in date of composition, though that fact is not likely to have affected its position in the series.

Socrates comes to the court of the king archon to attend to some preliminaries of his trial on the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Here he meets Euthyphro, who is bringing a charge of manslaughter against his father, on account of the death from exposure of a servant who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro says that he is bringing the charge in the interest of piety, and claims to know more than other men about the nature of piety, proper religious observances, and the will of the gods.\(^1\) It is this claim which leads to the discussion of the nature of piety, or holiness, the chief theme of the dialogue.

The purpose of the dialogue is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. Euthyphro, when requested to give a definition of piety or holiness says (5 d) "I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or

\(^1\) Of Euthyphro nothing further is known. He may be identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the *Cratylus* as a philologian addicted to fanciful etymologies.
steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else; and not prosecuting him is unholy." This reply leads at once to the proof that a particular example does not constitute a definition of a general concept. The second definition offered by Euthyphro is emended until it takes the form (9 ε) "What all the gods love is holy, and on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy." The question then arises whether a thing is holy because the gods love it, or the gods love it because it is holy. Cause and effect are discussed. In an attempt to arrive at a third definition, Euthyphro flounders hopelessly, whereupon Socrates shows how terms may be defined by referring a species to a genus. Finally Euthyphro states (12 ε) that "the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness." Hereupon Socrates tries to get him to tell what attention the gods require, what end human service to the gods has in view. In this he does not succeed, and the dialogue ends with this question unanswered.

Instruction in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, however, may find it interesting, and in Plato's times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occupies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues. In the Euthyphro the correct method of thinking is illustrated and inculcated in the course of an attempt to define piety or holiness. The two definitions offered by Euthyphro are rejected; the third is left unchallenged, though a further limitation is demanded. It may therefore be regarded as

1 See 11 c note.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

a definition accepted by Plato, but not considered complete until the purpose of our service to the gods is determined. How Plato would determine it may be seen in the Apology (30 A), where Socrates says his life has been spent in the endeavour to persuade men to care chiefly for the perfection of their souls. The Euthyphro may perhaps be regarded as a sort of scientific justification of the position taken in the Apology.

Special editions of the Euthyphro are numerous. Among them those of Schanz (1887), Christ (1890), Adam (1890), and Heidel (1902) may be chosen for especial mention. The last named contains an exhaustive bibliography.
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΟΣΙΟΤ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

1. ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τι νεώτερον, ὁ Σωκράτης, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταληπτῶν διατρίβας ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ ποια καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις οὕσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὅσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἄλλα γραφῆν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί φής; γραφήν σὲ τίς, ὡς ἔσικε, γέγραπται; οὐ γάρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγωγοῦσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τίς οὗτοι:

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτὸν, ὡς ἐγώμαι, Μέλιτον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εἰ τινα νὸ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλιτον οἶον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπτον δὲ.
EUTHYPHRO
[or ON HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

CHARACTERS
EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES

EUTHYPHRO. What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

SOCRATES. Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

EUTHYPHRO. What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don't accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

SOCRATES. Certainly not.

EUTHYPHRO. But someone else against you?

SOCRATES. Quite so.

EUTHYPHRO. Who is he?

SOCRATES. I don't know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.
ΕΤΘΕΡΠΝ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὡς Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφὴν σε γέγραπται;  
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ἡντίνα; οὐκ ἀγεννή, ἔμοιογε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον ὡς τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαύλον ἐστὶν· ἔκεινος γὰρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς· καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἰναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἠλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τὸν πολιτικῶν μόνον ἀρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἐσονται ὅ τι ἄριστον, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἵσως πρῶτον τον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δὴλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθείς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίας τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένω.

2. ΕΤΘΕΡΠΝ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλ’ ὁρρωδῶ, μὴ τοῦνατίνι γένηται· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἄφ’ ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι παραυργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σὲ. καὶ μοι λέγε, τι καὶ ποιοῦντά σὲ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;  
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ἀτοπα, ὡς θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὔτω γ’ ἀκούσαι. φησὶ γὰρ μὲ ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καίνοις ποιοῦντα θεοὺς, τοὺς δ’ ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράφατο τοῦτων αὐτῶν ἔνεκα, ὡς φησιν.
ΕΤΘΕΡΠΝ. Μανθάνω, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὡς καὶ δὴ σὺ
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. I don’t remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

SOCRATES. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State,—at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.

EUTHYPHRO. I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

SOCRATES. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO. I understand, Socrates; it is because
τὸ δαίμόνιον φής σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὥς οὖν καίνοτομούντος σου περὶ τὰ θέα τέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαύτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι,

ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελώσων ὡς μαυνομένου. καίτοι οὐδέν ὁ τι οὐκ ἄληθὲς εἰρηκα ὃν προείπον, ἀλλ' ὤμως φθονοῦσιν ἥμιν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. ἀλλ' οὗδεν αὐτῶν χρῆ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὤμοσε ἴέναι.

3. ΣΧΑΡΑΘΣ. Ὡ ϕίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήναι ἰσως οὖδεν πράγμα. Ἀθη- ναίους γὰρ τοι, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἀν τινα δεινον οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικόν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. ἄν ό' ἀν καὶ ἀλλος οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτος, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν ϕθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δ' ἀλλο τι.

ΕΓΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Τοῦτον οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνω ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθήναι.

ΣΧΑΡΑΘΣ. Ἡπὸσ γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιου σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὅποιο φιλαν- θρωπίας δοκό αὐτοῖς ὁ τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεῖς ἂν Ἧδεσιν, εἰ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιεν μου κατα- γελῶν, ὥσπερ σὺ ϕής σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀν εἰ ἀνδὲς παίξοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῷ διαγα- γεῖν, εἴ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἥδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσε- ται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.
you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

SOCRATES. My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

EUTHYPHRO. I don’t much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

SOCRATES. No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.
PLATO

ετωθφρων. Ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὁ Ἠσίκρατες, πράγμα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιζεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

4. σωκράτης. Ἐστίν δὲ δὴ σοι, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ετωθφρων. Διώκω.

σωκράτης. Τίνα;

ετωθφρων. "Ου διώκων αὐτοῦ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

σωκράτης. Τί δὲ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ετωθφρων. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὡς γε τυγχάνει ὃν εὑ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

σωκράτης. Τὸς οὗτος;

ετωθφρων. 'Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

σωκράτης. 'Ὁ σῶς, ὁ βέλτιστε;

ετωθφρων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

σωκράτης. Ἐστίν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλῆμα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ετωθφρων. Φόνου, ὁ Ἠσίκρατες.

σωκράτης. Ἡράκλεισ! ἤ ποιο, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ύπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὥστη ποτὲ ὅρθως ἔχει.1 οὐ γὰρ οἷμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὅρθως αὐτὸ 

Β πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ετωθφρων. Πόρρω μέντοι νη Δία, ὁ Ἠσίκρατες.

σωκράτης. Ἐστίν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεώς ύπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἡ δήλα δὴ; οὐ γὰρ ἀν ποὺ γε ύπὲρ ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξήγεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ετωθφρων. Γελοῖον, ὁ Ἠσίκρατες, ὅτι οἴει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριοις εἴτε οἰκεῖοι στὸ τεθνεώς,

1 Schanz, following Madvig, marks a lacuna here. For the meaning of the missing word or words he refers to 9 A and 16 D.

12
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

SOCRATES. What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

EUTHYPHRO. Prosecuting.

SOCRATES. Whom?

EUTHYPHRO. Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting him.

SOCRATES. Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

EUTHYPHRO. No flying for him at his ripe old age.

SOCRATES. Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO. My father.

SOCRATES. Your father, my dear man?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

EUTHYPHRO. Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO. Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

SOCRATES. Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.

EUTHYPHRO. It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed

1 The Greek word has much the same meaning as the Latin prosequer, from which the English 'prosecute' is derived, 'follow,' 'pursue,' and is at the same time the technical term for 'prosecute.'
PLATO

άλλ' οὐ τούτῳ μόνῳ δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἰτε ἐν δίκῃ ἐκτείνειν ὃ κτείνας εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, ἕαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξείναι, εῖαν περ ὃ κτείνας συνεστίος σοι καὶ ὀμοτράπεζος ἦ. ἵσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἕαν ξυνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδῶς καὶ μὴ ἄφοσιοις σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξείων, ἔπει ο θ' ἵνα ἀποθανοῦν πελάτης τις ἡ ἔμος, καὶ ως ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἔθητεν εκεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν. παρωνήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τι νά, πέμπει δεύρῳ ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ, ὃ τι χρεία ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ως ἀνδρόφονον καὶ οὐδέν ὄν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοιο· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ στίγμας καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθησόμενον πρὶν τοῦ ἀγγελοῦ παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανάκτει ὁ τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκείοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδρόφονον τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς φασίν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὧ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδρόφονον γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξείναι· κακὸς εἰδότες, ὃ Σωκράτες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἐχεῖ τοῦ ὅσιον τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Δίος, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, οὕτωσι ἀκριβῶς οἰεὶ ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων,
EUTHYPHRO

was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one's hearth and eat at one's table. For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.

SOCRATES. But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and
ὅπη ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὡστε τούτων οὕτω πραξθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὕ σὺ ἀνόσιον πράγμα τυγχάνησιν πράττων;

εὐθύρων. Οὕδεν γὰρ ἂν μου ὀφελοσ εἰῇ, ὡς

5 Ἐὐκράτεσ, οὐδὲ τῷ ἄν διαφέροι Ἐὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

6. Ἐὐκράτης. Ἀρ' οὖν μοι, ὡς θαυμάσσει Ἐὐθύφρων, κράτιστον ἐστι μαθητή σφὶ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ ὡς γραφής τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτά ταύτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιοῦμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ μὲ ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἔξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σός· καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὡς

Β Μέλητε, φαίνῃ ἂν, Ἐὐθύφρων ὁμολογεῖς σφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαύτα, καὶ ὅρθως νομίζεις ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικαζόν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρῶτον ἢ ἐμοί, ὥς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφείροντι, ἐμὲ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάζοντι, ἐκείνῳ δὲ νοῦθευντὶ τε καὶ κολάζοντι· καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθηται μὴ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σὲ, αὐτὰ ταύτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἄ προκαλοῦμην αὐτὸν.

εὐθύρων. Νάι μὰ Δία, ὡς Ἐὐκράτες, εἰ ἀρα μὲ

C ἐπιχειρήσεις γράφεσθαι, εὑροίμ' ἂν, ὡς οἴμαι, ὥστε σαθρός ἐστίν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἑμῖν πρῶτον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

Ἐὐκράτης. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὡς φίλε ἔταρπε, ταύτα γυμνώσκων μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδώς, 16
holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?

EUTHYPHRO. I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

SOCRATES. Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And "Meletus," I should say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father." And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

EUTHYPHRO. By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

SOCRATES. And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither
ὁτί καὶ ἄλλος ποὺ τὶς καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν ὁδὲ δοκεῖ ὅραν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὃξεν καὶ ῥάδων κατέδειξαι, ὥστε ἄσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Δίὸς λέγε μοι, διὸ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δυσχερίζουν· τι τὸ εὐσεβῆς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄσεβές καὶ

d περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὖν ταύτῳ ἐστὶν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὁσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ
tὸ ἄνοσιον αὐ τοῦ μὲν ὁσιον παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ
dὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἴδεαν

tί περὶ τὸν μέλλη ἄνοσιον εἶναι;

ετούφρων. Πάντως δὴ τοῦ, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

6. σῶκρατες. Δέγε δὴ, τι φῆς εἶναι τῷ ὁσιον
cαὶ τῷ ἄνοσιον;

ετούφρων. Δέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὁσιον ἐστὶν
dπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἄδικοντι ἢ περὶ φόνους

tὶ περὶ ίερῶν κλοπας ἢ τὶ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων

ε ἐξαμαρτάνουτι ἐπεξείναι, εάν τε πατήρ ὄν τυγχάνῃ

ε ἐάν τε μήτηρ ἐάν τε ἄλλος ὁστίσοιν, τὸ δὲ μὴ

ἐπεξείναι ἄνοσιον· ἐπεί, ὁ Σῶκρατες, θέασαι, ως

μέγα σοι ἔρω τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει,

ὃ καὶ ἄλλος ὠς ἔπτω, ὅτι ταύτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἰς

οὕτως ἐγνώμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἄσεβοντι μηδὲ

ἄν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὃν: αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι
6
tυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον

καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τούτοις ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ

πατέρα δήσαι, ὅτι τοὺς νεῖς κατέπινεν ὅνκ ἐν

δίκῃ, κακεῖνον γε αὐ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν

δι’ ἐτέρα τοιαύτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ

πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχωμαι ἄδικοντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ

1 After ἴδεαν BD read κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα, which Schanz

brackets.

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this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic quality?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong-doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are
αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἦρα γε, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ᾿ ἐστιν, οὐ ἑνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὡς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὰν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχέρας πώς ἀποδέχομαι; δι᾿ ἄ δή, ὡς έσικε, φήσει τίς με ἑξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ

Β τῷ εὗ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκῃ δή, ὡς έσικε, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνγχωρεῖν. τῷ γὰρ καὶ φήσωμεν, οὐ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογούμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἥγει ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΤΩΥΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἱσάσιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἥγει σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὅντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἀλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν άγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν κατα-πεπόικιλται, καὶ δή καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Πανα θηναῖοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμά-των ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὃ Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΤΩΥΡΩΝ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὃ Σώκρατες: ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοὶ ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλη, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούὼν εὐ οἶδ οτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσειν νῦνι δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἡρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπέων.

D οὐ γὰρ με, ὃ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτησάντα τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ τι ποτ’ εἶη, ἀλλὰ μοι
inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

Euthyphro. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

Socrates. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

Socrates. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy
εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὁν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπέξειῶν τῷ πατρί.

ἐγωθφρων. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὥ Σώκρατες.

σοκράτης. Ἰσως. ἄλλα γάρ, ὥ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φής εἶναι ὅσια.

ἐγωθφρων. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

σοκράτης. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο σοι διεκελευόμην, ἐν τῷ ἢ δύο με διδάξα τῶν πολλῶν ὅσιων, ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἔστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ ποὺ μὴ ἴδεα τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἦ οὖ μνημονεύεις;

ἐγωθφρων. Ἐγνωγε.

σοκράτης. Ταύτην τοῦτον με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τὸς ποτὲ ἔστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκεῖνην ἀποθέ- πων καὶ χρόμενος αὐτὴν παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἄν τοιοῦτον ἢ, ὃν ἄν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἄν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ἐγωθφρων. 'Αλλ' εἰ οὔτω βούλει, ὥ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔτω σοι φράσω.

σοκράτης. 'Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

ἐγωθφρων. 'Εστι τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ- 7 φιλέσ ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλέσ ἀνόσιον.

σοκράτης. Παγκάλως, ὥ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐξήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὔτω νῦν ἀπε- κρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθὲς, τοῦτο οὔτω σῶδα, ἄλλα σὺ δήλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.

ἐγωθφρων. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

8. σοκράτης. Φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψόμεθα, τί λέ- γομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλής ἀν- θρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισές καὶ ὁ θεομισής
which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?
EUTHYPHRO. Why, so they are.
SOCRATES. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don't you remember?
EUTHYPHRO. I remember.
SOCRATES. Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.
EUTHYPHRO. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.
SOCRATES. I do wish it.
EUTHYPHRO. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.
SOCRATES. Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.
EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.
SOCRATES. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the
ΠΛΑΤΟ

άνοσίος· ού ταύτων δ' ἐστίν, ἄλλα τὸ ἐναντίῳ
τατού τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὕχ οὖτως;
ἐτούφρων. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ εὐ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι;

Β
ἐτούφρων. Δοκῶ, ὥΣώκρατεσ.1
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ
θεοὶ, ὃ Εὐθύφρου, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλῆλοις καὶ
ἐχθρα ἐστίν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλῆλους, καὶ τούτῳ
εἰρήσαι;
ἐτούφρων. Εἰρησταί γάρ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὁργάς, ὃ ἀριστε, ἢ
περὶ τίνων διαφορά ποιεῖ; ὃδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἄρ’
ἀν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἄριθμοῦ,
ὅποτερ πλείω, ἢ περὶ τούτων διαφορά ἐχθροὺς
ἀν ἡμᾶς ποιοὶ καὶ ὁργίζομεθα ἀλλῆλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ
λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἀν

C ἀπαλλαγείμεν;
ἐτούφρων. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ
ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐλ-
θόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ’ ἀν τῆς διαφορᾶς;
ἐτούφρων. Ἐστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες,
ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφότερου
διακριθέμεν ἀν;
ἐτούφρων. Πῶς γάρ οὖ;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχέοντες καὶ
ἐπί τίνα κρίσιν ὡς δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε
ἀν ἀλλῆλοις εἰμεν καὶ ὁργιζοίμεθα; ἵσως ὥς πρὸ-

D χειρόν σοί εστίν. ἅλλ’ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ

1 The manuscripts read Δοκῶ, ὥΣώκρατεσ. εἰρησταί γάρ. Schanz brackets this and the preceding line. I follow
exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, just this.

SOCRATES. And it seems to be correct?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, we have said that.

SOCRATES. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course we should.

SOCRATES. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; but let

Hermann in omitting εἰπωνται γάρ, which may have been once a marginal note or may have been copied by mistake from the next words of Euthyphro.
τάδε ἐστὶ τὸ τε θίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν. ἀρα οὔ ταῦτα ἐστιν, ὃν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἄχθροι ἄλληλοις γνωμόμεθα, ὅταν γνωμόμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποί πάντες;

ἔτοσφρον. Ἄλλ' ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ διαφορά, ὥς Ἐσκρατεῖ, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

Σοκρατεῖ. Τί δέ; οἱ θεοὶ, ὁ Ἐθύφρον, οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροντ' ἂν;

ἔτοσφρον. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Ε Σοκρατεῖ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀρα, ὡς γενναίες Ἐθύφρον, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα ἡγούνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πον ἑστασίαζον ἄλληλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο ἡ γὰρ;

ἔτοσφρον. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

Σοκρατεῖ. Οὔκοιν ἀπερ καλὰ ἡγούνται ἐκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοσοφιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοὺτων μισοῦσιν;

ἔτοσφρον. Πάνω γε.

Σοκρατεῖ. Ταῦτα δὲ γε, ὡς σὺ φής, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγούνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἂ καὶ ἄμφισβητούντες στασιάζουσι τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἄλληλοις. ἀρα οὐχ οὕτω;

ἔτοσφρον. Οὕτω.

Σοκρατεῖ. Ταῦτ' ἀρα, ὡς ἐσικεν, μισείται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομοσὶ τε καὶ θεοφιλή ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

ἔτοσφρον. Ἐσικεν.

1 καὶ ἄδικα inserted by Hirchig, followed by Schanz.
EUTHYPHRO

me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

SOCRATES. And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

SOCRATES. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ὃσια ἀρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἀν εἰη, ὡ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΟΝ. Κῦνδυνεύει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕκ ἄρα ὁ ἡρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὡς θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο γε ἡρώτων, ἔτι τυγχάνει ταύτον ὅν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον. ὁ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ἦ, καὶ θεομισεῖς ἐστιν, ὡς ἕοικεν. ὥστε, ὡς ἔτούθυφρον, ὃς σὺν νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν, εἰ τοῦτο ἁρμῶν τῷ μὲν Διί προσφιλές ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαιστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἡρα ἐχθρόν καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἔτερος ἔτερο διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκεῖνος κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ.

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΟΝ. Ἡ ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τοῦτο τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἐτερον ἔτερω διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεὶ δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ἂν ἄδικως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, ἦδη τινὸς ἠκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἄδικως ἀποκτείναντα ἡ ἄλλο ἄδικως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεὶ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΟΝ. Οὐδέν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἄδικοντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγουσί τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, ἄδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὄμως οὖ δεῖν φασι σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΟΝ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

1 Schanz reads & for δ.
EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

EUTHYPHRO. I suppose so.

SOCRATES. Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

EUTHYPHRO. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

SOCRATES. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

SOCRATES. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Oh, no, they don't do that.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν, τούτῳ γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲν. 
D ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἰπέρ ἄδικούσι γε, δοτέον δίκην ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ φασίν ἄδικεῖν. ἥ γάρ;
ετοτφρον. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἄδικούντα δεὶ διδόναι δίκην ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἱσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἄδικων καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.
ετοτφρον. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἰπέρ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν ἀλλήλους ἄδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνο γε δήπου, ὥς θαυμάσιε, οὔδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε Ε ἄνθρωπων τολμᾶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἄδικούντι δοτέον δίκην.
ετοτφρον. Ναῖ, τούτῳ μὲν ἄληθες λέγεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ' ἐκαστὸν γε οἶμαι, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ, εἰπέρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοὶ· πράξεως τινος περὶ διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασίν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἄδικως· ἀρ' οὖχ οὔτω;
ετοτφρον. Πάνυ γε.
10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰθι νῦν, ὡ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, 
9 διδάξον καὶ ἔμε, ἰνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμηρίων ἔστιν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκείνον ἄδικως τεθινάναι, ὅσ ἂν θητεύον ἄνδρο-

1 οὐκ ἄρα ... 'Αληθῆ λέγεις bracketed by Schanz following Scheukl.
EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

EUTHYPHRO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

SOCRATES. But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant,
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φόνος γενόμενος, ἵνα δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ἐξηγητὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθήσῃ, τί χρῆ ποιεῖν, καὶ ύπέρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξεύρον, καὶ ἐπισκηπτεῖσθαι φόνου τὸν νῦν τῷ πατρί. Ὁ θεός, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφές ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἴσονται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πράξιν καὶ μοι ἴκανὸν ἐνδείξῃ ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίαν οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ἐτὸσφοι. Ἀλλ' ἵσωσ ὁν ὀλίγον ἔργον ἔστιν, ὡς Σώκρατες ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἑχοῦμι ἁν ἐπιδείξαι σοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι ἐπεὶ ἐκείνος γε ἐνδείξῃ δὴ λοιπόν ὅτι, ὡς ἀδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ ὁ θεός ἀπαντεῖ τὰ τοιαύτα μισούσιν.

ἐτὸσφοι. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἶν περ ἄκουσαῖ γε μοι λέγοντος.

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἄκουσονται, εἶν περ εὖ

C δοκῆς λέγειν. τὸδε δὲ σοι ἐνενόησα ἀμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ οἱ τί μάλιστα με Ἐνθύφρων διδάξειν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖ τὸν τοιούτον θάνατον ἴσονται ἀδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμαθηκα παρ' Ἐνθύφρωνος, τί ποτ' ἐστιν τὸ ὅσιον τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισεῖς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, εἰή ἀν ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὑμισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομισεῖς ὅν καὶ θεοφιλέσ ἐφάνη μὴ στε τοῦτον ἀφίημί σε, ὧν Ἐνθύφρων εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ

D ἤγείσθων θεοὶ ἀδικον καὶ πάντες μισοῦντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα εὖ τῷ λόγῳ,
a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

SOCRATES. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

SOCRATES. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: "If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and
PLATO

ός ὃ μὲν ἀν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δ᾽ ἀν φιλῶσιν, ὁσιον. ὃ δ᾽ ἀν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἡ ἄμφοτερα; ἀρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὑψίσθαι γύνιν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Τι γαρ κωλύει, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ὁ Ἐυθύφρων, ἀλλὰ οὗ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τούτῳ ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥάστα με διδάξεις ὁ ὑπέσχομαι.

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλ' ἐγγυσε φαίνω ἀν τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ὁσίον, ὃ ἀν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἀν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἑπισκοπῶμεν αὐτοῦ τοῦτο, ὁ Ἐυθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐὼμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢν μόνον φὴ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ἐξηγοροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Σκεπτέον: οἴμαι μέντοι ἐγγυγε τούτῳ νῦν καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τάχ', ὠγαθε, βέλτιον εἰσό-μεθα, ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιὸν. ἂρα τὸ ὁσίον, ὃτι ὁσίον ἐστίν, φιλεῖται υπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὃτι φιλεῖται, ὁσίον ἐστίν;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομεν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὄρωμεν καὶ ὄρων. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὃτι ἑτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ ἑτερα;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγγυγε μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

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say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. What is to hinder, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

SOCRATES. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

EUTHYPHRO. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

SOCRATES. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

EUTHYPHRO. I think I understand.
ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενον τί ἐστιν καὶ
toῦτον ἐτεροῦ τὸ φιλοῦν;
etọφρον. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Β ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγει δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον,
diότι φέρεται, φερόμενον ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ ἄλλο τι;
etọφρον. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἁγεταί,
kai τὸ ὁρῶμενον, διότι ὁρᾶται;
etọφρον. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρῶμενον γέ ἐστιν,
diὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑναυτίον διότι ὁρᾶται,
diὰ τοῦτο ὁρῶμενον οὐδὲ διότι ἁγόμενον ἐστιν,
diὰ τοῦτο ἁγεταί, ἀλλὰ διότι ἁγεταί, διὰ τοῦτο
ἀγόμενον οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ
diότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἀρα κατάδηλον, ὁ

C Εὐθύφρον, δὲ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε,
ὅτι, εἰ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενον
ἐστιν, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γεγονόμενον
ἐστιν οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστίν, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι
πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὖν ἔγνωκεν ὁυτω;
etọφρον. 'Εγώγη.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνό-
μενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπὸ του;
etọφρον. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ
tὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενον ἐστιν, φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ ὁν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;
etọφρον. 'Ανάγκη.
EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for that reason.

SOCRATES. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

SOCRATES. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

EUTHYPHRO. Obviously.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου,

Δ Ὡ Ἐυθύφρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων,

ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ἐτοὺφρον. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσίὸν ἐστὶν, ἡ
di' ἄλλο τι;

ἐτοὺφρον. Οὔκ, ἄλλα διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσίὸν ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται,

ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσίὸν ἐστὶν;

ἐτοὺφρον. "Εοικεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ

θεῶν, φιλομενόν ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλὲς.\(^{1}\)

Ε ἐτοὺφρον. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὁσίον ἐστὶν, ὡ

Ἕυθύφρον, οὔδὲ τὸ ὁσίον θεοφιλὲς, ὡς σὺ λέγεις,

ἀλλ' ἐτερον τοῦτο τοῦτον.

ἐτοὺφρον. Πῶς δὴ, ὡ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Οτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὁσίον διὰ
tοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι

φιλεῖται, ὁσίον εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ;

ἐτοὺφρον. Ναῖ.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται

ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς

εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλὲς, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ἐτοὺφρον. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' εἰ γε ταύτων ἦν, ὡ φίλε

Ἕυθύφρον, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὁσίον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ

ὁσίον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὁσίον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς

e民营企业 ἐναι εἰρινεῖτο ἃν τὸ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖ-

σθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ

\(^{1}\) τὸ θεοφιλὲς added by Schanz following Bost.

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Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro. No, for this reason.

Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro. I think so.

Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?

Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

Euthyphro. Very true.

Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because
διον ἀν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὁσιον ἦν νῦν δὲ ὅρας, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἐχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἐτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν ὁιον φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁιον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ἔρωτόμενος τὸ ὁσιον, ὃ τὶ ποτ' ἐστὶν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ ὃυ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δὲ τὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ τὶ πέπουθε τοῦτο τὸ ὁσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ύπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὃ τὶ δὲ ὅν, οὐτω εἴτες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μὴ με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἴπε ἔξ ἀρχῆς, τὶ ποτε ὅν τὸ ὁσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ύπὸ θεῶν εἴπε ὁτιδὴ πᾶσχεν· ὃ γὰρ περὶ τοῦτον διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἴπε προθύμως, τὶ ἐστὶν τὸ τε ὁσιον καὶ τὸ ἄνόσιον;

Ἐγωφρόν. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτὸ.

Σωκρατές. Τὸν ἦμετέρον προγόνου, ὁ Εὐθύ-φρον, ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ύπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἔγω ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἵσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἀρὰ καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅποιν ἂν τίς αὐτὰ θῇ νῦν δὲ—σαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἀλλοι δὴ τίνος δεὶ σκόμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

Εγωφρόν. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are entirely different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t stay where we put it.

SOCRATES. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my 1 ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won’t stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they won’t stay fixed, as you yourself see.

EUTHYPHRO. I think the jest does very well as it

1 Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself educated to be a sculptor. This is doubtless the reason for his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.
σκώμματος, ὁ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα.

D τὸ γὰρ περιέναι τούτοις ὁ τοῦ καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔγγῳ εἰμὶ ὁ ἐντιθεῖς, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος: ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἐμενεν ἀν ταῦτα οὕτως.

Ἐνκράτης. Κινδυνεύω ἁρα, ὡ ἐταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην το- σοῦτος, ὅσω ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγώ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μου τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐξου- λόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρύθαι μᾶλλον ἥ πρὸς τῇ Δαίδαλῳ σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων μὲν ἄδην ἐπεδῆ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφάν, αὐτὸς σοι εὐμπροθυμήσωμαι, ὁπως ἂν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης. ἵδε γὰρ, εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαίον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πάν τὸ ὁσίον.

Ετηγφρων. ἢ Εμοιγε.

Ἐνκράτης. ἢ Ἄρο ὡς καὶ πάν τὸ δίκαιον ὁσίον, τὸ μὲν ὁσίον πάν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πάν ὁσίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὁσίον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἀλλο;

Ετηγφρων. ὡς ἐπομαί, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Ἐνκράτης. Καὶ μὴ νεώτερος γε μοι εἰ οὐκ ἀλάττων ἡ ὁσίῳ σοφῶτερος ἀλλ', δ Λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὡ μακάριε,
is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

Socrates. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

Euthyphro. I do.

Socrates. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?

Euthyphro. I can't follow you, Socrates.

Socrates. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert
ξύντευξε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανόησαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητής ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας:

Ζήνα δὲ τῶν θ’ ἔρξαντα, καὶ διὰ τάδε πάντ’ ἐφύτευσεν,

B οὐκ ἔθελες εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅτι;

Ἑτευφρὸν. Πάνω γε.

Σμικράθης. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς. πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλά τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδίεναι μὲν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἀ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

Ἑτευφρὸν. Πάνω γε.

Σμικράθης. Ἀλλ’ ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐστὶν ὅστις αἰδούμενος τι πράγμα καὶ C αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἃμα δόξαν πονηρίας;

Ἑτευφρὸν. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

Σμικράθης. Οὐκ ἀρ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ, οἴμαι, δεός αἰδοῦς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδῶς δέονς, ὃσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὅστε οὐχ ἵνα περ ἀριθμός, ἐνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἐνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ποὺ νῦν γε;

Ἑτευφρὸν. Πάνω γε.

Σμικράθης. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἥρωτων, ἀρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἐνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἥ ὅν D μὲν ὅσιον, ἐνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ
EUTHYPHRO

yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet ¹ said, who wrote: “Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence.” Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?

EUTHYPHRO. By all means.

SOCRATES. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don’t you think so, too?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, he does fear.

SOCRATES. Then it is not correct to say “where fear is, there also is reverence.” On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO. Perfectly.

SOCRATES. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is,

¹ Stasinus, author of the “Cypria” (Fragm. 20, ed. Kinkel).
PLATO

πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὔτω φῶμεν ἡ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;

ἐγωθηρωίν. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὔτω. φαίνει γὰρ μοι ὃρθῶς λέγειν.

14. σωκράτης. "Ορα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς έοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἀν εἶθ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ με ἡρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἶον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ἦν τυγχάνει οὕτως ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ἦ, ἀλλ' ἵσοσκελής· ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ἐγωθηρωίν. Ἐμοιγε.

Εὐσκράτης. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὔτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιον ἐστὶν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἰκανὸς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβὴ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μὴ.

ἐγωθηρωίν. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

15. σωκράτης. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὡς Εὐθύ-

13 φρον, φαίνει λέγειν· ἄλλα σμικροῦ τινος ἐτι ἐνδείης εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὕπω δινότι ἡμῶν ὀνομάζεις. ὦ γὰρ ποι λέγεις γε, οὐιαί περ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαι εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ ποι—οἶον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ τάς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἄλλα ὁ ἴππικός· ἢ γὰρ;
there also is the right; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?

Euthyphro. No, I agree; for I think the statement is correct.

Socrates. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, "that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two"; or don't you agree?

Euthyphro. I agree.

Socrates. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.

Euthyphro. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.

Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by "attention." I don't suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
PLATO

ἔτοσφρων. Πάνυ γε.
ζωκράτης. 'Η γάρ ποι ἵππική ἵππων θεραπεία.

ἔτοσφρων. Ναί.
ζωκράτης. Οὔδε γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγητικός.

ἔτοσφρων. Οὔτω.
ζωκράτης. 'Η γάρ ποι κυνηγητική κυνῶν θεραπεία.

Β ἔτοσφρων. Ναί.
ζωκράτης. 'Η δὲ βοηλατική βοῶν.

ἔτοσφρων. Πάνυ γε.
ζωκράτης. 'Η δὲ ὅσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὁ Εὐθύφρον; οὔτω λέγεις;

ἔτοσφρων. Ἐγώγε.
ζωκράτης. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταύτων διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ὕφελεία τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ἀστερὸρ ὅρᾶς δὴ, ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἤπτικῆς θεραπευομένου ὕφελούνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται; ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

ἔτοσφρων. Ἐμοιγε.
ζωκράτης. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γε ποι ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγητικῆς, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὤσαύτως; ἢ ἑπὶ βλάβη οἷει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τῆς θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ἔτοσφρων. Μᾶ Δὲ οὖκ ἐγώγε.
ζωκράτης. 'Αλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὕφελεία;

ἔτοσφρων. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ;
ζωκράτης. 'Η οὖν καὶ ὑσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὕφελεία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς.
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

EUTHYPHRO. That is so.

SOCRATES. Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the oxherd's art is that of attending to oxen?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I do.

SOCRATES. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the oxherd's and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES. But for its benefit?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and
ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τούτο ἑυγχωρίσασι τι ὑψιφότικον ποιήσε, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει; ετετυφρῶν. Μὰ Δὲ οὐκ ἐγώγιεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, ὦιμαί σε τούτο λέγειν πολλοῦ καὶ δεῶ. ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἐνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπεῖαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενος σε τοιαύτῃν λέγειν.

ετετυφρῶν. Καὶ ὅρθῶς γε, ὃ Σώκρατες οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτῃν λέγω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰευ' ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἰη ἄν ἡ ὀσιώτης;

ετετυφρῶν. Ἡπερ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω. ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἃν, ὃς ἑοικεν, εἰη θεοὶς.

ετετυφρῶν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

16. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἣ ὁιτρώς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνως ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὕτα ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;

ετετυφρῶν. Ἔγωγιε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνως ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἐστίν;

ετετυφρῶν. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοῖοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ετετυφρῶν. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ, ὃ ἀριστεῖ; ἡ δὲ θεοὶς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνως ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἃν εἰη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οὐσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ γε θεία κάλλιστα γε φῆς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ετετυφρῶν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Δίος, τί ποτὲ ἐστὶν
EUTHYPHRO

makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by “attention to the gods” just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

SOCRATES. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?

EUTHYPHRO. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

SOCRATES. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly.

SOCRATES. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

EUTHYPHRO. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

SOCRATES. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. And what I say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me,
Δὲ κεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὥς οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;

ἐτῶφρον. Πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

14 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ, ὥς φίλε, ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν βαδίως ἀν εἰποῖς, οὕτω νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται ἢ οὔ;

ἐτῶφρον. Πῶς δ’ οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πολλὰ δὲ γ’, οἷμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ; ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ εκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆ.

ἐτῶφρον. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δή; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας;

ἐτῶφρον. Καὶ ὅλιγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃτι πλεῖονος ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταύτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν τὸδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὃτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοὺς θεοὺς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταύτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ὁσία, καὶ σφίζει τὰ τοιαύτα τοὺς τε ἰδίους οὐκοὺς καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἁσβη, ὧ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἀπαντά καὶ ἀπολλυσιν.

17. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, ἐπεις ἄν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἡρώτων. ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος με εἰ διδάξαι·

Σ. δήλος εἰ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῶ ἡσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὡς οἱ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανοὶ ἄν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθῆκη. νῦν δὲ—ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρώτα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅτι ἄν ἐκεῖνοι υπάγη· τί δὴ αὐ λέγεις τὸ ὤσιον εἶναι καὶ
what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

EUTHYPHRO. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overthrows and destroys everything.

SOCRATES. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or
ποιότητα; οὖχι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ εὐχεσθαί;

εὐθύφρων. Ἑγωγε.

ζυκρατής. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θεῖον δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς

D θεοῖς, τὸ δ' εὐχεσθαί αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς;

εὐθύφρων. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζυκρατής. Ἐπιστήμη ἀρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως

θεοῖς ὀσίότης ἀν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

εὐθύφρων. Πάνω καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνήκας δ᾿

eἰπὼν.

ζυκρατής. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γὰρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς

σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆς, ὡστε οὐ

χαμαί πεσεῖται ὅ τι ἄν εἴπης. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τῖς

αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φής

αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις;

εὐθύφρων. Ἑγωγε.

18. ζυκρατής. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἄν
eἰη, ὅν δέομεθα παρ’ ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

εὐθύφρων. Ἀλλὰ τί;

ζυκρατής. Καὶ αὐ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὃν ἐκείνου

Ε τυγχάνουσιν δέομενοι παρ’ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνους

αὐτ‿ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τεχνικὸν γ’ ἄν
eἰη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

εὐθύφρων. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζυκρατής. Ἐμπορική ἀρα τις ἄν εἴη, ὦ Ἐυθύ-

φρον, τέχνη ἡ ὀσίότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ’

ἄλληλων.

εὐθύφρων. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἤδιον σοι ὀνο-

μάζειν.

ζυκρατής. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἤδιον ἐμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγ-

χάνει ἀληθὲς ὁν. φράσων δὲ μοι, τῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια
toῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὕσα ἀπὸ τῶν δόρων ὧν παρ’
holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.

EUTHYPHRO. You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO. What else?

SOCRATES. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

SOCRATES. I don't like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from
ημῶν λαμβάνονσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι, παντὶ δὴ λογον οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἑκεῖνοι δῶσιν· ἢ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λαμβάνονσιν, τί ὥφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὡστε πάντα τάγαθα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἑκεῖνοι δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ετοιμόραι. Ἀλλ' οἶει, ὦ Σάκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὥφελείσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἃ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λαμβάνονσιν;

ζηκράθης. Ἀλλὰ τί δὴποτ' ἂν εἰη ταύτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ετοιμόραι. Τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἡ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγώ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

β ζηκράθης. Κεχαρισμένον ἀρα ἐστὶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸ ὀσιον, ἀλλ' οὖχι ὥφελιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ετοιμόραι. Οἴμαι ἐγώγη πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ζηκράθης. Τούτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὐ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὀσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ετοιμόραι. Μάλιστα γε.

19. ζηκράθης. Θαυμάσαι οὖν ταύτα λέγων, ἐὰν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνονται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὦν πολὺ γε τεχνικότερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταύτον ἤκει; μέμνησαι γὰρ ποιν, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν τὸ τε ὀσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταύτον ἡμῶν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἔτερα ἔλληλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ετοιμόραι. Ἐγώγη.

ζηκράθης. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς
EUTHYPHRO

the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?

EUTHYPHRO. Why you don’t suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

SOCRATES. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

EUTHYPHRO. What else than honour and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

SOCRATES. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I think it is precious, above all things.

SOCRATES. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES. Then don’t you see that now you say
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θεοῖς φίλον φής ὅσιον εἶναι; τούτο ὁ ἄλλο τι ἡ
θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται ἢ οὔ;

ετερφρων. Πάνυ γε.

εἰκ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ἀμολο-
γοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὖκ ὁρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ετερφρων. Ἔοικεν.

20. εἰκ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκε-
πτεόν, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἄν μάθω, ἕκὼν
D εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδεικνύομεν. ἄλλα μὴ με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἄλλα
παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὅ τι μάλιστα νῦν
eὶπὲ τὴν ἄλλῃσαν. οὐσθα γὰρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀν-
θρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἄφετέος εἰ, ὡσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς,
πρὶν ἄν εἴπης. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴδησθα σαφῶς τὸ τε
ὀσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε
ἐπεχείρησας ὑπέρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην
πατέρα διῳκάθειν φόνου, ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄν
ἐδείσας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ
ποιῆσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἥσχυνθης. νῦν δὲ
Ε εὐ οἴδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἰεὶ εἰδέναι τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ μὴ·
eἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀπο-
κρύψῃ ὅ τι αὐτὸ ἤγεί.

ετερφρων. Ἐοι αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν
γὰρ σπεῦδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὡρα ἀπιέναι.

εἰκ. Οἶα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος
με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἴχον, ὡς
παρὰ σοῦ μαθῶν τὰ τε ὁσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς
Μέλησον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενο
16 ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἴδη παρ' Εὐθύφρωνος τὰ θεία
γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὕπ' ἄγροιας αὐτοσχεδιάξω
οὐδὲ καίνοτομοι περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον
βίον ἁμεινον βιωσοίμην.
EUTHYPHRO

that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

SOCRATES. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

EUTHYPHRO. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

SOCRATES. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.
THE APOLOGY
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOLOGY

In the spring of 399 B.C., when Socrates was seventy years old, he was accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth. The chief accuser was Meletus, who was seconded by Anytus and Lyco. In the Euthyphro Meletus is spoken of as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is said to have been incensed by Socrates' criticism of the poets. Nothing further is known of him, though he may be identical with the Meletus mentioned in the Frogs (1302) of Aristophanes as a poet of Skolia. The statement of Diodorus Siculus (XIV, 37), that the Athenians, overcome by repentance for their injustice to Socrates, put Meletus and Anytus to death, deserves no credence. Anytus, who is one of the characters in the Meno, was a man of substance, who had served as general of the Athenian armies and had recently been active in expelling the Thirty Tyrants. He was a bitter enemy of all the sophists, and, according to the author of the Apology attributed to Xenophon, he had been irritated by Socrates' criticism of his conduct in employing his son in his tannery, when the young man was fitted for higher things. Lyco was charged by the comic poet Eupolis with being of foreign descent, and the comic poet Cratinus refers to his poverty and effeminacy, though Aristophanes (Wasps, 1301) mentions him among
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

aristocrats. He seems to have been a person of no great importance.

Cases involving religion came under the jurisdiction of the King Archon, to whom Meletus submitted his indictment of Socrates (see the beginning of the Euthyphro), and such cases, like others, were tried before the heliastic court, which consisted altogether of six thousand citizens chosen by lot, six hundred from each of the ten tribes. The court did not however, usually sit as a whole, but was divided, so that cases were tried before smaller bodies, consisting generally of five hundred jurymen or judges, though sometimes the number was less, as four hundred or two hundred, and sometimes more, as one thousand. One additional judge was added to these even numbers to avoid a tie. Socrates was tried before a court of 501 (Apology, 36 A). If the accuser did not receive a fifth part of the votes cast in a case of this kind, he was subject to a fine of 1000 drachmae (about £35 or $175). No penalty was prescribed by law for the offence with which Socrates was charged. After Socrates was found guilty the penalty still remained to be determined. The rule was that the accused, after conviction, should propose a counter penalty, the court being obliged to choose one of the two penalties proposed (Apology, 36 B–38 B); no compromise was permitted.

The question has frequently been asked, whether the Apology is substantially the speech made by Socrates before the court or a product of Plato’s imagination. In all probability it is essentially the speech delivered by Socrates, though it may well be that the actual speech was less finished and less charming than that which Plato has reported. The
legal procedure is strictly followed, and the manner of speech is that which was, as we know from Plato and also from Xenophon, usual with Socrates. There is nothing inconsistent with what we know of Socrates, and no peculiarly Platonic doctrine is suggested. The purpose of the dialogue, or rather, of the speech, for it is hardly a dialogue, is to present Socrates in a true and favourable light to posterity, and that end could hardly be gained by publishing a fiction as the speech which many Athenians must have remembered at the time of publication, which was, in all probability, not long after the trial.

In form the Apology, if we disregard the two short addresses after the conviction and the condemnation, follows the rules in vogue for public speeches. A brief introduction is followed by the narrative and argument, after which the speech closes with a brief appeal to the judges and to God (36 D). It conforms to Plato's own rule (Phaedrus 264 c), that every discourse should, like a living being, have its middle parts and its members, all in proper agreement with each other and with the whole, which is, after all, the rule of common sense, followed for the most part even by those teachers of rhetoric whose elaborate subdivisions and high-sounding nomenclature Plato ridicules in the Phaedrus (266 E–267 D). The two shorter addresses after the case had been decided against Socrates cannot be expected to stand as independent and complete speeches; they are, and must be, treated as supplementary and subordinate to the speech delivered before the first adverse vote. Yet they are symmetrically arranged and their topics are skilfully presented. A peroration would hardly be appropriate before the last of
INTRODUCTION TO THE *APOLOGY*

these and the last itself needs no formal introduction; it serves as a fitting conclusion for the entire discourse. As such it is a brilliant example of oratorical composition.

The high moral character and genuine religious faith of Socrates are made abundantly clear throughout this whole discourse. It would seem almost incredible that the Athenian court voted for his condemnation, if we did not know the fact. His condemnation is to be explained by the general hostility to the sophists. Socrates was, to be sure, not a sophist, though Aristophanes in the *Clouds* selects him as the representative of that profession to be ridiculed. He did not teach for pay and did not promise any definite result from his instruction. He did not investigate natural phenomena or claim to ensure the political or financial success of his hearers; his aim was to show the way to righteousness, to the perfection of the individual soul. This seems harmless enough, but Socrates endeavoured to lead men to righteousness by making them think, and thinking, especially on matters of religion, is not welcomed by the slothful or the conservative. The mere fact that he was a leader of thought caused Socrates to be confounded with the sophists who were also leaders of thought, and were, chiefly, perhaps, for that reason, regarded with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, Socrates claimed to possess a *daimonion*, or spiritual monitor, which guided his actions. He did not, so far as we know, attribute a distinct personality to this inner voice, but his belief in it caused him to be accused of introducing "new spiritual beings" or divinities and of disbelieving in the gods of the state, although he was apparently punctilious in religious observances.
His method had also, without doubt, aroused many personal antagonisms (*Apology* 21 c–23 a). Probably Meletus and the judges who voted for the condemnation of Socrates believed that they were acting in the interest of religion and piety, though their verdict has not been approved by later generations.

Editions of the *Apology* are very numerous. One of the best is that of Cron (*Apology* and *Crito*), upon which the excellent edition of Dyer is based (revised, 1908, by Seymour). Another good edition is that of J. Adam.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

[ΘΕΙΚΟΣ]

St. I,
p. 17

Α 1. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδας ἐγώ δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὁλίγον ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελάθομην οὔτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἄληθές γε, ὡς ἐπος εἶπείς, οὔδεν εἰρήκασίν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐφεύσατο, τούτο, ἐν δὲ ἔλεγον ὡς χρή υμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ έξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινὸν οὗτος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθήναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἐργῷ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ’ ὅπως τίνι φαίνομαι δεινός λέγειν, τούτο μοι ἐδοξεῖν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοῦν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ρήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὃσπερ ἔγω λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὔδεν ἄληθές εἰρήκασιν ύμεῖς δ’ ἐμοῖ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὃ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλλιπημένους γε λόγους, ὃσπερ οἱ τούτων, ρήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκή λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι δ’ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὡμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· 68
THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES
AT HIS TRIAL

[ETHICAL]

How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator—not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δῆτον πρέποι, ὃ ἀνδρὲς, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὗτος μειρακίῳ πλάττουτι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινεῖαι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτῳ ύμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστη μοι ἀπολογουμένου, δι’ ὅπερ εἰςθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἁγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ύμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἀλλοθε, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτον ἑνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως· νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονός ἐμβδομήκοντα· ἀτέχνως οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ἀποτελεῖν οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὁντὶ ξένου ἐτύγχανον ὡς, ξυνεγγυνώσκετε δῆτον ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἑκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλεγον, ἐν ὅπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τούτῳ ύμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γε μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐὰν· ἱσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων, ἱσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἶη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ, ἱθορῶς δὲ τάλιθθῇ λέγειν.

2. Ἑρωτοῦν μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖος, πρὸς τα πρῶτα μου ψευδῆ1 κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ υστέρα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. ἔμοι γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ύμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἥδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς λέγοντες, οὗς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντοῦν, καὶπερ ὅντας καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὃ ἀνδρές, οἳ ύμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε

1 Schanz brackets ψευδῆ, following Hirschig.
For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got
καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ ὅuel ἄληθες, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής καὶ τὰ υπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξήτητος καὶ τὸν ἦττῳ λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὕτω, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι,

C οἱ ταῦτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεύασαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μοι κατηγοροῦν, οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἕγειρον τοὺς ταῦτα ἕξτοιτα, οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν ἐπειτὰ εἰσιν οὕτω οἱ κατηγοροῦν πολλοὶ καὶ πολύν χρόνου ἂδην κατηγορημάκοτες, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἔν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παίδες ὄντες, ἐνιοὶ δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνώς ἔρημην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογοῦμένου οὔδενος. δ' δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, οτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὠνόματα οἰόν

D τε αὐτῶν εἴδεναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλῆν εἶ τις κωμῳ- διοποῖος τυχόντως ὅων· ὅσιοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρόμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὕτω πάντων ἀπορώτατοι εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶνον τ' ἐστίν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲ ἐλέγχει οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνώς ὃσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογοῦμένον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἄξιόωστε οὖν καὶ ύμείς, ὃσπερ ἐγώ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς

E κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἔτερους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτὶ κατηγορῆσαντας, ἔτερους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὐς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἱ ἥθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνος πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογηθάσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ύμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἰκούσατε κατηγοροῦντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἂ

1 After ἐμοῦ the MSS. read μᾶλλον "more" or "rather." Schanz reads μᾶ τόν—, "by—," Hermann brackets μᾶλλον and also οὔδεν ἄληθες, Wohlrab omits μᾶλλον.
THE APOLOGY

hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with
τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερων. εἰεν' ἀπολογητέου δή, ὃ

19 ἄνδρεσ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέου ὕμων ἐξελέ-

σθαί τὴν διαβολὴν, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ

ἐσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὅλῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην

μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἄμεινον

καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τι με ποιήσαι ἀπο-

λογούμενον οἴμαι δὲ αὐτῷ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ

πάντα με λανθάνει οἴον ἐστίν. θωμὸς τούτο μὲν

ἐπὶ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ

ἀπολογητέον.

3. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία

ἐστίν, ἐξ ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾧ δὴ καὶ

Β πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν

ταύτην. εἰεν' τι δὴ λέγουτες διέβαλλον οἱ δια-

βάλλοντες; ὡσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντω-

μοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώριν αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἄδικεί

καὶ περιεργάζεται, ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ

οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἢπτω λόγου κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ

C ἄλλοις τά αὐτά ταύτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς

ἐστίν' ταύτα γἀρ ἐωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀρι-

στοφάνους κοιμώδια, Σωκράτη τών ἐκεῖ περι-

θερμευοῦν, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην

πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὃν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν

οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπάθω. καὶ οὔχ ὡς

ἀτιμᾶξων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις

περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἐστίν. μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ

Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γἀρ

ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὔδέν μέτεστιν.

D μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῖς ὕμων τοὺς πολλοὺς παρ-

έχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὕμᾶς ἄλληλοις διδάσκειν τε καὶ

1 Schanz brackets μὴ πως... φύγοιμι.
much greater force than these who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence, men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes’ comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!)—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another
φράζειν, ὁσοὶ ἕμοι πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένων πολλοὶ δὲ ύμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἢκουσέ τις ύμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων διαλεγομένων· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἐστίν καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,1 οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τινὸς ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύεις ἐπιχειρῶ
Ε ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτο ἀληθές. ἔπει καὶ τούτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶδ' τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὡσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Δεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἥλειος. τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστός, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οἶδ' τ' ἐστιν 2 ἱδ' εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἳς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖαι ὃ ἄν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσιν τὰς ἐκείνων ἐνυσσίας ἀπολιπτόντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖαι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδεῖναι. ἔπει καὶ ἄλλος ἄνηρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἄνδρι ὑμᾶς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφιστάς πλεῖω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· τούτων οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστόν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ϊοε— Ὡ Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ ϊοε πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάσθην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῷ
Β τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὐτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάσθην λαβεῖν; τὶς τῆς τοιαύτης;

1 Schanz brackets ἐστιν. 2 Schanz brackets οἶδ' τ' ἐστιν.
and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me conversing—and there are many such among you—now tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also the other things that the multitude say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gentlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish among their own fellow citizens, to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him—for he has two sons—"Callias," said I, "if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind
κάρισα, εἰ ώς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ
οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ὑπιστάμην
tαύτα: ἀλλ' ὁ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς
'Αθηναίοι.

5. 'Τοπολάβου ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἵσως: 'Αλλ', ὁ
Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ Δια-
βολαὶ σοι αὐταί γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δῆσαι σοῦ γε
οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου
ἐπειτα τοσάτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ
τι ἐπράττεσ ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ.1 λέγει οὖν
ﻩμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἣς μὴ ἥμεις περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχε-
diáξωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων,
κἂν ύμῶν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστιν
τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τὸ τε ὅνομα καὶ τὴν
дейβολήν. ἀκούστε δή. καὶ ἵνας μὲν δόξω τις ὑμῶν
παῖδευ, εὐ μὲντο ὅστη, πᾶσαν ύμῶν τὴν
ἀλήθειαν ἐρώ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, δι'
οὔδεν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὅνομα
ἐσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἤπερ
ἐστιν ἵσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὁμιγ γὰρ
κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἰναι σοφὸς: οὕτω δὲ τὰχ' ἂν,
οὗς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείξοι τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπὸν
σοφίαν σοφὸν ἢ εἰν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τι λέγω. οὐ γὰρ
dὴ ἐγώγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἄλλ' ὅστις φησι

1 Schanz brackets ei μή τι . . . πολλοὶ.
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of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I, "and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." And I called Evenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin: "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case." The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom I was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to
ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔμοι ἔρω τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οὐα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεοῖν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφὼντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. 

21 οὕτως ἔμοι τε ἐταίρος ἢν ἢκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλῆθει ἐταίρος τε καὶ ἕξυνεφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ’ ὑμῶν κατηλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ, οἶος ἢν Χαιρεφὼν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ’ ὁ τὶ ὀρμήσειεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἑλθὼν ἐτολμήσε τούτῳ μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἢρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τίς ἐμοὶ εἰ ὑπερβοτρός. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὔτοσι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τε- 

teleúτηκεν.

Β 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὅν ἕνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταύτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμοῦμην οὔτωσι· τί ποτε λέγει ο θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὡν· τί οὐν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφωτάτου εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήποι ψεύδεται γε’ οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ, καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἦπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει. ἐπείτα μόνις πάνυ ἐπὶ ξήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

Ἡλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκουντων σοφῶν εἶναι, 

C ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἰ περποῦ, ἑλέγχων τὸ μαντείον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὧτι οὔτοσι ἐμοῦ

1 Schanz brackets ἐταίρος τε καὶ.
arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don’t make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: “What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him.” And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the
σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ’ ἐμὲ ἐφησθα. διασκοπῶν ὁμίλων τούτων—οὐκ ὁμαλος γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἂν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὅν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιούτον τι ἔπαθον, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἁθηναῖοι,—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἄνηρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἰναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἰναι δ’ οὗ κάπετα ἐπειρόμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οὗτος

D μὲν εἰναι σοφὸς, εἴη δ’ οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοίς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτόν δ’ οὖν ἀπίστων ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι τοῦτον μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερος εἰμί· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθον εἰδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν οἷεῖται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδός, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἰόμαι· ἐοικα γοῦν τούτων γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῶ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἰναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἰομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλων ἃ τῶν ἐκείνου

Ἐ δοκοῦντων σοφωτέρως εἰναι, καὶ μοι ταύτα ταύτα ἐδοξέ· καὶ ἑνταῦθα κάκεινω καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

7. Μετὰ ταύτ’ οὖν ἢδη ἐφεξῆς ἦσα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ ἀνυπούμενος καὶ δεδίως ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὡμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδοκεῖ εἰναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἱτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντᾷς τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὁ ἄνδρες

22 Ἁθηναῖοι. δει γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθή λέγειν· ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν τι τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου

1 Schanz brackets καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ.

2 Schanz brackets καὶ.
oracle “This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest.” So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, “I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either.” From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god’s business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience: those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient,
ένδεεις εἶναι ξητούντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαύλοτερον ἐπεικέστερον εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διδυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκεῖνων ὡντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἀ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρῶτων ἄν αὐτοὺς, τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, οἱ ἄνδρες, τάληθιν' ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἶπεῖν ὅλγουν αὐτῶν ἀπάντες οἱ παρόντες ἄν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖν ἄ ποιοῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμώδοι· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἵσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὃν λέγουσι. τοιούτων τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἀμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἀ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπ' οἷν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἱ ὀμένοις περιγεγογούναι ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἥ: Ε ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ἐνυπήδη οὐδὲν ἐπιστημένῳ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ

1 Schanz, following Stephanus, inserts μὴ after ἵνα.
2 Schanz inserts αὐτῶν after τῷ αὐτῷ.
as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men.

Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine
καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψευδθην, ἀλλ' ἥπισταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὡς ἄνδρες Ἄθηναῖοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξάω ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοί ἔδιο τὸ τῆν τέχνην καλῶς ἔξεργάζεσθαι ἐκαστὸς ἥξιον καὶ τᾶλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτῇ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν. ὡς' ἔμε ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωταίν
Ε ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἃν οὔτω ὀσπέρ ἐξώ ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὃν τὴν ἐκεῖνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἐχούσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὐν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὀσπέρ ἐχω ἔχειν.

9. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὡς ἄνδρες
23 Ἄθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγονασί καὶ οἷα χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὡςτε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οὕνετο γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταύτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφῶν, ἢ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὡς ἄνδρες, τῷ ὑπὶ ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστίν καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ οὗ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαί
Β δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὄνοματι, ἔμε παράδειγμα ποιούμενοι, ὀσπέρ ἃν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατος ἐστίν, ὅστις ὀσπέρ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.
Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ζητῶ

1 Schanz brackets καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.
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things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: "Human wisdom is of little or no value." And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: "This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

Therefore I am still even now going about and
καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκή, τῶ θεῷ, βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τί τῶν τής πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν ὀἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν C πενία μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τήν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτους οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἳ μάλιστα σχολή ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλούσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξετασμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, ἡτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν κάπειτα, οἵματί, εὐρίσκουσι πολλήν ἀφθονίαν οἰσμένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπους, εἰδότων δὲ ὄλγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὐν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμὸι ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τῆς ἔστι μιαρωτάτος

D καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ὁν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἦττον λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἴομαι, οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοιοι λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γύγονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν.

E ἀτε οὖν, οἴομαι, φιλότιμοι οἴντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ, καὶ ἐνυπερημένοι καὶ πιθανῶς λέγουντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὅτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ

1 Schanz reads ἀμφίγνοσιν, "they are in doubt."
2 Schanz reads ἔνυπερημένοι, "earnestly."
searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth" and "not to believe in the gods" and "to make the weaker argument the stronger." For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.
Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτος καὶ Δύκων, 
Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, 
Ἦν τοῦ δε ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, 1 Δύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ῥήστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔγο έλεγον, θαυμάζωμ' ἂν, εἰ οἶδο τ' εἶναν ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὄλγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτῳ πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταύτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὡ τὸν Ἀθηναίων, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὖδ' ὑποστελάμενος. καί τοῖς οἴδα σχεδον', ὦ ὁ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὡ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὥτι ἀληθὴ λέγω καὶ ὦτι αὕτη ἐστίν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αὕτη ταύτα ἐστίν. καὶ εάν τε νῦν B εᾶν τε αὕτης ἥνησθε ταύτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὃν οἱ πρῶτοι μοι κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἐστίν ἰκανΗ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησὶ, καὶ τοὺς ύστερους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογείσθαι. αὕτης γὰρ ἡ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων οὕτων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐ τῇ τῶν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησίν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθέιροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὖς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐτερά C δὲ δαίμονια καίνα. το μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τοιοῦτον ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἔκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δή τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν μὲ διαφθέιροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὡ τὸν Ἀθηναίων, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστάς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι,

1 Schanz follows Cobet in bracketing καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.
From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things
PLATO

ὅν οὖδεν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ώς δὲ τούτῳ οὔτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

12. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ: ἄλλο τι ἦ D περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; "Εγώγε. Ἐθι δὴ νυν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτούς βελτίους ποιεῖ. δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι οἷσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἔξευρων, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τοντοις καὶ κατηγορεῖς τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ίθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. όρας, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ τοῖς οὐκ αἰσχροῖς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον ὦ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὖδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ, ὦ γαθέ, τίς E αὐτοὺς ἀμείνον τοιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. 'Αλλ᾽ οὗ τούτῳ ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἄλλα τίς ἀνθρώπος, ὡστὶς πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τούτῳ οἴδῃ, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι ὁ Σώκρατες, οὶ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἴοι τε εἰσὶ καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ᾽ οὖ; "Ἀπαντεῖς. Εὔ γε νῦ τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὀφελούντων. τί δὲ δὴ; οἴδε οἱ ἄκροαταί βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. 'Αλλ᾽ ἁρὰ, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ᾧ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἁρὰ, ὥς ἐοικεν, Ἂθηναίοι καλοῦς κἀγαθοῦς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὔτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταύτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ'

1 Cobet's suggestion of εἰς τοῦτοι for τοῦτοι is adopted by Schanz.
2 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί.
for which he never cared at all. And that this is so
I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me: don't you consider
it of great importance that the youth be as good as
possible? "I do." Come now, tell these gentlemen
who makes them better? For it is evident that you
know, since you care about it. For you have found
the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring
me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and
now, come, tell who makes them better and inform
them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are
silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to
you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say,
that you have never cared about it? But tell, my
good man, who makes them better? "The laws."
But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but
what man, who knows in the first place just this very
thing, the laws. "These men, Socrates, the judges."
What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen
able to instruct the youth, and do they make them
better? "Certainly." All, or some of them and others
not? "All." Well said, by Hera, and this is a great
plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about
this? Do these listeners make them better, or not?
"These also." And how about the senators? "The
senators also." But, Meletus, those in the assembly,
the assembly-men, don't corrupt the youth, do they?
or do they also all make them better? "They also."
All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them
excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them.
Is this what you mean? "Very decidedly, that is
έμοι κατέγυνωκας δυστυχῶν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὐτῶ σοι δοκεῖ ἐχειν; οἱ μὲν 
Β βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, 
eis de tis ó διαφθείρων; ἡ τοῦνατίου τοῦτον πᾶν 
eis méν tis ó bελτίους οἶος τ' ὄν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ 
όλιγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ de πολλοὶ ἑάντερ ξυν猢 καὶ 
χρώνται ἵππους, διαφθείρουσι; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, 
ὡ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάν-
των ξύων; πάντως δῆτον, εἶν τε σὺ καὶ Ἀνυτος 
οὗ φήτε ἐών τε φήτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία 
eἶν περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς 
diaφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὄφελούσιν. ἅλλα γάρ, 
C ὡ Μέλητε, ἰκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώ-
ποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις 
tὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκεν 
περὶ ὧν ἔμε εἰσάγεις.

13. Ἐστὶ δὲ ἦμιν εἰπέ, ὡ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, 
πότερον ἔστιν οὐκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολύτατοις χρηστοῖς 
ἡ πονηροῖς; ὥ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὔδὲν γὰρ τοι 
χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι 
ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἢ ἐγγυνάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' 
ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις 
D βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξυνότων βλάπτεσσαι µᾶλλον 
ἡ ὄφελείσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὡ ἀγαθὲ καὶ γὰρ ὁ 
νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσθ' ὅστις βούλεται 
βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴτα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ 
eἰσάγεις δεύρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους 
καὶ πονηρότερος ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκόντα; 
Ἐκόντα ἐγώγε. Τί δὴτα, ὡ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ 
ἐμοὶ σοφῶτερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόσδε 
ἂν, ὡσε σὺ μὲν ἐγνώκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακὸν κακὸν 
Ε τι ἐργάζονται ἄει τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν,
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what I mean.” You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven’s sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad? My friend, answer; for I am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good? “Certainly.” Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited? Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured? “Of course not.” Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily? “Voluntarily I say.” What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some
οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἔγω δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄγνω, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φής σύ; ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὁ Μέλητε, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ἀλλ’ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ’ ἀμφότερα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοσοῦτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοοθετεῖν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὁ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφύγης καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστίν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μαθῆ-σεως.

14. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτο μὲν δῆλον ἡδῆ ἐστίν, ὁ ἐγώ ἐλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τού-των οὐτέ μέγα οὐτέ μικρὸν πῶς τοτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φής διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἢν ἐγράφω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἐτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια κανά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν γὰρ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖνυν, ὃς Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰτέ ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τούτωι. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἰναὶ τίνας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἰναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν άθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἄδικῳ, οὐ μέντοι

1 Schanz brackets καὶ ἀκουσίων.
good; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them? "Very decidedly that is what I say." Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the
oûsper ge ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὁ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἤ παντάπασι μὲ φῆς οὕτε αὐτὸν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδάσκειν. Ταύτα λέγω, ὥσ τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὡθαμάσσει Μέλητε, ἢν τί ταύτα λέγεις;

D οὐδὲ ἡλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἁρὰ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποι; Μα Δι', ὃ καὶ ἄνθρωποι τῶν μεν ἡλιον λίθον φησίν εἶναι, την δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἱ κατηγορεῖν, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπος ἄπειρος γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζο-μενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταύτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μαθάνοισιν, ἄ ἐξεστιν

E ἐνίστε, εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ορχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελάν, εἶναι προσποιη-
tαι ἀνωτώ εἶναι, ἄλλως καὶ οὕτως ἄστος ὅντα. ἄλλ', ὃ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωσί σοι δοκώ οὐδένα νομί-
ζειν θεόν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δία οὐδ’ ὀπωστιόν. Ἀπιστός γ’ εἴ, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ ταύτα μέντοι, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωσί, ὃ καὶ ἄνθρωποι Ἀθηναίοι, πάνω εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκό-
λατος, καὶ ἀτεχνώς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ
tι καὶ ἀκολογία καὶ νεότητι γραφασθαί. ἐνίκεν

27 γὰρ ὥσπερ αἰνειμα ξυνιθεύτη διαπειρωμένω, ἄρα γνώστει Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοὶ χαριεντζο-
μένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαντῷ λέγοντας, ἤ ἐξαπατήσω
αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἔμοι φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν
tῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐποι. ἀδίκει Σωκράτης

1 Schanz brackets Ἀναξαγόρου. 2 Schanz brackets δοκώ.
state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. "That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? "No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth." Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? "No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least." You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: "Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?" For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, "Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does
θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

15. Ἐνπεισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν: σὺ δὲ ἥμιν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ

Β Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ κατ’ ἄρχας ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. Ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ὑποσύνεται οὐ νομίζει, ἴττικά δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητάς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικά δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστω, ὦ ἀριστε ἄνδρών· εἰ μὴ σὺ θολεῖ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοίς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔπτοτῷ γε ἀπόκριναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστω. Ὁς ὀνήσας, ὥστε μόνης ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοῦτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκόν δαίμονια μὲν φήσι μὲ καὶ νομίζει καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὐν καὶνα εἶτε παλαιά· ἄλλ' οὖν δαίμονια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμονια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δή- του πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστων οὐχ οὖνς ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθημι γὰρ σε ὀμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι

C θεοῦς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν πάπας; φήσι ἢ οὐ; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φήσι, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἰη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι

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not believe in gods, but does believe in gods.” And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits? “There is not.” Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, or no? “Certainly.” Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I
πάλιν, ἐπειδῆπερ γε δαίμονας ἤγούμαι· εἴ δ' αὐτὶ δαίμονές θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀλλων, ὅν δὴ καὶ λέγονταί, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἤγοιτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μη; ὦμοίως γὰρ ἄν ἄτοπον εἴη.

Ε ὀσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἔπτυμον μὲν παῖδας ἤγοιτο καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἢμιόνους, ἔπτυμον δὲ καὶ ὄνων μη ἤγοιτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὁ Μέλιτε, οὐκ ἐστιν ὅτι σὺ 

1 Schanz brackets ταύτα, which the MSS. give after σὺ.

2 After ὃς the MSS., and Schanz, read οὐ. It was omitted by Stephanus.

3 Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

4 Schanz, following Pramer, brackets μήτε ἥρωας.
believe in spirits; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrongdoer according to Meletus's indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think will do so; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say: "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result?" But I should make to him a
ἀντείπομε, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ
οἴει δεῖν κινδύνου ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ
tεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελός ἔστιν,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπείν, ὅταν πράττῃ,
pότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαύλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σφ
λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ τετελευτή-
κασίν ο' τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦς, ὦς
tοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ
αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομείνα, ὡστε ἐπειδῆ εἴπεν ἡ μήτηρ
αὐτῷ προθυμομένῳ Ἰεκτορὰ ἀποκτείνα, θεὸς
οὐσα, οὕτωι πὼς, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὃ παλ, εἰ τιμωρή-
σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ ἸΕκτορᾶ
ἀποκτείνα, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γὰρ τοί,
φησί, μεθ' ἸΕκτορᾶ πότμος ἔτοίμος· ὃ δὲ ταῦτα
ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὄριν-
βησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεήσας τὸ ζῆν κακός ὅν καὶ
tοῖς φίλοις μή τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναῖν
dίκην ἐπιθείς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ὡν μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω
καταγέλαστος παρὰ νησὶ κορωνίσιν ἁχθὸς ἀροῦ-
ρησ. μὴ αὐτόν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κιν-
dύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἄν τις ἕαυτόν τάξη ἡγησάμενος
βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ· ἐνταῦθα
dει, ὥς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπο-
λογίζομενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ
tοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινα ἄν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὃ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, οτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐτατ-
tουν, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ
καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ
just reply: “You do not speak well, Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, ‘My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die; “for straightway,” ’ she says, ‘“after Hector, is death appointed unto thee”’;¹ he, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and ‘Straightway,’ said he, ‘may I die,’² after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.’³ Do you think he considered death and danger?”

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me,

¹ Homer, Iliad, xviii, 96. ² Homer, Iliad, xviii, 98. ³ Homer, Iliad, xviii, 104.
εκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμενον ὡςπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ὤνθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πράγμα λίπομι τήν τάξιν. δεινὸν τὰν εἰ, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸτ' ἀν με δικαίως εἰσάγων τις εἰς δικα-
στήριον, ὃτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδώς θάνατον καὶ οἴμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὡς. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδεῖναι, ὃ ἀνδρες, οὕδεν ἄλλο ἑστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα. δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἑστὶν ἢ οὐκ οἴδεν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὧν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίαστι δ' ὃς εὖ εἰδότες ὧτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἑστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἑστιν 
αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴσθαν εἰδέναι ἢ οὐκ οἴδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὃ ἀνδρες, τοῦτῳ καὶ ἑνταῦθα ἑστὶς 
dιαφέρο τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερῷ τοῦ φαίνη εἶναι, τοῦτῳ ἀν, ὃτι οὐκ 
eιδός ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν εὖ "Ἄιδου οὐτοὶ καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ 
βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὃτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἑστιν οἶδα. πρὸ ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν, ὡν οἶδα ὃτι κακά ἑστιν, ἢ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὡντα τυγχανει 
οὐδέποτε φοβησομαι οὐδέν θεοῦ οἴδει εἰ μὲ νῦν ύμεῖς ἀφίστε 'Ἀνύτῳ ἀποτήσαντες, ὃς ἕφη ἡ 
τὴν ἀρχήν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύρο εἰσελθεῖν ἡ, ἐπειδὴ 
eἰσήλθον, οὐχ οἶδον τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, 
λέγων πρὸς ύμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευγοῦμην, ἢδη ἄν 
ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει 
pάντες παντάπασι διαφαράρησοντα, —εἰ μοι πρὸς 
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like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when
the god gave me a station, as I believed and
understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy
and in examining myself and others, then I were to
desert my post through fear of death or anything else
whate’er. It would be a terrible thing, and truly
one might then justly hale me into court, on the
charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since
I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am
wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen,
is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is
not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not
know. For no one knows whether death be not
even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they
fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils.
And is not this the most reprehensible form of
ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one
does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter
also I differ from other men in this way, and if I
were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be
in this, that not knowing very much about the other
world, I do not think I know. But I do know that
it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey
him who is better than I, whether he be god or man.
So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning
which I do not know whether they are good or bad
rather than those which I know are bad. And there-
fore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced
by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have
been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to
trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that
if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly
ruined by practising what I teach—if you should say
ταύτα εἴποιτε· ὃ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτω οὗ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἁφιεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτω μέντοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ξητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εάν δὲ ἀλῶς ἐτι τούτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἴ οὐν με, ὅπερ εἴποι, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἁφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὕμιν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀσπάζομαί μὲν καὶ φίλω, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἡ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐωσπέρ ἄν ἐμπνεόν καὶ οἶσ τε ὃ, ὦ, μή παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύομενός τε καὶ ἐνδεκαύμενός ὅτι ἂν ἂεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰαπέρ εὔοθα, ὦτι, ὦ ἀριστε ἄνδρων, Ἀθηναίοις ὅν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἀσχύν, χρηματῶν μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελεύμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὄσι βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὔδε φρονίζεις; καὶ εάν τις ὑμῶν ἄμφισβητή καὶ φη ἐπιμελείσθαι, οὔκ εὔθυς ἁφήσω αὐτὸν οὔδ' ἄπειμι, ἄλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἕξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκή κεκτήσθαι ἄρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὄνειδώ, ὦτι τὰ πλείστον ἀξία περὶ ἐλαχίστον ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταύτα καὶ νεώτερο καὶ πρεσβυτέρω, ὅτι ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἄστοις, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὶ γένει. ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεὸς, εὖ ἵστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὔδεν πω ὑμῖν μείζων ἁγαθῶν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὔδεν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἡ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεώτεροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροις μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελείσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς,
to me in reply to this: "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die"; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, "Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: "Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?" And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell
όπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἔκ
χρημάτων ἄρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς
χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἁγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
λέγων διαφθέιρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἀν εἰη βλαβερά·
εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φήσιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν
λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὦ 'Αθηναίοι, ἢ
πείθεσθε Ἀνυτῷ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε,
ὡς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω

C πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες 'Αθηναίοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἑδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ'
οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι,
ὑνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν
ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἱσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ
μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ ἱστε, εὰν ἐμὲ
ἀποκτείνῃ τοιοῦτον ὑντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ
ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψεις εὐτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος·

D οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατο· οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτῶν εἶναι
ἀμείνου ἄνδρὶ υπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀπο-
kτείνει εἰκέντ' ἂν ἱσως ἢ ἐξελάσειν ἢ ἀτιμώσειν·
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτως μὲν ἱσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς
που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὖκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
μάλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὕτως νυν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως
ἐπιχεϊρεῖν ἀποκτινυνύαι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθη-
nαίοι, πολλοῦ δὲν ἐγὼ υπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι,
ὡς τίς ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ υπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἐξαμάρ-
tητης περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμὸν καταψη-

Ε φισάμενοι. εὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνῃ, οὐ ραδίως
ἀλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό-

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you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means. For know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not God's will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd
Plato

 τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκειμένον τῇ πόλει, ὁπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μυστός τινος· οἶνον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιούτῳ τινα, δε ὑμᾶς ἐγείρον
cal καὶ πείθων καὶ οὐνείδιξων ἕνα ἐκαστὸν οὐδὲν
παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων.
tοιούτος αὖν ἄλλος οὐ ράδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθε μου·
ὕμεις ὅ ὶσως τάχ' ἀν ἀχθόμενου, ὁπερ οἱ νυστά-
ξοντες ἐγείρομενοι, κρουσάντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι
Ἀνύτω, ράδιως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε, εἰτὰ τὸν λοιπὸν
βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῦτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τίνα ἄλλου
ὅ θεός ὑμῖν ἐπιτείμησεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ
τυγχάνω ὧν τοιούτος, οἶος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
πόλει δεδόθαι, ἐνθέντε ἂν κατανοήσατε· οὐ γὰρ
ἄνθρωπιν ἐοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἔμαυτον ἄπαντων
ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελου-
μένων τοσαῦτα ήδή ἐτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν
ἀεί, ἵδια ἑκάστῳ προσίστῳ ὁπερ πατέρα ἢ
ἀδελφόν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι
ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἄπο τοῦτον ἀπέλανον καὶ
μυσθὸν λαμβάνων τὰντα παρεκκελευόμην, εἰχεν
ἀν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοῖ, ὅτι ὁι
κατήγοροι τάλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὖτω κατη-
γοροῦντες τοῦτο γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπ-

1 The MSS. give ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, “by the god,” after πόλει. Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets it.

2 Schanz, with some inferior MS. authority, reads εἶχεν for εἶχον of the best MSS.

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figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his size and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think
γάρ, οὖμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχωμαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

19. Ἰσως ἂν οὐν δόξειν ἀτοπον εἴηαι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περίων καὶ πολυπράγμονα ἐπιξηγοῦμεν ἐν οἷς τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμετέρων ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτων δὲ αἰτίων ἐστίν ὅ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἄκηκοτε πολλάχου λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμοδών Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἐστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτο δ ἀν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε τούτ’ ἐστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· ἐγ γὰρ ἰστε, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολόγηται καὶ οὔτ’ ἐν ύμᾶς ὕφεληκη οὔδεν οὔτ’ ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι ὃς ἀχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῆ, ὅ γὰρ ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ύμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὔδειν γνησίος ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλυόμενος πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι,

32 ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχομένον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὅλογον χρόνον σωθῆσθαι, ἁδιωτεύειν ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20. Μεγάλα δ’ ἔγνωκε ὕμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ δ’ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἢν εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἄμ’ ἄν καὶ ἀπολοίμην.

1 The MSS. read φωνή, “voice,” after γίγνεται. Schanz, following others, omits it.
THE APOLOGY

I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more,—actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell
ἐρῶ δὲ ύμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαικὰ, ἀληθῆ δὲ.

B ἐγὼ γάρ, ὃ Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὕδεμιαν πῶποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλευσα δὲ· καὶ ἐτυχεὶ ὣμων ἡ φυλή πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ύμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως ὡς ἐν τῷ ὅστερῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτανεῶν ἡμαντιῶθην ύμῖν μηδέν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους. καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύειν με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ρητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώτων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὄμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἡ μεθ' ύμῶν γενέσθαι μη δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἡ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐντι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτοί υπεμψάμενοι μείζοντο τοὺς νομοὺς τῶν ἑκατέρων ἀγαγείν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ὑπαρχόντα καὶ ἀποθάνοις οἷς δὴ καὶ ἀλλοις ἐκείνοις πολλοίς πολλὰ προσέτατον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αὐτίδων τότε μέντοι

C ἐγὼ οὖ λόγῳ ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ αὐτοὶ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μη ἄγροικότερον ἤν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔξεπληξεν οὕτως ἵσχυρα ὑσσά, ὡστε ἄδικον τῷ ἐργάσασθαι, ἄλλῃ ἐπείδη ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξῆλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτες ξύχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὕψιμου ἀπίων οἰκαδε. καὶ ἵσως ἄν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μη ἡ ἀρχὴ

D ἐγὼ οὖ λόγῳ ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ αὐτοὶ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μη ἄγροικότερον ἤν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἔξεπληξεν οὕτως ἵσχυρα ὑσσά, ὡστε ἄδικον τῷ ἐργάσασθαι, ἄλλῃ ἐπείδη ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξῆλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτες ξύχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὕψιμου ἀπίων οἰκαδε. καὶ ἵσως ἄν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μη ἡ ἀρχὴ

1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets καὶ ἐναντία ἐγί-φισαμεν, “and I voted against it,” which the MSS. give after 116
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you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been vophous. Xenophon, Mem. iv. 4. 2, states that Socrates, as presiding officer, refused to put the question to vote.
Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ύμιν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.
21. 'Αρ' οὖν ἂν με οἰσθή τοσάδε ἐτη διαγε-νέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλεῖστον ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοὺ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἀνδρέ! 'Αθηναίοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἂλλοις ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βιοῦ δημοσία τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπράξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἴδια ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὔδεν πώποτε ἐγνυχωρήσας οὔδεν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὔδεν, οὐ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθό-
Β νησα, οὖδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίω καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτάν, καὶ εὰν τὶς βούληται ἄποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν νῦν ἄν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὔκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχουμι, ὃν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησί παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἴδια ὃ τι μή καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἵστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.
22. Ἀλλά διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίροντι
C τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβουντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἀνδρέ! 'Αθηναίοι· πᾶσαν ύμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς αἰώμενοι μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὐδὲ ὅ ὦ· ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνδέσ. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί, προστέτακται

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put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one's teacher. If any one, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I
After μεμνῄσθαι the best MSS. give καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαί, “and punish.” Schanz follows Bekker and some MSS. in omitting these words.
THE APOLOGY

have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk—ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus; Theages was his brother; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then, let
δὲ τὸτε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἄλλα
τοῦτον πάν τοῦναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὡς ἄνδρες, πάντας
ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακᾶ
ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέ-

Λητος καὶ Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεθθαρ-
μένοι τάχ' ἀν λόγου ἔχοιει βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ
ἀδιάφθαρτοι, προσβύτεροι ἢ ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων
προσήκοντες, τίνα ἅλλον ἔχουσι λόγου βοηθοῦντες
ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὃτι ξυνίσασι
Μελήτῳ μὲν ἴσευμένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

23. Εἶνεν δ' ὡς ἄνδρες· ἂ μὲν ἔγω ἔχοιμ' ἂν
ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστί ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἰσως
τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἃν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειν

Αναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἑλάττω τοιοῦτο
τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδείξῃ τε καὶ
ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστάς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων,
παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἑνά δ' τι μάλιστα
ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἅλλος τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολ-
λούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα
κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαμι, τὸν ἐσχατον κίνδυνον.
τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἄν
πρὸς με σχοῖνη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοὺς τοὺς θείο
ἄν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψήφου. εἰ δ' τις ὑμῶν οὕτως

ἔχει,—οὐκ ἄξιον μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπεικῆ
ἀν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι
ἐμοί, ὡς ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν ποὺ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι·
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὔδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ
δρυός οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφικα, ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων,
ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοὶ εἰσὶ καὶ νιεῖς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἢ ἡ, δύο δὲ παιδία·
him do so now; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves corrupted might have some motive in aiding me; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth?

Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some one among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps some one with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, "not born of an oak or a rock," but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still

1 Homer, Odyssey, xix, 163.
ἀλλ' δήμως οὖδένα αὐτῶν δεύρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δη οὖν οὖδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι,

Ε οὔ τι ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάξων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὖδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τότῳ τούνομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν ψεύδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστιν τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἶτε σοφία εἶτε ἀνδρεία εἶτε ἄλλη ἡ τινιοῦ ἁρετή τοιοῦτοι ἑσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἰτ' οἴουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐσφάκα τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζόμενος, ὡς δεινὸν τὸ οἰόμενον πεῖσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἄθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτεῖνητε· οὐ̃ ἐμοι δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνη τῇ πόλει πειράματε, ὡστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ἔνων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες ὀδηγοῖν εἰς ἁρετήν, οὕς αὐτοῖ περατῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνονσιν, ὑποτε γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐτε ἡμᾶς χρῆ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁμοῦ οἱ εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφίσθη τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινα ταῦτα δράματα εἰςάγοντος καὶ καταγελαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος η τοῦ ἕσυχαν ἄγοντος.

24. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οὐδὲ δι-

C καίνοι μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δείσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὖδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. 124
children; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honour with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform
οὐ γὰρ ἔπλη ̓ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ’ ἔπλη τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα, καὶ ὁμώμοκεν ὦ χαρεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκοιν χρῆ ὦτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιστρεφεῖν οὐθ’ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἠμῶν εὐσεβοίεν. μὴ οὖν ἁξιοῦτε με, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, τοιαῦτα δείν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ὁ μῆτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μῆτε δίκαια μῆτε ὅσια,

D ἀλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία καὶ ἁσβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτοῦ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πεῖθομι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοῦμη ὁμομοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκομι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεὶ οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐδεῖς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνατε περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀρίστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

Ε 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τε μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονός 1 τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θυμάζω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμοῦν. οὐ γὰρ ψόμην ἔγωγε οὗτω παρ’ ὅλιγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἐοίκεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μοῦνα μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποτεφεύγῃ ἂν. Μελήτου μὲν οὖν, ὃς ἐμὸι δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποτέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποτέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τούτῳ γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη

1 Schanz brackets τὸ γεγονός.
and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honourable nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had
"Ανυτος καὶ Δύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν
ἀφλε χελίας δραχμάς, οṤ ἡμᾶς βλαβῶν τὸ πέμπτον
μέρος τῶν ψῆφων.

26. Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἰεν'
ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὃ ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τής ἁξίας; τί οὖν; τί
ἀξίος εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ
βίῳ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἡγοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὑπνεῖρ
οἱ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ
στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγορίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁρχῶν
καὶ ἐξωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
γυγυμοῖν, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὀντὶ ἐπιει-
κέστερον εἶναι ἡ ὡστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἱόντα σφόδροι,
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ ἑλθὼν μὴτε ὑμίν μὴτε
ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὀφελοὶ εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ
ἴδια ἐκαστὸν ἓν1 εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐερ-
γεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦν, ἐπιχειρῶν
ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μὴτε τῶν
ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμε-
ληθεῖν, ὡς ὁ θέλησας καὶ φρονιμώτατος
ἐσοιτο, μὴτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς
πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν
τρόπτον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἁξίος παθεῖν
tοιοῦτος ὁν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
ei δεὶ γε κατὰ τὴν ἁξίαν τῇ ἁληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι
cal ταῦτα γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἁν πρέποι
εἰμί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτη,
δεόμενῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ υμετέρα παρακε-
λεύσει; οὐκ ἐσθ’ ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
pρέπει οὕτως, ὃς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανεῖω
σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἡ ἐκ τῶν υμῶν ἵππῳ ἡ

1 Schanz brackets, i nw.
not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honourable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as I deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens, if I must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the
PLATO

Ξυνωρίδι ἥ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὁλυμπίασιν, ὤ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαιμονίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγώ δὲ εἶναι. Ε καὶ ὦ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ ὦν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, 37 τοῦτο τιμῶμαι, ἐὰν πρυτανεύρ ςιτήσεως.

27. Ἰσως ous ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτί λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οὐκτον καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπανθαδίζομενος: τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥ Ἀθηναίοι, τοιούτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαί ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τούτο οὐ πείθων ὁλίγων γάρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγεμεθα: ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ὦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡσπερ καὶ ἀλλοις B ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἥμεραν μόνον κρύνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπείσθητε ἀν: νῦν δ' οὐ ράδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὁλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἑρεῖν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἢξιός εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσομαι τοιοῦτον τῶν ἐμαυτῶ. τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τούτο, οὐ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὁ φημὶ οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἄγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τοῦτο δὴ ἔλωμαι ὃν εὗ ὁδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦ τιμῆσαμενος; πότερον δεσμοὺ;

C καὶ τί με δεὶ ξῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἄει καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι, ἔως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτῳ μοὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον' οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμησωμαι; ἰσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτον τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἄν με φιλοσοφία ἐχοι, εἰ οὕτως

1 Schanz brackets εἶναι, following Hermann.
THE APOLOGY

Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil? What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? And why should I live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be
Δέ εγένεσθε ἐνεγκείν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ξητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγῆναι, ἅλλοι δὲ ἀρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι πάλιοι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν ὁ βίος εἰ ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλῃ εἰς ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζήν. εὖ γὰρ οἴδ᾽ ὅτι, ὅτι οὖν ἁν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὡσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτων ἀπελαύνω, οὐτοὶ ἐμὲ αὐτὸι ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εὰν δὲ ἐμὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι’ αὐτοὺς τούτους.

28. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἶποι· συγών δὲ καὶ ἰσυχίαν ἁγιών, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷος τ’ ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθῶς ζήν; τοιτι δὴ ἔστι παῦτος χαλαρότατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν. εὰν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τούτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἰσυχίαν ἁγείν, οὐ πείσομεθα μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένως· εὰν τ’ αὐ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοῦς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ὑμῖν εἶναι ἀκούσετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνθρώπως, ταῦτα δ’ ἐτὶ ἤττον πείσομαι μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὁ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ πάριον, καὶ ἐγὼ ἂμα οὐκ εἴδισαμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον κακοὺ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησόμην

38 ἐκεῖνοι ὅσα ἐμελλοῦν ἔκτισειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ
possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.
δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὰ νόμιμα ἄθετον ἐκτίσατο, τοσοῦτον βουλευθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἦσος δ’ ἀν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνήματι ἄργυρίου· τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ οὗτος, ὁ ἀνδρείας Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύονσι με τριάκοντα μνών τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἐγγυάσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ C ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἄργυρίου οὕτως ἀξιόχρεος.

29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὁ ἀνδρείας Ἀθηναίοι, ὅνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαιν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορέως, ὡς Σωκράτης ἄπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ μὲ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιμείνατε ὅλον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἀν ὑμῖν τούτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ ἤ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἡδὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τούτο οὐ πρὸς D πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοὺ καταψυχή-φισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τὸ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς τούτους. ἦσως μὲ οἶκεσθε, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἀν ὑμᾶς ἐπεισά, εἰ ὡμὴν δεῖν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ’ ἀπορία μὲν ἐὰν ἐκλώκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμησι καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὐ ἀν ὑμῖν ἡδίστα ἢ ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τε μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλὰ E ποιούντος καὶ λέγουντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἰθεσθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ’ οὕτε τότε ψήθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ

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But as it is—I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Apollodorus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time
κινδύνου πραξάι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὅδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ξῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ᾽ ἐμὲ οὔτ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδένα δεὶ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πάν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δήλου γίγνεται, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἀν τις ἑκφύγω καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεῖσι καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἱκετεῖαν ὑπομένοι τῶν διωκόντων καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσίν ἐν ἐκάστους τοὺς κινδύνους, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾷ πάν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν χαλεπῶς, ὃ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν. θάττων γὰρ θανάτου θεί.

B καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὅτι καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οὐ δ᾽ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς οὕτε ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ύφ᾽ υμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὕτοι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὕφληκτος μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἅδικιαν. καὶ ἐγώγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὕτω. ταύτα μὲν ποὺ ἱσως οὕτως καὶ ἐδεί σχεῖν, καὶ οἴμαι ὃτα μετρίως ἑχεῖν.

C 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῶν χρησιμοδῆσαι, δω καταψηφισάμενοί μου καὶ γὰρ εἴμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμοδούσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθαναίησθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόναστε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῶν ἢξειν εύθεια μετὰ τοῦ ἐμῷ θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπώτεραν νὴ Δία ὃ οἶμαι ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόναστε, νῦν γὰρ τούτῳ εἰργασθε οἵμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἑλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον
that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death in dangers of various kinds if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find
D ἀποβῆσται, ὃς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς
οἱ ἐλέγχουτες, οὗς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ
οὐκ ἥσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὁσφ
νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἰσθεὶς ἀποκτείνουσαν ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν
tοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι ὦκ ὀρθῶς ξήτε, οὐκ
ὁρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ἀὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ
ość τάνυ δυνατή οὔτε καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ
καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν,
ἀλλ' ἔαυτόν παρασκεύαξειν ὅπως ἔσται ὁς
βέλτιστος. τάντα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφι-
E σαμένους μαντευσάμενοι ἀπαλλάττομαι.
31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισάμενοι ἤδεως ἄν διαλε-
χθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τοιτού πράγματος,
ἐν φ οἱ ἀρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἀγονοί καὶ οὕτω
ἐχθῶνται οἱ ἐθῶντα με δεὶ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι,
ὡς άνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσούτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν
γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἄλληλους,
ἔως ἐξεστίν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὕσιν ἐπιδείξαι
ἐθέλω τὸ νῦν μοι ἔξυμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ.
ἔμοι γὰρ, ὡς άνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ
dικαστὰς
καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἄν καλοίην—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν.
ἡ γὰρ εἰσοπλοία μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαίμονίου
ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνιν πυκνὴ ἄει
ἡ καὶ πάνιν ἑτέρα σμικροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τι
μέλλοιμι μή ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ἔξυμβεβηκέ
μοι, ἀπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταύτη ἣ γε δὴ σινθεῖη
ἀν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἔμοι δὲ
B οὔτε ἐξίοντι ἐσθεν οἴκοθεν ἡμαντιώθη τῷ τοῦ
θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἣνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ

1 Schanz follows Schleiermacher in bracketing ἡ τοῦ δαι-

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the result far different. Those who will force you to
give an account will be more numerous than hereto-
fore; men whom I restrained, though you knew it
not; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are
younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you
think that by putting men to death you will prevent
anyone from reproaching you because you do not act
as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of
escape is neither possible at all nor honourable, but
the easiest and most honourable escape is not by
suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good
as possible. So with this prophecy to you who
condemned me I take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should
like to converse about this which has happened, while
the authorities are busy and before I go to the place
where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends;
for nothing prevents our chatting with each other
while there is time. I feel that you are my friends,
and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has
now happened to me. For, judges—and in calling you
judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing
has happened to me. For hitherto the customary
prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently
and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was
going to do anything I should not; but now, as you
yourselves see, this thing which might be thought,
and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has
come upon me; but the divine sign did not oppose me
either when I left my home in the morning, or when I
came here to the court, or at any point of my speech,
έπε τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἐρείν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοὶ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὔτε οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αὐτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἔρω· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ εὐμβεβηκὸς τούτο ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅπως ἡμείς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὁσοι οἴόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν' οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντίωθη ἃν μοι τὸ εἰσθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἐμελλὼν ἐγὼ ἁγαθὸν πράξειν.

32. 'Εννοησώμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὡς πολλή ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἁγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι· δοῦν οὖν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶν τὸ τεθνάναι. ἡ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεώτα, ἡ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μεταίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἰτε μηδεμία αἰσθησις ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὑπά, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃν οἴμαι, εἰ τινὰ ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἣν ούτω κατεδαρθεῖν, ὡστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἄντιπαραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἃν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν

D ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὑπά, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃν οἴμαι, εἰ τινὰ ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἣν ούτω κατεδαρθεῖν, ὡστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ἄντιπαραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἃν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν

E βασιλέα ἐναριθμήτους ἃν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας. εἰ οὖν

1 Schanz, following C and Hirschig, brackets τοῦ τόπου τοῦ

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when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if any one were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night,—I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I
τοιούτων ὁ θάνατός ἦστιν, κέρδος ἔγγυε λέγω·
καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μία νῦξ. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν ἀποδη-
μήσαι ἦστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον,
καὶ ἀληθῆ ἦστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν
ἀπαντεῖ· τι μεῖζον ἄγαθὸν τούτου εἶ ἂν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος
εἰς "Αίδου, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων
δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς,
οὔπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ
Ῥαδάμανθι καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ
ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέους δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ
ἐαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἰ ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὐ
"Ὀρφεῖ ἐξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσίόδῳ
καὶ Ὀμῆρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαι· ἂν ὡς ἡ
γνω μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθυνόμαι, εἰ ταῦτ
ἔστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμοι ἐγὼ καὶ αὐτῶ θαυμαστῇ ἂν
Β εἰ ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτῶθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχουμι Παλα-
μήδει καὶ Αἰαντὶ τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος
τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἁδίκου τέθυκεν, ἀντι-
παραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων,
ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀγαθὴς εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ
μέγιστον, τοὺς ἑκεί ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνώντα
ὀσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τις αὐτῶν σοφὸς
ἔστιν καὶ τίς οὐείται μὲν, ἐστίν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ
δ' ἂν τις, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξατο ἐξετάσαι
τὸν ἐπὶ Τροῖαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιῶν
C ἡ Ὀδυσσέα ἡ Σίκυοι, ἡ ἄλλους μυρίως ἂν τις
εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἑκεὶ διαλέ-
γεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἄν
εἰ ἐυδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δῆπον τούτον γε
ἐνεκα οἱ ἑκεῖ ἀποκτεῖνουσιν· τα τε γὰρ ἄλλα
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count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on the other hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, judges? For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable? Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and compared my experience with theirs. I think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. What price would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention? To converse and associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill people for it; since, if what we are told is true,
εὐδαιμονεστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστων.

33. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἰναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθὲς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνδρὶ ἁγαθῷ κακῶν οὐδὲν οὕτε ξὼντι οὕτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τοῦτο πράγματα. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δήλον ἔστι τούτῳ, ὅτι ἦδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάξχαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἢν μοι. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημείον, καὶ ἐγὼ γε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καὶ τοῦ οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζουτο μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴοι

Ε μενοι βλάπτειν τούτῳ αὐτοῖς ἃξιον μέμψεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι τοὺς νεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβῆσωσι, τυμωρήσασθε, ὡς ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσωμεν, εάν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἡ χρημάτων ἡ ἄλλος τοῦ πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἡ ἁρετή, καὶ εὰν δοκοῦσι τι ἕναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ονειδίζετε αὐτοῖς; ὅσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἕν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονται τι εἴναι ὄντες οὔδενος ἃξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια 42 πεποιθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ύφ' ὑμῶν αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ νεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἦδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἁποθανομένω, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις; ὅποτεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πράγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῷ.
THE APOLOGY

death, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them: when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.
CRITO
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO

This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his lifelong friend Crito, which takes place in the prison where Socrates is confined after his trial to await the day of his execution. Crito was a man of wealth and position, devotedly attached to Socrates, and greatly interested in philosophical speculation. Diogenes Laertius (II. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects attributed to him, but Plato represents him throughout as a man of kindly disposition and practical common sense, quite lacking in originality and with no gift for philosophical investigation.

There can be little doubt that Crito tried more than once to induce Socrates to escape from prison, but this dialogue can hardly be considered a mere report of a conversation which actually took place; it is planned and carried out with the exquisite skill peculiar to Plato, and must be recognised as his work. It is difficult, often impossible, to distinguish between the doctrines and beliefs of the real Socrates and those which are put into his mouth by Plato; but in view of the fact that Socrates did not escape from prison, his conduct must have been determined by some consideration of right. We may therefore believe that the doctrine that injustice is always
wrong and that we must not requite injustice with injustice is really Socratic, and that the exalted patriotism and sublime serenity of mind portrayed by Plato in this dialogue were really exhibited in the last days, as in the previous life, of the master whom he delighted to honour.

For editions of the *Crito*, see the Introduction to the *Apology*. 
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ
Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΕΟΤ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Α 1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ προὔπτει ἐστίν;
κρίτων. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
κρίτων. Ὁρθρος βαθύς.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἥθελησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ
dεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.
κρίτων. Ξυνήθησ ἦδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
dιὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύρῳ φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργε-
tηται ὑπ' ἐμοῖ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι;
κρίτων. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθύς ἐπῆγειράς με,
ἀλλὰ σιγῆ παρακάθησαι;
κρίτων. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔδ' ἀν
ἀυτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ
eῖναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανό-
μενος, ὡς ἤδεως καθεῦδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὐκ
ήγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν
dή σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα
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CRITO
[or ON DUTY; ethical]

CHARACTERS
SOCRATES, CRITO

SOCRATES. Why have you come at this time, Crito? Or isn’t it still early?
CRITO. Yes, very early.
SOCRATES. About what time?
CRITO. Just before dawn.
SOCRATES. I am surprised that the watchman of the prison was willing to let you in.
CRITO. He is used to me by this time, Socrates, because I come here so often, and besides I have done something for him.
SOCRATES. Have you just come, or some time ago?
CRITO. Some little time ago.
SOCRATES. Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence?
CRITO. No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I have been wondering at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you sleep; and I purposely refrained from waking you, that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible. I have often thought through-
τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ραδίως αὕτην καὶ πράως φέρεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἰπὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτοιο ὀντα, εἰ δεὶ ἥδη τελευτάν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἄλλη οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἥλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὗτῳ πρὸ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 'Αγγελίαν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, φέρων χαλεπῆν, οὕτω, ὃς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἄλλη ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοὶς ἐπιτηδεύοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἢν ἐγώ, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύταις ἄν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοίον ἀφίκται;

D ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεὶ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὕτω δὴ ἀφίκται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἢξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντες τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπτόντες ἐκεὶ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἢξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς αὐριον ἔσται, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τῆς ἀγαθῆ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι 44 οἴμαι ἢξειν αὐτῷ τήμερον.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐνώ σοι ἔρω. τῇ γὰρ ποῦ ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθυγκειν ἦ ἦ ἤν ἐλθῃ τὸ πλοίον.

1 Schanz brackets ἀγγέλων.
CRITO

out your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

CRITO. Other men as old, Socrates, become involved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

SOCRATES. That is true. But why have you come so early?

CRITO. To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and to few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

SOCRATES. What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

CRITO. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

CRITO. What is your reason for not thinking so?

SOCRATES. I will tell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας ὁμαί αὐτὸ ἥξεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινὸς ἐνυπνίου, ὅ ἐώρακα ὅλιγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγείραι μέ.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδοκεὶ τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλῆ καὶ εὐειδῆς, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι ἐμὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν ὁ Σώκρατες,

ἡματὶ κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίνην ἐρίβωλον ἰκοιο.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γε μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

3. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὁ δαιμόνιον Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ 1 καὶ σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοῖ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ἕναμφορά ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδείου, οἶνον ἑγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ C μὴ σαφῶς ἵσασιν, ὡς οἶδος τ' ὁν σε σφέξεω, εἰ ἠθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἃν αἱ χίων εἰπ' ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλεῖονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθέντε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὁ μακάριος Κρίτων, οὐτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὃν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράξθαι, ὡσπερ ἄν πραξθῇ.

D ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλ' ὀρᾷς δή, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες,

1 πιθοῦ Schanz, following Burges, πελθον BCDE.
CRITO

CRITO. So those say who have charge of these matters.

SOCRATES. Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

CRITO. What was the dream?

SOCRATES. I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, "Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia." ¹

CRITO. A strange dream, Socrates.

SOCRATES. No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

CRITO. Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than that of considering one's money of more importance than one's friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

CRITO. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to

¹ Homer, Iliad ix, 363.
καὶ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὕτα δὲ δῆλα
tὰ παρόντα υπνό, ὅτι οἷοὶ τ' εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί οὐ τὰ
σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ
μέγιστα σχεδὸν, ἕαν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλη-
μένος ἦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ γὰρ ὠφελού, ὁ Κρίτων, οἳοὶ τ'
eῖναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἐνα
οἷοὶ τ' ἢσαν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά, καὶ καλῶς
ἀν εἰχεν νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοι τε οὕτε γὰρ φρό-
νυμον οὕτε ἀφρον δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ
tοῦτο ὁ τὰν τύχωσι.

Ε 4. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε
dὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἀρὰ γε μὴ ἐμοὺ προ-
μηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μὴ, εὰν σὺ
ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συνοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα
παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκα-
σθώμεν ἢ καὶ πάσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ
συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τοὺς
45 παθεῖν; εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἐάσον αὐτὸ
χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ πον δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντες
σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τῶν κίνδυνον καὶ, ἐὰν δέῃ,
ἐτι τοῦτο μείζῳ. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως
ποίει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων,
καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μὴτε τοῖνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ πολὺ τἄργυριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες
τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα
οὐχ ὁρᾶς τούτους τοὺς συνοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἀν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοὺ ἄργυρίου; σοι
Β δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
ικανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ ὀiei
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CRITO

care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.

Socrates. I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

Crito. That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this: you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either all our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

Socrates. I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

Crito. Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don’t you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you
δείν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι1 ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἰκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. οὕστε, ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενοι ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχωι ἐξελθὼν ὁ τι χρώσα σαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον ὅποι ἂν

C ἀφίκῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἴέναι, εἰσθαμένοι ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οὐ σε περι πολλοὺ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξουνται, ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

5. Ἐπὶ δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτῶν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθήναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτῶν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἄν καὶ οἱ ἐχόροι σου σπεύσαις τε καὶ ἐσπευσάν σε διαφθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτως καὶ τοὺς νικῶς τοὺς σαυτῶν ἐμοῦ λεγεῖς δοκεῖς D προδιδόναι, οὐς σοι ἔξων καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰκήσει καταλιπτών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι ἄν τύχοις, τούτῳ πράξουν· τεῦξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἱ οἰκεῖοι εἰσὶ διδάξοντας ἐν ταῖς ὁρφανίαις περὶ τῶν ὁρφανοῦς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρή ποιεῖσθαι παῦς ἡ ξυνιδιακαλαπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. χρῆ δὲ, ἀπερ ἄν ἄνδρος ἀγάθος καὶ ἄνδρεῖς ἔλοιπον, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντα γε δὴ ἀρετὴς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπικελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἐγνωρίζει· καὶ ὑπέρ σου καὶ ὑπὲρ Ἐ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηθείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξη ἄπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανρίᾳ τινὶ τῇ

1 After ξένοι the MSS. read οὐτοῖ, which Schanz brackets.

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ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thbes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebes also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right—betraying yourself when you might save yourself. And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has
διαπεφυγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὗτοις οὖν ἔσωσάμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οίον τε ὦν καὶ δυνατόν, εἰ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν όφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅρα μή ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἦ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύουν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἐτι ὧρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσῃς νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπράξαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἴον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθομεν καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλοις ποιεῖ.
been conducted with a sort of cowardice on our part—both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use whatever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; for all this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don’t refuse.

SOCRATES. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honour the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are frightened with goblins, threatening us with imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now
αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλαβομέν, διὸ σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ ὦ, ὥστε ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ. ἦ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παϊδία καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς Κρίτων, κοινὴ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ φῶς ἔχω, ἢ ὃ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἣ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως, ὥστε ἐγώμαι, ἐκάστοτε φῶς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν ὃ ἐγὼ ἐλέγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ὃς οἱ ἀνθρώποι.

Ε δοξάζουσιν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μὴ. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὡς Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὕριον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν σε παρακροοῦν ἡ παροῦσα ἐξερεύνη: σκόπει δὴ: οἷς ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

κρίτων. Καλῶς.

ζωκράθης. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ ποιηρὰς μὴ;

κρίτων. Ναί.

ζωκράθης. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, ποιηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

κρίτων. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

7. ζωκράθης. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα

Β ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων

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CRITO

how could we examine the matter most reasonably? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God's name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

CRITO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

CRITO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his
πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἔπαινος καὶ ψόγω καὶ δόξη τοῦ νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἔνος μόνου ἐκείνου, ὅσ ἂν 
tυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὄν; 

κριτὼν. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ζωκράθης. Οὐκόν ψοβείσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

κριτὼν. Δῆλα δῆ.

ζωκράθης. Ταῦτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαινοῦντε, μᾶλλον ἢ ἤ ἐξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

κριτὼν. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

Σινωκράθης. Εἰεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαινοῦτων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πεῖσεται;

κριτὼν. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ζωκράθης. Τί δ’ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τούτο; καὶ ποῖ 
tείνει, καὶ εἰς τὶ τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

κριτὼν. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ 

dιολλύει.

ζωκράθης. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκόν καὶ τάλλα, ὦ Κρίτων, οὔτως, ἢν μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ 

βούλη ἡμῖν ἐστὶν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ

δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίνων, ὅπερ δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ὥς εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσωμεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ

1 Schanz, following Burges, brackets καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους.

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CRITO

business, does he pay attention to every man's praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

CRITO. To those of one man only.

SOCRATES. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

CRITO. Obviously.

SOCRATES. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

CRITO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

CRITO. Of course he will.

SOCRATES. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

CRITO. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

SOCRATES. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by
λωβησόμεθα, ὅ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγύγνετο,
τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπόκλυτο. ἦ οὔδεν ἐστὶ τοῦτο;
κριτών. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

8. Ἐνκράτης. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιείνου
μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ
dιαφθείρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν
Ε ἐπαινότων δόξῃ, ἀρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρ-
μένου αὐτοῦ; ἐστὶ δὲ που τοῦτο σῶμα. ἦ οὐχὶ;
κριτῶν. Ναὶ.

Ἐνκράτης. 'Αρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ
μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σῶματος;
κριτῶν. Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἐνκράτης. 'Αλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν
διεφθαρμένου, ὦ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβάται, τὸ δὲ
dίκαιον ὀνύνησιν; ἦ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἰναι
tοῦ σῶματος ἐκείνο, ὦ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.

48 περὶ δ' ἦ τε ἄδικια καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν;
κριτῶν. Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἐνκράτης. 'Αλλὰ τιμωτερον;
κριτῶν. Πολὺ γε.

Ἐνκράτης. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν
οὗτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς,
ἀλλ' ὦ τί ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων,
ὁ εἰς, καὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὦστε πρῶτον μὲν
tαύτη οὐκ ὁρθοὶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν
πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν
dικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.

Β ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ
πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι.
κριτῶν. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα: φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ὦ
Σώκρατες.

1 φαίη γὰρ ἄν bracketed by Schanz.
CRITO

the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

CRITO. I think it is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined?

CRITO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body?

CRITO. By no means.

SOCRATES. But more important?

CRITO. Much more.

SOCRATES. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

CRITO. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αληθὴ λέγεις. ἂλλ', ὁ θαυμάσιε, οὖτός τε ὁ λόγος ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ἐτὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ πρῶτερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, ἐδ ἐτὶ μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ξῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέου, ἄλλα τὸ εὐ ξῆν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 'Αλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταύτων ἐστίν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μένει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδεο

πειράσθαι εξίεναι μὴ ἀφιέντων 'Αθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον καὶ ἔαν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐδῶμεν. ἃς δὲ ὑπὲρ ἡγεῖς τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως θρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταύτα, ὁ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίων ἀποκτινωῦτοι καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἶοι τ' ἦσαν, οὔδεν ἢνυ νῦν, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἴρεῖ, μὴ οὔδεν ἀλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὑπὲρ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξεωμεν καὶ θρημάτα τελοῦντες

tούτως τοὺς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδεο εξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ εξάγοντεσ τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἡ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταύτα ποιοῦντες· καὶ ἐφανώμεθα ἀδικὰ αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲν ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ' εἰ ἀποδημοσκείν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἤσυχίαν ἀγοντας, οὔτε ἀλλο ὑπομοί πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

1 Schanz gives ἀληθὴ λέγεις to Crito.

2 The usual reading, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ ὁμοίως εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρῶτερον was corrected by Schanz, who follows a quotation of the passage by Priscian.

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CRITO

SOCRATES. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

CRITO. We do hold to it.

SOCRATES. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure anything else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.
KRITON. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Σωκρατε. ὀρᾷ δὲ, τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃ ἁγαθέ, κοινῷ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι: εἰ δὲ μῆ, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὃ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὃς χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπείνα: ὃς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκόντως. ὅρα δὲ ἥ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, εάν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἥ ἀν μάλιστα ὦν.

KRITON. Αὕτη πείρασομαι.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδεμισθεῖται, φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ὥς τιν μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὐ; ὦ οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἁγαθῶν οὔτε καλῶν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογήθη; ἦ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἔκειναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς γε τῆς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκεκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὃ Κρίτων, ἢρα ἐτηλικοῖδε Ἀνδρεῖ πρὸς ἀλλὴλους στουδῆ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέρουτε; ἦ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μῆ, καὶ εἰτε δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐτὶ τῶν χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πράοτερα, ὡμῶς τὸ γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὁν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἢ οὐ;

KRITON. Φαμέν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς ἢρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

1 The words ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, “as has just been said, too,” follow in the MSS. but are omitted by Schanz and others.

2 Τηλικοῖδε γέρωντες MSS.
CRITO

CRITO. I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do.

SOCRATES. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

CRITO. I will try.

SOCRATES. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.

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ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ού δήτα.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ούδε ἀδικούμενον ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

C ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δεὶ δή που, ὡς Σώκρατες.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ γάρ πον κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδέν διαφέρει.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτε ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἄν οἴοιν πάσχῃ
D ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὁρα, ὡς Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαις ὁμολογήσει. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὁλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὐτώ δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτος ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εἰ μᾶλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖς σοι, καὶ ἁρχώμεθα ἐνετείθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἁμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ὑφίστασαι καὶ οὐ
Ε κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἁρχῆς; ἐμοί μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὔτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἰ πὴ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.
CRITO

CRITO. Why, no.

SOCRATES. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.

CRITO. Apparently not.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

CRITO. Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

CRITO. Not right, certainly.

SOCRATES. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

CRITO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.
κριτὼν. 'Αλλ' ἐμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

Σωκράτης. Δέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τούτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἄ ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ ὄντα ποιητέου ἢ ἕξαπατητέον;

κριτὼν. Ποιητέον.

11. Σωκράτης. 'Εκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπίοντες

50 ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίους οὐσίν ἢ οὐ;

κριτὼν. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

Σωκράτης. 'Αλλ' ὥδε σκόπει. εἰ μελλοῦσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἰτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ'. ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τούτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτῶ· εἰπὲ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἡ τούτω τῷ ἔργῳ, ὃ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς

Β τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδον τε ἐτί ἐκείνῃ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἂν γενόμεναι δίκαιοι μηδὲν ἵσχυον, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἀκυροὶ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα τουαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπὲν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολυμένου, ὅς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικαιοθείας προστάτει κυρίας εἶναι. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς,

C ὅτι ἄδικε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνειν; ταύτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

κριτὼν. Ταύτα νῦ τῇ Δίᾳ, ὅ Σώκρατες.
CRITO

CRITO. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

SOCRATES. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: "ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?"

CRITO. He ought to do it.

SOCRATES. Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

CRITO. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

SOCRATES. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, "The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly"? Shall we say that, or what?

CRITO. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.
12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι: ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὀμολόγητο ἦμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἰς ἄν ἢ τὸλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζῃ τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ’ ἀποκρίνου, ἔπειδὴ καὶ εἰὼθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε

D γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἦμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἦμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δ’ ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφεις ὡς οὗ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνειν ἂν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἢ καὶ σὺ ἑπαδεύθης; ἢ ὃν καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἑπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι,2 παραγγέλλουτε τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μοῦσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;

Ε καλῶς, φαίνειν ἂν. εἶεν. ἔπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένον τε καὶ ἕξετράφης καὶ ἑπαδεύθης, ἔχουσιν οὐκ εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἡβὰ καὶ ἐκγονός καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀρ’ ἐξ ὑσον οἰεὶ εἰναὶ σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀττ’ ἢν ἡμεῖς σε ἑπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἰεὶ δίκαιον εἰναί; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἃρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ὑσον ἢν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοὶ ὃν ἐτύγχανεν, ὡστε, ἀπερ πᾶσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν 51 οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύππειν οὔτε ἀλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά: πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἀρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους

1 Schanz omits τοῖς νόμοις. 2 Schanz omits νόμοι.

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CRITO

Socrates. What then if the laws should say, "Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?" Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, "Don't be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?"

"I find no fault," I should say. "Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "You did," I should say. "Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and the like; and do you think that it will be proper for
ἐσται 1 σοι, ὡστε, έαν σε ἐπιχειρώμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ’ ὅσον δύνασαι, ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταύτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὥ τῷ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφὸς, ὡστε λέληθεν σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερον ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ θεοὶς καὶ παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποις τοὺς νόμους ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μάλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἤσυχαν ἁγοῦντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δεῖσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἅγη τρωθησόμενον ἡ ἀποθανόμενον, ποιητέον ταύτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικέτεον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπότεον τὴν τάξιν, ἅλλα καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ εἰς πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὁσιον οὕτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἐτί ἠττον τὴν πατρίδα; τὶ φήσομεν πρὸς ταύτα, ὡ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ; 

κριτόν. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

13. σωκράτης. Σκόπει τούνων, ὡ Σώκρατεσ, φαίην ἀν ἵσως ὅ νομοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταύτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρείς δραν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρείς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ἃν

1 So Schanz, ξέσται BCE.
CRITO

you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue? Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?" What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

CRITO. I think they do.

SOCRATES. "Observe then, Socrates," perhaps the laws would say, "that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to
1) οἶοι τ' ἢμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολέταις, ὀμος προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ Βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὦ ἄν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὕδεις ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἑστιν οὕδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἕαν τε τις βούληται ἡμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαις ἵναι, εὗ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἕαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσε ποι ἐλθὼν. ἵναι ἐκείς ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ.

Ε ὃς ὡς ἂν ἡμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὅρων ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τάλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἣδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσεων ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμὲν ἁδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὕσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσει, καὶ ὅτι ὡμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ

52 μὴ καλῶς τε ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυνῶν θάτερα, ἡ πείθει ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

14. Ταύταις δή φαμὲν καὶ σέ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι· διὰ τί δή; ἵσως ἃν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιτο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὡμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίει γὰρ ἂν

B ὁτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμηρία

1 Schanz omits 2 and brackets Σώκρατες.
you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things."

"We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others." If then I should say, "How so?" perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in
The words ἕτι μὴ ἄπαξ εἰς ἱσθμόν, “except once to the Isthmus,” after ἔξηλθε is omitted by Schanz and others as an early interpolation.
it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and might have done with the state's consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us." What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true?

Crito. We must, Socrates.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαίειν, ἡ ξυνθήκας
Ε' τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις,
οὕς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεῖς
οὐδὲ ἐν ὅλῳ ἅρμονι ἀναγκασθεῖς βουλεύσασθαι,
ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεισιν ἐβδομῆκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι
ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι
ἐφαινοῦτο σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἰναι· σὺ δὲ οὔτε
Δακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκά-
στοτε φής εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἀλλήν οὐδεμίαν τῶν
Ε' Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ
ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμης ἢ οἱ χωλοί τε καὶ
τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι; οὗτοι σοὶ διαφε-
ρόντις τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἥρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε
καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἄν πόλις
ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; 1 νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς
ὁμολογημένοις· ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὃ Σώκρατες
cαὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἐσεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
ἐξελθῶν.

15. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρ-
tάνων τι τούτων τι ἁγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ
Β τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτού. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
κινδυνεύσωσι γε σοι οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοῖ
φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν
ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα τινα πόλεων ἔλθης,
ἡ Θῆβαξ ἡ Μέγαράδε—ἐνυμοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφό-
tεραι—πολέμους ἢξεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων
πολιτεία, καὶ ὁσοιπέρ κήδουνται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων,
ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων,
C καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὡστε

1 Schanz omits δῆλον δτι... νόμων, "evidently; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws?"
SOCRATES. "Are you then," they would say, "not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? You will if you take our advice, Socrates; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

"For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property. And you yourself, if you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara—for both are well governed—will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the
δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι: ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεύς ἔστιν, σφόδρα που δοξείειν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοιήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεύς είναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τούτο ποιοῦντι ἀρα ἄξιον σοι ζην ἔσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτους καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὁ Σωκράτης; ἡ οὔσπερ ἐνθάδε, ως ἡ ἀρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὖκ οἶει ἀσχήμον ἄν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οὔπεθαί γε χρή. ἁλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἄπαρείς, ἥσεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρά τούς ξένους τοὺς Κριτωνος· ἐκεί γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἄν ἠδὲως σου ἄκουοιεν, ὡς γελοῖως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευήν τε τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἡ ἀλλὰ οία δὴ εἰσθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ ἡγέρου ἄνηρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς

D τὸ εἰκός, ἐτολμησας οὔτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζην, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβίας, οὐδεὶς ὅσ ἐρεί; ἴσως, ἄν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄκουσει, ὁ Σωκράτης, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχώμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύσων τί ποιῶν ἡ ευωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλία, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ δείτινον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἀλλης ἁρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἁλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν

1 Schanz omits δουλεύσων, “being a slave.”
2 Schanz omits ἐν Θετταλίᾳ.
CRITO

judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilised men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant's leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and changing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But
ἐνεκα βούλει ξῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἄγαγων θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ἔξους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοὺ δὲ τρεφομενοι σοῦ ξώντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται 1 αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γε τι ὅφελος αὐτῶν ἐστίν τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἷς θαλ γε χρῆ.

16. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἢμῶν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσαι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ξῆν μήτε ἄλλο μήδεν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς έκεῖ ἁρχοντιν' οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἀμείνον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὁσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τῶν σῶν οὕδει, οὔτε έκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἀμείνον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένος ἀπει, ἐὰν ἀπίης, οὐχ υφ' ἢμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: εὰν δὲ έξέλθῃς σοῦ τῶν αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτος οὐς ἡκιστα ἐδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἤμεις τε σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ξώντι, καὶ έκεῖ οἱ ἡμετέροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν "Αἰδοὺ νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι

1 Schanz omits ἐπιμελήσονται here and also the punctuation after αὐτῶν, making one long interrogative sentence.
perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? How so? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up and educated if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

"Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defence. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades' realm, will not receive you graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay,
τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν
D ἄ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

17. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, ἕν ἵσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιώντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχῇ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν ἄλλα ἵσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. οἷς μὲντοι εἰ τι οἷει πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἄλλα, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ἘΝΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐξι τούτων, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεός ὑφηγεῖται.

1 Schanz follows Cobet and Naber in omitting Κρίτων.
CRITO

to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice."

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

CRITO. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES. Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.
PHAEDO
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

The Phaedo, like the Crito, has for its scene the prison of Socrates, though the dialogue is here supposed to be reported by one who was present, not actually carried on in the presence of the reader. The immediate purpose of the dialogue seems to be to show that the philosopher will be glad to die; and this purpose is never lost sight of, for it appears toward the end, as at the beginning. In order, however, to prove that willingness to die is rational, it is necessary to prove that the soul will continue to exist after the death of the body, and thus the original statement that the philosopher will be glad to die leads to the proof of a far more important truth. The commonly accepted statement that the real subject of the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul has certainly some justification. In order, however, to prove that the soul is immortal the theory is advanced that generation proceeds from opposite to opposite by alternation, that life proceeds from death as death from life, and that therefore the soul must exist after death as before birth. Again, all sensible objects are referable to certain types, of which they are likenesses. These types must be known to us before we can refer objects to them, and we have not seen or learned the types in this life; we must therefore have seen them before this life began; our knowledge is thus seen to be reminiscence of knowledge.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

gained before our birth. All this proves, however, only that the soul existed for a probably very long time before our birth and continues to exist for a probably very long time after our death, but not that it is immortal and indestructible. This objection leads to the discussion of causation and to the conclusion that "the ideas are the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge." The idea inherent in soul is life, and since ideas are so connected with particulars that no particular can admit an idea directly contrary to its own inherent idea, the soul cannot admit death. The proof of the immortality of the soul has been reached by proving the everlasting truth of the ideas. This last is the most important part of the Phaedo, so far as the development of Plato's system of philosophy is concerned, though it is introduced as a means for proving the immortality of the soul, just as the immortality of the soul is proved in order to show that the true philosopher will not fear, but welcome, death.¹

This dialogue, then, establishes the doctrine of the real existence of ideas as the sole objects of knowledge and also shows how that doctrine is necessary to human happiness, because it serves to prove that the soul is immortal. The ordinary human being is little interested in metaphysical speculation, but greatly interested in his own future; he will therefore pay attention to metaphysical theory if it is so presented as to seem to affect his happiness. The Phaedo, by applying the doctrine of ideas to prove

¹ This brief discussion of the contents and purpose of the Phaedo is for the most part derived from the introduction to R. D. Archer-Hind's excellent edition, to which the reader is referred for a more complete exposition.
the immortality of the soul, tends to popularise the doctrine of ideas, and this may have been the ultimate purpose of Plato in writing the dialogue; but that he was also fully in earnest in his belief in the immortality of the soul, and that the proof of immortality was an important part of his purpose in writing the dialogue, cannot be doubted.

In composition the *Phaedo* is elaborate without being complicated. The dramatic setting serves here, as in the *Crito*, as an appropriate introduction to a discourse on immortality and offers an opportunity to portray the gentle, genial nature, the kindly humour, and the calm, untroubled courage of Socrates; it also marks the divisions between the various parts of the discussion, and offers relief to the mind of the reader who is wearied by close application to serious argument. Those who take part in the conversation are admirably characterised; this is especially true of the two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who play the most important parts after Socrates himself. Both are eager searchers after truth, and both are evidently highly regarded by Socrates—were, in other words, at least respected by Plato; but Simmias appears as a man of somewhat vague notions, inclined to mysticism, and somewhat lacking in keenness, while Cebes is clear-sighted, sharp, and keen, tenacious of his opinion, but quick to see when an opinion is no longer tenable. These distinguishing traits are drawn with few lines, but the few are masterly. The beautiful imaginative description of the life of souls in the other world is not merely a picturesque addition to the variety of the composition; it teaches us how Plato believed that right and wrong actions were rewarded or
punished. Quite different imagery is employed for the same end in the *Phaedrus*, but in both dialogues the justice of the treatment accorded the souls is made clear, and in both the importance of conduct in this life is emphasised, though this emphasis is stronger in the *Phaedo*, as is natural in view of the dramatic setting.

The number of persons mentioned in the *Phaedo* is considerable.

Echecrates of Phlius was one of the last of the Pythagoreans; we know of no particular reason why he is introduced into this dialogue, unless it be that, as a Pythagorean, he might naturally be in sympathy with the doctrine of ideas. Of his personal relations to Socrates nothing is known. Phaedo, of Elis, was taken prisoner in 401 B.C. and brought to Athens, where he was, according to Aulus Gellius (ii., 18), ransomed by Cebes. After the death of Socrates he returned to Elis and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which was afterwards moved to Eretria by Menedemus and known as the Eretrian school. Phaedo wrote several dialogues, but virtually nothing is known of his doctrines. He seems to have been highly esteemed by Socrates and his followers. Apollodorus of Phalerum is of no philosophical importance. He is mentioned several times by Plato and Xenophon as an ardent admirer and constant companion of Socrates, and a man of impulsive, unrestrained disposition. Simmias and Cebes were both Thebans, warm personal friends, and equally devoted to Socrates; both offered money to secure the release of Socrates from prison (*Crito*, 45 b). The composition preserved under the name of *Pinax* or *Tablet* of Cebes is certainly spurious. *Crito* appears
here, as in the dialogue that bears his name, as the old and tried friend of Socrates. The others who are mentioned as companions of Socrates in his last hours are Critobulus, the son of Crito; Hermogenes, probably the son of Hipponicus and then identical with a speaker in the *Cratylus*; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aeschines, a well-known follower of Socrates, author of several dialogues; Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school; Ctesippus, a youth mentioned also in the *Euthydemus* and the *Lysis*; Menexenus, son of Demophon and an admirer of Ctesippus; his name is given to one of Plato's dialogues; Phaedonides, a Theban; Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megarian school; and Terpsion, also a Megarian. Evenus, mentioned in 60 p, was a Parian sophist and poet.

The most important separate editions of the *Phaedo* are those of Geddes, W. Wagner, Wohlrab, Schanz, Hirschig, Burnet, and Archer-Hind. The introduction and commentary in the last-named edition are of special importance.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ
Η ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ, ΕΘΙΚΟΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

EXEKRAΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΟΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ,
ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΣΩΝ, Ο ΤΟΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΤΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

St. I.
p. 57

Α 1. EXEKRAΤΗΣ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένου
Σωκράτει ἑκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιευν
ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἀλλού τοῦ ἱκουσασ;
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες.

EXEKRAΤΗΣ. Τι οὖν δὴ ἐστιν ἄττα εἴπειν ὁ ἀνὴρ
πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἔτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ
ἀν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν
Φιλιασίων οὔδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ ἔνν
Ἀθήνας, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ

Β ἑκείθεν, ὡστὶς ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγείλαι οἶος τ’
ἡν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν
ἀποθάνον· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἴχεν φράξειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἃρα ἐπύθησθε
ὅν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EXEKRAΤΗΣ. Ναὶ, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγείλε τις,
καὶ ἑβαυμαζόμεν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς
πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἢν
τοῦτο, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη·
ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα
200
PHAEDEO

[OR ON THE SOUL; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

Echecrates, Phaedo, Apollodorus, Socrates, Cebes, Simmias, Crito, the Servant of the Eleven.

Echecrates. Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

Phaedo. I was there myself, Echecrates.

Echecrates. Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

Phaedo. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

Echecrates. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

Phaedo. It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, δ νῦν Δήλον Ἀθηναίου πέμπτουσιν.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τότε δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τούτ’ ἐστι τὸ πλοίον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν φ᾽ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δῖς ἐπτὰ ἐκείνους ὧχετο ἀγων καὶ ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὐν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐξαντό, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖν, ἐκύστου ἐτοὺς θεωρίαν ἀπὰξειν εἰς Δήλου ἢν δὴ ἄεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐτι εξ ἐκείνου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτουσιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἑστὶν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δήλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο· τότῳ δ’ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, οὕτων τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ’ ἐτυχεῖν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἑγέρετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

2. ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τῶν θάνατον, ν Ὁ Φαίδων; τί ἢν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων τῶ ἀνδρί; ἢ οὖν εἴην οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ’ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτατο φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἁσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἁλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι.
Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

ECHECRATES. What ship is this?

PHAEDO. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honour of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

ECHECRATES. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

PHAEDO. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

PHAEDO. I am not busy and I will try to tell
ύμιν διηγήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι Σω-
κράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα
ἔμοιγε ἂεὶ πάντων ἡδίστων.

ἐξεκραθη. 'Αλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς
ἀκοουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἄλλα
πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνη ἀκριβέστατα διεξέλθειν πάντα.

Ε Φαίδων. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἐπαθον
παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με
ἄνδρός ἐπιτηδείου ἐλεος εἰσῆγεν εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι
ἀνὴρ ἑφαίνετο, ὦ Ἔξεκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ
τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεώς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὡστε
μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδ' εἰς "Αἰδοῦν ἴοντα
ἀνευ θείας μοιρας Ἴναι, ἂλλ' καὶ ἐκείσε ἀφικό-

59 μεν εὑ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πῶπτετε καὶ ἄλλοις.
διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνω μοι ἐλεεινών εἰσῆγεν,
ὡς εἰκὸς ἄν δόξειν εἰναὶ παρόντε πένθειν οὔτε αὐ
ἡδονή ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἦμων ὄντων, ὡσπερ
εἰσῴμενεν καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινὲς ἕσαν·
ἀλλ' ἀνεχθὼν ἀτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆκαί τις
ἀφίκῃς κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη
όμοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομένων ὁτι
αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἐμελλε τελευτάν. καὶ πάντες οἱ
παρόντες σχεδὸν τινώ τινες διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν
γελῶντες, εὔιστε δὲ δακρύωντες, εἰς δὲ ἦμων καὶ
diaφεροῦντος, Ἀπολλόδωρος: οἶσθα γάρ ποι τὸν

Β ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ἐξεκραθη. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Φαίδων. 'Εκεῖνος τε τοῖνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως
εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε έτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ἐξεκραθη. Ἐπιχου δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παρα-

γενόμενοι;

Φαίδων. Οὕτως τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν
you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

ECHECRATES. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him and his character.

ECHECRATES. To be sure I do.

PHAEDO. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

ECHECRATES. Who were these, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. Of native Athenians there was this
PLATO

ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτι Ἕρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λίσχύνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἣν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές τῶν ἐπιχωρίων· Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἦσθενει.

C exekrathe. Ξένοι δὲ τινὲς παρῆσαν;

φαίδων. Ναι, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Ὄθεβαιος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαϊδωνίδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

exekrathe. Τι δέ; Ἀριστιππος καὶ Κλέομ-βροτος1 παρεγένοντο;

φαίδων. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

exekrathe. Ἀλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;

φαίδων. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτως παραγενέ-σθαι.

exekrathe. Τι οὖν δή; τίνες, φής, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

3. φαίδων. Ἔγώ σοι ἔξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειρά-σομαι διηγήσασθαι. ὑεί γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτάν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τῶν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἐσθεῖν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν φί καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο πλησίον γὰρ ἢν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐως ἀνοιχθεὶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατρι-βοντες μετ' ἄλληλων' ἀνεῴγετο γὰρ οὐ πρὸ-επειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τῶν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύσαμεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωίαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραία2

1 Schanz, after Cobet, inserts οὗ after Κλεόμβροτος.
2 After προτεραία the MSS. read ἡμέρα, which Hermann, followed by Schanz and others, brackets.

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Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

Echecrates. Were any foreigners there?

Phaedo. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

Echecrates. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

Phaedo. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

Echecrates. Was anyone else there?

Phaedo. I think these were about all.

Echecrates. Well then, what was the conversation?

Phaedo. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison
Ε ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπιθύμησα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἴη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἂλληλοις ἤκειν ὡς πρωιάτατα εἰς τὸ εἴωθός. καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ ἦμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὁσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἰπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἐως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Ἀύουσι γὰρ, ἐφι, οἱ ἐνδέκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἄν τῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευ- 
τῆσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ’ οὖν χρόνον ἐπισκόπου ἤκειν καὶ ἐκέλευς ἡμᾶς εἰσίεναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἅρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ἑαυθίπτην—γυνώσκεις γὰρ—ἐξουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν ἐδεε ήμᾶς ἢ Ἑαυθίπτη, ἀνευφήμησε τε καὶ τοιαύτ’ ἀττα εἰπεν, οί η ἐιώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι Ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι 
νῦν οἱ ἐπιτίθειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σω- 
κράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα: Ὁ Κρίτων, ἐφι, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οὐκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνη 
μὲν ἀπῆγον τινὲς τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν 
B τε καὶ κοπτομένην ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζό- 
μενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἁμα Ἄγω 
ἀτοποῦν, ἐφη, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἐοικε τι εἶναι τοῦτο, 
δ’ ἀλοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἡδονής ὡς θαυμασίως 
πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, 
τῷ ἁμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγγείλεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τὶς διώκῃ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, 
σχέδον τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, 
ὁσπερ ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δὖ ὄντε. καὶ 
C μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Εὐσωπος, 
μῦθον ἄν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ 
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in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. "For," he said, "the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day." So after a little delay he came and told us to go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: "Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them." And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, "Crito, let somebody take her home." And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, "What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think," he said, "if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when
Διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδή οὖκ ἔδυνατο, συνήψεν εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὁ ἄν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. Ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔσικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τῷ ἀλγεινών, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἦδυ.

4. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὐ γ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας Ἐλ με. περὶ γάρ του τῶν ποιημάτων ὡν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν 'Ἀπόλλων προοίμων καὶ ἄλλου τινές με ἴδῃ ἠροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐήνους πρώθη, ὦ τι ποτὲ διανοθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεύρῳ ἠλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτὰ, ἐπέτοιον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἦχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρωτᾶ, εὐ οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. Δέγε τοίμων, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὅτι οὖν ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενοι οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτὸν ἀντίτεχνοι εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. ἦδειν γάρ ὡς οὐ βάδιον εἰή· ἀλλὰ ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενοι τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενοι, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γάρ δὴ ἀτὰ τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φυτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνιοὺ ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βῶ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὤψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐδέ λέγου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζονται. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τούτῳ ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπικελεῦειν, ὡσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελεύομενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνυπνιοῦν, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τούτῳ ἐπικελεῦειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης.
he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after."

Here Cebes interrupted and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say."

"Then tell him, Cebes," said he, "the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it.' And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the
μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· γὰρ δ' ἐπειδή ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἀποθυμήσκειν, ἐδοξῆς χρῆναι, εἰ ᾳρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταῦτῃ τὴν δημώδη μουσικῆν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπειναί
Β πρὸν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πείθομενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὗτοι δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐνυπηρέσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εὔπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐσ προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρῶτοι ἐνέτυχον.

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καὶ, ἄν σωφρονή, ἐμὲ διώκειν ώς C τάχιστα· ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ως ἐσικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ 'Αθηναίοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας· Οἴον παρακλεῖει, ἐφη, τοῦτο, ὁ Ἁγκρατες, Εὐήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἢδη ἐντετυχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδὸν οὖν, εξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἱσθημαι, οὐδ' ὀπωσδέποτε σοι ἐκών εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; ή δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλοσοφὸς Εὐήνως; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοῖς καὶ Εὐήνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτιν ἄξιως τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος μέτειτεν. οὐ μέντοι ἰσχως βιάσεται αὐτὸν· οὐ γὰρ φασί θεμιτῶν εἶναι.

D καὶ ἄμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὕτως ἢδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἦρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο 212
greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians.”

And Simmias said, “What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it.”

“Why so?” said he. “Is not Evenus a philosopher?”

“I think so,” said Simmias.

“Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted.” And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him: “What do you mean by
λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἐαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δὲ ἀν τῶ ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάω συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφὲς, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἂ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκώς, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγεις. καὶ γὰρ ἦσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολόγειν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί,¹ ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι: τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἓν τῳ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνων;

6. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὐν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀποκτινύναι, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἡδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἣρου, καὶ Φιλολάων ἡκουσα, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἡμῶν διητάτῳ, ἡδὲ ἐδὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὖ δέοι τούτῳ ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενός πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρῆ, ἐφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκοῦσαις. ἦσως μὲντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα,² ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ οἰς βέλτιον τεθύναντι ἡ ξῆν· οἰς δὲ βέλτιον τεθύναναι, θαυμαστὸν ἦσως σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἄλλα ἄλλοι δὲ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ο Κέβης ἥρεμα ἐπιγελάσας· Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἐφη τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπὼν. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἐφη ὁ

¹ Schanz brackets τῆς ἐκεί.
² Schanz, following Forster, puts a period after τάλλα and inserts ἄλλα.
this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?"

"How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?"

"Nothing definite, Socrates."

"I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?"

"Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it."

"You must have courage," said he, "and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor."

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, "Gawd knows it doos," speaking in his own dialect.

"It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,"
Β Σωκράτης, οὔτω γ’ εἶναι ἀλογον’ οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ’ ἦσως γ’ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἀνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δει δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ’ ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδεῖν’ οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὐ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; Ἄμοιγε, 

C φησιν ο Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτηνύω, μὴ σημηναντός σου ὦτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἰ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖ ἂν; Πάνυ γ’, ἐφι. Ἠσος τοῖνυν ταύτη σύκ ἁλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτηνύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεοῖς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

7. Ἀλλ’ εἰκός, ἐφι ο Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἔθελεν ἀποθυνόσειε, ἐοίκεν 

D τοῦτο, ὦ Σωκράτες, ἀτόπως, εὔπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεοῦ τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίόντας, ἐν ἦ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οὐπέρ ἀριστοὶ ἐσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοῖ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ποι αὐτὸς ὡς αὐτὸν οἶεται ἁμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ’ ἀνόητος μὲν ἀνθρωπος τάχ’ ἂν οἰηθεῖη ταύτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ
said Socrates, "but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "I do."

"Well then," said he, "if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me."

"That," said Cebes, "seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run
PLATO

Ε δεσπότου,1 καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζομεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τι μᾶλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγωι, ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοὶ ποι ἂν ἄει εἶναι παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ βελτίων. καίτοι οὖτως, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦναντίον εἶναι εἰκός ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἀφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκοῦσας οὖν ὁ Ἔω-

63 κράτης ἔσθηναι τε μοι ἐδοξεῖ τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς. Ἀεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνὰ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πειθεῖσθαι, ὁ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἀνδρεῖς σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς τὸ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπωσι καὶ ἄρχοντας ἄγαθούς, ὡς

B αὐτῶς ὁμολογεῖς, θεοὺς. Δικαία, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἴμαι γὰρ ὡμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι χρὴ με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογηθοῦσαι ὁσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δὴ ὁς, πειραθὼ πιθανῶτερον πρὸς ὡμᾶς ἀπολογηθοῦσαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὣμην ἢξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἀλλοὺς σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἄγαθοὺς, ἐπείτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἦδικον ἂν οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ νῦν δὲ

C εὐ ἵστε, ὅτι παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι

1 Schanz bracketa fevktēon . . . δεσπότου.
away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice."

When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, "Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says."

And Simmias said, "Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers."

"You have a right to say that," he replied; "for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court."

"Precisely," said Simmias.

"Well, then," said he, "I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe," said he, "that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would
Πλάτων: καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνω διασχυρισάμην· ὅτι μὲντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνω ἀγαθοὶς ἤξειν, εὐ ἱστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, διασχυρισάμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἴμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς η τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἐφ' ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διὰνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοῖς; κοινῶν γὰρ δὴ ἐμοίγει δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἁμα σοὶ ἀπολογία ἑστίν, ἐὰν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἐφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἑστιν ὁ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὃς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι, φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δειν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δίς καὶ τρῖς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιούντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης: Ἔα, ἐφη, χαίρειν αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζότω ὡς καὶ δίς δώσων, εὰν δὲ δὲ, καὶ τρῖς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ὑδη, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει. Ἐα αὐτῶν, ἐφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ὑδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνήρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν

1 Schanz brackets ἤξειν, following Hirschig.
2 Schanz brackets τὸ ἑαυτοῦ.
3 Schanz brackets πάλαι.
assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.

"Well," said Simmias, "do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence."

"I will try," he replied. "But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time."

"Only, Socrates," said Crito, "that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times."

And Socrates said: "Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times."

"I was pretty sure that was what you would say," said Crito, "but he has been bothering me for a long time."

"Never mind him," said Socrates. "I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is
μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθεῖας εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τούθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὡ Sigma τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράζομαι φράσαι.

9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὁσι τυχόνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὑτὸ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνησκείν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τούτο ἄληθές, ἀτοποὶ δὴ ὅπως εἰν προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο τοῦτο, ἤκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁ πάλαι προεθυμοῦντο τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμάς γελᾶσας. Νὴ τὸν Δία, Ἐφ, ὡ Sigmaται, οὐ πάντω γέ με νῦν γελασεῖντα ἐποίησας γελᾶσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνω εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ἐξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πᾶν, ὅτι τῷ οὗτοι τοι φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατώσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λεληθάσιν, ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσίν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἄληθῆν ἦ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡ Sigmaία, πλῆν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατώσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοι εἰσίν θανάτου καὶ οὕνθανάτου οἱ ὑς ἄληθῶς φιλό-

Σοφοὶ. εἴπωμεν γὰρ, Ἐφ, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνοις. ἔγονμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνη γε, Ἐφ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμάς. Αρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡ τῆν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν.
naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebei, how this would be.

"Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practising."

And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it."

"And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then," said he, "speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?"

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

"We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists

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αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἥρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τῇ 1 θάνατος ἡ τοῦτο; Οὐκ, ἄλλα τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψατε δή, ὡς ἀγαθεῖ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῆ.

D ἀπερ ἐμοί. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἢ μᾶς εἰσεσθαι περὶ ἧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφοι ἀνδρός εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλομένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἶον σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν; Ὅχιστα, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμών. Τί δὲ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δὲ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο; οἶον ἰματίων διαφεροῦν τήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν.

Ε δοκεῖ σοι ἡ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ γε ὡς ἄληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ὡς τοῦ τοιοῦτο πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; Ἐμοιγε. Ἀρ’ οὐν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δῆλος ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὁ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφεροῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δῆπον, ὡς Σιμών, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὧ μηδὲν ἢδυ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ἔνν, ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὃ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος εἰσιν. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

1 Schanz brackets ἢ.
alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?"

"No, it is this," said he.

"Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?"

"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.

"How about the pleasures of love?"

"Certainly not."

"Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?"

"I think the true philosopher would despise them," he replied.

"Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?"

"Yes."

"To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?"

"It is."

"Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn’t deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead."

"That is very true."
10. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ;

Β οἶνον τὸ τοιόνοις λέγω· ἀρα ἔχει ἀλήθειαν τινα ὤψις τε καὶ ἄκοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τἀ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἢμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβεῖς οὐδὲν οὕτε ὄρῳμεν; καὶ τοιούτων εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσίν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ αὐ γε ἄλλαι πάσαι γάρ ποι τούτων φαιλότεραι εἰσίν· ἢ σοί οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται· ὅταν μὲν γάρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

C 'Αληθῆ λέγεις. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἰπέρ που ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν οὖντων; Ναὶ. Λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἄκοι μήτε ὤψις μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὃ τι μάλιστα αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτῆν γίγνηται ἐώσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὃσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ οὖντος. 'Εστι ταύτα. Οὐκοὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα

D ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτῆν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὥ Σύμμια; φαμέν τι εἰναὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μὲντοι νη Δία. Καὶ 226
"Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly I do," he replied.

"Then," said he, "when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it."

"True."

"In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?"

"Yes."

"But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality."

"That is true."

"In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?"

"Evidently."

"Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?"

"We certainly think there is."
καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν; Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ἡδη ὡν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἰδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὦς. Ἀλλ' ἀλλή τιν' αυθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήσων αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἰον μεγέθους πέρι, ὕγιείας, ἱσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνι λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς Ἑ οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν ὡν· ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὢδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάστηκαί αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθήναι περὶ οὐ σκοπεῖ, οὔτος ἂν ἐγχύτατα ίοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἐκαστὸν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὦστις ὤτι μάλιστα αὐτή τῇ διανοίᾳ ίοι ἐφ' ἐκαστὸν, μήτε τὴν ὄφιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην

66 αὐσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτή καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖ ἐκαστὸν ἐπιχειροὶ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὦτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὡτῶν καὶ ὡς ἐτος εἰπείν ἔμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔωντος τῆς ψυχῆς κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὦταν κοινωνῆ, ἢρ' οὖχ ὑτὸς ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλοις, ὦ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ἱππερφυός, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦς ἀληθῆ λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Β 11. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαι τοιαῦτε τινὰ τοῖς γυνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν, ὦτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπὸς τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὦτι, ἔως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἐχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυμένη 228
"And absolute beauty and goodness."
"Of course."
"Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?"
"Certainly not," said he.
"Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?"
"Certainly."
"Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?"
"That is true as true can be, Socrates," said Simmias.
"Then," said he, "all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: 'There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the
Ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτησώμεθα ἵκανώς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἁσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν· ἐτί δὲ ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζοντι ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἔρωτον δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπὸν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ὡς τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμίαν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα

Κ τάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δούλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἁσχολίαν ἀγομενον ψιλοσοφίαν πέρι διὰ πάντα ταύτα. τὸ δ’ ἐσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, εάν τοις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολῇ γένηται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ξητήσεσιν αὐτοῖ πανταχοῦ παραπιπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθορὰν τύληθεσί. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δεδεικται ὥστε, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἰσέσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ

Ε ψυχῇ θεατεον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς έσικεν, ἡμῖν ἐσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταί εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτησιμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ξῶσιν δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶον τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γιόναι, τοῦ θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν κτῆσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτησατι· τότε γὰρ αὐτῆ καθ’ αὐτῆν ἡ

67 ψυχῇ ἐσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ’ οὖ.
soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall,
καὶ ἐν ὧν ἀν ἔσώμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἔσώμεθα τοῦ εἰδήναι, ἐὰν ὁ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὁ τι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἢν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς: καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τού σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἴκος, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσώμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πάν τὸ εἰλικρινές.

Β τούτο δ' ἔστιν ἵσως τὸ ἀληθὲς. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἡ τοιαύτα οἶμαι, ὅ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὁ Ἑπεκράτες.

12. Ὁὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Ἑπεκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὁ ἐταῖρε, πολλὴ ἑλπίς ἀφικομένω οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἶπεν πον ἀλλοθεί, κτήσασθαι τούτο οὐ ένεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὡστε ἦ γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι

C προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἄγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ, ὅς ἢγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καθαροὶ δὲ εἶναι ἂρα οὗ τοῦτο ἐξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπ' τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐβίωσα αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οίκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι

D καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπείτα μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυμένην ὡσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνω μὲν
I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.' Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?"

"Most assuredly, Socrates."

"Then," said Socrates, "if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?"

"Certainly," said he.
οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ γε θάνατος ὑμομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ’ ὡς. Δὺειν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὅρθως, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἦ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γέλοιον ἀν εἰη ἀνδρὰ παρασκευάζονθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὦ τι ἐγγυτάτω ὡντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ξῆν, κάπειθ’ ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τοῦτον ἀγανακτεῖν. 1 οὐ γέλοιον; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Τῷ ὄντι ἀρα, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμπά, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποδήνουσιν ἀρκετά, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκόπευ. εἰ γὰρ διαβεβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σῶματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλή ἀν ἀλογία εἰη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἔκεισε ἰοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστίν οὐ διὰ βίου ἦρων τυχεῖν ἦρων δὲ φρονίσεως· ὦ τε διεβεβλητο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντως αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νίεων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἥθελησαν εἰς "Αἰδοὺ ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐκπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὀψεθαί τε ἐκεὶ ὄν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεθαί· φρονίσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἔρων, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐκπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐνευξέσθαι αὐτῇ. Β ἀξίως λόγου ὦ ἐν "Αἰδοὺ, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθυνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἰςιν αὐτόσε; οἰεσθαί

1 After ἀγανακτεῖν BT read οὐ γέλοιον; Schanz brackets these words. Burnet reads γέλοιον", giving it to Simmias.

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"Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?"

"Exactly so," said he.

"But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?"

"Obviously."

"Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?"

"Of course."

"In fact, then, Simmias," said he, "the true philosophers practise dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot
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γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὀντὶ γε ἥ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφοι· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἁλλ' ἥ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἄλογία εἶ, εἰ φοβοῦτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μὲντοι νή Δία, ἥ δ' ὦς.

13. Οὐκοῦν ἴκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἐφη, τοῦτο ἄνδρος ὅν ἀν ἵδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, οτι οὐκ ἂρ' ἥν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τίς φιλοσώματος; οὗ ἀυτὸς δὲ που οὕτως τυγχάνει ὦν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ήτοι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ, ἐφη, ἔχει οὕτως, ὃς λέγεις. Ἀρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαξωμένη ἄνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δὴτου, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὀλυγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἂρ' οὐ τοῦτοι μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλυγωροῦσιν

D τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἄναγκη, ἐφη. Εἴ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἥ δ' ὦς, ἐννοήσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἄνδρειαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἥ δ' ὦς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειξόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρείοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν υπομένωσιν; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδειναὶ ἀρα καὶ δεει ἄνδρείοι εἰσὶ πάντες πλὴν οἱ

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think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?"

"Very foolish, certainly," said he.

"Then is it not," said Socrates, "a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body? And this same man is also a lover of money and of honour, one or both."

"Certainly," said he, "it is as you say."

"Then, Simmias," he continued, "is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?"

"By all means," said he.

"And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?"

"Necessarily," said he.

"For," said Socrates, "if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd."

"How so, Socrates?"

"You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?"

"They certainly do."

"And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?"

"That is true."

"Then all except philosophers are brave through
ϕιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινα καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταύτων τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν ἀκολασία τινὶ σώφρονες εἰσι; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἄδυνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὀμος αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τοῦτο ὀμοιώ τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἔδονών στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἔκεινων, ἀλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατοῦμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσι γε ἀκολασίαν

69 τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔδονών ἄρχεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὀμος συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ύφ' ἔδονων κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἔδονών. τοῦτο δ' ὀμοῖον ἐστὶν ὦ νῦν δὴ ἑλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δ' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσω-φρονίσθαι. Ἐοικε γὰρ. Ὡ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὖχ αὕτη ἡ ὥρθη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἄλλαγη, ἔδονας πρὸς ἔδονας καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβου πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἑλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὥρθον, ἀντὶ οὐ δεῖ ἀπαντα

Β ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρονήσεις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὑνούμενα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὃντε ἡ καὶ ἄνδρεια καὶ σω-φροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἄληθῆς ἀρετῇ μετὰ φρονίσεως, καὶ προσγυγομένων καὶ ἀπογυγομένων καὶ ἔδονων καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονίσεως καὶ ἄλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἄλληλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῇ καὶ τῷ ὃντι ἀνδραποδόδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ύψιές οὖν ἄληθὲς ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἄληθὲς τῷ ὃντι ἡ κάθαρσις τις

1 Schanz brackets ἄλλων.
fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice.”

“Very true.”

“And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence.”

“So it seems.”

“My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in
C τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμὸς τις ἡ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οί τὰς τελετὰς ἢμῖν οὕτω καταστήσαστε ὑμῖν φαύλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑμῖν πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι δς ἂν ἠμῶντος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἀίδου ἀφίκησαι, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν ὑικήσει.

eἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι.

D οὕτω δὲ εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὃν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προομιθήθην γενέσθαι: εἰ δ’ ὀρθῶς προομιθήθην καὶ τὴν ὑπόσαμεν, ἐκείσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἀν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὀλίγον ὑστεροῦ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταύτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ, ἐφη, ὡ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ἦμῶς τε ἀπολείπον καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς

Ε φέρω οὐδ’ ἄγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κάκει οὔδεν ἤπτον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπότας τε ἄγαθος ἐντευέσθαι καὶ ἐταῖροις.1 εἰ τι οὖν ἦμῶν πιθανώτερὸς εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δικασταῖς, εὐ ἂν ἔχοι.

14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ο Ἀκέβης ἔφη: Ἡ ᾿Ω Σωκράτες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὗδαμοῦ ἐτί ἡ.

1 After ἐταῖροι, the MSS. read τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, “but the many do not believe this.” Ast, followed by Schanz and Burnet, omits.

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fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not un-enlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes un-initiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, 'the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few'; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well.' "

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: "Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the
δ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολύεται, ἦ δὲν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀποθνῄσκει εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὅσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθείσα, σχίζεται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦν· ἐπεί, εἰπερ εἰπὶ πον ἀυτῇ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν συνεθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὡν σὺ νῦν δὴ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἀν ἐλπίς εἰπὶ καὶ καλή, ὁ Σωκρατές, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἦστιν ἢ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἱσως οὐκ ἰώγης παραμυθίας δείται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἦστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἦ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογώμεν, εἰτε εἰκός οὐτως ἔχειν εἰτε μή; Ἐγὼ γε σὺν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαμι ἢμτινα δοξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκ οὖν γὰρ ἢν οἴμαι, ἢ δὴ ὁς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδιοποίος εἰη, ὡς ἀδολεσχὼ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

15. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ δὲ πη, εἰτ' ἀρα ἐν Ἀιδον εἰσίναι οἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἦστι τις λόγος, οὐ μεμνημέθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμειναι εἴκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρο ἀφικοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὖτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ξώντας, ἀλλὰ τῇ δὲ εἰεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἔκει; οὐ γὰρ ἂν πον πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὐσαί, καὶ τοῦτο ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταύτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ οὔτι φανερῶν γίγνοιτο, ὅτι

1 Schanz and Burnet bracket οἶχηται . . . ἦ.
day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence."

"What you say, Cebes, is true," said Socrates. "Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?"

"I do," said Cebes. "I should like to hear what you think about it."

"Well," said Socrates, "I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

"Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the
οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ξώντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν 
tεθνεῶτων: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν του 
δέοι λόγου. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ 
τοίνυν κατ᾿ ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ᾿ ὅσ, σκόπει μόνον 
tοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾴδιον μαθεῖν, ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ ξῆς 
pάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλληψίδην ὀσαπερ ἔχει 
γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων εἰδωμεν, ἃρ’ οὕτωσί γίγνεται 
Ε πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, 
όσοις τυγχάνει ὦν τοιοῦτον τι, οἶνον τὸ καλὸν τῷ 
αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον ποὺ καὶ δίκαιον ἄδικῳ, καὶ ἄλλα 
σὲ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα 
ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν 
ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον. 
oἶνον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἐξ 
ἐλάττων ὀντὸς πρότερον ἐπείτα μείζον γίγνε-
σθαι; Ναὶ. Όὐκοῦν καὶ ἐλαττὸν γίγνηται, ἐκ 
71 μείζονος ὀντὸς πρότερον ὑστερον ἐλαττὸν γενή-
σται; Ἐστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἱσχυρο-
tέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ 
θᾶττον; Πάννυ γε. Τι δὲ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γί-
γνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνουνος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ 
ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἐκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, 
ἐχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ 
ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάννυ γε. 
Τι δ᾿ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὑτοῖς, οἷον
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living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed."

"Certainly," said Ce bes.

"Now," said he, "if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater."

"Yes."

"And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?"

"That is true," said he.

"And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?"

"Certainly."

"And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?"

"Of course."

"Then," said he, "we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?"

"Certainly."

"Now then, is there between all these pairs of
μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοίν
Β ὄντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρου, ἀπὸ δ' αὐ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρου·
μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξύ
αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν
αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι
καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὖτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ
χρώμεθα τοὺς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν
πανταχοῦ οὖτως ἔχειν ἄναγκαιον, γίγνεσθαι τε
αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου
εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἤ δ' ὃς.

C 16. Τι οὖν; ἔφη. τῷ ξῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον,
ὡσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέων τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνω μὲν
οὖν, ἔφη. Τι; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ
ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εὕπερ ἐναντία
ἐστὶν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰς ἑναὐτῶν μεταξύ δύο
δυοίν ὄντων; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν
ἐτέραν συζυγίαν ὄν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγαν ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη,
Ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις·
οὗ δὲ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. Λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν,
tὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέων, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ
ἐγρηγορέων γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέων τὸ
καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν κατα-
δαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι,
ἔφη, ἦ οὗ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ

1 Schanz brackets εἰς ἑκατέρου.
opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?"

"Yes," said he.

"And similarly analysing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"What?"

"Being dead," said he.

"Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?"

"Of course."

"Now," said Socrates, "I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?"

"Certainly."
σὺ, ἐφη, οὐτώ περὶ ζώης καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἔναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;
Εγώγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ εἰς ἄλληλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἐφη. Τί δὲ, ἢ δ᾽ ὦς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;
Ἀναγκαίον, ἐφη, ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἄρα, ὃ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντα τε καὶ οἱ Ἐ ἔναντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἐφη. Εἰσίν ἄρα, ἐφη, αἳ γυναῖκες ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄιδον. Ἐοίκεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσίον τοῖν περὶ ταύτα ἡ γῆ ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὕσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφές δῆπον, ἡ οὗ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὦς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάνως ποι, ἐφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὦς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ 72 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἀν εἰς γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὐτῇ, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνω γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς 248
"Now do you," said he, "tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?"
"I do."
"And that they are generated one from the other?"
"Yes."
"Now what is it which is generated from the living?"
"The dead," said he.
"And what," said Socrates, "from the dead?"
"I can say only one thing—the living."
"From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?"
"Evidently," said he.
"Then," said Socrates, "our souls exist in the other world."
"So it seems."
"And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?"
"Certainly," said he.
"Well then," said Socrates, "what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?"
"Certainly we must," said he.
"What is this process?"
"Coming to life again."
"Then," said Socrates, "if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?"
"Certainly."
"So by this method also we reach the conclusion
ξώντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ξώντων· τούτου δὲ οὐντος ἰκανόν ποι ἐδοκεῖ τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι ποι, οἶδεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

17. 'Ιδὲ τοίνυν οὗτος, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδέν αὐτοῦ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὅς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἂν ἀνταποδιδοῖ τὰ ἐτερὰ τοῖς ἐτέροις γυγνώμενα ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιώντα, ἀλλὰ εὐθεία τις εἶν ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτεροῦ μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρύ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτεροῦ μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσατο γυγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἡ δ' ὡς, ἐννοῆσαι ὁ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἰ, τὸ δ' ἀνεγειρέσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοῖ γυγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος.

Β οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λήρων τὸν 'Ενδυμιώνα ἀποδέξεις καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαῖνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τάλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκεῖνο πεπονθέναι, καθεύδεν. καὶ εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, δια-κρῖνοιτο δὲ μὴ, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγο-νός εἰ, ὦμοι πάντα χρήματα. ὡσαύτως δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνῄσκων μὲν πάντα, ὡςα τὸν ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι εἰν τοῦτο τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιω-σκοῖτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ τελευτῶντα πάντα.

C οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λήρων τὸν 'Ενδυ-μίωνα ἀποδέξεις καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαῖνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τάλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκεῖνο πεπονθέναι, καθεύδεν. καὶ εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, δια-κρῖνοιτο δὲ μὴ, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγο-νός εἰ, ὦμοι πάντα χρήματα. ὡσαύτως δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνῄσκων μὲν πάντα, ὡςα τὸν ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι εἰν τοῦτο τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιω-σκοῖτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ τελευτῶντα πάντα.

D τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ξώντα γύγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ξώντα θυήσκοι, τὶς 250
that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life."

"I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions."

"Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all."

"What do you mean?" said he.

"It is not at all hard," said Socrates, "to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, 'all things are chaos,' would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is
μηχανή μή οὔ πάντα καταναλωθήναι εἰς τὸ
tεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης,
δέ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ
λέγειν. Ἡστιν γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ,
pαντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ
ἐξαπατώμενοι ὀμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι
καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων τοὺς
ζώντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς
Ε ἐίναι. 1

18. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ
κατ' ἐκεῖνον γε τὸν λόγον ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰ
ἀληθῆς ἐστίν, δὴν σὺ εἰσθάνας θαμά λέγειν, ὅτι
ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμμησις τυγχάνει
οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἡμᾶς ἐν
προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀνα-
μμηνεσκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἄδυνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν
ποὺ ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχή πρὶν ἐν τῷ τῶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ
εἶδεν γενέσθαι ὡστε καὶ ταῦτῃ ἄθανατον ἡ
ψυχή τι ἐουκεν εἰναι. Ἀλλά, ὡς Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ
Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις;
ὑπομνήσον με οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρώντι
μέμνημαι. Ἔνι μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλ-
λίστω, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, εὰν τις
καλῶς ἑρωτᾶ, αὐτὸλ λέγουσιν πάντα ἡ ἔχει:
καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα
καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἄν ὁ ὁλοὶ τῇ ἡσαν τοῦτο
ποίησαι. ἐπειτα εάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα

1 After εἶναι the MSS. read καὶ ταίς μὲν γε ἁγάθαις ἀκεινον
eἶναι, ταίς δὲ κακάς κάκιον, “and that the good fare better
and the bad worse.” Bracketed by Stallbaum, followed by
Schanz, Burnet, and others.

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there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?"

"I see none, Socrates," said Cebes. "What you say seems to be perfectly true."

"I think, Cebes," said he, "it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist."

"And besides," Cebes rejoined, "if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal."

"But, Cebes," said Simmias, "what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now."

"Briefly," said Cebes, "a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort."

"And if you are not convinced in that way,
ταύτῃ γε, ἐφη, πείθει, ὡ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἂν τῇ δὲ πῇ σοι σκοποῦμεν ψε συνδόξη. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἢ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἔστιν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἐγώγη, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο, ἐφη, δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεξείρησε λέγειν ἡ δε μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μέντ' ἀν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν, πῇ σὺ ἐπεξείρησας λέγειν. Τὴν ἐγώγη, ἢ δ' ὃς. ὀμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἰ τίς τι ἀνα- μνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τούτο πρότερον ποτὲ ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ', ἐφη. 'Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τότε ὀμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τουτῷ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τινα τρόπον τόυτο: εὰν τίς τι 1 ἢ ἑδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἅλλην αἰσθησιν λαβῶν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἅλλα καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ἅλλ' ἅλλη, ἀρα οὐχὶ τούτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τίν ποιοῦν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἴνον τὰ τοιάδε; ἅλλη ποὺ ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ὅντικούν οἰσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται, ὅταν ἰδὼς φῶς ἑραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἅλλο τι οἰς τὰ παντικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρησθαι, πάσχοι τούτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἴδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ ἢν ἡ λύρα; τούτο δὲ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὀσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τὶς ἑδὸν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἅλλα που μυρία τοιαύτ' ἀν εἰη. Μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ὅντικοῦν, ἢ δ' ὃς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τὶς ἔστι; μάλιστα

1 After τι BCD read πρότερον, which Schanz brackets. T reads τὶ ἔτερον τι, Burnet τὶ ἔτερον.

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Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?"

"I am not incredulous," said Simmias, "but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say."

"It was this," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?"

"What do you mean?"

"Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre."

"Of course."

"Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples."

"To be sure you could," said Simmias.

"Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of
μέντοι, ὅταν τὸς τοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἀ ὑπὸ 
χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἡδὴ ἐπελέληστο; 
Πάνυ μὲν ὄν, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; ἦ δ’ ὃς ἐστιν 
คุ้ม411 οὗ θον γεγραμμένον ἱδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην 
ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθήναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἱδόντα 
γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι; Πάνυ γε. 
Ὁύκοιν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ 
74 Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθήναι; Ἐστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

19. Ἀρ’ ὄν ὦ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει 
τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἄφ’ ὄμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ 
ἀπὸ ἄνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ 
τῶν ὄμοίων ἀναμνήσκεται τῖς τι, ἂρ’ οὐκ ἀναγ-
καίον τὸδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει 
τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ 
ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἦ δ’ ὃς, 
eἰ ταῦτα οὖτως ἔχει. φαμέν ποῦ τι εἶναι ἵσον, 
oῦ ξύλον λέγω ξῦλῳ οὐδὲ λίθῳ λίθῳ οὐδ’ ἄλλο 
tῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα 
ἐτέρον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον φώμεν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;

Β Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς 
γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ’ ἐστιν; Πάνυ γε, 
ἦ δ’ ὃς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; 
ἀρ’ οὐκ ἔξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἥ ξύλα ἢ λίθους 
ἡ ἄλλα ἄττα ἱδόντες ἰσα, ἐκ τοῦτων ἐκεῖνο 
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recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?"

"Surely."

"And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?"

"Yes," said he.

"All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?"

"Yes."

"And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?"

"Inevitably," he replied.

"Now see," said he, "if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?"

"We shall say that there is," said Simmias, "most decidedly."

"And do we know what it is?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood
PLATO

ἐνενοησαμεν, ἐτερον δυν τούτων; ἢ οὗχ ἐτερόν σοι φαινεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τηδε. ἂρ' οὐ λίθου μεν ἵσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταύτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἵσα φαινεται, τῷ δ' οὐ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἢ

C ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταύτων ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ταύτα τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαινεται, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἄλλα μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἵσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἵσου, ὃμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεονήκας τε καὶ ἐλήφας; Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὀμοίου ὄντος τούτως ἢ ἀνομοίον; Πάνω γε. Διαφέρει δὲ γε, ἢ δ' ὦς, οὐδέν; ἔως ἂν άλλο ἴδων ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς

D ὀψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὀμοίου εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ' ὦς. ἢ πάσχομεν τι τοιούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἰσοίς; ἄρα φαινεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἦσα εἶναι ὡςπερ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἵσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοιούτων εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἵσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἴδων ἐννοήση, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, δ' 258
or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?"

"Certainly."

"Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?"

"No, Socrates, never."

"Then," said he, "those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract."

"Not at all, I should say, Socrates."

"But from those equals," said he, "which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?"

"Very true," he replied.

"And it is either like them or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"It makes no difference," said he. "Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection."

"Surely."

"Now then," said he, "do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?"

"They fall very far short of it," said he.

"Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being
νῦν ἔγω ὁρῶ, εἰναὶ οἶλον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὀντῶν, ἐνδεὶ
δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἰναὶ οἶλον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον ποι τοῦ τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο φιλοσοφὸν αὐτὸ προσευκέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀν-άγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἦ οὖ, περὶ τε τὰ ἱσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον; Παντά-πασί γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἱσον πρὸ ἐκεῖνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἴδοντες τὰ ἱσα ἑννοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἰναὶ οἶλον τὸ ἱσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐν-
deeestérōs. 'Εστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ δὲ ὀμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἑννοηκέναι μήδε δυνατὸν εἰναὶ ἑννοῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἦ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἀψασθαὶ ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλής τῶν αἰσθῆσεων ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτον γὰρ ἐστιν, ὡς Ὀκράτης, πρὸς γε ὁ βοῦλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος.
'Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθῆσεων δεῖ ἑννοῆσαι,
ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθητοῖσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέ-
γεται τοῦ ὅ ἐστιν ἱσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερᾶ ἐστιν ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὐτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρὰν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἐδεῖ ποι οἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱσον ὅ τι ἐστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητοὺς ἱσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτ' εἰναι οἴον ἐκεῖνο, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὡς Ὀκράτης. Ὁυκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμεν τε

1 Schanz brackets ὅτι προθυμεῖται ... φαυλότερα.
like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,' he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?"

"We must."

"Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?"

"It certainly is."

"Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'"

"That is true."

"And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike."

"Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument."

"Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?"

"Yes."

"Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it."

"That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates."
καὶ ἰκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;

C Πάντα γε. Ἐδει δὲ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τοῦτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἔπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἦμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἐοίκεν.

20. Οὔκοιν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἐχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι ὁ μόνον τὸ ἴσου καὶ τὸ μειζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἄλλα καὶ ἐξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὔ γαρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἦμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου, καὶ ὀπερ λέγω,

D περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ ὁ ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἦμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκαστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βιον εἰδέναι τὸ γαρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, λαβόντα τοῦ ἔπιστήμην ἐχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι. ὃ οὐ τούτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὡ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολῆ; Πάν.

Ε τῶς δήπορ, ἔφη, ὡ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δὲ γε, οἴμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ύστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ὡς ποτὲ 262
"And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?"
"Certainly."
"But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?"
"Yes."
"Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born."
"It does."
"Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of 'absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth."
"That is true."
"And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?"
"Certainly, Socrates," said he.
"But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process
καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἃρ’ οὖχ δὲ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἄν εἶη; τούτῳ δὲ ποὺ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαί λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγωμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό 76 γε ἑφάνη, αἰσθομενόν τι ἢ ἱδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἀλλὴν αἰσθησιν λαβόντα ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι, ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ὃ τοῦτο ἐπιληψίαζεν ἄνωμοιον ὅν ἢ ὅμοιον· ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυνοῦ τὰ ἑτερα, ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὑστερον, οὓς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὔδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀναμμυνήσκονται οὕτωι, καὶ ἡ μᾶθησις ἀνάμυνησις ἄν εἴη. Καὶ μᾶλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ Σώκρατες.
21. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ, ὃ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμένον ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαί ὑστερον ὃν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὃν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὗ; Πολλή ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ὃ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὃν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μὲντ’ ἂν, ἐφη ὃ Σιμμίας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖριον τημικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶδες τε C τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἀρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπιστασθαι γε, ἐφη, ὃ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς. 264
which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?"

"Assuredly."

"For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection."

"That is certainly true, Socrates."

"Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?"

"I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates."

"How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?"

"Certainly he can, Socrates."

"And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?"

"I wish they might," said Simmias; "but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly."

"Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?"

"By no means."
'Αναμμυήσκονται ἄρα ἂ ποτὲ ἐμαθοῦν; Ἐναγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἳ ψυχαί ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἢ ἄφ' οὐ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δὴ τα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναὶ. Ἡσαν ἄρα, ὁ Σιμμία, αἳ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἰδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἰχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὕτως γὰρ D λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἰεν, ὁ ἔταϊρε: ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτᾶς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντες γε αὐτᾶς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὁμολογή- σαμεν· ἥ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ὕπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἡ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς. ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλα ἐλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπὼν.

22. Ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὁ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλὸν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἑπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέ- Ρομεν, ὑπάρχονσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέρας οὕσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὁσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐστίν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἄν ὁ λόγος οὕτως εἰρημένος εἰη· ἂρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἵση ἀνάγκη ταῦτα te εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ

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"Then they recollect the things they once learned?"
"Necessarily."
"When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings."
"Certainly not."
"Then previously."
"Yes."
"Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence."
"Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains."
"Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?"
"None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense."
"Then, Simmias," said he, "is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?"
τάδε; Ἄπερφυῶς, ὥς Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμολογεῖ εἶναι τὴν 77 τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἦν σὺ λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἐξό ἐγγορεύει οὐδὲν οὖτω μοι ἔναργες δυν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὡς οἶον τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ἀ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγες· καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἰκανῶς ἀποδείκται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἐγγορεύοιμαι καὶ τοιοῦ καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλὰ ὀνεὶ ὁμοὶ οὐκ ἐνδεὼς τοῦτο πεπείθαν αὐτὸν, ὅτι πρὶν B γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή. 23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐτὶ ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὡς Σωκράτες, ἀποδειχθαί, ἀλλὰ ἐτὶ ἐνέστηκεν, ὁ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἐλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθῠσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαστήτερη ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ εὐνύστασθαι ἀλλοθέν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου ὑπακείσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφικηταὶ καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τοῦτον, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτῶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; C Ἐν λέγεις, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαί- νεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἡμῖν ἀποδεικθάτω οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐχειν. Ἀποδεικται μὲν, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, 268
"Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient."

"But how about Cebes?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be convinced, too."

"He is fully convinced, I think," said Simmias; "and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?"

"You are right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect."

"It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already," said Socrates, "if you will combine this conclusion
καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθείναι τούτων τε τῶν λόγων εἰς ταύτων καὶ δυ πρὸ τούτων ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάν τὸ ξῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἕστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ ξῆν ιούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθναναί γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἰναι, ἐπειδῆ γε δεῖ ἀνθίς αὐτήν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδεδεικταί μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.

24. Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἥδεως ἂν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἐτί μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδέλθαι τοῖς τῶν παῦδων, μή ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνεμος αὐτῆν ἑκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσά καὶ διασκεδάντως, ἀλλος τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νυμείᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθυνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάτας: Ἡς δεδοτῶν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πειρᾶ ἀναπείθειν μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ’ ἵσως ἑνι τις καὶ ἐν ἠμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται: τούτων οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδέλθαι τὸν θάνατον ὡσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπαρδεῖν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐὼς ἀν ἐξεπάσητε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἐποδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδή σὺ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἐλλάς, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐν ἣ ἐνεισὶ που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρῆ διερευνάσθαι ξητοῦντας τοιούτων ἐποδὸν, μήτε χρῆματος φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἑστίν εἰς τι ἢν ἀναγκαίότερον ἀναλίκησκοιτε χρῆματα. ξητεῖν δὲ χρῆ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλῆλων ἵσως.
with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather."

And Cebes laughed and said, "Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin."

"Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear."

"Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"

"Hellas, Cebes," he replied, "is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for
γὰρ ἄν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὑροίτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. 'Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὕπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανελθομεν, εἰ τοι ήδομένω εστίν. 'Αλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε' πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

25. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δει ήμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἐαυτοῖς, τῷ ποίῳ τινί ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάνυσθαι, καὶ ύπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθη αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ· καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ύπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; 'Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 'Αρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ οὗτι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαρεθήναι ταῦτα ἐπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει οὐ ἄξιόνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὔτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ αἰε κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἄξιόνθετα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλη ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ σύνθετα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὔτως. Ἡμεὺν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἔφ' ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν

D λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἡς λόγον δίδομεν τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰε ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἡ ἄλλη ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὃ ἐστίν, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ενδεχεται; ἡ ἀεί αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὃ ἐστὶ, μονοειδές ὃν αὐτὸ

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perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you."

"That," said Cebes, "shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing."

"Oh, I am willing, of course."

"Good," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?"

"You are quite right," he replied.

"Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?"

"I think," said Cebes, "that is true."

"Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Let us then," said he, "turn to what we were discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence,
καθ' αὐτό, ὀσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμὴ ὀνδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὑσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ο Ἰὲβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ὦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἰματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὀντινωσοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἵσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνως ὁμονύμων; ἢρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τούν- αντίον ἐκείνοις οὕτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὕτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἴπειν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταύτα; Οὐτως, ἔφη ὡ Ἰὲβης: οὐδέποτε ὁσαύτως ἔχει.

79 Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαυι κἂν ἰδοῖς κἂν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς αὐθήσεσιν αὐσθεοί, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ποτ' ἄν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοι ή τῶ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐστίν ἀείδη τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὀρατά; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

26. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὄρατον, τὸ δὲ ἀειδὲς; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἀεί κατὰ ταύτα ἐχον, τὸ δὲ ὄρατον μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα; Καὶ τούτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.

Β Φέρε δὴ, ἡ δ' οὐς, ἀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἀλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρω οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντὶ, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὄρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὄρατον ἡ ἀειδὲς; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες,
since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?"

"It must," said Cebes, "necessarily remain the same, Socrates."

"But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?"

"The latter," said Cebes; "they are never the same."

"And, you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?"

"Certainly," said he, "that is true."

"Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?"

"Let us assume them," said Cebes.

"And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?"

"Let us assume that also," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?"

"Yes," he replied.

"Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?"

"To the visible," said he; "that is clear to everyone."

"And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates."
PLATO

ἐφη. Ἄλλα ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὀρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν: ἡ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει; 
Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; 
ὅρατὸν ἢ ἀὁρατον εἶναι; Οὔχ ὅρατον. Ἀειδές 
ἀρα; Ναὶ. Ὄμοιότερον ἂρα ψυχὴ σῶματὸς ἐστὶν 
τῷ ἀείδει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἄνάγκη, ὁ 
Σώκρατες.

27. Οὔκοιν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ 
ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σῶματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ 
σκοπεῖν τι ἡ διὰ τοῦ ὀράν ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' 
ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστὶν τὸ διὰ 
τοῦ σῶματος, τὸ δ' αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—, 
τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ουδέποτε 
κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ 
ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾶ ὠσπερ μεθύουσα, ἀτε 
τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δὲ γε 

D 

αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οἰχεῖται εἰς τὸ 
καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὅψι καὶ ἄθανατον καὶ ὀσαύτως 
ἔχου, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς ύψιτα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου 
τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπέρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται 
καὶ ἔξα αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυται τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ 
περὶ ἐκείνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὀσαύτως ἔχει, ἀτε 
τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα 
φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, καλῶς 
καὶ ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐ 
σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ 

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"But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?"
"Yes, we do."
"Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?"
"It cannot be seen."
"Then it is invisible?"
"Yes."
"Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible."
"Necessarily, Socrates."
"Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?"
"Certainly."
"But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?"
"Socrates," said he, "what you say is perfectly right and true."
"And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which
Ε τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχή ὁμοίωτερον εἶναι καὶ ἔννοιανεστερον; Πάς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ’ ὅς, συγ-
χωρήσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου,
καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλφ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιο-
τερον ἐστὶ ψυχή τῷ ἀεὶ ὑσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον
ἡ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἔτερῳ.

28. "Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῆς, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ
80 αὐτῷ ὅσι ψυχή καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύει καὶ
ἀρχεσθαί ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ
dεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὐτότερον σοι δοκεῖ
ὁμοίον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυντῷ; ἡ
οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θείον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄγεμο-
νεύειν περικέναι, τὸ δὲ θυντὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ
dουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρφο οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἔσικεν;
Δήλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχή τῷ θείῳ,
tὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυντῷ. Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὦ
Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ τάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἢμῖν
13 ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἄθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ
kαὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἄεὶ ὑσαύτως
κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίωταν εἶναι ψυ-
χήν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θυντῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ
kαὶ ἀναφέρον καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα
ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοίωταν αὐτὸ εἶναι σῶμα. ἐξομεν
τι παρὰ ταύτα ἀλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ἡ οὖν
οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἐξομεν.

29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἄρ’ οὐχὶ
σῶμα καὶ τὰ χῦν διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχή δὲ
αὐ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἡ ἐγγύς τι τού-

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class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?"

"I think, Socrates," said he, "that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not."

"And the body?"

"Is more like the other."

"Consider, then,' the matter in another way. When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"

"Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal."

"Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and unintellectual and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?"

"No, we cannot."

"Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?"
PLATO

C του; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 'Εννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὦτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρωπός, τὸ μὲν ὄρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὄρατῳ κείμενον, ὁ δὲ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ὁ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδέν πέπονθεν, ἀλλὰ ἑπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἕαν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ἱκῇ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσοῦν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὦσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγον ὅλου μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον.1 ἔνα

D δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἄν σαπῆ, ὅστα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὁμοὶ ὡς ἔπτος εἰπεῖν ἄθανατα ἔστω; ἦ οὖ; Ναί. 'Η δὲ ψυχή ἀρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἴχομενον γενναίον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς 'Αἰθένας ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἱ, ἄν θεὸν ἐθέλη, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἵπτεν, αὐτὴ δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλολεν, ὡς φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι;

Ε τολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡς φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλὸ μᾶλλον ὤθ' ἔχειν; ἕαν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ἔννεφελκουσα, ἀτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθροισμένη2 αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτὴν, ἀτε μελετῶσα αἰεί τούτο—τούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἐστίν ἡ ὄρθως φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ 81 ὀντὶ τεθνάναι μελετῶσα.3 ἦς οὖ τοῦτ' ἀν εἰὴ

1 Schanz brackets συμπέσων . . . χρόνον.
2 συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν T Stobaeus. Schanz brackets καὶ συνηθροισμένη. Β and Schanz omit αὐτή εἰς ἑαυτήν.
3 The MSS. read μελετῶσα ὅδις. Schanz brackets ὅδις.
"Of course."

"Observe," he went on, "that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favourable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?"

"Yes."

"But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this:—if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practised being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?"
μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὔτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὁμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρύνιμον, οἱ ἱφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαιμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἄγριων ἔρωτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὥς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἡ ἄλλως;

30. Οὔτω νη Δία, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δὲ γε,

B οὐμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι αἰεί ἐξουσία καὶ τούτῳ θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἔρωσα καὶ γεγοιητευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἔπιθυμών καὶ ἱδονῶν, ὥστε μηδέν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές ἄλλ’ ἡ τὸ σωματοειδὲς, οὐ τις ἂν ἄψαυτο καὶ ἱδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὀμμασι σκοτώδες καὶ αἰειδὲς, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἱρετὸν, τούτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷεί

C ψυχήν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε, οὐμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἅει εὐνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλῆν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. Ἔμβριθες δὲ γε, ὃ φίλε, τοῦτο οἰεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ὀρατόν’ ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ "Αιδον,

D ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὄφθη ἄττα 282
"By all means."

"Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?"

"Assuredly," said Cebes.

"But, I think, if when it departs from the body it is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?"

"By no means," said he.

"But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?"

"Certainly."

"And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been
ψυχῶν σκιωειδῆ φαντάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦτα ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὅρατον μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μὲντοι, ὁ Κέβης καὶ οὗ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνους τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὐσίας καὶ μέχρι γε τοῦτον Ε ἐπανάλαβον, ἐὼς ἀν τῇ τοῦ ἐνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμία ἐνδεῆσιν εἰς σῶμα. 31. 'Ενδοῦνται δὲ, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἡθη ὅποι' ἀττ' ἀν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποιὰ δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἶνον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὑβέρεισ καὶ φιλοσοφίας μεμελετηκυῖας καὶ μὴ διενθημένους, εἰς τὰ τῶν ὅνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδεῆσθαι. Ἡ οὐκ οἶει; Πάνω μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγάς προτετιμηκυῖας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων γένης ἡ ποὶ ἀν ἄλλος σαφές μετὰ τῶν τοιαύτας ἱέραι; 'Αμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ὁὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὦ, δήλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἢ ἄν ἐκαστά ἐνο, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δήλον δὴ, ἐφη πῶς δ' οὖ; Ὁὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονεστατοί, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰς καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τῆς δημοτικῆς Ἐ καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιτετδεσκότες, ἡν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἐθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονεῖαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ

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seen, figures of those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of the visible; and this is why they are seen."

"That is likely, Socrates."

"It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about until through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are likely to be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former life."

"What natures do you mean, Socrates?"

"I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly that is very likely."

"And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they go?"

"Beyond a doubt," said Cebes, "they pass into such creatures."

"Then," said he, "it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "of course."

"Then," said he, "the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice?"
νοῦ; Πὴ δὴ οὕτωι εὐδαιμονεστατοί; "Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταύτὸν γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι εξ αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

32. Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπίόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεί. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔνεκα, ὡ ἐταίρη Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχουσι τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδίδοσιν αὐταῖς εαυτοὺς, οὐ τι οἰκοφορίαν τε καὶ τενίαν φοβοῦμενο, ὅσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι οὔδὲ αὐτὸι ἡμῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὅσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοι τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχουσιν αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἄν πρέποι, ἐφε, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μὲντοι μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὦς. Τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἀπασίω, ὡ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι, οἰς τι μέλει τῆς εαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σῶματι λατρεύοντες ἡ ζωῆς, χαίρειν ἐπιόντες οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅτη ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πρᾶττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἐπόμενοι, ἣ ἐκείνῃ ύπηγεῖται.

33. Πῶς, ὡ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἔρω, ἐφή. γυγνῶσκουσι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὦς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἡ ἐπεξήνως

1 latreúontes is an emendation proposed by Schanz for πλάττοντες of the MSS.
"How are these happiest?"

"Don't you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?"

"Yes."

"And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonour or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honour and power, that they refrain from them."

"No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates," said Cebes.

"Most assuredly not," said he. "And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads."

"How do they do this, Socrates?"

"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of knowledge," said he, "perceive that when philo-
Ε διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὡσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὅντα ἄλλα μὴ αὐτὴν δι’ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἴργμοῦ τῆς δεινότητας κατεδοῦσα ὅτι δι’ ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος

83 ξυλλήπτωρ εἰς τοῦ δεδεσθαι,—ὁπερ οὖν λέγω, γνωσκούσοιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχήν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπειρεί, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἤ διὰ τῶν ὄμμάτων σκέψεως, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὡτών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρησθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευμένην, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτήν, ὅ τι ἄν νοησῇ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ὑπότων ὁ τι δ’ ἄν δι’ ἄλλων σκοτῆ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄν ἄλλο, μηδενὶ ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἰναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὅρατον, δ’ ὅτι αὐτὴ ὀρᾶ νοητὸν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένῃ δεῖν ἐναντίονσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἥσθη ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὅν ἄν τις οἰηθεῖ, οἴον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας

B ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτήν, ὁ τι ἄν νοεῖσῃ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ὑπότων ὁ τι δ’ ἄν δι’ ἄλλων σκοτῆ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄν ἄλλο, μηδενὶ ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἰναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὅρατον, δ’ ὅτι αὐτὴ ὀρᾶ νοητὸν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένῃ δεῖν ἐναντίονσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἥσθη ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὅν ἄν τις οἰηθεῖ, οἴον ἢ νοσὴσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας

C διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἄλλ’ ὁ πάντων μέγιστον τε κακὸν καὶ ἐσχατὸν ἔστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτὸ. Τί τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐφ’ ὁ

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sophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think—for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts—but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account.”

“What is this evil, Socrates?” said Cebes.
Κέβης ὁΤι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἀμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ ἃν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατον τε εἶναι καὶ ἄληθέστατον, οὐχ οὔτως ἔχον ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὅρατα· ή οὖ; 

Πάννυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μᾶλιστα καταδείκται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; ὁΤι ἕκαστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνάκει καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἄληθὴ εἶναι ἀπερ ἄν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὀμοδοξείν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὀμότροπός τε καὶ ὀμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἶα μηδέποτε εἰς Ἀιδον καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἔξειναι, ὡς ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἀλλο σῶμα καὶ Ἐ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἁμοιρὸς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφή, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες.

34. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐνεκα, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμιοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὅν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκα· ἢ σὺ οἰεἰ; Οὐ δὴτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλ’ οὕτω λογίσατι ἄν ψυχή ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεὶ τῇ μὲν φιλοσοφίᾳ χρήμαν ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυοῦσθε δὲ ἐκεῖνης αὐτὴν ταῖς ὤνοναις καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὐ ἐγκατάδειν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης.
"The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute."

"What you say, Socrates, is very true," said Cebes.

"This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world's reason. Or do you disagree?"

"Certainly not."

"No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his
τινὰ ἐναντίως ἵστον μεταχειριζομένην, ἄλλα γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ᾧ ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου

B τρεφομένη, ζητὶ τε οἷς ταῖς δεῖν, ἐως ἀν ζητ., καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτῆσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγένες καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνεμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οὐχὶται καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτί οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.

35. Σιγῆ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ

C Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἂν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἦμὼν οἰ πλεῖστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἠδών αὐτῷ ἤρετο. Τί; ἐφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλάς γὰρ δὴ ἐτί ἐχει υποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἀλλο σκοπεῖσθων, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήσῃ καὶ αὐτὸι

D εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ πὴ ύμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἄν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ’ ἐμοῦ εὐπορῆσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σωκράτης, τάληθη σοι ἐρώ. πάλαι γὰρ ἠμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἐτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν

1 After φοβηθῇ the MSS. read ταῦτα δ’ ἐπιτηδεύσασα. Ast bracketed this and is followed by Schanz and Burnet.
soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere."

When Socrates had said this there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said: "Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company."

And Simmias said: "Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer,
μὲν ἀκούσας, ὅκνειν δὲ ὀχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀγδές ἦ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἥρέμα καὶ φησιν, Βαβαί,

Ε ὁ Σιμμία· ἢ ποι χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαμι, ὡς οὐ συμφοράν ἤγούμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδὲ ὡμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολώτερον τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὕμιν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἱ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγονότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεόν ἀπίέναι, οὐπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ᾽ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασὶν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται, ὅτι οὗτον ὄρνεον ἄδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ἤ ῥυγοὶ ἢ τίνα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἄραραν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἐποψ, ἄδει τί φασι διὰ λύπης θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν: ἀλλ’ οὔτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκων, ἀλλ᾽ ἄτε οἴμαι τοῦ 'Απόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν "Αἰθον ἄγαθα ἄδοντες καὶ τέρπονται ἐκεῖνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφέροντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθέν χρόνῳ, ἐγώ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤγομαι ὀμόδουλός γε εἶναι τῶν κύκων καὶ ἵερος τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκεῖνον τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὔτε δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἑνεκα λέγειν τε χρή καὶ ἐρωτῶν ὁ τί ἂν βούλησθε, ἐως ἂν Ἄθηναιῶν ἑώσιν ἄνδρες
but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune."

And when he heard this, he laughed gently and said: "Ah, Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask whatever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit."
ένδεκα. 1 Καλώς, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὃ Σιμμίας, καὶ C ἐγωγή σοι ἕρω δ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐ ὁδε, ἡ σου ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἵσως ὀσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ γνῷ βίῳ ἡ ἄδυνατον εἶναι ἡ παγχάλετον τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ σοὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοτῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός, δειν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἡ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἡ εὑρεῖν ἡ, εἰ ταῦτα ἄδυνατον, τὸν γοῦν βελτιστὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπινῶν λόγων D λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀχουμενον ὀσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλέυσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὁχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγγυε ὡς ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδή καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ύστερῳ χρόνῳ, ὅτι νῦν ὡς εἶπον ὃ ἔμοι δοκεῖ. ἔμοι γὰρ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν δε σκοτῶ τὰ εἰρήμενα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι. E 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. 'Ισως γὰρ, ἐφη, ὡς ἔταιρε, ἀληθὴ σοι φαίνεται: ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὡς ἰδιὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς. Ταῦτῃ ἐμοίγε, ἡ δ᾽ ὡς, ἡ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἄρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἶποι, ἡς ἡ μὲν ἄρμονία ἀδοτῶν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλον τι καὶ 86 θείον ἐστίν ἐν τῇ ἡμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτῇ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα

1 Schanz brackets ἐως . . . ἐνδεκά.
"Good," said Simmias. "I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely. And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem quite satisfactory."

And Socrates replied: "Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory."

"In this," said he, "that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies,
καὶ αἰ χορδαὶ σῶματα τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμη 1 καὶ διαρρήξη τὰς χορδὰς, εἰ τις διυσχυρί-ξοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σὺ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολολέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανή ἂν εἶ ἡ τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν 2 καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυητοειδεῖς οὕσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολολέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὠμοφυῖ τε καὶ ξυγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θυητοῦ ἀπολομένην ἀλλὰ φαίνη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴ τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ προτέραν τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπη-σεσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν, — καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατε, οἶμαι ἔγνωκε καὶ αὐτὸν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμ-βάνομεν τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ τοιοῦτων τινῶν, κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τῆν ψυχήν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρῶς κραθῇ πρὸς ἅληλα. εἰ οὖν τυχχάνει ἡ ψυχή οὕσα ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρῳς ἡ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἀλλῶν κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχήν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολολέναι, καὶ περ ὡσπερ ἀρμονία, ὡσπερ καὶ αἴ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἴ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἴ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημοιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολύν

1 Schanz brackets διατέμη.
2 Schanz brackets διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν.
and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a
D χρόνον παραμένειν, ἐως ἃν ἡ κατακαυσθῇ ἡ κατασαπῆ. ὁρὰ οὖν πρὸς τούτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἄξιοι κράσιν οὕσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμᾶς. εἰ οὖν τὶς υμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι

Ε χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρῶτερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί αὐτὸ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅια χρόνον ἐγγενομένου βουλευσόμεθα, τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εάν τι δοκῶσι προσήδειν, εάν δὲ μὴ, οὗτος ἢ ἡ ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἁγε, ἢ δ' ὃς, ὡ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἢν τὸ σὲ αὐθράττον. Λέγω δὴ, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταυτὸν ἐγκλήμα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸν ἐδῶς ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ σοφί πάνυ χαριέντως, καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἔστων εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἰκανὸς ἀποδείχθαι: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποδανώτων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἐσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἱσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σῶματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμᾶν ἀντιλήψει: δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολύ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἢν φαίνῃ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπίστεις, ἐπειδή ὀρᾶς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε

87 ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὃν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σφόδρως εἶν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τούτῳ τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ τι

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long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?"

Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: "Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebes finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defence of our reasoning. Come, Cebes," said he, "tell us what it was that troubled you."

"Well, I will tell you," said Cebes. "The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before. For I do not deny that it has been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias' objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I think it is far superior in all such respects. 'Why then,' the argument might say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?' Now see if my
Λέγω· εἰκόνοις γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ γὰρ ὅσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἔμοι γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὅσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου υφάντου προσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τούτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλολεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλ' ἔστι ποι σῶς, 1 τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θωμάτιον ὃ ἦμπειρευοτέατο αὐτὸς υφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν, καὶ εἰ τις ἀπιστοὶς αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτήθη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἰματίων ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορομενοῦ, ἀποκρυμανέου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω ἀποδεδείξθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἀρα μᾶλλον ὁ γε ἀνθρώπος σῶς ἔστιν, ἐπειδή τὸ γε ὀλγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλολεν. τὸ δ' οἴμαι, ὡς Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἡ λέγω. πάς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐήθεις λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὃ γὰρ υφάντης οὕτως πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαύτα ἰμάτια καὶ υφηνάμενος ἑκείνων μὲν ὑστερος ἀπόλολεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἴμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοῦτον ἔνεκα ἀνθρώπος ἔστιν ἰματίων φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενεστέρον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα δέξατ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι ἂν μοι φαινοῖτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενεστέρον καὶ ὀλγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαῖ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἐτη βιώη· εἰ γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἐτι ξωντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ οἰε τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι,
reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

"But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feeblener or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then
άναγκαίον μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ὅπως ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὑφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτήν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτοι μόνον προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἡδὴ τῆν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχύ σαπέν διοίχοιτο. ὡστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὖπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ώς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνομεν, ἐτι ποι ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή ἐσται. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἐτι τῷ λέγοντι ἀ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλά μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνομεν ἐνίων ἐτί εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖ- σθαι αὖθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχήν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταύτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῦ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἐν τινὶ τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι· τούτοις δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὀλέθρου, μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὅτους αἰσθάνε- σθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχεις, οὐδὲν προσή- κει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοίτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἃν μὴ ἐχῇ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἐστὶν ψυχή παντά- πασιν ἁθάνατον τε καὶ ἀνόλεθρον εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τῶν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόλληται.

38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀνήδως διετέθημεν, ὃς ὑστερον ἔλεγομεν πρὸς ἅλλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἔδοκον ἀναταράξαι καὶ
when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay. And so we are not yet justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, that our souls will still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths. But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.”

Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and
eis ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ῥήθησεν τοι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κρίται ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἀπισταὶ.

Εξεκρατεῖ. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὁ Φαίδων, συγγραμμὴν γε ἔχω ύμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτόν ἐπέρχεται: τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγως; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὅποι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ τὸ ἁμαμία τινὰ ἦμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὡσπέρ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥήθεις ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς μοι πάντα προδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὡσπέρ ἐξ ἁρχῆς ἁλλού τινὸς λόγου, ὃς με πείσει ὅσ τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθηκηκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Δίος, πὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐμετήλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκείμονον, ὡσπέρ ἕμας φής, ἐνθύλλος τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἐβοὴθεί τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοὴθησέν ἡ ἐνδεώς; πάντα ἦμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

Φαίδων. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Ἐξεκρατεῖς, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὃ τι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος, ἵσως οὔδεν ἀτοποῦν ἀλλὰ ἐγὼ γε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τούτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὕμερος καὶ ἀγαμέμνος τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἐπείτα ἦμῶν ὡς οξέως ἤσθεν ὁ πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἐπείτα ὡς εὐ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὡσπέρ πεφευγότας καὶ
distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

Echecrates. By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathise with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself: “What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit.” For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven’s sake, tell how Socrates continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo. Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men’s criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and
προτρεψθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ἐξεκρατής. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιὰ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαίζηλον τινὸς, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ υψηλοτέρου ἢ ἔγω. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὅποτε τούχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Ἀύριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἵσως, ὁ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἐσικεύ, ἵνα δ' ἐγὼ, ὁ Σωκράτης. Οὔκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη. Ἀλλὰ τί; ἵνα δ' ἐγὼ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταῦτας, ἐανπερ γε ἣμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιῶσασθαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶπη καὶ με διαφεύγων ὁ λόγος, ἐνορκοῦν ἂν ποιησάμην ὡσπερ Ἀργείοι, μὴ πρὸτερον κομήσειν, πρῶτὶ ἀν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ᾽, ἵνα δ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ἦρακλῆς οὖς τε εἰναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἐὼς ἐτὶ φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τούς, ἔφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἦρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως. Οὔδεν διοίσει, ἔφη.

39. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποίον; ἵνα δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενῶ-μεθα, ἵνα δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὡσπερ οἱ μισάνθρω-ποὶ γεγονόμενοι; ός οὐκ ἐστίν, ἔφη, ὁ τι ἂν τοῖς μείζον τούτοι κακῶν πάθοι ἡ λόγους μισῆσας, γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδυόταν ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ

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defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

Echeocrates. How did he do it?

Phaedo. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, "To-morrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair."

"I suppose so, Socrates," said I.

"Not if you take my advice."

"What shall I do then?" I asked.

"You will cut it off to-day, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again. If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes."

"But," I replied, "they say that even Heracles is not a match for two."

"Well," said he, "call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light."

"I call you to help, then," said I, "not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles."

"That is all one," said he. "But first let us guard against a danger."

"Of what sort?" I asked.

"The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument," said he, "as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without
ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασι τε ἀληθή εἶναι καὶ ὑγιὴ καὶ πιστῶν τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν, ἐπείτα ὅλοιον ύστερον εὑρέθη τοῦτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἀπιστῶν καὶ αὖθις ἐτερων· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὕς ἄν ἡγήσαστοι οἰκειοτάτοις τε καὶ ἑταίροτάτοις, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμα προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιές εἶναι τὸ παράπαυν. ἡ οὐκ ἡσθησαι σὺ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοὖν, ἡ δ' ὡς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δήλων ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια τὸ τοιοῦτον χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ ποι μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο, ὁσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἄν ἡγῆσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρήστους καὶ πονηρούς σφόδρα ὅλογος εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφην ἐγὼ. "Οσπερ, ἡ δ' ὡς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων: οὐ εἰ τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἐξευρεῖν ἀνθρωπὸν ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν; ἡ αὐ ταχὺν ἡ βραδὺν ἡ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαια; ἡ οὐκ ἡσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων τὰ μὲν ἁκρα τῶν ἑσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὅλγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἁφθόνα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοὖν οἶει, B ἐφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγών προτεθεὶ, πάνυ ἄν ὅλιγον καὶ ἑνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτος φαινήναι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ

1 Schanz brackets αἰσχρόν.
sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?"

"Certainly," said I.

"Well," he went on, "is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?"

"To be sure," said I.

"And don't you think," said he, "that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?"

"Very likely," I replied.

"Yes, very likely," he said. "But it is not in that
μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἀγώ ἐφεστόμην, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνη, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεὶ
eiναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κά-
pειτα ὁλίγον ύστερον αὐτῷ ὁδὸν ψευδής εἰναι
evίστε μὲν ὄν, ἐνίστε δ ’ οὖκ ὄν, καὶ αὖθις ἔτερος καὶ ἔτερος καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντι-
λογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ’ ὅτι τελευ-
tῶντες οἶνονταί σοφῶτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ
kατανενοχέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων
οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν υγίες οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων,
ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἄτεχνῶς ὅσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ
ἀνώ καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνων οὐδένα ἐν
οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφήν ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὡ Φαῖδων, ἐφή, οἰκτρὸν ἄν εἰ
tὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βε-
βαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἐπειτα
dιὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τοῖς
αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἰναι, τοτὲ δὲ
μή, μὴ ἔαντον τις αἰτίῳ μηδὲ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ
ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἀσμενὸς
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ’ ἔαντον τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο
καὶ ἣδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν
dιατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ
ἐπιστῆμης στερηθείη. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἥν δ ’ ἐγὼ,
οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

40. Πρῶτον μὲν τούνων, ἐφή, τοῦτο εὐλαβη-
θῶμεν καὶ μὴ παρίσωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς τῶν
λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν υγίες εἰναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
mᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω υγίῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ
ἀνδριστεὺν καὶ προθυμητεύων υγίῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν
όν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς

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respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time."

"Certainly," I said, "that is very true."

"Then, Phaedo," he said, "if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality."

"Yes, by Zeus," I said, "it would be sad."

"First, then," said he, "let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others
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91 ἐνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὡς κινδυνεύω ἐγώγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ὡς φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ὡσπέρ οἱ πάντες ἀπαί- δευτοι φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβήτωσιν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὅν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ ἐθεντο ταύτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· ὥσ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῇ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰπ̐ι πάρεγγον, ἀλλὰ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὃ τι μάλιστα δόξει οὔτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταίρε· θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλὰ σὺν τοῦτον γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦτον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἄρδης ἔσομαι ὄδυρόμενος. ἢ δὲ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνιδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἢν, ἀλλὰ ὅλιγον ὑστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία τι καὶ Κέβης, οὔτως ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθῆς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ υπὸ προθυμίας ἄμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξα- πατήσας ωσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπτῶν οἰχήσομαι.

41. 'Αλλ’ ἵτεν, ἔφη. πρῶτον με ὑπομνή- σατε ἀ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἢ ψυχὴ ὀμωσ καὶ θειότερον καὶ
for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So," he said, "Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

"But we must get to work," he said. "First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the
κάλλιον ὥν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύεται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἰδεὶ οὖσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχήν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἀδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύεται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ολέθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γε ἂν ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἀρα ἂλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὥ Σιμ-μία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπίσκοπεῖσθαι;

συνωμολογεῖτιν δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη, πάντας τους ἐμπροσθε λόγους οὓς ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ' οὖ; Τοὺς μέν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὖ. Τι οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ώ ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μέν, ἐφη ο Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδεὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μήν, ἐφη ο Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτῶς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πᾶν ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ μοι περὶ γε τοῦτον ἀλλὰ ποτέ δόξειν. καὶ ο Σωκράτης; Ἀλλὰ ἀνίγκη σοι, ἐφη, ὥ ξένη Θηβαῖς, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι, ἐνώπιον μείνη ἢδε ἡ οὐσία, τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκει-θαι. οὐ γὰρ ποι ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ως πρότερον ἢν ἀρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, ἐξ ὧν ἐδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμώς, ἐφη, ὥ Σωκράτες. Λιθάνεις οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν
body, may perish first, being of the nature of a harmony. And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no one could know that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving the body; and that this was death—the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually being destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we must consider?"

They both agreed that these were the points.

"Now," said he, "do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?"

"Only some of them," they replied.

"What do you think," he asked, "about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body?"

"I," said Cebes, "was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument."

"And I too," said Simmias, "feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point."

And Socrates said: "You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?"

"Certainly not, Socrates."

"Then do you see," said he, "that this is just
φης μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός γε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία γέ σοι τοιούτον ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ

C φθόγγοι ἐτί ἀνάρμοστοι οὖντες γίγνονται, τελευταίοι δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρώτων ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μὴν, ἡ δ’ ὃς, πρέπει γε εἰπέρ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἥξυνοιδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοῖνυν, ἐφη, σοὶ οὐ ἥξυνοιδὸς· ἀλλ’ ὅρα, πότερον αἱρέι τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐφη, ἐκεῖνων, ὡ Σώκρατες. οὐδὲ μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς

D καὶ εὐπρεπείας, οθέν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιομένους λόγους ἥξυνοιδά οὕσιν ἀλαξόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτούς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὐμᾶλα ἤξαπατώσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν. ὃ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι’ ὑποθέσεως ἁξίας ἀποδείξεως εὖρηται. ἐρρήθη γὰρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἐχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ δ

E ἐστὶν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πεῖθω, ἵκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδείξεως, ἀνάγκη οὐν μοι, ὡς ἐοίκε, διὰ ταῦτα μὴτε ἐμαυτὸν μὴτε ἄλλου ἀποδείξεως λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἄρμονία.
what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?"

"I cannot at all," said Simmias.

"And yet," said Socrates, "there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others."

"Yes, there ought," said Simmias.

"Well," said he, "there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?"

"The former, decidedly, Socrates," he replied.

"For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists. Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony."
42. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὡς, ὥς Σιμμία, τήδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἡ ὡς ἢν ἐκείνα ἔχη, ἔξ ὡν ἢν συγκέκται; Οὐδαμώς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τί, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἢ ἤν ἐκείνα ἡ ποιή ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἤγείσθαι γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων, ἔξ ὡν ἢν συντεθῇ, ἄλλ' ἐπεσθαί. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἐφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὔτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστῃ ἀρμονίᾳ, ὡς ἢν ἀρμοσθῇ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη. Οὐχί, ἡ δ' ὡς, ἢν μὲν μᾶλλον Β ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἰπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἢν ἀρμονία εἰη καὶ πλεῖον, εἰ δ' ἢττὸν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττον, ἢττὸν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνω γε. Ἡ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἢττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Οὐδ' ὅπωστιοιν, ἐφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἐφη, πρὸς Διὸς· λέγεται ψυχῇ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἁρετήν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθῆ, ἢ δὲ ἀνοιάν τε καὶ μοχ-
"Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias," said he. "Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?"

"Certainly not."

"And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?"

He agreed.

"Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them."

He assented.

"A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts."

"Quite unable," said he.

"Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonised?"

"I do not understand," said Simmias.

"Would it not," said Socrates, "be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonised more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonised and to a less extent?"

"Certainly."

"Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?"

"Not in the least," said he.

"Well now," said he, "one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to
θηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἡλθός μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα οὖντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονία οὐσί ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀναρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχοι ἔγωγη, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν δήλου δ' ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἄττ' ἀν λέγοι ο έκεῖνο ύποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προῳμολόγηται, ἔφη.

D μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἢττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἔπι πλέον μηδ' ἢττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἐλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; Πάνω γε. Τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἢττον ἁρμονίαν οὕσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἢττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἐστιν οὕτως; Ἡστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἢττον ἡρμοσμένη ἐστιν ὁ τι πλέον ἡ ἐλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἡ τὸ ἵσον; Τὸ ἵσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἢττον

Ε ἀλλη ἁλλης αὐτό τούτο ψυχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ δ' μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἢττον ἡρμοσταὶ; Οὔτω. Τοῦτο δὲ γε πεποιθεῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχου ἢν; Οὐ γάρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ' αὐτοποιηθειν άρ' ἀν τι πλέον κακίως ἢ ἁρετής μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἁναρμοστία, ἢ δ' ἁρετῆ ἁρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δὲ γε ποι, ὁ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχῆ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρ-
possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?" "Yes, it is true."

"Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?"

"I cannot tell," replied Simmias, "but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort."

"But we agreed," said Socrates, "that one soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?" "Certainly."

"And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonised. Is that so?" "Yes."

"But has that which is no more and no less harmonised any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?" "An equal amount."

"Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonised."

"That is so."

"And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?" "No."

"And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?" "It cannot."

"Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony;"
μονία ἐστίν. ἀρμονία γὰρ δὴπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τούτο οὗσα ἀρμονία ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἄν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὔδε γε δὴπον ψυχήν, οὗσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ νε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἁγαθαὶ ἐσονται, εἰπερ ὁμοῖως πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαὶ, εἰναι. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

B Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὦς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἢν ταύτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθῇ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχήν ἀρμονίαν εἰναι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη.

43. Τί δὲ; ἦ δ' ὦς: τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὁ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχήν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμου; Οὐκ ἐγώγε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν1 τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ2 ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόντε, οἶνον3 καῦματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἐλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πεῦνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποὺ ὀρῶμεν ἑναντιομένην τὴν ψυχήν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἦ οὔ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὐ ὀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μὴποτ' ἄν αὐτῆν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὗσαν, ἑναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνιοτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοτο καὶ ἄλλο ὤτίον πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὀντυγχαίνει οὗσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαί ἐκείνοις καὶ οὐποτ'  

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1 Schanz brackets συγχωροῦσαν.
2 Schanz omits ἢ καλ.
3 cf Stobæus. ὀπ' CDE, bracketed by Schanz.
for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord."
"Certainly not."
"Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness."
"How could it, if what we have said is right?"
"According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good."
"So it seems, Socrates," said he.
"And," said Socrates, "do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?"
"Not in the least," he replied.
"Well," said Socrates, "of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?"
"No, I do not."
"Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?"
"Certainly."
"Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?"
ἀν ἠγεμονεύειν; Ὅμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πάν τούναντίον ἦμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἠγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησὶ τις αὐτῆν εἶναι, καὶ ἑναντιοῦν·

D μένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀληθιδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τῆν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὁργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὕσα ἀλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἶον ποιεῖ καὶ Ὁμήρος ἐν Ὁδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὁδυσσέα:

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίνην ἴσπαπε μύθῳ·
tετλαθε δή, κραδίνη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

Ε ἄρ’ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονιάς αὐτῆς οὕσης καὶ οἶας ἀγεσθαί ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἶας ἀγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζεων, καὶ οὕσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειότερον τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ’ ἀρμονίαν; Νή Δία, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Όν κάρα, ὡ ἀριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῆ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς 95 ἐοικεν, Ὅμηρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὀμολογοίμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχειν οὕτως ἔφη.

44. Εἶει δή, ἡ δ’ ὦς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἠμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ὑλεῖ πως, ὡς ἐοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δή τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὡ
"Yes," he replied, "we did, of course."

"Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannising over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the *Odyssey* \(^1\) when he says of Odysseus:

He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart:

'Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this'?

Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?"

"By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think."

"Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That is true," said he.

"Very well," said Socrates, "Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately

\(^1\) *Odyssey* xx, 17, 18. Bryant's translation.
Κέβης, πώς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφὶ ο Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν τοὺτον γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἰπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Συμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅ τι ἥπορει, πάνω ἐθαύμαζον, εἰ τι ἐξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ; πάνω μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἐδοξεῖν εὑρὸν τὴν πρώτην ἐφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σου λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τόν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὡ γαθέ, ἐφὶ ο Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τὰς ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὅμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἱόντες πειρώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ξητείς· ἄξιος ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχῆν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὕσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἄνηρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγοῦμενος ἀποθανόν ἔκει εὗ πράξειν διαφέροντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐπελεύστα, μὴ άνωτόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡτι ἵσχυρόν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή καὶ θεοειδῆς καὶ ἂν ἐτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φης πάντα ταῦτα μὴνειν ἄθανασίαν μὲν μη, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνων τὲ ἐστὶν ψυχή καὶ ἂν πον πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὁσον χρόνον καὶ ἱδει τε καὶ ἐπράττειν πολλὰ ἄτατα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἂν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπον σώμα ἐλθεῖν ἄρχῃ ἂν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρον, ὡςπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρομένη τε δὴ τούτον τὸν βίον ξόη καὶ τελευτῶσι γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ

1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets ἔσεσθαι.
gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?"

"I think," said Cebes, "you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

"My friend," said Socrates, "do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, 'charge the foe' and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that, but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally
ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν¹ ἐὰν ἐὰν δὴ πάξ, εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἰς τι πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκειν² γάρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰ, τῷ μὴ εἰδότε μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ως ἀθάνατον ἔστιν. τοιαύτη ἄττα

Ε ἕστιν, οἱμαί, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ λέγεις· καὶ ἔρεπιτηδεὶς πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τὸ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἡ ἀφελης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης: Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφε, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθείναι δέοµαι· ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτα, ἄ λέγω.

45. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Ὑπ' ἐφόλου πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐπτίδεις· ὅλως γάρ δέι περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αὐτίναν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίεμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλη, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἀν τί σοι χρῆσιμον φαίνηται ὅν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὄν λέγεις χρῆσει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε. Ἀκούε τοίνυν ὡς ἔρούντος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ἂν θαυμαστῶς ὃς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσί περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αὐτίς ἐκάστουν, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἔκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί

Β ἕστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε, ἃρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν;¹³ σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβη, ως

¹ Schanz reads διαφέρει.  
² Schanz reads προσήκει.  
³ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν Eb Stobaeus. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν BD, Schanz brackets ψυχρὸν.
perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a body once or many times, so far as the fear each of us feels is concerned; for anyone, unless he is a fool, must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. That, Cebes, is, I think, about what you mean. And I restate it purposely that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you wish, add or take away anything.”

And Cebes said, “I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning.”

Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said: “It is no small thing that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty.”

“Certainly,” said Cebes, “I wish to hear your experiences.”

“Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these: Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organisation of animals, as some people say? Is
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tines ἐλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ξῆςα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἔστιν ὃ φρονούμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄρη ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τοὺτων μὲν οὓδεν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος ἔστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὅραν καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦσαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβοῦσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν κατὰ ταύτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτων τὰς θεράσ σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἐδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἄφυης εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμήριον δὲ σοι ἐρῶ ἰκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἦπιστάμην, ὡς γα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ὕμνη εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἀνθρώπως αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ ὕμνη πρὸ τοῦ παυτὶ δήλων εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσχένωται, τοῖς δὲ ὁστέοις ὁστὰ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλύγον ὅγκον ὑπάπτερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἀνθρώπου μέγαν· οὕτως τότε ὕμνη· οὐ δοκότι σοι μετρίως· Ἑμοῖγε, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτί. ὕμνη γὰρ ἰκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνετο ἀνθρώπους παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῆ γῇ· ἐκ κεφαλῆ καὶ ὑπ᾿ ὑπον. καὶ ἐτί γε τοῦτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδοκεῖ τῶν ὁκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτῶς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ διπτῆχυ τοῦ πηχυαιὸν μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δή, ἐφὴ ὁ Κέβης, τὶ σοι
it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn't that seem to you reasonable?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other, and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length."

"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"
δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω πον, ἕφη, η Ἀία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οὗσθαι περὶ τούτων του ἦν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὡς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὔδε ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσήη ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν φ᾽ προσετήθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ

97 φ᾽ προσετήθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γάρ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρίς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἀρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθη τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἀρα αὐτία αὐτοίς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίων ἀλλήλων τεθήναι. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, ἕαν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἐτὶ πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αὐτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσεις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γάρ γίγνεται

B ἢ τότε αὐτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γάρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετῆθετο ἐτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δέ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτερον ἀφ᾽ ἐτέρου. οὐδὲ γε, δι᾽ ὅ τι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἐτὶ πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδὲ ἀλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι᾽ ὅ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τούτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, τούτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίμαι.

46. 'Ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσας μεν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινὸς, ὡς ἕφη, 'Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ

C λέγοντος ὡς ἀρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμᾶτε καὶ πάντων αὐτίως, ταυτῇ δὴ τῇ αὐτίᾳ ἡσθήν τε καὶ ἐδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αὐτίων, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν¹ καὶ ἐκα-

¹ Schanz brackets κοσμεῖν.
"By Zeus," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from another. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

"Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes
στον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βελτιστα ἔχῃ εἰ οὐν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τούτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπη βελτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἰναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἄνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἄλλῳ ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βελτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι: τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἁσμενὸς εὑρηκέναι ἰθην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαντῶ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν, πότερον ἡ γη πλατεία ἐστιν ἡ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειν, ἑπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἁμεινον ἢν τοιαύτην εἶναι: καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίνῃ εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἑπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἁμεινον ἢν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἕλιου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην, ὡςαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἀλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πὴ ποτε ταύτ' ἁμεινόν ἐστιν ἐκάστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἄτ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτῶν ἰθῆν, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὑτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βελτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἐχεῖν ἐστὶν ὀσπερ ἐχεῖ: ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ

1 αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου BCDE. Scholz brackets αὐτοῦ. Wohlrab omits ἐκείνου and reads αὐτοῦ. Burnet brackets ἐκείνου.

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each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same. As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the centre, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the centre; and I had made up my mind that if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause. And I had determined that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are. So I thought when he assigned the cause
κοινὴ πάσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον φῶν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πάσιν ἐπεκδηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδὴ λαβῶν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶος τῇ ἀνεγήγαγοςκοῦ, ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χείρων.

47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστὴς ἐλπίδος, ὡ ἔταίρε, φώκημην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προίων καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὅρω ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν σύδεν χρώμενον οὐδὲν ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλά καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξεῖν ὁμοίωτατον πεποιθέναι ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις λέγων ὦτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὡσα πράττει νῦν πράττει, κάπετα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίαις ἐκάστων ὁν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὦτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὦτι σύνγκειτά μου τὸ σώμα ἐξ ὅστεων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὥστα ἔστων στερεὰ καὶ διαφυγὼς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα διὰ ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὥστα μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτά: αἰωρουμένων ὥστε τῶν ὅστεων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνυμβολοῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι ποὺ ποιεῖ οἶον τ' ἐὰν ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτη τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεῖς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι καὶ αὐ ἐπεὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι υμῖν ἔτερας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάσε τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοας καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος,

Ε ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἄληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Άθηναίοις ἐδοξεῖ βέλτιου εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον

1 Schanz brackets καλ.
of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

"My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me, and therefore I have decided
αὐ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθήσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένουσα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἤν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· 

ἐπεὶ ὑ' τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἔγχυμα, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστά ἂ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἢν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ 

dικαιότερον ὕμνη καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ 

φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει 

dίκην ἦντιν ἀν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα 

καλεῖν λιαν ἀτοπον' εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ 

tα τοιαύτα ἐχεῖν καὶ ὀστὰ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα 

ἐχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶος τ' ἢν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντα μοι, 

ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μὲντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἄ ποιῶ 

B 

καὶ ταῦτα νῦ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὗ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου 

αἱρέσει, πολλή καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία ἂν εἰ ὑ' τοῦ 

λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶον τ' εἶναι ὅτι 

ἄλλο μὲν τ' ἐστι τὸ αἰτίον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ 

ἐκεῖνο ἂνευ ὅτι τὸ αἰτίον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἰθ αἰτίον· ὃ 

dὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφώντες οἳ πολλοὶ ὀσπέρ 

ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ όνόματι προσχρόμενοι, ὡς 

αἰτίον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ο μὲν τις 

dίνην περιτιθεῖς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ 

ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ ὀσπέρ καρδόσῳ πλατεία 

βάθρων τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδε'. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅς οἶον 

C 

βελτίστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, 

ταῦτην οὔτε ξητούσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαίμονιαν 

ἰσχὺν ἐχειν, ἀλλὰ ἢγονται τοῦτος Ἀτλαντα ἂν 

ποτὲ ἵσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον 

ἄπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξερεύνη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ 

ὡς οὔτων καὶ δέοιν ἦνυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδέν 

οἴονταί. ἐνώ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπη 

ποτὲ ἐχει, μαθητής ὁτοιοῦν ἦσστ' ἂν γενομήν· 

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταῦτης ἐστερῆθην καὶ οὕτ' αὐτὸς εὗρεῖν 

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that it was best for me to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by the Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that
οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενομην, τὸν
δεύτερον πλούν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἤ
πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἐφη, ἐπίδειξιν
ποιήσωμαι, ὥς Κέβης; ὶπέρφυως μὲν οὖν, ἐφη,
ὡς βούλομαι.

48. Ἐδοξὲ τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, μετὰ ταῦτα,
ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὅντα σκοπῶν, δειν εὐλαβη-
θῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἡλιόν ἐκλείποντα
θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι διαφθείρονται γάρ
ποὺ ἐνοὶ τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὑδατὶ ή τῶι
τοιοῦτοι σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῶν. τοιοῦτον
ti καὶ ἐγὼ διενοῆθη, καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι
τὴν ψυχῆν τυφλωθείνοι κλέπτων πρὸς τὰ πράγ-
ματα τοὺς ὄμμαι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων
ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ἐδοξὲ δὴ μοι χρήναι
eἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνουσι σκοπεῖν
τῶν ὅντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἦσως μὲν οὖν ψ εἰκάζω

100 τρόπον τινὰ ὅνκ ἐοίκεν. οὐ γὰρ πάνω συγχωρῶ
τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοποῦμενοι τὰ ὅντα ἐν εἰκόσι
μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἂλλ’ οὖν δὴ
tαύτη γε ὀρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον
ὅν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενεστατον εἶναι, ἄ μὲν ἂν μοι
dοκή τούτω συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀλήθη ὅντα,
καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων
τῶν ὅντων, ἄ 8 an μή, ὡς οὖκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι
dὲ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω. οἶμαι γὰρ σε
νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης,
οὐ σφόδρα.

Β 49. Ἀλλ’, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ὅδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καίνων,
ἀλλ’ ἀπερ ἄει καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι
λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ
ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ
was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes,” said he, “to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?”

“I wish it with all my heart,” he replied.

“After this, then,” said he, “since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the least that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now.”

“Not very well, certainly,” said Cebes.

“Well,” said Socrates, “this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying,
πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἰμι πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρόλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ’ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέ-
μενος εἰναί τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τάλλα πάντα· ἃ εἰ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἰναι ταῦτα, ἐπιτίθω σοι ἐκ τού-
tων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης,
ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαιῶν. Σκόπει δὴ, ἐφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνως, εάν σοι ἕ
υνδοκῆ ὠσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ
di’ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἡ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου
tοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ
tουμᾶδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ,” ἐφη. Οὐ
τοίνυν, ἡ δ’ ὦς, ἐτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς
ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγνώσκειν. ἂλλ’
εάν τίς μοι λέγη, δι’ ὃ τι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὁτίον, ἡ
χρώμα εὐανθής ἔχου ἡ σχῆμα ἡ ἄλλο ότιον τῶν
tοιοῦτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, ταράττομαι
γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπόλως καὶ
ἀτέχνως καὶ ἱσώς εὐθέως ἐχὼ παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι
οὗκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἡ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ
καλοῦ εἰτε παρουσία εἰτε κοινωνία ὅπῃ δῆ καὶ
ὅπως προσγενομένῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο διοχυρί-
ζομαι, ἄλλ’ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται
cαλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι
cαὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ τούτου
ἐχόμενος ἠγούμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ πεσεῖν, ἄλλ’
ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄτωσιν ἄλλῳ ἀπο-
kρινασθαί, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ· ἡ οὐ
καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἀρα τὰ
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and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal."

"You may assume," said Cebes, "that I grant it, and go on."

"Then," said he, "see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?"

"I do," said he.

"Now I do not yet, understand," he went on, "nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?"

"I do."

"And great things are great and greater things
μεγάλα μεγύλα καὶ τὰ μεῖζων μεῖζων, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων; Ναὶ. Οὔδε σὺ ἄρ’ ἂν ὑποδέχοιο, εἰ τίς τινα φαίη ἐτέρου ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζων εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττων τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ ἐλάττων, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροι ἃν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν ὠνδέν ἀλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἐτέρου ἐτέρου ὠνδένι ἀλλῷ μεῖζον ἑστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων ὠνδένι ἀλλῷ ἐλάττων ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλάττων, διὰ τὴν σμικρότηταν, φοβούμενος οἶμαι, μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἡν τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττων, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων ἐλάττων, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ

Β οὐσῃ τὸν μεῖζων μεῖζων εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας· Ἐγώγη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυσὸν πλεῖον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δύσημα τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγέθει· οὗ αὐτὸς γάρ ποι φόβος. Πάνω γ’, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; εἰ νῦν προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο

C γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῦης ὅτι οὐκ οὐσθὰ ἀλλως πως ἐκαστὸν γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν 346
greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?"
"Yes."
"And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head, but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same thing, and secondly, that the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

And Cebes laughed and said, "Yes, I should."
"Then," he continued, "you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two-cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear."
"Certainly," said he.
"Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it
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τούτοις οὐκ ἐχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλης τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δειν τούτοις μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἐσεσθάι, καὶ μονάδος δὲ ἄν μέλλη ἐν ἐσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐξῆς ἄν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις: σὺ δὲ δεδώς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν; εἰ δὲ τις αὐτής τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐφοίτο, χαίρειν ἐώς ἄν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἔως ἄν τὰ ἄπτ᾽ ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαι, εἰ τοῖς ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεὶ ἡ διαφωνεῖ ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δεόι σε διδόναι λόγουν, ὡσαυτός ἄν διδοίης, ἀλλὰν αὐτῆς ὑπόθεσειν ὑποθέμενος, ἣτις τῶν ἀνωθέν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἦς ἐπὶ τι ἰκανὸν ἐλθεῖν, ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἄν φύροι ωσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενοι καὶ τῶν εἴς ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἶπερ βούλοι τοῖς ὑπὸν ὑφεῖν. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὔδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτοις λόγοις οὔδὲ φροντίς: ἰκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοὶ πάντα κυκώντες ὦμως δύνασθαι ἂν τοῖς ἀρέσκειν: σὺ δὲ εἶπερ εἰ τῶν πειρατῶν, οὐμαι ἄν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σημμίας ἀμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EXEKPATHS. Νὴ Δία, ὦ Φαίδον, εἰκότως γεθε θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἦς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἐχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταύτα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὥς Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐδοξεῖν.

1 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing δύνασθαι.
participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the saying goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling to that safe principle of ours and would reply as I have said. And if anyone attacked the principle, you would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until you had examined the consequences to see whether they agreed with one another or not; and when you had to give an explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about these things. They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix everything up; but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I have said.”

“That is true,” said Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHECRATES. By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those matters astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

PHAEDO. Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too.
ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἦμῖν τοὺς ἀπούσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούονσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἢν τὰ μετὰ ταύτα λεχθέντα;

50. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταύτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ωμολογεῖτο εἰναί τι

Β ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχεν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταύτα ἡρώτα. Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ταύτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἃρ’ οὖν, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἰναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τὸτ’ εἰναι εὖ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; ἦγογε. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ἢ δ’ ὦς, ωμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὖν ὅς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ποιον πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν

C τούτω τῷ Σιμμίαν εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων; οὐδ’ αὐ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἑκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδὲ γε αὐ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίαν σμικρότητα; Ἐστὶ ταύτα. Οὐτως ἀρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἰναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων,

D τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει υπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα υπέχου, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων υπερέχον. καὶ ἀμα μειδιάσας. Ὑποκα, ἐφ’, καὶ ἐπιγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἔχει γέ που, ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔνεκα.
ECHECRATES. And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said after that?

PHAEDO. As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then Socrates asked: "Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?"

"Yes."

"But," said Socrates, "you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than Socrates by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness."

"True."

"And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias's smallness."

"That is true."

"Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two, surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness." And he laughed and said, "I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say."

Simmias agreed.

"I am speaking so because I want you to agree
βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοὶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ 
φαίνεται ὡς μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ' ἐθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
tὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ 
σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ 
ἐτερον, ἥ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ 

Ε προσίη τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος 
ἐκείνου ἀπολογεῖν· ὑπομείναν δὲ καὶ δεξίμενον 
tὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἐτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. 
ἀστερ ἐγὼ δεξίμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρό-
τητα, καὶ ἔτι ὃν ὅπερ εἰμί, οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς 
σμικρὸς εἰμὶ· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετολμηκένα μέγα ἢν 
σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν 
ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, 
οὐδ' ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὃν ὅπερ ἦν 
ἀμα τούναντιον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι 
ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. 
Παντάπασιν, ἕφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

51. Καὶ τις εἰπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις 
ὁ ἦν, οὐ σαφώς μέμνημαι. Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν 
τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν 
νυν λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ 
μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μεῖζονος τὸ ἐλαττον, 
καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, 
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι 
τούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης 
παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρι-

Β κῶς, ἕφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς 
τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. 
tότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος 
tὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ 
tὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο,
with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change."

"That," said Cebes, "seems to me quite evident."

Then one of those present—I don't just remember who it was—said: "In Heaven's name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen."

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened.

"You have spoken up like a man," he said, "but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become
οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπινοομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, ὅν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὁνομαζόμενα: αὐτὰ δ', ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ

C φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἄλληλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἀμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν. 'Ἀρα μὴ πον, ὁ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σὲ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν όν ὀδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' Οὐκ 1 αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, 2 οὔτως ἔχω: καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλὰ με ταράττεi. Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἀρα, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἀπλῶς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐσεθαί. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

52. Ἔτι δ' μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἅρα συνωμολογήσεις. θερμὸν τι καλεῖσ καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἔγωγε. Ἄρ' ὀπερ χίονα καὶ πῦρ;

D Μᾶ Δ', οὔκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλ' ἐτερὸν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἐτερὸν τι χιώνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλ' τόδε γ', οἴμαι, δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χίονα 3 οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἕτι ἐσεθαί ὀπερ ἦν, χίονα καὶ θερμὸν, 4 ἀλλ' προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκ- χωρήσειν αὐτῷ 5 ἡ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐτ' προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἡ ὑπεξίεναι ἡ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ

1 δ' αὖ ΒΤ. δ' οὐκ αὖ, Hermann, Schanz.
2 Schanz brackets δ Κέβης.
3 Schanz inserts χίονα before χίονα.
4 Schanz brackets καὶ θερμοῦ.
5 αὐτῷ BCE; bracketed by Schanz. αὐτῷ c, Wohlrab, Burnet.

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its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other."

At the same time he looked at Cebes and said: "And you—are you troubled by any of our friends’ objections?"

"No," said Cebes, "not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me."

"Well, we are quite agreed," said Socrates, "upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite."

"Entirely agreed," said Cebes.

"Now," said he, "see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?"

"Yes."

"Are they the same as snow and fire?"

"No, not at all."

"But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?"

"Yes."

"Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist."

"Certainly."

"And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in
τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτι εἶναι
Ε ὁπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. ¹ 'Αληθῆ, ἔφη, ἰέγεις. Ἐστιν ἀρα, ἢ δ' ὃς, περὶ ένα τῶν
tοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος ἄξιονοςθαί
tοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀλλο τι, ὃ ἐστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου
μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὑπαντηρ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσδε ἵσως
ἐσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεὶ
που δεῖ τούτο τοῦ ὄνοματος τυγχάνειν, ὁπερ νῦν
λέγομεν ἢ οὕ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρα μόνον τῶν
ὄντων, τούτο γὰρ ἑρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἀλλο τι, δ ἐστι
104 μὲν οὐχ ὁπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὦμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ
tοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τούτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ
ὄντω πεφυκέναι, ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε
ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς
πέπονθε καὶ ἀλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς
τριάδος. ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὄνοματι
ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ,
ὄντος οὐχ οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὦμως οὔτω πως
πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτᾶς καὶ ὁ ἡμισὺς
τοῦ ἁριθμοῦ ἄπας, ὡστε οὐκ ὄν ὁπερ τὸ περιττοῦ
Β ἀεὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττὸς· καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δύο
καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἐπερος αὐ στίχος τοῦ
ἁριθμοῦ οὐκ ὄν ὁπερ τὸ ἀρτιον ὦμως ἐκαστὸς
αὐτῶν ἁρτιός ἐστιν ἀεὶ συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; Πῶς
γὰρ οὖκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοινν, ἔφη, βούλομαι ἀνα-
λῶσαι, ἀβρεῖ. ἐστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ
μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἄλληλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ
tάναντια, οὔδε ταύτα ἐοικε δεχομένους ἐκεῖνην τὴν

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ ψυχρόν.
admitting cold and being still fire, as it was before, and also cold."

"That is true," said he.

"The fact is," said he, "in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?"

"Certainly."

"But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?"

"Of course," he replied.

"Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites;
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ιδέαν ἢ ἄν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐση ἑναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' C ἔπιστους αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα· ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὠτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομείναι ἐτί τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἑναντίον γε ἐστι δυᾶς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἑναντία οὖχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἀττα τὰ ἑναντία οὖχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

53. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἐὰν οἷοὶ τ' ὥμεν, ὁμισώμεθα ὅποια ταῦτα ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε. D 'Αρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἶν ἂν, ἢ οὶ τι ἂν κατάσχη, μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τήν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν αὐτὸ ὄσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑναντίον ἀεὶ τινος; 1 Πῶς λέγεις; Ὡσπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶθα γὰρ δήπου, ὅτι ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἱδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς. Πάνυ γε. 'Επὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἢ ἑναντία ἱδέα ἐκείνη τῆς μορφῆ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἄπεργα-ζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γὰρ. Εἰργάζετο

1 αὐτῷ ἂεὶ τίνως BCDE. Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, brackets αὐτῷ.
these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"But the number two is not the opposite of the number three."

"No."

"Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites."

"Very true," he said.

"Shall we then," said Socrates, "determine if we can, what these are?"

"Certainly."

"Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?"

"What do you mean?"

"Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd."

"Certainly."

"Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result."

"No, it cannot."
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dé ye ἡ περιττή; Νάι. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτη ἡ ἔντεκα τοῦ ἄρτιος; Νάι. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἁρὰ ἡ τοῦ ἄρτιοι ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει. Οὐ δήτα. Ἀμοιρά δὴ τοῦ ἄρτιον τὰ τρία. Ἀμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἀρα ἡ τριάς. Νάι. Ὁ τοῖνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποία οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ἀντα ὤμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὁ οἶνος νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἄρτιῳ οὐκ οὕσα ἐναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἂει αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δύας τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἄλλῃ ὁρὰ δὴ, εἰ οὔτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὁ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκεῖνῳ, ἐφ’ ὃ τι ἄν αὐτὸ ἢ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρου τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμμηνήσκον’ οὐ γὰρ χείρων πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιον οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τούτῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἐναντίον, ὤμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ Β οὐ δέξεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὴν τοῦ ὄλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ

1 Schanz, following Bekker, brackets τὸ ἐναντίον.
2 After τοιαύτα the MSS. read τὸ ἡμιόλιον. “half,” which Schanz brackets.

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"But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?"
"Yes."
"And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?"
"Yes."
"Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three."
"No."
"Then three has no part in the even."
"No, it has none."
"Then the number three is uneven."
"Yes."
"Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple frac-
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὖπερ ἐπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἕφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἕφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγει καὶ μὴ μοι ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμὲ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὅρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἐροιό με, ὃ ἂν τί ἑγγένηται, θερμῶν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὃ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὃ ἂν τὸ ρήμα οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ὃ ἂν σώματι τί ἑγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ὃ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ὃ ἂν ἀριθμοῦ τί ἑγγένηται, περιττῶς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὃ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τάλλα οὔτως. ἀλλ' ὃρα, εἰ ἦδη ἰκανῶς οἰσθ' ὃ τι βούλομαι. ἂλλὰ πάνυ ἰκανῶς, ἕφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὃ ἂν τί ἑγγένηται σώματι, ξῶν ἔσται; Ὁμι ἂν ψυχή, ἕφη. Οὐκ' οὖν ἂεὶ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γάρ οὐχὶ; ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἂεὶ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ φέρουσα ξωήν; Ἡκει μέντοι, ἕφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ξωὴ ἑναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἐστὶν, ἕφη. Τί; Ὅναντος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἑναντίον ὃ αὐτῇ ἐπιφέρει ἂεὶ οὖ μὴ ποτε

1 After τί the MSS. read ἐν τῷ σώματι, “in the body,” which Schanz brackets.

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tions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go with me and agree to this?"

"Yes, I agree entirely," he said, "and am with you."

"Then," said Socrates, "please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently what I mean?"

"Quite sufficiently," he replied.

"Now answer," said he. "What causes the body in which it is to be alive?"

"The soul," he replied.

"Is this always the case?"

"Yes," said he, "of course."

"Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Is there anything that is the opposite of life?"

"Yes," said he.

"What?

"Death."

"Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will
δέχηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὑμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.

55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἱδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἄναρτιον, ἐφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μονσικὸν Ε μὴ δέχηται; Ἄμουσον, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἰεν· ὦ δὲ ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἄθανατον, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἄθανατον ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχή. Ἄθανατον. Εἰεν, ἐφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδειχθαι φῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅσ, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἄν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀθερμὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τὶς ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἑπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆς ἂν ἡ χιών οὕσα σῶς καὶ ἀτηκτός; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἡμαύτωσι, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄνυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπηκεί, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλευτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἄν ἀπελθὼν ὁχέτο. Ἄναγκη, ἐφη.

Β Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁδε, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ θανάτου.
never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it."

"Decidedly not," said Cebes.

"Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?"

"Uneven," said he.

"And those which do not admit justice and music?"

"Unjust," he replied, "and unmusical."

"Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?"

"Deathless or immortal," he said.

"And the soul does not admit death?"

"No."

"Then the soul is immortal."

"Yes."

"Very well," said he. "Shall we say then that this is proved?"

"Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates."

"Well then, Cebes," said he, "if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?"

"Of course."

"And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat."

"That is very true," he replied.

"In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed."

"Necessarily," he said.

"And must not the same be said of that which is
εἶπεὶν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἔστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἤ, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ’ ἔσται τεθνηκνία, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἀρτιον, οὔδε γ’ αὗ τὸ περιττόν, οὔδε δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὔδε γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἄλλα τί κωλύει, φαίη ἂν τις, ἀρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίον, ὥσπερ ψυχῆς, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄντ’ ἐκείνου ἀρτιον γεγονέναι; τὸ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἐχοίμεν διαμίσχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἔστιν· ἔτει εἰ τούτῳ ψυχῆς ἕμιν, βαδίσως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἁρτίον τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπίοντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἦ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοὖν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἕμιν ψυχῆς ἀπολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἰναι, ψυχῇ ἂν εἰ οὕτως τῷ ἀθάνατῳ εἰναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἁλλ’ ἂν δεσθοῦ λόγου.

Αλλ’ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἐνεκα· σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι ἁλλο ψυχῇ ἡ μὴ δέχοτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἁδίον δὲν ψυχῇ ἐξεταί.

56. Ὅ δε γε θεὸς, ὀίμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τι ἁλλο ἀθάνατον ἔστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὑμολογθεῖ μηδεποτε ἀπολλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί’, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τε γε καὶ ἐτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγώμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἔστιν, ἁλλο τι ψυχῇ ἡ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὐσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἰη; 366
immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about fire and heat and the rest, could we not?"

"Certainly."

"And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed."

"But," he said, "it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable."

"All, I think," said Socrates, "would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish."

"All men would, certainly," said he, "and still more, I fancy, the Gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?"
Поллη ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θυτήτων, ὡς ἐοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δὲ ἁθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ὑψεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἐφι, ὡς Κέβης, ψυχῇ ἁθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὦτὶ ἐσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν "Αιδοι. Οὐκούν ἐγώγε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἅλλο τι λέγει συνδέ τη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἂλλ' εἰ δ' τι Σιμμίας ἢ τις ἅλλος ἐχει λέγειν, εὐ ἔχει μὴ κατασκηνήσαι· ὥς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντων τις ἅλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν ψυν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἢ δ' ὡς ο Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὅν οἱ λόγοι εἰςιν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστεῖν ἐτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ', ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμία, ὡς Σώκρατης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ύποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὡμοὶ ἐπισκέπτεια σαφέστερον, καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἰκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μᾶλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφές γένηται, οὐδὲν ξητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις.

57. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἐφη, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, δικαιον διανοοθήναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχῇ ἁθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ ἰδεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ὅ καλούμεν τὸ καθ', ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς, καὶ

1 After ἀλλὰ the MSS. read ταύτα τε ἐβ λέγεις; bracketed by Ast, Schanz, and others.

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"Necessarily."

"Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death."

"So it seems."

"Then, Cebes," said he, "it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world."

"I," said Cebe, "have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters."

"But," said Simmias, "I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said."

"Not only that, Simmias," said Socrates, "but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyse them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther."

"That is true," he said.

"But my friends," he said, "we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life,
ό κύνδυνος νῦν δή καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἀμ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. νῦν δὲ ἐπειδή ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴῃ αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ ἀποφυγῇ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλῆν τοῦ ως βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἀιδοὺς ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλῆν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἀ δή καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὡφελείν ή βλάπτειν τοῦ τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἁρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἐκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὀσπερ ξώντα εἰλῆχει, οὗτος ἄγει ἐπι- χειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οὶ δὲ τοὺς συλ- λεγέντας διαδικασσαμένους εἰς ὁ Ἀιδοὺς πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ὡς δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθέυσε ἐκεῖσε πορεύσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὡν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας δὴν χρῆ χρόνου ἄλλος δεύρῳ πάλιν ἡγεμόνων κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνον καὶ μακράς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Ἀισχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει· ἐκείνως μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῆν οἰμῶν φησιν εἰς ὁ Ἀιδοὺς φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὔτε ἀπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει οὐ γὰρ ποῦ τις ἂν διαμάρτου οὐδαμόσθε μιᾶς ὑδοῦ οὐσίας. νῦν δὲ ἔσοκε σχῖσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἑχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαίρο- μενος λόγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἐπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἄγουε τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνῳ πολὺν χρόνου

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but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; and when they have there received their due and remained through the time appointed, another guide brings them back after many long periods of time. And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practised here on earth. Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the visible world for a long time, and after much resist-
Επτομένη καὶ περὶ τῶν ὀρατῶν τόπων, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόνις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ θυμεραί ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τὶ πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἡ φῶνων ἀδίκων ἡμέρην ἡ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαύτα εἰργασμένην, ἀ τούτων ἀδελφὰ τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἐργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν.  

ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανάται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ, ἐως ἂν δὴ τινὲς χρόνοι γένωνται, ὥν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτήν πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἡ δὲ καθαράς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὄκησαν τὸν αὐτὴν ἐκάστης τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰςίν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτή οὔτε οὐλα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινὸς πέπεισμαι.

58. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας. Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, ὦ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἠδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνῃ γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἢ γ’ ἐστίν· ως μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερον μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἃμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἰσως οὐδ’ ἂν οίος τε εἰη, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς, ὁ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἱδέαν τῆς γῆς, οἴαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ’, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοῖνυν,
ance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone's authority."

And Simmias said, "What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it."

"Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it."

"Well," said Simmias, "that will be enough."

"I am convinced, then," said he, "that in the first
Η δ’ ος, ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὐσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πρεσεῖν μὴτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτήν ἰσχεὶν τὴν ὁμοίωτητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ έαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ἵττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθήμαι, ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχων ἀκλίνες μενεῖ. πρῶτον μέν, ἢ δ’ ὦς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὅρθῳς γε, ἐφῃ ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐτι τοινυν, ἐφη, πάμμεσα τί εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων B στηλών ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινὶ μοριῷ, ὡςπερ περὶ τέλμα μῦρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἀξιωρρη-κέναι τὸ τε ὑδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ὑπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἀστρα, ὅν ἡ αἰθέρα C οὐνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστήμνῃ ταύτα εἶναι, καὶ ἐξουρίειν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦνται ἐν τοῖς κοῖλοις αὐτῆς λεηθέναι, καὶ οἰεσθαί ἀνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οὐοίντο τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκείων, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὅρων τῶν ἦλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀστρα τῆς θαλατταν ἦγορο όὐρανον εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτα τε καὶ D ἀσθενείαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἀκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἐωρακὼς εἰς, ἐκδὼς καὶ ἀνακύψας 374
place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the centre of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced."

"And rightly," said Simmias.

"Secondly," said he, "I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the
ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὡς καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὁν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοῶς εἰῃ τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταύτων ὁ τούτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεποιθέναι οἰκούντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοῖλῳ τῆς γῆς οἰεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἄρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτον οὐρανού ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα: τὸ δὲ εἶναι

Ε ταύτων, ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἷος τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ’ ἐσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἀκρα ἔλθοι ἡ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτυκτο, κατιδεῖν ἃν ἀνακύψαντα, ὦσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτουσι οὐρόσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὔτως ἃν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανή εἰῃ ἀνέγερσαθαι θεωροῦσα, γνώναι ἃν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνῶς ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἄληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὃς ἄληθῶς γη. ἢδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἄπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὦσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁλμῆς, καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἐποὺ εἰπεὶν, οὔδεν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πῦλος ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσιν, ὅποιν ἁν καὶ ἡ γη ἡ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὖ τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν πολὺ ἀν ἐτὶ πλέον φανεῖ

Β διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μύθον λέγειν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, ὡ Σιμμία, οἰα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἤδεως ἂν ἀκούσαμεν.

59. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἐφη, ὡ ἐταῖρε, πρῶτον

1 Schanz, following Rückert, brackets εἶναι ταύτων.
sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognise that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth. For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours. If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing:"

"By all means, Socrates," said Simmias; "we should be glad to hear this story."

"Well then, my friend," said he, "to begin with,
µὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἰδεῖν, εἰ τις ἀνωθεν θεότο, ὦσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὃν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὦσπερ δεήγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς

C καταχρώνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαι τῆν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἐτὶ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρω-τέρων ἡ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὁση λευκὴ γύψου ἡ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐτὶ πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἡ ὁσὰ ἡμεῖς ἐωρά-καμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοίλα αὐτῆς ὑδατὸς τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα ὁντα, χρώματός τι

D εἴδος παρέχεσθαι στιλβοῦντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικίλη, ὥστε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐἴδος συνεχῆς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐσῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς· καὶ αὖ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον τὴν τε λειώτητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίων· ὃν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιβίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε

E καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὦ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἐτὶ τοῦτων καλλίων. τὸ δ’ αἰτίον τοῦτο εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὦσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης· ὑπὸ τῶν δεύρῳ ξυνερρυνκότων, ἢ καὶ λίθους καὶ γῆ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἰσχῆ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτως τε ἀπασι καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ καὶ

1 Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης.
the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colours, of which the colours which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use. But there the whole earth is of such colours, and they are much brighter and purer than ours; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colours likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance of colour as they glisten amid the variety of the other colours, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in colour than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and jaspers, and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapours and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants. And the earth there is adorned with all these jewels and also with gold and silver and every-
111 ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὖ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὡντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεστῶν. ξῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἁέρα, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νῆσοις ὡς περιπρέπειν τὸν ἁέρα πρὸς τῇ ἱπέρῳ οὕσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὡσπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὑδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἔστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἁέρα, δ' ἡμῖν ὁ ἄρη, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὅρας αὐτῆς κράσιν ἐχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε τῇ πολύ πλείω τῶν ἑνθάδε, καὶ όψει καὶ ἀκόη καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἄπερ ἁέρ τε ὑδάτως ἀφέστηκεν καὶ ἀιθήρ ἁέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἀλήθη τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητάς θεοῦς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θέων καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοῖς· καὶ τὸν γε ἡλιοῦ καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρά ὑπάρχον τῃ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὡντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι. 60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὕλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπτυπμένους μᾶλλον ἥ ἐν ὧ ἡμεῖς οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα ἐλαττον ἐχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἐστὶ δ' οὖς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἑνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ
thing of the sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places, so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions, and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

"Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these
γῆν εἰς ἄλληλους συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχὶ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ἥειν ἐξ ἄλληλων εἰς ἄλληλους ὅσπερ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀνενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὕδατων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πῆλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου

Ε καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὅσπερ ἐν Σικέλιᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ρέοντες ποταμῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ. ὃν ἄν καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὅσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῆς ἐστὶ δὲ ἀρὰ αὐτῇ ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινὰ. ἐν τι τῶν χαμμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυχάνοι δὲ καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένοι δὲ ὀλὴς τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ "Ομηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτῷ

τῆλε μάλ', ἵνα βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέρεθρον.

ὅ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἔκεινος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν γύγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοί τοιούτοι, διʼ οίας ἄν καὶ τῆς γῆς ρέωσιν. ἢ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρείνε τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰςρεῖν

Β πάντα τὰ ἰεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα ὅνε ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄρη καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταύτον ποιεῖ. ξυνεπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ
are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows: One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth; ¹

and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here is that this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and

¹ Homer, *Iliad* 8, 14, Lord Derby's translation.
ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνῄει τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ἰεν τὸ πνεῦμα, οὔτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ἐνυαναρρούμενον τῷ ύγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοῦς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιόν καὶ ἐξίον. ὅταν τε ὁν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ύδωρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλουμένων, τοῖς κατ' ἐκείνα τὰ ῥεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρέει τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὐτ ἐκείθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεύρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ἐρεί διὰ τῶν όχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστα ἄφικνούμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεύθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείον, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρῳ ἢ ἐπηνυλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγου· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρέει τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἕνα μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ, ἕνα δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἄ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελυχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὀφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ’ οὐ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς ῥεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν ἥγγεται μέρος.

61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεύματά ἐστι τυχαίαν δ’ ἄρα ὅντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἀττα ῥεύματα, ὃν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ ῥέουν κύκλῳ ὁ καλουμένος Ὡκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρύ καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἦχερων, δ’ δ’ ἐρήμων τε

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just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out. And when the water retires to the region which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth, some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm. Now it is possible to go down from each side to the centre, but not beyond, for there the slope rises upward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

"Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through
113 τόπων ρέι ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχεροουσιάδα, οἱ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπουνται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καίομενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μεῖζω τῆς παρ’ ἧμιν θαλάττης, ξέουσαν ὑδατος καὶ πηλοῦ.

B ἐντεύθεν δὲ χωρεὶ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελίττόμενος δὲ ἀλλοσὲ ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ’ ἐσχάτα τῆς Ἀχεροουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνυμενος τῷ ὑδατὶ περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου. οὗτος δ’ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπονομάζοσιν Πυρὶφλεγέθοντα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ρύκαις ἀποστάσματα ἀναφυσώσιν ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὐτοκρυψτὸ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον ὁ ἐστὶν τοῦ ποιητῆς Στυγιού, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἢν ποιεὶ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στυγια. ο’ δ’ ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὸς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὑδατὶ, δύς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελίττόμενος χωρεὶ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρὶφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχεροουσιάδι λίμνῃ εἰς ἐναντίαις καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὑδωρ οὕδειν μῦνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρὶφλεγέθοντι ὁνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστὶν, ὥς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

C 62. Τούτων δὲ οὗτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφί-

1 Schanz brackets πρῶτον.
PHAEDO

various desert places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud. Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyrrophlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli. This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyrrophlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyrrophlegethon. And the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

"Such is the nature of these things. Now when
κωνταὶ οἱ тετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἐκαστὸν κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ όσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μὴ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευόμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὁχήματα ἔστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσι τε καὶ καθαιρομένοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσίων τιμᾶς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἧξιάν ἐκαστὸς· οἱ δ' ἀν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἄμαρτημάτων, ἡ ἱεροσύλλας πολλάς καὶ μεγάλας ἡ φόνους ἁδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἡ ἀλλὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὅντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, οἴδεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνωσιν. οἱ δ' ἀν ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἄμαρτηματα, οἶνον πρὸς πατέρα ἡ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βιαιών τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλειον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσι, ἡ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσείν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεὶ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκτόνον, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὓς ὑβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἐὰν σφᾶς ἐκβήναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φέρονται αὐθίς εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκείθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποτα-
the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings, and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrong-doings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge. Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyrphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on
μούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρῶτον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὐσ ἡδίκησαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῶν ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιώναι, οὕτω εἰσίν οἱ τῶν μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὡσπερ δεσμω- τηρίων, ἀνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οὐκησιν ἀφικνοῦ- μενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζομενοι. τοὺτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἰκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἀνεὐ τε σωμάτων ἐξεῖ τοῖς πάραπαν εἰς τὸν ἀπέιτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐτῆ τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦται, ἃς οὕτε ῥίδιον δηλῶσαι οὕτε ὁ χρόνος ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα χρῆ ὃν διελη- λύθαμεν, οὐ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὡστε ἠρετής καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

63. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα διασχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· ὅτι μέντοι ή ταύτ' ἐστὶν ή τοιαύτ' ἀττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἀπείπερ ἀθώντον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαύτα ὡσπερ ἐπίδειν ἐαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἐγὼγε καὶ πάλαι μηκὺν τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτῷ ψυχῇ ἀνδρα, οὕστε ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶδος χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενοι ἀπεργά- ξεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μαυθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἕλλα τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ 390
until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

"But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

"Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and
115 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἔλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περι-
mένει τὴν εἰς Ἀιδοὺ πορείαν, ὡς πορευόμενοι
όταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὡμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ
Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαύθης ἐν
tινὶ χρόνῳ ἐκαστὸι πορεύσεσθε· ἔμε δὲ νῦν ἦδη
καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ
σχεδὸν τί μοι ὃρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν·
dokei γὰρ ἐδὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιείν τὸ
φάρμακον καὶ μή πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν
νεκροὶ λουέων.

64. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρῆτων. Εἶνεν,
B ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἔμοι ἐπι-
stέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του,
ὅ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἥμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα
ποιοῖμεν; "Απερ ἂει λέγω, ἔφη, ὁ Κρῆτων, οὐδὲν
καίνοτέρου· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ὑμεῖς
καὶ ἔμοι καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ύμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι
ποιήσετε ἄττ᾽ ἂν ποιήτε, κἂν μὴ νῦν ὀμολογήσητε·
ἐὰν δὲ ύμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε καὶ μὴ θέλητε
ὡσπερ κατ᾽ έχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τὸ εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ
ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθέν χρόνῳ ξήν, οὐδὲ εὰν πολλὰ
C ὀμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν
πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοιοῦν προθυ-
μηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὐτῶ ποιεῖν ὑπάττωμεν δὲ
ἐν τίνα τρόπον; "Οπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε,
εάντερ γε λάβῃτε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ύμᾶς.
γελάσας δὲ ἄμα ἴσυχη καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας
ἐἴπεν· Οὐ πείθω, ὁ ἄνδρες, Κρῆτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ
ἐμὶ οὕτως Σωκράτης, ὃ νυνι διαλεγόμενος καὶ
διατάττων ἐκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται μὲ
ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, δὲν ὅφεται ὅλιγον ὑστερου νεκρόν,
D καὶ ἔρωτα δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι

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courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest,” he said, “will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse.”

When he had finished speaking, Crito said: “Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else—anything we can do to serve you?”

“What I always say, Crito,” he replied, “nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing, no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at present.”

“We will certainly try hard to do as you say,” he replied. “But how shall we bury you?”

“However you please,” he replied, “if you can catch me and I do not get away from you.” And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: “I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And though I have been saying at
πολύν λόγον πεποίημαι, ώς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὡμίν παραμενῶ, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταύτὰ μοι1 δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἁμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἀμα δ’ ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν μὲ πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφ’ ἡν ἐναιτίαν ἐγγύην ἡ ἣν οὖτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἕγγυυτο. οὖτος μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴν παραμενεῖν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ Ε ὁἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ρᾶον φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὄρων μοῦ τὸ σῶμα η καἰομενον η κατορυττό-
μενον ἀγακτη ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μὴ δὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἡ ἐκφέρει ἡ κατορύττει. εὐ γὰρ ἵσθι, ἡ δ’ ὅς, δ’ ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τούμον σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως 116 ὅπως ἀν σοι φίλον ἡ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγὴ νόμιμον εἶναι.

65. Ταὐτ’ εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνέπτατο εἰς ὁικημα τὶ ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἦμᾶς δ’ ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἠμᾶς αὐτούς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρη-
μένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτε δ’ αὐ περὶ τῆς ἐμφορας διεξόντες, ὡς ἠμῖν γεγονυια εἴη, ἀτεχνως ἡγούμενοι ὡσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξειν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἐπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλού-

Β σατο καὶ ἰνέχθη παρ’ αὐτόν τὰ παιδία—δῦο γὰρ αὐτῷ νίεις σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ

1 Schanz, following Madvig, brackets μοι.
great length that after I drink the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage you and myself. So,” he said, “give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial; for he gave security that I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die, but shall go away, so that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. No, you must be of good courage, and say that you bury my body,—and bury it as you think best and as seems to you most fitting.”

When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and
οίκείαι γυναίκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον¹ τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεξθείς τε καὶ ἑπιστείλας ἃττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἤκε παρ’ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ᾧ ἡδή ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνου γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἐνδον. ἐλθὼν δ’ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέξθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ’ αὐτὸν. Ἡ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, οὐ καταγγώσομαι σοῦ ὀπερ ἄλλων καταγγειόγωςκο, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρώνται, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνεων τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἐγνώκα, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναῖ- ὰτατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πῶποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὗ οἶδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις, γεγυνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἄλλα ἐκείνοις. νῦν, οἴσθα γὰρ ἡ ἠλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥάστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. καὶ ἂμα δακρύσας μετα- στρεφόμενος ἀπῆκε. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν. Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἂμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστείος, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρωπός· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆκε καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἄνδρὼν λύστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναῖος με ἀπο- δακρύει. ἀλλ’ ἄγε δὴ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἀνθρωπός. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων,

¹ ἐναντίον ἐκείναις, Ebd. ἐναντίον ἐκείναι, BD. Schanz brackets ἐκείναι. ἐκείναις ἐναντίον Herrmann, Wohlrab.

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the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito’s presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not much was said, and the servant of the eleven came and stood beside him and said: “Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are to blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must as easily as you can.” And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said: “Fare you well, too; I will do as you say.” And then he said to us: “How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it.” And Crito said: “But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and
καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἀλλοις πάνυ ὡς πίνοντας, ἔπειδαν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνῆσαντᾶς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὐ μᾶλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίους ὥν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μήδεν ἔπειγον· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἐφη, ὡς Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐς σὺ λέγεις, οἶνται γὰρ κερδάινειν ταῦτα ποιή

1 Schanz brackets Εἰκότως, following Hirschig.

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I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry; for there is still time."

And Socrates said: "Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do; for I think I should gain nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and spared it, when there is no more profit in it. Come," he said, "do as I ask and do not refuse."

Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said: "Well, my good man, you know about these things; what must I do?" "Nothing," he replied, "except drink the poison and walk about till your legs feel heavy; then lie down, and the poison will take effect of itself."

At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing colour or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: "What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?" "Socrates," said he, "we prepare only as much as we think is enough." "I understand," said Socrates; "but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I
εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι. ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαι τε καὶ γέ
νοτο ταύτῃ. καὶ ἂμ' εἴπὼν ταύτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ
μάλα εὐχέρως καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ
πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἔπιεκὼς οὐκί τε ἡσαυ κατέχειν
tὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἴδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ
πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ
ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυφάμενος
ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτὸν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνων γε, ἀλλὰ

D τὴν ἐμαυτὸν τύχην, οıyorum ἀνδρὸς ἐταῖρου ἐστερη-
μένος εἶναι. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἐπὶ πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶος τ' ἂν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα,
ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπρο-
σθέν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ
tότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ¹ ἀγανακτῶν
οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρὼντων πλή

Ε γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δὲ, Ὀία, ἔφη,
pοιεῖτε, ὥς θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι ὄνχ ἤκιστα
tούτου ἐνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἦν μὴ
τοιαύτα πλημμελοῦεν· καὶ γὰρ ἄκηκοα, ὅτι ἐν

1 Schanz brackets κλαίων καί.
2 Schanz follows Upton and others in bracketing οὗτος . . .
φάρμακον.

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offer this prayer, and may it be granted.” With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, “What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave.” Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his feet and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said “No”; then after that, his thighs; and passing upwards in
ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψυχοῖς τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ ἄνθρωποι τοιούτοι· ἦττετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰκύπτεται. ἦδη οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἢττρον ψυχομένεα, καὶ ἐκκαλυφάμενος, ἐνεκκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο. 'Ω Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὁφείλομεν ἀλέκτρονόνα· ἄλλα ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. ἄλλα ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἄλλα ὥρα, εἰ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρωμένοι αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐτί ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλον ἔλεγον χρόνον διαλυόντ᾽ ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἐφακάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὁς τὰ ὀμματα ἐστησεν· ἦδων δὲ ὁ Κρίτων σύνελαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

67. Ὅθεν ἦ τελευτή, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῶν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἦμεν φαινεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὅν ἐπειράθημεν ἄριστον καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

1 ἄνθρωποι, Forster. ἄνθρωποι, BCD. αὐ, Schanz.
2 Schanz brackets ἄλλως.
this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it." "That," said Crito, "shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say." To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.
PHAEDRUS
PHAEDRUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

The Phaedrus is pre-eminent among the dialogues of Plato for the variety of its contents and style, the richness of its imaginative description, and the sportive humour of its conversation. The chief theme of the dialogue is rhetoric, the art of speaking, a subject which formed an important part of the oral and written instruction of the sophists. Plato, and herein he agrees with the sophists, assumes that the result aimed at by rhetoric is persuasiveness, ability to lead the minds of the hearers to a particular belief or action. For the attainment of this result, the sophists claimed that knowledge of the truth concerning the subject under discussion is not essential; all that is necessary is ability to make one's conclusions seem probable. Plato shows that only the man who knows the truth can know what will seem probable; and he must also know the minds or souls to be persuaded. This he cannot do without a knowledge of the nature of the soul. Now knowledge of the truth concerning the various subjects of discourse and knowledge of all the different classes of human souls must be supplemented by knowledge of the different kinds of argument and of the various niceties of speech taught by the sophists. Only he who has acquired all this knowledge is a perfect orator, so far as perfection is attainable by man; but the acquisition
of this knowledge is a great task, which no one would undertake merely for the purpose of persuading his fellows; a higher purpose, the perfection of his soul and the desire to serve the gods, must animate the spirit of the student of the real art of rhetoric.

But if rhetoric is the chief theme of the dialogue, it is not by any means the only theme. The rationalistic (Euhemeristic) explanation of myths is briefly discussed and rejected, the higher and lower forms of love are analysed, the nature of the soul is described in the beautiful figure of the charioteer and his two horses, and here, as in the *Phaedo*, the doctrine of ideas and its derivative, the doctrine of reminiscence, are intimately connected with the description of the life of the soul. Yet, formally, at any rate, the other subjects of the dialogue are subordinate to the discussion of rhetoric. The processes of collection and division, by which a number of particulars may be brought together under one head and a general concept may be divided, are clearly stated. The latter is of such importance in the dialectic method, which for Plato was the only correct method of reasoning, that we may well believe the discussion of rhetoric to have been undertaken in part for the purpose of giving a concise and clear statement of this principle.

In this dialogue, as in the *Phaedo*, we find the soul justly rewarded or punished for conduct in this life; but the soul is here described as made up of a charioteer and two horses, whereas in the *Phaedo* it is one and indivisible; but the description of the soul in the *Phaedrus* is confessedly and obviously figurative, and the simple, uniform nature of the soul
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

is arrived at in the Phaedo by serious argument. It is therefore evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer is reason. It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato's conception of the soul. Since the Phaedo and the Phaedrus were probably written about the same time, no real disagreement between them is to be assumed.

The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to the famous orator, Lysias, son of Cephalus, and the question has been much discussed whether it is really a work of Lysias which Plato has inserted here. All the extant speeches of Lysias were composed to be spoken in court or at least on public occasions. We have no specimen of a discourse written by him purely as an example of his skill or for the delectation of his audience, nor do we know that he ever wrote such discourses. The discourse on love is certainly in the style of Lysias, that is to say, it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in a court of law; but Plato was a consummate literary artist, and there is surely every reason to believe that he could imitate the style of Lysias if he chose. Similarity to the style of Lysias is therefore no sufficient reason for the belief that

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the discourse is not Plato's composition, especially as the introduction of a genuine discourse by Lysias would impair the unity, and, to a certain extent, the dignity of the dialogue.

Toward the end of the Phaedrus, Plato inserts a remarkable discussion of the relative value of the spoken and the written word. It is somewhat startling to find so voluminous a writer maintaining that the written word is only a plaything, or, at best, a reminder; yet this must, apparently, be accepted as his deliberate judgment. In the Academy he laid great stress upon oral instruction, and this passage seems to indicate that he considered that instruction more important than his writings. It is interesting to find this judgment of the written word in a dialogue in which the playful element is so strong.

Of Phaedrus, the only interlocutor and the sole audience of Socrates in this dialogue, little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato. He was the son of Pythocles, of the Attic deme of Myrrhinus. He appears in several dialogues of Plato as a follower of Socrates, but no writings of his are extant, if any ever existed. Diogenes Laertius (iii., 29, 31), speaks of him as Plato's favourite. Some of the persons mentioned in the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary. Such are the great orator Lysias, the sophist and rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini, the philosopher Zeno of Elea (who masquerades under the name of Palamedes, 261 D), the distinguished sophist Protagoras of Abdera, Hippocrates, the "father of medicine," and the rhetorician, orator, and sage Isocrates. Acumenus and his son, Eryximachus, were Athenian physicians,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

Herodicus was a physician of Megara, Morychus was an Athenian of some means, whose house had apparently been bought by Epierates, who is described by a scholiast as an orator and demagogue. The other persons mentioned, Tisias of Sicily, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Theodorus of Byzantium, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus of Agrigentum, and his teacher, Licymnius, were all sophists and rhetoricians, whose inventiveness in the matter of rhetorical nomenclature is ridiculed.

Separate editions of the Phaedrus are few. The only one which appears to demand special mention is that of W. H. Thompson (1868).
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΛΟΤ. ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

TA TOY ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΙΙΙ.

p. 227

A 1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ω φίλε Φαιδρέ, ποι δή καὶ πόθεν; ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου. πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τεῖχους. συχνὸν γάρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθῆ-μενος ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ· τῷ δὲ σῷ καὶ ἐμῷ ἔταιρῳ πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῷ κατὰ τὰς ὅδους ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι

B τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὃ ἔταιρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἢν, ὡς ἑοικεν, ἐν ἀστεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναι, παρ’ Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇ ἑδε τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μορυχίᾳ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς σὺν δὴ ἢν ἡ διατριβή; ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πεύσει, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἄν οἶει με κατὰ Πίν-
PHAEDRUS

[or ON THE BEAUTIFUL, ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates. Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from?

Phaedrus. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets.

Socrates. He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city?

Phaedrus. Yes, at Epicrates' house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympieum.

Socrates. What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches.

Phaedrus. You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

Socrates. What? Don't you believe that I
δαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσα
σθαί τὸ σήν τε καὶ Λυσίαν διατρίβην ἀκοῦσαι;

C  ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρόαγε δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγοις ἄν.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά
γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὁ γὰρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ δὲν
diestριβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὄντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός.

γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενον τινα τῶν
καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ’ ἐραστοῦ δὲ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο
καὶ κεκόμψενται: λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον µὴ
ἐρωτικάν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρωτικάν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡς γενναίοις, εἰθε γράψειεν ὡς χρή
πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ

νεωτέρων, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοὺς

D  πολλοίς ἡμῶν ἢ γὰρ ἄν υπερτεροι καὶ δημοφιλείς
eἰεν οἱ λόγοι. ἐγὼν’ οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα
ἀκούσαι, ὡστ’ ἔαν βαδίζων ποιή τὸν περιπατον
Μέγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει

πάλιν ἀπίθης, οὐ µὴ σου ἀπολειφθῇ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκρατες;

228  οἷέν με, ἀ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν

συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὃν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα

ἰδιώτην ὑντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἡξίως ἐκεῖνον;

1 Pindar Isthm. i. 1. Μάτερ ἐμά, το τεῦν, χρύσασσι Θήβα,

πράγμα καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον θήσομαι. “My mother, Thebes

of the golden shield, I will consider thy interest greater even
than business.”

2 Herodicus, Sch. : ιατρὸς ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦξω τείχους

ἐποιεῖτο, ἀρχάγχεον ἀπό τινος διαστήματος οὐ µακρού ἄλλα συμμε-

τρού, ἄρχε τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων. “He was a physician

and exercised outside the wall, beginning at some distance,

not great but moderate, going as far as the wall and turning

back.”

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PHAEDRUS

consider hearing your conversation with Lysias "a greater thing even than business," as Pindar says?¹

PHAEDRUS. Lead on, then.

SOCRATES. Speak.

PHAEDRUS. Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For the discourse about which we conversed, was in a way, a love-speech. For Lysias has represented one of the beauties being tempted, but not by a lover; this is just the clever thing about it; for he says that favours should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.

SOCRATES. O noble Lysias! I wish he would write that they should be granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and most of us have; for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility. I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.²

PHAEDRUS. What are you saying, my dear Socrates? Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?
πολλοῦ γε δέω· καὶ τοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἀν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὤ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἁγνῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξσμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἐστὶ τούτων· εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Δυσίου λόγον ἄκούν ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἀπαξ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευεν οἱ λέγειν· ο ὅ ἐπείθετο προθύμως. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτα ἦν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ὃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει, καὶ τούτο δρῶν, ἔξε ἐξωθινοῦ καθήμενος, ἀπειπῶν εἰς περίπατον ἦει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἡ τῶν κύων, ἐξεπιστάμενος τῶν λόγων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις ἔνυ μακρός. ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους, ἵνα μελετήσῃ. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι περί λόγων ἄκοψι, ἰδὼν μὲν ἡσθη, ὅτι ἔξοι τὸν συγκορματιώντα, καὶ προάγειν εκέλευε· δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἑραστοῦ, ἔθρηπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶ ἔγοιν τελευτῶν δὲ ἐμέλλε, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις ἐκών ἄκούοι, βία ἔρειν. σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεῖθητι, ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσει, νῦν ἣδη ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐμοί ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστον ἐστίν οὔτως ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν. ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσειν, πρὶν ἄν εἰπω ἀμῶς γέ τως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

3. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτωσι τοῖνυν ποιήσω. τῷ ὅμω νῷρ, ὦ Σώκρατε, παντὸς μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχέδον ἀπάντων, οἷς ἐφή διαφέρειν τά τοῦ ἑρωτός ἢ τά τοῦ μῆ, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐφεξῆς δίειμι, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

416 1 τις Β.Τ. τις Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

Far from it; and yet I would rather have that ability than a good sum of money.

SOCRATES. O Phaedrus! If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself. But since neither of these things is true, I know very well that when listening to Lysias he did not hear once only, but often urged him to repeat; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this he sat from early morning. Then, when he grew tired, he went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. And he was going outside the wall to practise it. And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his revel, and told him to lead on. But when the lover of discourse asked him to speak, he feigned coyness, as if he did not yearn to speak; at last, however, even if no one would listen willingly, he was bound to speak whether or no. So, Phaedrus, ask him to do now what he will presently do anyway.

PHAEDRUS. Truly it is best for me to speak as I may; since it is clear that you will not let me go until I speak somehow or other.

SOCRATES. You have a very correct idea about me.

PHAEDRUS. Then this is what I will do. Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, the points in which he said the lover was superior to the non-lover, giving them in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δείξας γε πρώτου, ὁ φιλότης, τί ἀρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἰματίῳ. τοπάζω γὰρ σε ἔχειν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἐστιν, Ε οὔτωσι διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ σε πάνυ μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος δὲ Λυσίου ἐμαυτὸν σοι ἐμμελετῶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται. ἀλλ' ἤθι, δείκνυε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκάσ με ἐλπίδος, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἴχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς ἐγχυμυνασόμενος. ἄλλα ποὺ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώμεν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῦρ' ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλίσσον ἰὼμεν, εἰτὰ ὅποι ἄν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰς καίρον, ὡς ἐοικέν, ἀνυπόδητος ὅν ἔτυχον; σοὶ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἀεὶ. ράςτον οὐν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἴναι, καὶ οὐκ ἄρθρες, ἀλλος τε καὶ τὴν ἰδία τὴν ὦραν τοῦ ἐτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρόαγε δὴ, καὶ σκόπει ἀμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. ὸρᾶς οὖν εκείνη τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μὴν;

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῦμα μέτρον, καὶ πόα καθιζεσθαι ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλιθήναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Προάγοις ἃν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τῇ Ὄρεσθιαν ἀρπάσαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ

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PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Yes, my dear, when you have first shown me what you have in your left hand, under your cloak. For I suspect you have the actual discourse. And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practise on. Come now, show it.

PHAEDRUS. Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practising on you. But where shall we sit and read?

SOCRATES. Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please.

PHAEDRUS. I am fortunate, it seems, in being bare-foot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day.

SOCRATES. Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit.

PHAEDRUS. Do you see that very tall plane tree?

SOCRATES. What of it?

PHAEDRUS. There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on.

SOCRATES. Lead the way.

PHAEDRUS. Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia?

SOCRATES. Yes, that is the story.

PHAEDRUS. Well, is it from here? The streamlet
καθαρά καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἑπτιθέδεια κόραις παῖξειν παρ’ αὐτά.

Σematics. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δὺ ἢ τρία στάδια, ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαινομεν’ καὶ ποῦ τίς ἔστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

Φαιδρος. Όù πάνυ νενόηκα: ἀλλ’ εἶπὲ πρὸς Δίος, ὃ Σωκρατες: σῦ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθῆς εἶναι;

4. Σematics. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀπιστοῖην, δ外墙 οἱ σοφοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἶην εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην ἂν αὐτήν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίων πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακελά παῖξονσαν ὄσαι, καὶ

D οὗτο δὴ τελευτήσαςν λεχθήναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀναρπαστὸν γεγονέναι. ἐγὼ δὲ, ὃ Φαιδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοὶ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐνυχός ἄνδρός, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν, ὅτι δ’ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἴδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αἴθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργώνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων

Ε ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων: αἷς εἰ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβάζει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔκαστον, ἀτε ἀγροίκη τινὶ σοφία χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ σχολή: τὸ δὲ αἰτίου, ὃ φίλε, τούτου τόδε: οὐ δύναμαι πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν· γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται,

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PHAEDRUS

looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by.

SOCRATES. No, the place is about two or three furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the precinct of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas somewhere thereabouts.

PHAEDRUS. I have never noticed it. But, for Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this tale is true?

SOCRATES. If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off the neighbouring rocks as she was playing with Pharmacea, and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been carried off by Boreas. But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very pretty in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable man, for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegas, and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet

1 The MSS. insert here ἦ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου λέγεται γὰρ αὕτη τὸ λόγος, ὅσον ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθέντε ἡρπάσθη, "or from the Areopagus, for this story is also told, that she was carried off from there and not from here." Schanz follows Bast and many editors in rejecting this as a gloss.
230 τούτο ἐτὶ ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἄλλατρα σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταύτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομίζομενον περὶ αὐτῶν, δ ὑπὸ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶν οὐ ταύτα ἄλλα ἐμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θερίον τυγχάνω Τυφώνος πολυπλοκότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμένον, εἴτε ἡμερότερον τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ἥφων, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μούρας φύσει μετέχοι. ὑπάρ, ἦ ἐταίρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἢρ οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ’ ὅπερ ἤγες ἡμᾶς;

Β  ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό.

5. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῆ τῇ Ἰραν, καλὴ γε ἡ κατα·

γωγὴ. ἡ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὐτὴ μάλ’ ἀμφιλαφής 

tε καὶ ύψηλὴ, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ύψος καὶ τὸ 

σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ως ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθής, 

ὡς ἄν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον· ἢ τε αὖ 

πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ἑτί μᾶλα 

ψυχροῦ ὑδατος, οὕτε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμῆρασθαί· 

Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχέλων ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν 

κορών τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἐοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ’ αὖ 

βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπον ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ 

σφόδρα ἤδυθερινὸν τε καὶ λυγυρὸν ὑπηχει τῷ 

τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ 

τῆς πόσα, ὅτι ἐν ἧρεμα προσάντε τίκαιν πέφυκε 

κατακλινέντε τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἐχειν. ὅστε 

ἀριστὰ σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὃ φίλε Φαίδρε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σὺ δὲ γε, ὃ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατος 

ταῖς 

φαίνει. ἀπεχθῶς γὰρ, ὃ λέγεις, ἐξεναγομένω τω̣

καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχορήγη ἐοικας· οὔτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεος 

οὔτ’ εἰς τὴν ὑπερομίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ’ ἐξω τεῖχους 

ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν εξέναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὃ ἁρίστε. φιλο-

μαθὴς γὰρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα
know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, this is it.

SOCRATES. By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! and it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

PHAEDRUS. You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don't go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don't go outside the walls at all.

SOCRATES. Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and
οὐδέν μ’ ἐδέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἀνθρωποί. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ἐυρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινώντα θρέμματα θαλλόν ἢ τίνα καρπὸν προσείστηκες ἀγουσίων, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὔτω προτείνων ἐν βι-

Ε βλύοις τὴν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνει περιάξειν ἀπασαν καὶ ὅποιο ἄν ἄλλοσσε βούλη. νῦν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρ-

όντι δεῦρ’ ἀφικόμενος ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακεί-

σεθαι, σὺ δ’ ἐν ὅποιο σχῆματι οἱ̇ ὑπὸ ῥάστα ἀνα-

γνώσεσθαι, τοῦθ’ ἐλόμενοι ἀναγίγνωσκη.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀκοῦε δή.

6. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὃς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων

231 ἀκήκοας: ἀξίω δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὃν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ὃν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὃν ἂν εὐ ποιήσωσιν,

ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος, ἐν ὁ μεταγινών προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ

ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ’ ἐκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἀρίστα περὶ τῶν

οἰκείων βουλεύσασιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν

αὐτῶν εὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρωτεῖ οὐκο-

ποὺσιν ἃ τε κακῶς διέθευτο τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν

ἐρῶτα καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὐ, καὶ ὃν εἰχον τόνον

Β προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδω-

κέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν

οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ

προφασίζεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους

ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας

διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι: ὅστε περιηρημένων τοσοῦ-

των κακῶν οὐδέν ὑπολείπεται ἀλλ’ ἡ ποιεῖν

προθύμως, ο’ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς οἴωνται πράξαντες

C χαριεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοὺς
PHAEDRUS

the trees won't teach me anything, and the people in
the city do. But you seem to have found the charm
to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals
by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or
some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before
me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica
and wherever else you please. So now that I have
come here, I intend to lie down, and do you choose
the position in which you think you can read most
easily, and read.

PHAEDRUS. Hear then.

You know what my condition is, and you have
heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange
these matters. And I claim that I ought not to
be refused what I ask because I am not your lover.
For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done
when their passion ceases; but there is no time when
non-lovers naturally repent. For they do kindnesses
to the best of their ability, not under compulsion,
but of their free will, according to their view of
their own best interest. And besides, lovers consider
the injury they have done to their own concerns on
account of their love, and the benefits they have
conferred, and they add the trouble they have had,
and so they think they have long ago made sufficient
return to the beloved; but non-lovers cannot aver
neglect of their own affairs because of their con-
dition, nor can they take account of the pains they
have been at in the past, nor lay any blame for
quarrels with their relatives; and so, since all these
evils are removed, there is nothing left for them but
to do eagerly what they think will please the beloved.
And besides, if lovers ought to be highly esteemed
ἐρώντας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὅτι τούτους μάλιστά φασί φιλεῖν ὅν ἀν ἐρώσειν καὶ ἔτοιμοι εἰσί καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρί-ζεσθαι, ῥάδιον γνῶναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὁςων ἀν ύστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιήσονται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εάν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσουσι. καὶ τοι πῶς εἰκός ἐστι τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι τοιαύτην

D ἐχοντι συμφοράν, ἢν οὔδ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν ούδεις ἐμπειροὶ ὧν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν· ὥστε πῶς ἢ εὐ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγήσαιτο περὶ ὧν οὗτω διακεῖμενοι βεβούλευνται; καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον αἱροῦ, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἄν σοι ἡ ἐκλεξίς εἰη’ εἰ δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτὸ ἐπιτηδεύοτατον, ἐκ πολλῶν.

Ε ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σής φιλίας.

7. Εἰ τοῖς τῶν νόμων τῶν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐείδος σοι 232 γένηται, εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας, οὕτως ἂν οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ξηλοῦσθαι ὦσπερ αὐτοὺς ὑφ’ αὐτῶν, ἐπαρθήμαι τῷ ἔχειν καὶ φιλοτιμομένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἄπαντας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρών- τας, κρέιττους αὐτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱρεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι.
because they say they have the greatest love for the objects of their passion, since both by word and deed they are ready to make themselves hated by others to please the beloved, it is easy to see that, if what they say is true, whenever they fall in love afterwards, they will care for the new love more than for the old and will certainly injure the old love, if that pleases the new. And how can one reasonably entrust matters of such importance to one who is afflicted with a disease such that no one of any experience would even try to cure it? For they themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind, and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves; and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? And if you were to choose the best from among your lovers, your choice would be limited to a few; whereas it would be made from a great number, if you chose the most congenial from non-lovers, so that you would have a better chance, in choosing among many, of finding the one most worthy of your affection.

Now if you are afraid of public opinion, and fear that if people find out your love affair you will be disgraced, consider that lovers, believing that others would be as envious of them as they are of others, are likely to be excited by possession and in their pride to show everybody that they have not toiled in vain; but the non-lovers, since they have control of their feelings, are likely to choose what is really best, rather than to court the opinion of mankind. Moreover, many are sure to notice and see the lovers going about with their beloved ones and making
καὶ ἰδεῖν, ἀκολουθοῦντας τοὺς ἔρωμένους καὶ ἔργον

B τούτῳ ποιουμένους, ὥστε ὅταν ὁφθώσι διαλεγόμενοι ἀλλήλους, τότε αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ μελλούσης ἐσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἔρωτας οὐδ’ αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαίον ἐστὶν ἢ διὰ φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δι’ ἀλλήν τινά ἡδονήν.

καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγομένῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένειν, καὶ ἀλλῷ μὲν τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινῆν ἄν φωτείρους καταστήναι τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δὲ σου ἄ

C περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ· μεγάλην δὴ ἡ σοι βλάβην ἄν γενέσθαι, εἰκότως δὴ τοὺς ἔρωτας μᾶλλον ἄν φοβοῖο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστὶ τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ πάντ’ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβη νομίζουσι γίγνεσθαι.

διότερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἔρωμένων συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν ὀυσίαν κεκτημένους, μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερβάλονται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους, μὴ συνέσει κρείττους γένωνται· τῶν δ’ ἀλλο τι κεκτημένων

D ἀγαθὸν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου φυλάττονται. πελασάντες μὲν οὖν ἀπέχθεσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἔρημιαν φίλων καθιστᾶσιν, ἡδ’ ἐὰν τὸ σεαυτῷ σκοτῶν ἀμείνου ἐκείνων φρονῆσι, ἣν εἰς αὐτοὺς εἰς διαφοράν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἔρωτες ἔτυχοι, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἀρετὴν ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἄν τοῖς συνοῦσι φθονοῖεν, ἀλλ’ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῦει, ἡγοῦμενοι σ’ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων μὲν ὑπερράσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ

1 ἄν inserted by Hirschig and Schanz.
2 δὴ here and after εἰκότως is inserted by Schanz for ἄν of BT.

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that their chief business, and so, when they are seen talking with each other, people think they are met in connexion with some love-matter either past or future; but no one ever thinks of finding fault with non-lovers because they meet, since everyone knows that one must converse with somebody, either because of friendship or because it is pleasant for some other reason. And then, too, if you are frightened by the thought that it is hard for friendship to last, and that under other circumstances any quarrel would be an equal misfortune to both, but that when you have surrendered what you prize most highly you would be the chief sufferer, it would be reasonable for you to be more afraid of the lovers; for they are pained by many things and they think everything that happens is done for the sake of hurting them. Therefore they prevent their loves from associating with other men, for they fear the wealthy, lest their money give them an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove superior in intellect; and they are on their guard against the influence of everyone who possesses any other good thing. If now they persuade you to incur the dislike of all these, they involve you in a dearth of friends, and if you consider your own interest and are more sensible than they, you will have to quarrel with them. But those who are not in love, but who have gained the satisfaction of their desires because of their merit, would not be jealous of those who associated with you, but would hate those who did not wish to do so, thinking that you are slighted by these last and benefited by the former, so that there is much more
Ε ὦφελεῖσθαι, ὡστε πολὺ πλεῖων ἐλπὶς φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔχθραν γενήσεσθαι.

8. Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώτων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἐγνώσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἐμπειροὶ ἐγένοντο, ὡστε ἀδήλου εἰ ἔτι βουλήσουσι φίλοι εἶναι,

233 ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν, οὐ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλους φίλοι ὡντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἔξ ὄν ἄν εὐ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκός ἐλάττω τῆς φιλίας αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μημεῖα καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτιών ὑπὸ προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἢ ἔραστῃ. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βελτιστὸν τὰ τὸ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαυνοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδίτεσ τὴ

Β ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γυγνόςκοντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται: δυστυχοῦντας μὲν, ἢ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιαρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν εὐτυχοὺντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἥδονῆς ἀξία παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυχχάνειν: ὡστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἁλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἡ ξηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἥδονὴν θεραπεύουν συνεσομαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν

C μέλλουσαν ὦφελίαν ἐσεσθαι, οὕτως ὑπ’ ἐρωτοὶς ἤττώμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, ὡδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἵσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιροῦμενος, ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως διλύγνῃ ὄργῃ ποιοῦμενος, τῶν μὲν ἄκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἐκούσια πειρόμενος ἀποτρέπειν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλίας πολὺν χρόνου ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δ’ ἄρα σοὶ τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὕχ οἶδον τε ἵσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι,
likelihood that they will gain friendship than enmity from their love-affair with you.

And then, too, many lovers are moved by physical passion before they know the character or have become acquainted with the connexions of the beloved, so that it is uncertain whether they will wish to be your friends after their passion has ceased. But in the case of those who are not in love, who were your friends before entering into the closer relation, the favours received are not likely to make the friendship less, but will remain as pledges of future joys. And then, too, it will be better for your character to yield to me than to a lover. For lovers praise your words and acts beyond due measure, partly through fear of incurring your displeasure, and partly because their own judgment is obscured by their passion. For such are the exhibitions of the power of Love: he makes the unsuccessful lovers think that things are grievous which cause no pain to others, and he compels the successful to praise what ought not to give pleasure; therefore those whom they love are more to be pitied than envied. But if you yield to me, I shall consort with you, not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future advantage also, not being overcome by passion but in full control of myself, and not taking up violent enmity because of small matters, but slowly gathering little anger when the transgressions are great, forgiving involuntary wrongs and trying to prevent intentional ones; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will endure for a long time. But if you have a notion that friendship cannot be firm
PLATO

D ἐὰν μὴ τις ἔρων τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς νίεῖς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιοῦμεθα οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ' ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οὐ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόναςιν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐπιτηδεύματος.

9. 'Ετι δὲ εἰ χρή τοὺς δεομένους μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἄλλα τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὐ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἰσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ιδίαις δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἄλλα τοὺς προσαίτουντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησιμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσονται καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἔπε τὰς θύρας ἥξουσιν καὶ μάλιστα ἥσθησονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἰσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. ἀλλ' ἵσως προσήκει οὐ τοὺς σφόδρα δεομένους χαρίζεσθαι, ἄλλα τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένους· οὐδὲ τοῖς προσαίτουσι μόνον, ἄλλα τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἅξιοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς 234 ὥρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδόσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἱ διαπρεξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἀπαντᾶσι σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὅλιγοις χρόνον σπουδάζοντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλους ἐσομένους· οὐδὲ οἱ τινες πανόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἑχθρὰς πρόφασιν ἕξησουσιν, ἀλλ' Β οἱ παυσαμένοις τῆς ὥρας τὸτε τὴν αὐτῶν ἄρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται· σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρωταίς οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὅντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος,
unless one is in love, you should bear in mind that in that case we should not have great affection for sons or for fathers and mothers, nor should we possess faithful friends who have been gained not through passion but through associations of a different kind.

Besides, if you ought to grant favours to those who ask for them most eagerly, you ought in other matters also to confer benefits, not on the best, but on the most needy; for they will be most grateful, since they are relieved of the greatest ills. And then, too, at private entertainments you ought not to invite your friends, but beggars and those who need a meal; for they will love you and attend you and come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful, and will call down many blessings upon your head. Perhaps, however, you ought not to grant favours to those who beg for them, but to those who are most able to repay you; and not to those who ask merely, but to the most deserving; and not to those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but to those who will share their good things with you when you are older; and not to those who, when they have succeeded, will boast to others of their success, but to those who will modestly keep it a secret from all; and not to those who will be enamoured for a little while, but to those who will be your friends for life; and not to those who will seek a pretext for a quarrel when their passion has died out, but to those who will show their own merit when your youth is passed. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and bear this also in mind, that lovers are admonished by their friends, who think
τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν οὔδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμυγατο ὡς διὰ τούτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἑαυτῶν.

'Ισως μὲν οὖν ἂν ἔροιό με, εἰ ἀπασίν σοι παρανῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρώσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ οἷμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἐρώντα πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρώντας ταύτην ἐχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ¹ λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἦσσον ἄξιον, οὔτε σοι βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατὸν· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἄπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὥφελιαν δὲ ἀμφότερον γίγνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἰκανὰ μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα. εἰ δέ τι ² σὺ ποθεῖς, ἥγουμενος παραλελείφθαι, ἐρώτα.

10. Τί σοι φαίνεται, οὐ Σώκρατες, ο λόγος; οὐχ ¹ ύπερφυῶς τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς οὖν ὁμοίως εἰρήσθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὁ ἑταίρε, οὕστε με ἐκπλαγήναι. καὶ τούτῳ ἐγὼ ἐπαθὼν διὰ σὲ, ὃ Φαιδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, ὦτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι υπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων. ἡγούμενος γὰρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαίειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοι εἰπόμην, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐιεν· οὐτω δὴ δοκεῖ ³ παίξειν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκῶ γὰρ σοι παίξειν καὶ οὖχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μηδαμῶς, οΣώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπὲ πρὸς Δίος φιλίου, οὐεὶ ἂν τινα ἐχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐτερα τούτων μεῖζω καὶ πλεῖω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

¹ λόγῳ B. Omitted by Schanz.
² δέ τι BT. δ' ήτι τι Schanz, following Heindorf.
³ δὴ δοκεῖ T. δὴ B. δεί, Schanz.
their way of life is bad, but no relative ever blamed a non-lover for bad management of his own interests on account of that condition.

Perhaps you may ask me if I advise you to grant favours to all non-lovers. But I think the lover would not urge you to be so disposed toward all lovers either; for the favour, if scattered broadcast, is not so highly prized by the rational recipient, nor can you, if you wish, keep your relations with one hidden from the rest. But from love no harm ought to come, but benefit to both parties. Now I think I have said enough. But if you feel any lack, or think anything has been omitted, ask questions.

What do you think of the discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful, especially in diction?

Socrates. More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.

Phaedrus. Indeed! So you see fit to make fun of it?

Socrates. Do I seem to you to be joking and not to be in earnest?

Phaedrus. Do not jest, Socrates, but, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, tell me truly, do you think any other of the Greeks could speak better or more copiously than this on the same subject?


**ΣΠΙΣΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Τι δε; και ταύτη δεί υπ’ εμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπανεβήναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνη μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἔκαστα τῶν ὅνωμάτων ἀποτελοῦνται; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σην, ἐπει ἐμὲ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας. τὸ γὰρ ῥητορικὸν αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον, τούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν ὥμην λυσίαν οίσθαι ἵκανον εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὁ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δίς καὶ τρῖς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὖ πάνω εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλά λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἵσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ὡς οἶδο τε ὄν ταύτα ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἀριστα.

**ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.** Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὁ Σπίσκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ καὶ μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ εὐόντων ἀξίως ῥηθήναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὡστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνων εἰρημένα μηδὲν ἄν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλεῖον καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.

**ΣΠΙΣΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Τούτῳ ἐγὼ σοι ὀυκέτι οἶδο τε ἐσομαι πιθέσθαι. παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσι με, εάν σοι χαριζόμενος συγχωρῶ.

**ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.** Τίνες οὐτοί; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

11. **ΣΠΙΣΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν δήλον δὲ ὧτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἢ ποιον Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαίρομενος λέγω; πληρές πως, ὃ δαμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθά-

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1 ἀξίως BT. ἀξίων Madvig, followed by Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. What? Are you and I to praise the discourse because the author has said what he ought, and not merely because all the expressions are clear and well rounded and finely turned? For if that is expected, I must grant it for your sake, since, because of my stupidity, I did not notice it. I was attending only to the rhetorical manner, and I thought even Lysias himself would not think that satisfactory. It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

PHAEDRUS. Nonsense, Socrates! Why that is the especial merit of the discourse. He has omitted none of the points that belong to the subject, so that nobody could ever speak about it more exhaustively or worthily than he has done.

SOCRATES. There I must cease to agree with you; for the wise men and women of old, who have spoken and written about these matters, will rise up to confute me, if, to please you, I assent.

PHAEDRUS. Who are they? and where have you heard anything better than this?

SOCRATES. I cannot say, just at this moment; but I certainly must have heard something, either from the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps from some prose writers. What ground have I for saying so? Why, my dear friend, I feel that my own
νομαὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ἀν ἐχεῖν εἰπεῖν ἔτερα μὴ χείρῳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρὰ γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννευό-
ηκα, ἐν οἴδα, συνειδῶς ἐμαυτῶ ἀμαθίαν λείπεται
δὴ, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς
ἀκοῆς πεπληρωσθαὶ με δίκην ἀγγείον· ὑπὸ δὲ
νωθείας αὐ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέξημαι, ὅπως τε
καὶ ὧν τιων ἥκουσα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλ', ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἰρη-
κας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοι ὧν τιων μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἥκουσας,
μηδ' ἀν κελεύω εἰπης, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ὁ λέγεις
ποίησον τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ
ἐλάττω ἔτερα ὑπόσχει εἰπεῖν, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος.
καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπισχυό-
μαι χρυσὴν εἰκόνα ἐσομάκρυτον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθή-
σειν, οὐ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φίλτατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς,
ὅ Φαίδρε, εἰ με οὐεί λέγειν ὡς Δυσίας τοῦ παντὸς
ἡμάρτηκε, καὶ οἶον τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἄλλα
εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἀν τὸν φαυλότατον
παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περί οὐ ὁ λόγος, τίνα
οὗει λέγοντα ως χρῆ μὴ ἔρωτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρωτὶ
χαρίζεσθαι, παρέντα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκο-
μαξειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαία γοῦν
ὄντα, εἰτ' ἂλλ' ἄττα ἐξεῖν λέγειν; ἂλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ
μὲν τοιαῦτα ἑατέα καὶ συγγρωστέα λέγοντι· καὶ
tῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὐρεσίν ἄλλα τὴν διάθε-
σιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλε-
pῶν εὐρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὐρεσίν.

12. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συγχωρῶ ὁ λέγεις· μετρίως γάρ
μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτως

1 υποσχέσαι: BT, ἐπιχειρεῖ Schanz. The reading in the text
was first suggested by Wex.
bosom is full, and that I could make another speech, different from this and quite as good. Now I am conscious of my own ignorance, and I know very well that I have never invented these things myself, so the only alternative is that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the well springs of another; but, again because of my stupidity, I have forgotten how and from whom I heard it.

PHAEDRUS. Most noble Socrates, that is splendid! Don't tell, even if I beg you, how or from whom you heard it; only do as you say; promise to make another speech better than that in the book and no shorter and quite different. Then I promise, like the nine archons, to set up at Delphi a statue as large as life, not only of myself, but of you also.

Socrates. You are a darling and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing that he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst writer. For example, to take the subject of his speech, who do you suppose, in arguing that the non-lover ought to be more favoured than the lover, could omit praise of the non-lover's calm sense and blame of the lover's unreason, which are inevitable arguments, and then say something else instead? No, such arguments, I think, must be allowed and excused; and in these the arrangement, not the invention, is to be praised; but in the case of arguments which are not inevitable and are hard to discover, the invention deserves praise as well as the arrangement.

PHAEDRUS. I concede your point, for I think what you say is reasonable. So I will make this concession:
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Β τὸ μὲν τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ μὴ ἔρωντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δῶσοι σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἔτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος άξια εἰπὼν τῶν Λυσίου, παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρῆλατος εὖ Ὀλυμπίας στάθητι. ¹

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡσποῦδακας, ὁ Φαίδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἐρεσχηλῶν σε, καὶ οίει δὴ μὲ ώς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἐτερὸν τι ποικιλώτερον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὃ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας λαβάς ἐλήλυθας. ῥητέον μὲν γὰρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως οἶός τε εἰ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κομωδών φορτικόν πράγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις, εὐλαβήσθητι ² καὶ μὴ βούλων με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἑκεῖνο τὸ εἰ ἑγώ, ὡς Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἁγιόω, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἑθρύπτετο δὲ ἀλλὰ διανοήσθητι ὅτι ἐντεύθεν οὐκ ἀπίμεν, πρὶν ἄν σὺ εἰπης ἁ ἐφησθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ μόνω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, ἴσχυρότερος δὲ ἑγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δ ε ἀπάντων τούτων ἔχεις σοι λέγω, καὶ μηδαμῶς πρὸς βλας βουληθῆς μᾶλλον ἥ ἑκὼν λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ', ὃ μακάριε Φαίδρε, γελοίος ἐσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιήτην ἱδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιαζών περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οἶσθ' ώς ἔχει: παῦσαι πρὸς με καλωπιζόμενος' σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκᾶσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μηδαμῶς τούνυν εἰπης.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὃ δὲ μοι

¹ στάθητι BT, ἐσταθὶ Schanz following Cobet.
² Schanz, following Cobet, omits εὐλαβήσθητι.
PHAEDRUS

I will allow you to begin with the premise that the lover is more distraught than the non-lover; and if you speak on the remaining points more copiously and better than Lysias, without saying the same things, your statue of beaten metal shall stand at Olympia beside the offering of the Cypselids.

SOCRATES. Have you taken my jest in earnest, Phaedrus, because, to tease you, I laid hands on your beloved, and do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the rhetoric of Lysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?

PHAEDRUS. Now, my friend, you have given me a fair hold; for you certainly must speak as best you can, lest we be compelled to resort to the comic "you're another"; be careful and do not force me to say "O Socrates, if I don't know Socrates, I have forgotten myself," and "he yearned to speak, but feigned coyness." Just make up your mind that we are not going away from here until you speak out what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger and younger than you; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and speak voluntarily, rather than under compulsion.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art.

PHAEDRUS. Now listen to me. Stop trying to fool me; for I can say something which will force you to speak.

SOCRATES. Then pray don't say it.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, but I will. And my saying shall
λόγος ὁρκὸς ἔσται ὁμοῦ ἀλλ' σοι—τίνα μέντοι,
Ε τίνα θεῶν; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; ἢ
μὴν, εάν μοι μὴ εἰπὴς τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
ταύτης, μηδέποτέ σοι ἑτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς
ἐπιδείξειν μηδ' ἐξαγγελεῖν.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βαβάι, ὃ μιαρέ, ὡς εὕ ἀνεύρες
τὴν ἀνώγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν ὃ ἄν κελεύῃς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δήτα ἔχων στρέφει;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σύ γε ταῦτα
ὁμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἄν οἶός τ' εἴην τοιαύτης
θούνης ἀπέχεσθαι;

237 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἰσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦ πέρι;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡγκαλυφήμενος ἔρω, ἣν ὃ τι τάχι-
στα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον, καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ
ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ ὅπως βούλει
ποίει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄγετε δή, ὃ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ὕδης
εἴδος λέγεις, εἴτε διὰ γένους μουσικὸν τὸ Διογύς
ταύτην ἐσχετε τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε
τοῦ μύθου, ὃν μὲ ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὕτος
Β λέγειν, ᾗν ὃ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν
tούτῳ σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξη.

'Ἡν οὐτὸ δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα
καλὸς τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἑράσται πάνυ πολλοί. εἰς
dὲ τις αὐτῶν αἴμυλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἦττον ἐρῶν
ἐπεπείκει τὸν παιδά ὃς οὐκ ἑρῴη καὶ ποτε αὐτὸν

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PHAEDRUS

be an oath. I swear to you by—by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

SOCRATES. Oh! Oh! You wretch! How well you found out how to make a lover of discourse do your will!

PHAEDRUS. Then why do you try to get out of it?

SOCRATES. I won’t any more, since you have taken this oath; for how could I give up such pleasures?

PHAEDRUS. Speak then.

SOCRATES. Do you know what I’m going to do?

PHAEDRUS. About what?

SOCRATES. I’m going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk, that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed.

PHAEDRUS. Only speak, and in other matters suit yourself.

SOCRATES. Come then, O tuneful Muses, whether ye receive this name from the quality of your song or from the musical race of the Ligyans, grant me your aid in the tale this most excellent man compels me to relate, that his friend whom he has hitherto considered wise, may seem to him wiser still.

Now there was once upon a time a boy, or rather a stripling, of great beauty: and he had many lovers. And among these was one of peculiar craftiness, who was as much in love with the boy as anyone, but had made him believe that he was not in love; and once in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that favours ought to be granted rather
αἱτῶν ἐπειθεὶς τοῦτόν αὐτόν, ὥς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἔρωντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέν τε ὁ δὲ:

14. Περὶ παντὸς, ὁ παί, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλ.

 Plato
to the non-lover than to the lover; and his words were as follows:—

There is only one way, dear boy, for those to begin who are to take counsel wisely about anything. One must know what the counsel is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile, but most people are ignorant of the fact that they do not know the nature of things. So, supposing that they do know it, they come to no agreement in the beginning of their enquiry, and as they go on they reach the natural result,—they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Now you and I must not fall into the error which we condemn in others, but, since we are to discuss the question, whether the lover or the non-lover is to be preferred let us first agree on a definition of love, its nature and its power, and then, keeping this definition in view and making constant reference to it, let us enquire whether love brings advantage or harm. Now everyone sees that love is a desire; and we know too that non-lovers also desire the beautiful. How then are we to distinguish the lover from the non-lover? We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead; one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms; and whichever of these forms is most marked
οὔτε τινὰ καλήν οὔτε ἐπαξίαν κεκτήσθαι.1 περὶ
μὲν γὰρ ἔδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου
Β καὶ τῶν ἅλλων ἐπιθυμῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστρομαργία
te καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτικόν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέ-
ξεται· περὶ δ’ αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσα, τὸν κεκτη-
μένον ταύτη ἁγούσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσ-
ρήματος· καὶ τὰλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ
ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμῶν ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυνα-
στενοῦσης ἤ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ὃς δ’
ἔνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εὐρήται, σχεδὸν μὲν
ηὐη φανερὸν, λεχθέν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθέν πᾶν πῶς
σαφέστερον· ἢ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ
C ὀρθὸν ὀρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἠδονήν
ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὐ τῶν ἑαυτῆς
συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἔρρω-
μένως ῥωσθεῖσα νυκήσασα ἀγωγὴ, ἀπ’ αὑτῆς τῆς
ῥόμης ἐπωνυμίαι λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.
15. Ἅταρ, ὡς φίλε Φαίδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὡσπερ
ἔμαυτῷ, θείων πάθος πεποιθέναι;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὡ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ
eἰωθὸς εὐροία τῆς σε ἐἰληφεῖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σιγῆ τοιοῦν μου ἀκουε· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ
D θείως ἐοικεν ὁ τότος εἶναι· ὡστε ἐὰν ἀρα πολλάκις
νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένομαι, μὴ
θαυμάσης· τὰ ἴνν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων
φθέγγομαι.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων μὲντοι σὺ αἴτιος· ἀλλὰ τὰ
λοιπὰ ἀκοε· ἵνως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράπητο τὸ ἐπίον.
gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honourable, to him who possesses it. For example, if the desire for food prevails over the higher reason and the other desires, it is called gluttony, and he who possesses it will be called by the corresponding name of glutton, and again, if the desire for drink becomes the tyrant and leads him who possesses it toward drink, we know what he is called; and it is quite clear what fitting names of the same sort will be given when any desire akin to these acquires the rule. The reason for what I have said hitherto is pretty clear by this time, but everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken; so I say that the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force, and is called love.  

Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency.

SOCRATES. Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambs.

PHAEDRUS. That is very true.

SOCRATES. You are responsible for that; but hear what follows; for perhaps the attack may be averted.

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1 This somewhat fanciful statement is based on a supposed etymological connexion between ἐρως and ἴμη, ἐρωμένως, ὅσθεῖσα.
ταύτα μὲν ὁνὶ θεῷ μελήσει, ἕμιν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἵτεον.

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε· δὲ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὅπερ οὔ βουλευτέοις, εἰρήταί τε καὶ ὄρισται, βλέποντες δὲ 

Ε δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγομεν, τίς ὦφελία ἢ 
βλάβη ἀπὸ τε ἔρωτος καὶ μὴ τῷ χαρίζομένῳ ἐξ 

εἰκότος συμβῆσει τα. 

Τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντι 

τε ἡδονή ἀνάγκη ποὺ τὸν ἐρώμενον ὑδὶ εἰστον 

ἐαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ 
μὴ ἀντιτεῖνον, κρείττον δὲ καὶ ἵσον ἔχθρόν. οὐ 

δὴ κρείττω οὔτε ἰσούμενον ἐκών ἐραστῆς παι- 

δικά ἀνέξεται, ἢττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεστερον ἀεὶ ἀπεργάζεται: ἢττων δὲ ἀμαθῆς σοφῶν, δειλὸς ἀνδρείον, ἀδύνατον εἰπείν ῥητορικόν, βραδὺς ἀγχίνον. τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἐτὶ πλειώνων κατὰ 

τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γιγνομένων 

τε καὶ φύσει ἐνοῦτων, τῶν μὲν ἥδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ 

παρασκευάζειν, ἦ στέρεσθαι τοῦ παραυτίκα ἥδεος. 

Β φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων 

συνοσιῶν ἀπείροντα καὶ ὑφελίμων, ὅθεν ἄν 

μάλιστ' ἄνηρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αὐτίοιν εἶναι 

βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἄν φρονιμῶτατος 

εἰη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὅν, ἡς 

ἐραστὴν παιδικά ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἰργεῖν, περὶ- 

φοβοῦ ὅντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι· τὰ τε ἄλλα 

μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἄν ἡ πάντα ἄγνωσι καὶ πάντα 

ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστὴν, ὦρος ὄν τῷ μὲν 

C ἥδιστος, ἐαυτῷ1 δὲ βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἰη. τὰ μὲν 

1 ἐαυτῷ T Stobaeus: τῷ ἐαυτῷ Β Schanz.
That, however, is in the hands of God; we must return to our boy.

Well then, my dearest, what the subject is, about which we are to take counsel, has been said and defined, and now let us continue, keeping our attention fixed upon that definition, and tell what advantage or harm will naturally come from the lover or the non-lover to him who grants them his favours.

He who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will inevitably desire to make his beloved as pleasing to himself as possible. Now to one who is of unsound mind everything is pleasant which does not oppose him, but everything that is better or equal is hateful. So the lover will not, if he can help it, endure a beloved who is better than himself or his equal, but always makes him weaker and inferior; but the ignorant is inferior to the wise, the coward to the brave, the poor speaker to the eloquent, the slow of wit to the clever. Such mental defects, and still greater than these, in the beloved will necessarily please the lover, if they are implanted by Nature, and if they are not, he must implant them or be deprived of his immediate enjoyment. And he is of necessity jealous and will do him great harm by keeping him from many advantageous associations, which would most tend to make a man of him, especially from that which would do most to make him wise. This is divine philosophy, and from it the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised; and he will contrive to keep him ignorant of everything else and make him look to his lover for everything, so that he will be most agreeable to him and most harmful to himself. In respect to
οὐν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

16. Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἔξιν τε καὶ θεραπεῖαν οίαν τε καὶ ὃς θεραπεύεισι ὦν ἄν γνέφηται κύριος, ὃς ἦδυ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἴναγκασται διώκειν, δεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὁφθήσεται δὲ 1 μαλθακὸν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεόν διώκων, οὕτ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένου ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμυγεῖ σκιά, πόνον μὲν ἄνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἀπειρον, ἐμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διάλητης, ἀλλοτρίως χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, ὁσα τε ἄλλα τούτως ἐπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ἡ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀρισμένοις ἐπ' ἄλλο ἱέαν: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σώμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις ὅσαι μεγάλαι οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ θαρροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἔρασται φοβοῦνται.

Τούτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἐστέειν, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ἔρητεν, τίνα ἡμῖν ὕψελλαν ἡ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἢ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὁμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφὲς δὴ τοῦτο γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὦτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνοοστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὅρθαιον πρὸ παντὸς εὐξαίτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν ἐρωμένον· πατρός γὰρ καὶ μητρός καὶ ἕνεγκενω καὶ φίλων στέρεσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δεξαίτο, διακωλυτάς καὶ ἐπιτιμητάς ἤγοιμένος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ύστειν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως οὔτ' εὖάλωτον ὁμοίως οὔτε ἀλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγιστέαι: ἐξ' οὗ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν ύστειν κεκτημένοις,

1 δὲ BT, δὴ Schanz following Hirschig.
Phaedrus

the intellect, then, a man in love is by no means a profitable guardian or associate.

We must next consider how he who is forced to follow pleasure and not good will keep the body of him whose master he is, and what care he will give to it. He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worth while to describe further. We can sum it all up briefly and pass on. A person with such a body, in war and in all important crises, gives courage to his enemies, and fills his friends, and even his lovers themselves, with fear.

This may be passed over as self-evident, but the next question, what advantage or harm the intercourse and guardianship of the lover will bring to his beloved in the matter of his property, must be discussed. Now it is clear to everyone, and especially to the lover, that he would desire above all things to have his beloved bereft of the dearest and kindest and holiest possessions; for he would wish him to be deprived of father, mother, relatives and friends, thinking that they would hinder and censure his most sweet intercourse with him. But he will also think that one who has property in money or other possessions will be less easy to catch and when caught will be less manageable; wherefore the lover must necessarily begrudge his beloved the possession of
PLATO

ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἐτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον, ἀπαιδα, ἀοικον ὁ τι πλείστον χρόνον παιδικά ἐραστῆς εὐξαίτ' ἀν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ ἡλικὺ ὡς πλείστον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

17. Ἐστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀλλα κακά, ἀλλά τις Β δαίμον ἐμιζὲ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραντική ἡδονήν, οἶνον κόλακόν, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὦμως ἐπέμιξεν ἢ φύσις ἡδονῆς τινα οὐκ ἀμοσίον, καὶ τις ἐξαιρέαν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἃν, καὶ ἀλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηθευμάτων, οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδί- στοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει: παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐραστῆς πρὸς

C τῷ βλαβερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἄνδρόνταν. ἡλικα γάρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τῶν ἡλικια. ἡ γάρ, οἴμαι, χρόνου ἱσότης ἐπ' ἱσας ἡδονᾶς ἄγουσα δ' ὀμοιοτήτᾳ φιλίαν παρέχεται: ἀλλ' ὄμως κόρον γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνουσία ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀναγκαίον αὖ βαρὺ παντὶ πάν λέγεται: ὥ δὴ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιοτήτι μάλιστα ἐραστῆς πρὸς παιδικά ἔχει. νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνῶν οὔθ' ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτός ἱκών

D ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οὕστρον ἐλαύνεται, δς ἐκεῖνω μὲν ἡδονᾶς αἰὲ διδοὺς ἄγει ὀρώντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀπτομένῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἀισθανομένῳ τοῦ ἑρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν τῳ δὲ δὴ ἑρωμένῳ ποῖον παραμύθιον ἢ τίνας ἡδονᾶς διδοὺς ποιήσει τὸν ἱσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἐσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἑρίδιας; ὀρώντι μὲν ὄψιν πρεσβύτεραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ, ἐπομένων δὲ τῶν ἀλλων ταύτη, ἢ καὶ

E λογὶς ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπεῖ, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἑργῷ ἀνάγκης αἰὲ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι. φυλα-
property and rejoice at its loss. Moreover the lover would wish his beloved to be as long as possible unmarried, childless, and homeless, since he wishes to enjoy as long as possible what is pleasant to himself. Now there are also other evils, but God has mingled with most of them some temporary pleasure; so, for instance, a flatterer is a horrid creature and does great harm, yet Nature has combined with him a kind of pleasure that is not without charm, and one might find fault with a courtesan as an injurious thing, and there are many other such creatures and practices which are yet for the time being very pleasant; but a lover is not only harmful to his beloved but extremely disagreeable to live with as well. The old proverb says, "birds of a feather flock together"; that is, I suppose, equality of age leads them to similar pleasures and through similarity begets friendship; and yet even they grow tired of each other's society. Now compulsion of every kind is said to be oppressive to every one, and the lover not only is unlike his beloved, but he exercises the strongest compulsion. For he is old while his love is young, and he does not leave him day or night, if he can help it, but is driven by the sting of necessity, which urges him on, always giving him pleasure in seeing, hearing, touching, and by all his senses perceiving his beloved, so that he is glad to serve him constantly. But what consolation or what pleasure can he give the beloved? Must not this protracted intercourse bring him to the uttermost disgust, as he looks at the old, unlovely face, and other things to match, which it is not pleasant even to hear about, to say nothing of being constantly compelled to come into contact with them? And he
κάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένω διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἑπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκοῦντι, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν σὺν ἀνεκτούς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἴόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἑπαίσχεις ¹ παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη χρωμένου.

18. Καὶ ἔρων μὲν βλαβερὸς τε καὶ ἂνδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνου ἁπιστος, εἰς ὅν πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὄρκων τε καὶ δεήσεων ύπισχυούμενος μόνιμα κατείχε τὴν ἐν τῷ τότε ἕμνουσίαν ἐπίτινον φέρειν δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν, τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγονὼς λέληθεν τὰ παιδικά. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν χύριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ύπομιμήσκων τὰ πραγμένα καὶ λεξέντα, ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾷ ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, ὡθ' ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοίητον ἄρχης ὀρκῳμοσία τε καὶ Β ύποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσει ἔχει, νοῦν ἣδη ἐσχῆκως καὶ σεσωφρονικώς, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταύτα τῷ πρόσθεν ὄμοιος τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγάς δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπεστηρικώς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἔραστής, ὁστράκων μεταπεσόντως, ἵπται φυγή μεταβαλὼν· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων, ἠγονοκὼς τὸ ἀπαν ἔξ ἄρχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἑδεὶ ποτὲ ἔρωτι καὶ ὑπ' Σ ἀνάγκης ἀνοίητω χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον

¹ ἑπαίσχεις Schanz following Heindorf, ἐπ' αἰσχεὶ BT.
is suspiciously guarded in all ways against everybody, and has to listen to untimely and exaggerated praises and to reproaches which are unendurable when the man is sober, and when he is in his cups and indulges in wearisome and unrestrained freedom of speech become not only unendurable but disgusting.

And while he is in love he is harmful and disagreeable, but when his love has ceased he is thereafter false to him whom he formerly hardly induced to endure his wearisome companionship through the hope of future benefits by making promises with many prayers and oaths. But now that the time of payment has come he has a new ruler and governor within him, sense and reason in place of love and madness, and has become a different person; but of this his beloved knows nothing. He asks of him a return for former favours, reminding him of past sayings and doings, as if he were speaking to the same man; but the lover is ashamed to say that he has changed, and yet he cannot keep the oaths and promises he made when he was ruled by his former folly, now that he has regained his reason and come to his senses, lest by doing what he formerly did he become again what he was. He runs away from these things, and the former lover is compelled to become a defaulter. The shell has fallen with the other side up; and he changes his part and runs away; and the other is forced to run after him in anger and with imprecations, he who did not know at the start that he ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reason-

1 This refers to a game played with oyster shells, in which the players ran away or pursued as the shell fell with one or the other side uppermost.
μὴ ἔρωντι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰ δὲ μη, ἀναγκαίον εἰς ἑνδοὺναί αὐτὸν ἀπίστω, δυσκόλω, φθονερῷ, ἀνήδει, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαι, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἑξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ὃς οὔτε ἄνθρωποι οὔτε θεοὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώτερον οὔτε ἔστων οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. ταῦτά τε οὖν χρῆ, ὡ παῖ, ἔξυπνοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὃτι οὐ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπου, χάριν πλησμονῆς,

D ὥς λύκοι ἄρν ἀγαπῶσ᾽, ὡς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

19. Τούτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, ὁ Φαίδρε. οὐκέτ᾽ ἀν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢδη σοὶ τέλος ἐχέτω ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καίτοι φὸην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἔρειν τὰ ἵσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἔρωντος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκεῖνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὁσ᾽ αὐ ἔχει ἀγαθά· νῦν δὲ δή, ὁ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύει;

Ε ἙΚΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἤσθον, ὁ μακάριε, ὃτι ἢδη ἐπὶ φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐπαινεῦν τὸν ἐτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οὔει ποιήσειν; ἀρ' οἰσθ᾽ ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προὐβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἐνι λόγῳ, ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἐτέρον λελοιδορή- καμεν, τῶ ἐτέρῳ τάναντα τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστο; καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἄμφοτέρι ἰκανῶς εἰρηται. καὶ οὔτω δή ὁ μῦθος, ὃ τι πάσχειν

242 προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται καγὼ τὸν ποταμὸν

1 δυσκόλῳ φθονερῷ omitted by Schanz, following Spengel.
2 λέγων BT, λέγονθ᾽ Schanz.
able non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harmful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher importance in truth either in heaven or on earth. These things, dear boy, you must bear in mind, and you must know that the fondness of the lover is not a matter of goodwill, but of appetite which he wishes to satisfy:

Just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover adores his beloved.

There it is, Phaedrus! Do not listen to me any longer; let my speech end here.

PHAEDRUS. But I thought you were in the middle of it, and would say as much about the non-lover as you have said about the lover, to set forth all his good points and show that he ought to be favoured. So now, Socrates, why do you stop?

SOCRATES. Did you not notice, my friend, that I am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithyrambs, even though I am finding fault with the lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you purposely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the advantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover. Why make a long speech? I have said enough about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as
τούτον διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

Φαίδρος. Μήτω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἀν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ; ἢ ὃιχ ὄρις ὡς σχεδὸν ἦδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται; ἠ ἀλλὰ περιμείναντες, καὶ ἁμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἤμεν.

Σώκρατες. Θείος γ’ εἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαίδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ

B τῶν ἔπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενήθη τί οὐκ αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἐνὶ γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Σιμμίαν Θηβαίου ἐξαιρώ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς· καὶ νῦν αὐτοὶ άιτίδος μοι γεγενήθη λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθήναι.

Φαίδρος. Οὐ πόλεμον γε ἀγγέλλεις· ἠ ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

20. Σώκρατες. Ἦνικ’ ἐμελλὼν, ὦ γαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμονίον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς

C σημείον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δὲ με ἐπίσχει, ὅ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν—καὶ τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκούσαι, ἢ με οὕκ ἐὰν ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἄν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θείον. εἰμὶ δὲ οὐν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαίος, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαύλοι, ὡς οὐν μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνῳ ἰκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἦδη μανθάνω τὸ ἀμάρτημα. ὡς δὴ τοι, ὡ ἔταιρε, μαντικόν γε τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή ἔμε γὰρ ἐθραξεῖ μέν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καὶ πῶς ἐδυσποτούμην κατ’

1 After ἵσταται BT have ἦδη (ἡ δὴ τ., Stobaeus) καλομέμενη σταθερά, “which is called noontide,” which Schanz brackets.
2 Schanz follows Heindorf in bracketing ἀεὶ . . . πράττειν.
it may; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me.

**Phaedrus.** Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don’t you see that it is already almost noon? Let us stay and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

**Socrates.** Phaedrus, you are simply a superhuman wonder as regards discourses! I believe no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me.

**Phaedrus.** That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse?

**Socrates.** My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came—it always holds me back from something I am about to do—and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes; so now I understand my error. How prophetic the soul is, my friend! For all along, while I was speaking my discourse, something troubled
D Ἅρων, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς ἀμβλακῶν τιμᾶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψων νῦν δ' ἤσθημαι τὸ ἀμάρτημα. 

φαιδρος. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί; 

σωκράτης. Δεινών, ὦ Φαιδρε, δεινῶν λόγου αὐτὸς τε ἐκόμισας ἐμὲ τε ἡνάγκασας εἰπεῖν. 

φαιδρος. Πῶς δὴ; 

σωκράτης. Εὐήθη καὶ ὑπὸ τι ἀσεβὴς οὗ τίς ἂν εἰη δεινότερος; 

φαιδρος. Οὐδεὶς, εἰ γε σὺ ἄληθῆ λέγεις. 

σωκράτης. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἑρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἰγεῖ; 

φαιδρος. Λέγεται γε δὴ. 

σωκράτης. Οὐ τι ὑπὸ γε Δυσίον, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ε σοῦ λόγου, δς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρ-μακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δ' ἐστιν, ὦσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὁ Ἑρως, οὐδὲν ἃν κακὸν εἰη τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τῷ νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄντος. ταύτη τε οὖν ἡμαρτανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἑρωτα, ἔτι τε ἐνήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνω ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγίες λέγοντε μηδὲ ἄληθὲς σεμνύνεσθαι ὡς τι ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκη ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογιῶν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαιος, ὅν"Ομηρος μὲν οὐκ ἤσθετο, Στησίχορος δὲ. τῶν γὰρ ὀμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἡγνόησεν ὦσπερ "Ομηρος, ἀλλ'
me, and "I was distressed," as Ibycus says, "lest I be buying honour among men by sinning against the gods." But now I have seen my error.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that?

PHAEDRUS. Nothing, if you are right about it.

SOCRATES. Well, do you not believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite and is a god?

PHAEDRUS. So it is said.

SOCRATES. Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched. If Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil. So then they sinned against Love; but their foolishness was really very funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honour among them. Now I, my friend, must purify myself; and for those who have sinned in matters of mythology there is an ancient purification, unknown to Homer, but known to Stesichorus. For when he was stricken with blindness for speaking ill of Helen, he was not, like Homer, ignorant of the reason, but

1 Fragment 24, Bergk.
Πλάτων: Ούκ εστί έτυμος λόγος ούτος, ούδε έβας εν νησίων εύσέλμοις, ούδέ ἵκεο.

Πέργαμο Τροίας:
καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλομέμενην παλινωδίαν παραχρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφότερος ἐκείνων γενήσομαι κατ’ αὐτό γε τούτο πρὶν γάρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἐρωτός κακηγορίαν πειράσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινωδίαν, γυμνὴ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὖν ὡσπερ τότε ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

Φαίδρος. Τοῦτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄττ’ ἂν ἐμοὶ εἶπες ἡδίω.

21. Σάκραθες. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ γαθε Φαίδρε, ἐννοεῖς

C ώς ἀναίδως εἰρήσθων τῶν λόγων, οὔτός τε καὶ ο ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθεῖς. εἰ γάρ ἄκουὼν τις τύχοι ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶος τὸ ἴθος, ἕτερον δὲ τοιούτων ἔρων ἢ καὶ πρότερον ποτε ἐρασθεῖς, λεγόντων ώς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἀναίρονται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὖκ ἂν οὗι αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι ἄκουειν ἐν ναύταις ποιν τεθραμμένων καὶ οὔδένα ἐλεύθερου ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων, πολλοῦ δ’ ἂν

D δειν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἄ ψέγομεν τοῦ Ἐρωτα;

Φαίδρος. Ἰσως νη Δι’, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σάκραθες. Τοῦτον γε τοῖνυν ἔγωγε αἰσχυνόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἐρωτα δεδικός, ἐπιθυμῶν ποτίμων λόγῳ οἶνον ἀλμυρὰν ἀκόην ἀποκλύσασθαι συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Δυσία ὁ τι τάχιστα γράψαι,
since he was educated, he knew it and straightway he writes the poem:

"That saying is not true; thou didst not go within the well-oared ships, nor didst thou come to the walls of Troy";¹

and when he had written all the poem, which is called the recantation, he saw again at once. Now I will be wiser than they in just this point: before suffering any punishment for speaking ill of Love, I will try to atone by my recantation, with my head bare this time, not, as before, covered through shame.

PHAEDRUS. This indeed, Socrates, is the most delightful thing you could say.

SOCRATES. Just consider, my good Phaedrus, how shameless the two speeches were, both this of mine and the one you read out of the book. For if any man of noble and gentle nature, one who was himself in love with another of the same sort, or who had ever been loved by such a one, had happened to hear us saying that lovers take up violent enmity because of small matters and are jealously disposed and harmful to the beloved, don't you think he would imagine he was listening to people brought up among low sailors, who had never seen a generous love? Would he not refuse utterly to assent to our censure of Love?

PHAEDRUS. I declare, Socrates, perhaps he would.

SOCRATES. I therefore, because I am ashamed at the thought of this man and am afraid of Love himself, wish to wash out the brine from my ears with the water of a sweet discourse. And I advise Lysias

¹ Fragment 32, Bergk.
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 difféρι ἕραστη μᾶλλον ἤ μὴ ἐρῶντι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Ἀλλ' εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι ἐξεί τοῦθ' οὕτωςοὖν γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ ἱεραστοῦ ἑπαίνον, πᾶσα

Ἐ ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι ἀν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἐωσπερ ἄν ἦς ὅς εἶ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλεγον; ἵνα καὶ τούτο ἀκοῦσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὑμῖν φθάσῃ

χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἂν πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

22. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐτωσοὶ τοίνυν, ὡς ταῖς καλέ,

244 ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἄνδρος· ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἰμεραίον. λεκτέος δὲ ὡδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστ' ἐτύμοι λόγος,

ὃς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φητὶ δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὃ δὲ σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θεία μὲντοι δόσει διδομένης. ἦ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προ-

Β φήτις αἰ τ' ἐν Δωδώνη ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἴδια τε καὶ δημοσία τὴν Ἐλλάδα εἰργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἡ οὐδέν· καὶ ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλὰν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι

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also to write as soon as he can, that other things being equal, the lover should be favoured rather than the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS. Be assured that he will do so: for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same subject.

SOCRATES. I believe you, so long as you are what you are.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then without fear.

SOCRATES. Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him.

PHAEDRUS. Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him.

SOCRATES. Understand then, fair youth, that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhtown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favoured, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds; and if we should speak of the Sibyl and all the others who by pro-
μαντικὴ χρώμενοι ἐνθέω πολλὰ δὴ πολλοὶς προ- λέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλουν ὁρθῶσαν, μηκύνοιμεν ἄν δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες· τόδε μὴν ἄξιον ἐπιμαρτύ- ρασθαι, ὡς καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἠγούντο οὐδὲ ὁνείδος μανίαν.

C οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἢ τὸ μέλλον κρίνε- ται, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τούνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικῆν ἐκάλεσαν· ἀλλ’ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θεία μοίρα γίγνηται, οὕτω νομίζαντες έθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικῆν ἐκάλεσαν. ἔπει καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόων ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων ¹ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν σημείων, ἂτ’ ἐκ διανοίας πορίζομένων ἀνθρω- πίνη οἰήσει νόσῳ τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοιστικήν ἐπωνύμασαν, ἢν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ὁ σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν· ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐν- τιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς, τὸ τε οὖμα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ’ ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυ- ροῦσιν οἱ παλαιὸι μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ’ ἀνθρώπων γνωμομένης. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ τόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τισὶ τῶν γενῶν, ἡ μανία

D πίνη αἰώνιοι τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοιστικὴν ἐπωνύμασαν, ἢν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ὁ σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν· ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐν- τιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς, τὸ τε οὖμα τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔργον τ’ ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυ- ροῦσιν οἱ παλαιὸι μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ’ ἀνθρώπων γνωμομένης. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ τόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τισὶ τῶν γενῶν, ἡ μανία

E ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἱς ἐδει ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρετο, καταφυγόοσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντλη ἐποίησε τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρὸς

¹ Schanz brackets τοιουμένων.
Phetic inspiration have foretold many things to many persons and thereby made them fortunate afterwards, anyone can see that we should speak a long time. And it is worth while to adduce also the fact that those men of old who invented names thought that madness was neither shameful nor disgraceful; otherwise they would not have connected the very word mania with the noblest of arts, that which foretells the future, by calling it the manic art. No, they gave this name thinking that mania, when it comes by gift of the gods, is a noble thing, but nowadays people call prophecy the mantic art, tastelessly inserting a T in the word. So also, when they gave a name to the investigation of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds and by other signs, since they furnish mind (nous) and information (historia) to human thought (oiesis) from the intellect (dianoia) they called it the oionoiistic (oionoistike) art, which modern folk now call oïnistic, making it more high-sounding by introducing the long O. The ancients, then testify that in proportion as prophecy (mantike) is superior to augury, both in name and in fact, in the same proportion madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin. Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of
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τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μακάμεντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων
κακῶν εὐρομένην. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μούσων κατοκώχι τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείροσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατά τε ὧδας καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλλήν ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπυγιγμομένους παидеὺς. δὴ ἀν ἄνευ μανίας Μούσων ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἢρα ἐκ τέχνης ἰκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελής αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μανικομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἡμανίσθη.

B 23. Τοσαῦτα μέντοι καὶ ἔτι πλεῖον ἔχον μανίας γυγυμομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα. ἢστε τοῦτό γε αὐτό μὴ φοβόμεθα, μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτω δεδιπτόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεὶ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀντὶ πρὸς ἐκείνῳ δεῖξας φερέσθω τὰ ὕμνησία, ὡς οὐκ ἔπει ὡφελιὰ δὲ ἔρως τῷ ἔρωτι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιτέμπηται. ἢμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τοῦ γαντίου, ὡς ἔπει εὐτυχία τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται. ἢ δὴ ἢ ἀποδείξεις ἐσται δεινοὶ μὲν ἀπιστῶς, σοφοὶ δὲ πιστῆ. δεὶ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἱδώτα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τάληθες νοῆσαι ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεσις ἢδε.

C 24. Ψυχὴ πάσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον τὸ δ’ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς. μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἀτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ζαυτό, οὐ ποτὲ λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τούτῳ πηγῇ καὶ ἀρχῇ κινήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγείνητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ
madness a release from present ills is found. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.

All these noble results of inspired madness I can mention, and many more. Therefore let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy. Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory. We, on our part, must prove that such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows:

Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the
γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἁγεμοντὸν ἐστὶν, καὶ ἁδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἄπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἐκ του οὔτε ἀλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενησται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὔτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχή τὸ αὐτὸ ἀυτὸ κινοῦν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ', ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν,

Ε ἡ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσούσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὕτης ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθεντα γενησται. ἠθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὔσιαν τε καὶ λόγου τούτου αὐτὸν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. πάν γὰρ σῶμα, ὃ μὲν ἐξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ὃ δὲ ἐνδόθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐμψυχον, ὥς ταύτης οὐσίας φύσεως ψυχῆς· εἰ δ' ἐστιν τοῦτο οὕτως ἐχον, μὴ ἀλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁγενητον τε καὶ ἠθανατον ψυχὴ ἄν εἴη.

25. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἠθανασίας αὐτῆς ἴκανον· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἱδέας αὐτῆς ὃ δε λεκτέον· οίον μὲν ἐστι, πάντη πάντως θείας εἰναι καὶ μακρὰς διηγήσεως, ὃ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττωνος· ταύτης οὖν λέγωμεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ξεύγουσ τε καὶ ἡμί χο. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ὑποτι τε καὶ ἡμῖ χοι πάντες αὐτοί τε ἁγαθοὶ καὶ ὁ ἄγαθον, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμικται· καὶ πρῶτον

1 Schanz adds τοῦτο before οὐκ.
beginning is ungenerated. For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not generated from anything; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be generated from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also indestructible; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, since all things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that which moves itself must be the beginning of motion. And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin. But since that which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says that this self-motion is the essence and the very idea of the soul, will not be disgraced. For every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul; but if this is true,—that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal.

Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and of good descent, but those of other races are mixed; and first
The word ψυχή, given in the MSS. after θείου, is omitted by Plutarch and most modern editors, including Schanz.

Schanz omits καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.
the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. Now we must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal. Soul, considered collectively, has the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in one form and sometimes in another; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal. It is not immortal by any reasonable supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. Let that, however, and our words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses its wings. It is something like this.

The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods. More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities; by these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as vileness and
PLATO

φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. ὦ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἦγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἀρμα, πρῶτος πορευέται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελεύμενος. 247 
τῷ δὲ ἔστει τα στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαίμονων, κατὰ ἐνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δώδεκα ἄριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἁρχοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἵνα ἐκαστὸς ἐτάξηθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαί τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ὡς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων 1 ἐπιστρέφεται, πράττων ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτὸν, ἔστει τε ὁ ἀεὶ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἑσταταί· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαίτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοῶν

Β ἵσσιν, ἀκραν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα πορεύονται 2 πρὸς ἀνώτερης· ἦ δὴ 3 τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐνυπα τὸ ῥαδίως πορεύεται, τα δὲ ἄλλα μόνιμα· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἱπτὸς μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γην ῥέτων τε καὶ βαρύνων, ὡς μὴ καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡμίχων· εὖδα δὴ τόνων τε καὶ ἄγων ἐσχατός ψυχή πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι, ἡνίκα ἄν πρὸς ἀκρω ἐγένωται, ἔξω πορευθένται ἐστησᾱν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νῶτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περι-, φορὰ, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τα ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

27. Τῶν δὲ ὑπερουράνιων τούτων οὔτε τις ὑμνησε ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς ποιητῆς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἔχει δὲ ὥδε. τολμητέον γὰρ οὕν τὸ γε ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τα καὶ περὶ ἀληθειάς λέγοντα. ἢ γὰρ ἀχρόματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος

1 Schanz reads εὐδαιμόνως.
2 Schanz brackets πορεύονται.
3 ἦ δὴ Proclus, followed by Burnet. ἦ δὴ BT Schanz et al.

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evil, they are wasted away and destroyed. Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things. He is followed by an army of gods and spirits, arrayed in eleven squadrons; Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. Of the rest, those who are included among the twelve great gods and are accounted leaders, are assigned each to his place in the army. There are many blessed sights and many ways hither and thither within the heaven, along which the blessed gods go to and fro attending each to his own duties; and whoever wishes, and is able, follows, for jealousy is excluded from the celestial band. But when they go to a feast and a banquet, they proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven, where the chariots of the gods, whose well matched horses obey the rein, advance easily, but the others with difficulty; for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the top, pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven. But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly
καὶ ἀναφής οὕσια ὃντως οὗσα ψυχής\(^1\) κυβερνήτη
mόνῳ θεατῇ νῦ, περὶ ἢν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς
ἐπιστήμης γένος τοῦτον ἔχει τὴν τόπον. ἂτ\(^2\) οὖν
θεοῦ διάνοια νῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκρατώ τρεφο-
mένῃ καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχής, ὅση ἃν μέλλῃ τὸ προσ-
ήκον δέξησθαι.\(^3\) ἵδοσα διὰ χρόνον τὸ ὅν ἄγαπα
τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τάληθρ θέρεται καὶ ἐνπαθεῖ,
ἔως ἃν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταύτων περιενέγκη
ἐν δὲ τῇ περίοδῳ καθορᾶ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην,
καθορᾶ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾶ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ
ἡ γενέσις πρόσεετω, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐστὶν που ἔτερα ἐν
ἔτερῳ οὕσα ὅν ἤμεις νῦν ὃντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ
τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστὶν ὃν ὃντως ἐπιστήμης οὕσαν· καὶ
τάλλα ὃσαύτως τὰ ὃντα ὃντως θεασαμένη καὶ
ἐστιαθείσα, δύσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ ὀὐρανοῦ,
οἴκαδε ἢλθεν, ἐλθοῦσα δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡμιόχος πρὸς
τὴν φάτην τοὺς ἑπτάνοις στῆσας παρέβαλεν ἀμ-
βροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτὴ νέκταρ ἐποίησεν.

28. Καὶ ὁντός μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυ-
χαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεὶ ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη
ὑπερήρεν εἰς τὸν ἐξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡμίοχου
κεφαλῆς, καὶ συμπεριπέρεσθη τὴν περιφοράν, θορυ-
βομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ὑππον καὶ μόνης καθορῶς τὰ
ὁντα· ἡ δὲ τοτε μὲν ἡρε, τοτε δ’ ἐδυ, βιαζομένων
dε τῶν ὑππον τὰ μὲν εἰδεν, τὰ δ’ οὐ· αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι
γλυκὸμεναι μὲν ἀπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἐπονται, ἀδυ-
νατούσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχιαι ἐμπεριφέρονται, πα-
τοῦσαι ἄλληλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἔτερα πρὸ τῆς

\(^1\) ψυχή οὗσα Β οὗσα ψυχής Τ. οὗσα Madvig, Schanz.
\(^2\) ἂτ: BT ὁ τ’ Heindorf, Schanz.
\(^3\) καὶ ἀπάσης . . . δέξησθαι bracketed by Schanz, following Suckow.

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existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place. In the revolution it beholds absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge, not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute; and in the same way it beholds and feeds upon the other eternal verities, after which, passing down again within the heaven, it goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others. The other souls follow after, all yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, and are carried round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each
étpéras peirwmeính genvésathai. òbrubhos ònh kai
ámmilla kai ídrwos ëschatos génvetai, ou ði kákiá
ënió chóv pollaí méven xholéounntai, pollaí de
polla pterá brávontai: pássai de polýn èxousai
pónon áteleis tís toú óntos théas àpérhontai,
kal ápelyðousai tropéi doxásth chrwntai. ou
ð' ènèx' ð' pollh spoudh to áltheias ñdeivn pedión
ou1 èstiv, ð te ð' prósíkousa ñxhí kai èréstw
voumë ek toú èkei leimóvos tughávnei ouda, ð te toú
c pterou fúsis, ð' ñxh koufízetai, tou té-
feretai: ðesmó te 'Aðrasteias ðde, ñtis ðn ñxh
théò ëxunopadós genvoméné katóìh ti tòw álthòw,
méxri te tís étpéras periódou èivai ápphýmova, kàv
åeì tou toù dúnvetai poieiv, åí bblabh èivai. òta
de ð' ñdunatíshasa èpistéthai mì ïða, kaì tìs
súntuxhia xhrastaménei lìsthìs te kai kàkías plh-
sthíshsa barunthi, baruntheísa de pterorrrhísh te
kal èptì tìn ñgh pèsth, tòte nómos taúvtìn mì
D

futeúsai eìs mhdeìmán ðhreion fúsìn èn tì pròtw
gevésai, àllà tìn mèn plèistà ñdòusan eìs ñgòvhn
ánðrós genvostoményv ðilosófoû ñ filosófoû ñ
möusíkoû tîwos kai èropthkou, tìn de ðeðevéràn eìs
básielwos ènnémon ñ pólemikoû kai ãrphikoû,
tríthn eìs poíthtkou ñ tîwos ñikomhnikou ñ
xrh-
matistikov, tetártìn eìs filopónoû xwmastistikou
ñ perì sómatoû ìasín tîwos èsomémon, pémpthn
E

mántikov bìov ð tîna têlestikov èxousan: èkth
poíthtkou ñ tòw perì mìmphné tìs ãllhos ármòseì,
èbdómò ðêmìogýkòs ð gewogýkòs, ñgòrh ñofh-
stikov ñ dhmòstikov, ènýtà tûranikov.

1 ou is omitted by Schanz, following Madvig.
striving to pass its neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed, and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers; and after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion. But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul shall never pass into any beast at its first birth, but the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature, and the second soul into that of a lawful king or a warlike ruler, and the third into that of a politician or a man of business or a financier, the fourth into that of a hard-working gymnast or one who will be concerned with the cure of the body, and the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or someone who conducts mystic rites; to the sixth, a poet or some other imitative artist will be united, to the seventh, a craftsman or a husbandman, to the eighth, a sophist or a demagogue, to the ninth, a tyrant.
29. Ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἀπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ, ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δὲ ἂν ἄδικως, χείρονος. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὤθεν ἦκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη ὅυκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦνται πρὸ τοσοῦτον χρόνου, πλὴν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἄδολως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας· αὐταί δὲ τρίτη περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεί, ἐὰν ἔλωνται τρίς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τούτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχίλιοστῷ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται· αἱ δὲ ἀλλαί, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον, κρυθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια ἔλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς Β τούρανον τινά τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κοὐφισθεῖσαι διάγοςων ἄξιος οὐ ἔν ἄνθρωποι εἰδεῖ ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνοῦμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσιν τε καὶ αἱρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἰροῦνται ὅν ἂν ἑθέλῃ ἐκάστη· ἐνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίου ἄνθρωπίνη ψυχή ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου, ὃς ποτὲ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἦ γε μὴ ποτὲ ἱδοῦσα τὴν ἀληθείαν εἰς τόδε ζεῖ τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εὐνιέναι κατ' ἐνδος λεγόμενου, ἐκ πολλῶν ἠν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν Σ λογισμῷ ἐνναίρουμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμμησις ἑκείνων, ἀ ποτ' εἰδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ υπεριδοῦσα ἂ νῦν εἰναι φαμέν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὁν ὀντῶς. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἑκεῖνοις ἀεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς

1 Schanz inserts τὸ after κατ'.
2 Schanz, following Heindorf, reads ἐνναίρουμενον.
Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things.
δισπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖος ἔστιν. τοὺς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὁρθῶς χρῶμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετάς τελοῦμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται.

D εξιστάμενοι δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γυγόμενος νοουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

30. "Ἔστιν δὴ ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν νοῦς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἢν ὅταν τὸ τῆς τῶν ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμμηνευόμενος, πτερώταταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτεροῦμενος ἀναπτεροῦμενος, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ, ὑμνήσας δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτιῶν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος· ὅς ἄρα αὐτὴ πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῶν τε ἔχουσι καὶ τῶν κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἔρως τῶν καλῶν ἑραστῆς καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ φύσει τεθεῖται τὰ ὄντα, ἡ οὐκ ἂν

250 ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ δῶδε τὸ ξῆρον, ἀναμμηνεύσκεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀπίσω ὁ διόδιον ὄπώση, οὔτε ὅσα βραχέως εἶδον τὸτε τάκει, οὔτε αἱ δεύρει πεσοῦσαι ἑδυστύχησαν, ὡστε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμολογίας ἑπὶ τὸ ἁδίκον τραπέζην, λιθήν ὃν τότε εἶδον ἰερῶν ἔχειν. ὁλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, αἷς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν· αὕται δὲ, ὅταν τὶ τῶν ἐκεί ὁμοίωμα ἱδοσιν, ἐκπλήθουσαι καὶ οὐκέθ᾽ αὐτῶν γίγνον-

1 Schanz omits τε καὶ.
the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.

All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover. For, as has been said, every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, otherwise it would not have entered into a human being, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not
ταῖ, ὃ δ' ἐστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἰκανῶς

diaisθάνεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὐν καὶ σωφρο-

σύνης, καὶ ὁσα ἀλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἔνεστι

φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇ δε ὀμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀμυν
dρῶν ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς
eἴκόνας ἑότες θεῶν ταῖ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος-
kάλλος δὲ τὸ τ' ἦν ἴδειν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐ-
dαιμονι χορφ ἐκαρπίαν ὦν τε καὶ θέαν, ἑπόμενοι

μετὰ μὲν Δίος ἥμεις, ἀλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου θεῶν,
eἰδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἦν θέμις

λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, ἢν ὀργιαζομεν ὀλόκληροι
μὲν αὐτοὶ ὧτες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν, ὁσι ἡμᾶς ἐν

ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὀλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἀπλά
καὶ ἀτρεμή καὶ εὐδαιμονια φάσματα μυσμενοί τε

καὶ ἑποτεῦνοντες ἐν αὐγή καθαρὰ, καθαροὶ ὧτες
καὶ ἀσάμαντοι τοῦτον, ὃ νῦν σώμα περιφέροντες

ὁνομάζομεν, ὀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

31. Ταύτα μὲν οὐν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω, δι' ἦν

πόθῳ τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εἴρηται. περὶ δὲ

cάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἐλαμπεν

οὐ, δεύρο τ' ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς

ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἥμετέρων στίλβων

ἐναργεστάτα. ὦνις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ

σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ

ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἄν παρεῖχον ἐρωτας, εἰ τι

tουσύν ταυτῖς ἐναργῆς εἰδώλου παρείχετο εἰς

ὦνιν ἰόν—καὶ ταλλα ὁσα ἔραστά νῦν δέ κάλλος

μόνου ταύτην ἐσχε μοίραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον

Ε ἐἶναι καὶ ἐρασμώτατον. ὃ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεστελής ἦ

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understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company—we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other god—they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.

So much, then, in honour of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.
διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὃξεὼς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν, ὅστε οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλὰ ἥδουνη παράδος τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ παιδοστορεῖν, καὶ ὑβρεὶ προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ’ αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἥδουνη διώκων ό δὲ ἀρτιτελῆς, ο τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδῆς πρὸσωπον ἵδη κάλλος εὐ μεμιμημένον ή τινα σώματος ἵδεαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐφριξὲν καὶ τι τῶν τότε ύπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ώς θεῶν σέβεται, καὶ ε’ μὴ ’δεδίε τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἄν ως ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς, ἰδόντα δ’ αὐτὸν οὖν ἐκ τῆς φρίκης μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρῶς καὶ θερμότης ἀνήθης

Β λαμβάνειν: δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἑθερμάνθη, ή ή τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκφυσιν, ἀ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμοικότα εἰργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρεύεσθησι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ὕδησε τε καὶ ὄρμησε φύσεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς βίτης ο τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πάν το τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος: πᾶσα γὰρ ἢν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτῆ.

32. Ζεὶ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ δόλῃ καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὀπερ τὸ τῶν ὁδοτοφυοῦντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὁδόντας γίγνεται, ὅταν ἀρτι φύσιν, κνήσις τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ ὦλα, ταῦταν δὴ πέπουθεν ἢ τοῦ πτεροφυείν ἄρχομένου ψυχῆς ζεὶ τε καὶ ἀγανάκτει καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύσισα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς

1 Schanz brackets ἢ . . . ἄρδεται.
Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, does not quickly rise from this world to that other world and to absolute beauty when he sees its namesake here, and so he does not revere it when he looks upon it, but gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting; he makes licence his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue pleasure in violation of nature. But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a god-like face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat; for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.

Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpitates, and as in those who are cutting teeth there is an irritation and discomfort in the gums, when the teeth begin to grow, just so the soul suffers when the growth of the feathers begins; it is feverish and is uncomfortable and itches when they begin to grow. Then when it gazes upon the beauty of the boy and
κάλλος ἐκείθεν μέρη ἑπιόντα καὶ ἰέοντι, ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἰμερος καλείται, δεχομένη ἁρδηται τε καὶ

D θερμαίνηται, λωφὰ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμήσῃ, τὰ τῶν
dιεξόδων στόματα, ἦ τὸ πτερόν ὀρμᾶ, συναναιω-
μενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήει τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ,
ἡ δὲ ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἰμέρου ἀποκεκλημένη, πηδώσα
οῖον τὰ σφύξοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ ἐγχρίει ἐκάστῃ τῇ
καθ’ αὐτῆς, ὅστε πᾶσα κεντομένη κύκλῳ ἥ
ψυχὴ οἴστρᾶ καὶ ὀδυνᾶται· μνήμην δ’ ἀι ἐχουσα
τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν. ἐκ δὲ ἁμφοτέρων μεμιγμένων

E ἄδημονεὶ τε τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα
λυτᾶ, καὶ ἐμμανῆς ὀῦσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται
καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ’ ἡμέραν οὐ ἄν ἢ μέενιν, θεὶ δὲ
ποθοῦσα, ὅπου ἂν οὕτω δῆσθαι τὸν ἐχοῦς τὸ
cάλλος· ἰδοὺς δε καὶ ἐποχετευσαμένη ἰμερον
ἐλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοῆν δὲ
λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὁδίων ἐληξεν, ἠδονὴν δ’

252 αὐ ταύτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται.
ὅθεν δὴ ἐκουσά εἶναι οὖκ ἀπολείπεται, οὔδὲ τινα
tοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων
τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἑταίρων πάντων λέσθαι,
καὶ οὕσις δὲ ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ’ οὔδεν
tίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οὺς πρὸ τοῦ
ἐκαλλωπίζοντο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν
ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἄν ἔα τις ἐγγυνάτω
τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος

Β ἐχοῦτα ἰατρὸν ηὔρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων.

1 After δεχομένη the best MSS. read τὸν ἰμερον. Schanz
follows Stallbaum in omitting it.

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receives the particles which flow thence to it (for which reason they are called yearning),\(^1\) it is moistened and warmed, ceases from its pain and is filled with joy; but when it is alone and grows dry, the mouths of the passages in which the feathers begin to grow become dry and close up, shutting in the sprouting feathers, and the sprouts within, shut in with the yearning, throb like pulsing arteries, and each sprout pricks the passage in which it is, so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain; and then again, remembering the beautiful one, it rejoices. So, because of these two mingled sensations, it is greatly troubled by its strange condition; it is perplexed and maddened, and in its madness it cannot sleep at night or stay in any one place by day, but it is filled with longing and hastens wherever it hopes to see the beautiful one. And when it sees him and is bathed with the waters of yearning, the passages that were sealed are opened, the soul has respite from the stings and is eased of its pain, and this pleasure which it enjoys is the sweetest of pleasures at the time. Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for him mother and brothers and all friends, neglects property and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the beloved; for it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but finds in him the only healer of its greatest woes. Now this

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\(^1\) The play on the words \(\mu\epsilon\nu\) and \(\tau\nu\epsilon\rho\oslash\) cannot be rendered accurately in English. Jowett approaches a rendering by the use of the words motion and emotion, but emotion is too weak a word for \(\tau\nu\epsilon\rho\oslash\).
τούτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὃ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἀνθρωποι μὲν Ἕρωτα ὀνομάζουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν ἀκοῦσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δὲ, οἶμαι, τινὲς Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἄποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἕρωτα, ὅπερ τὸ ἐτερον ύβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἐμμετροὶ ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὄδε'

C τὸν δ' ἦτοι θυντοὶ μὲν Ἕρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν, ἄθανατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφυτόρ' ἀνάγκην.

D τούτως δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μὴ ὁμώς δὲ ἡ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώτων τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὁν.

33. Τῶν μὲν οὖν Δίὸς ὑπαδῶν ὁ λῃσθεῖς ἐμβρεθέστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἀχθος. ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεως τε θεραπευταί καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ' Ἕρωτος ἀλώσιν καὶ τι οἰχθώσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φονικοὶ καὶ ἐτοιμοὶ καθιερεύειν αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἐκαστὸν θεοῦ, οὐ ἐκαστὸς ἦν χορευτής, ἐκείνου τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κη, ἐως ἄν ἡ ἀδιάφθορος, καὶ τὴν τῆς πρώτης γένεσιν βιοτεύχ, καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ πρός τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὀμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. τὸν τοῦ ἔρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται ἐκαστὸς, καὶ ὡς θεοῦ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὄντα ἐαυτῷ οὐν ἀγαλμα τεκταίνεται τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Δίὸς διὸν τινα εἶναι ξητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ύφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον σκοποῦσιν οὖν, εἰ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὐρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πάντως ποιοῦσιν ὅπως 490
condition, fair boy, about which I am speaking, is called Love by men, but when you hear what the gods call it, perhaps because of your youth you will laugh. But some of the Homeridae, I believe, repeat two verses on Love from the spurious poems of Homer, one of which is very outrageous and not perfectly metrical. They sing them as follows:

“Mortals call him winged Love, but the immortals call him The Winged One, because he must needs grow wings.”

You may believe this, or not; but the condition of lovers and the cause of it are just as I have said.

Now he who is a follower of Zeus, when seized by Love can bear a heavier burden of the winged god; but those who are servants of Ares and followed in his train, when they have been seized by Love and think they have been wronged in any way by the beloved, become murderous and are ready to sacrifice themselves and the beloved. And so it is with the follower of each of the other gods; he lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god, so long as he is uncorrupted, and is living his first life on earth, and in that way he behaves and conducts himself toward his beloved and toward all others. Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honour and worship him. The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus; so they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they find him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.
τοιούτος ἐσται. ἔαν οὖν µὴ πρῶτερον ἐµβεβώσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες µανθάνουσι τε θεν ἂν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται, ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡγαγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόµενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ µυήµη ἐνθουσιώντες εἷς ἐκείνου λαµβάνουσι τὰ ἐθῆ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύµατα, καθ' ὁσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπω µετασχεῖν καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώµενον αἰτιώµενον έτι τε µᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν, ὡσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωµένου ψυχῆν ἐπαντλοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁµοίοτατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.

Β ὁσοὶ δ' αὖ µεθ' Ἡρας εἴποντο, βασιλικὸν ζητοῦσι, καὶ εὐρόντες περὶ τούτον πάντα δρῶσιν τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος τε καὶ ἑκάστοι τῶν θεῶν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν θεοῦ ιόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα πεφυκέναι, καὶ ὅταν κτῆσωνται, µιµοῦµενοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθµίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτηθεύµα καὶ ἱδέαν ἄγουσιν, ὡς ἑκάστῳ δύναµις, οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνελευθέρω δυσµενείᾳ χρώµενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁµοίοτητα

C αὐτοῖς τῷ θεῷ, δυ ἃν τιµῶσι, πᾶσαν πάντως ὅ τι µάλιστα πειρώµενοι ἤγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυµία µὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώτητον καὶ τελετή, ἐὰν γε διαπράξωνται ὃ προθυµοῦνται ἦ λέγω, οὕτω καλῇ τε καὶ εὐδαιµονικῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ ἔρωτα

1 Schanz, following Madvig, reads ἄν.
If they have not previously had experience, they learn then from all who can teach them anything; they seek after information themselves, and when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god. And those who followed after Hera seek a kingly nature, and when they have found such an one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects; and likewise the followers of Apollo, and of each of the gods, go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honour. Thus the desire of the true lovers, and the initiation into the mysteries of love, which they teach, if they accomplish what they desire in the way I describe, is beautiful and brings happiness from the inspired lover to the loved one, if he be captured; and the
μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίγνεται, ἐὰν αἰρεθῇ ἀλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἰρεθεὶς τοῦτος τρόπῳ.

34. Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τούτῳ τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ διειλόμην ψυχὴν ἐκάστην, ἵππομόρφῳ μὲν δύο τινὲς εἴδη, ἦμιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτου, καὶ υἱὸν ἐτί ἢμῖν ταύτα μενέτω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ὕππουν ὦ μέν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ’ οὐ’ ἁρετῇ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν, υἱὸν δὲ λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοῖνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίωι στάσει ἄν τὸ τε εἰδος ὕρθος καὶ διηθρωμένοι, ὑψαύχει, ἐπίγνυσι, λευκὸς ἴδεῖν, μελανόμματος, τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰώνος, καὶ ἀληθείης δόξης ἑταίρος, ἀπληκτός, κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἠνοχεῖται.

E ὁ δ’ αὐτοί σκολιός, πολύς, εἰκῆ συμπεριφημένος, κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμματος, ύβαιμος, ύβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταίρος, περὶ ὥτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόνης υπείκων. ὅταν δ’ οὖν ὁ ἦμιοχος ἴδον τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὦμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχὴν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθον κέντρων ὑποπλησθῆ, ὁ μὲν εὑρεθῆς τῷ ἦμιοχῷ τῶν ὕππων, ἀεί τε καὶ τοῦτο αἰώνι βιαζόμενος, ἐαυτὸν κατέχει μῇ ἐπιπηδάν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ὁ δὲ οὔτε κέντρων ἦμιοχικὸν οὔτε μάστιγος ἐτὶ ἑντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βία φέρεται, καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τῷ σύνυγι τε καὶ ἦμιοχῷ ἀναγκάζει ἴενα τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνεῖαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τῷ δὲ κατ’ ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον ἀγανακτοῦντε, ὡς δὲ, δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένῳ, τελευτῶντες ὅταν μηδὲν ἦ πέρας κακὸν, πορεύεσθοι

1 Schanz brackets ὁ αἰρεθέης, following Badham.
In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in colour, and has dark eyes; he is a friend of honour joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his colour dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs. Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and forcing them to approach the beloved and propose the joys of love. And they at first pull back indignantly and will not be forced to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but finally, as the trouble has no
αγομένω, εξάντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ’ ἐγένοντο καὶ έιδον τὴν ὅψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν.

35. Ἡδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἦμιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἦνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν. ίδούσα δὲ ἔδεισε τε καὶ σεφθείσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, καὶ ἀμα ἡναγκάσθη εἰς τοῦπίσω ἔλκυσαι τὰς

C ἡνίας οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡστ’ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱσχία ἀμφώ καθίσαι τῷ ὕππῳ, τὸν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μη ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ υβριστὴν μάλ’ ἄκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἱδρώτι πάσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ δὲ λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης, ἢν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχεν καὶ τοῦ πτώματος, μόνης ἐξαναπνεύσεσα ἐλοιδόρησεν ὄργην, πολλὰ κακίζων τὸν τε ἦμιόχον καὶ

D τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δειλία τε καὶ ἀνανάρδη λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔθελοντας προσεῖναι ἀναγκάζων μόγις συνεχώρησε δειμένων εἰσαύθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιομένω ἀναμμυνήσκων, βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, ἐλκων ἦναγκασαν αὐτοὶ προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ τούς αὐτοὺς λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον, ἐνδακών τῶν χαλινῶν,

E μετ’ ἀναιδείας ἔλκει: ὃ δ’ ἦνίοχος ἔτι μᾶλλον ταύτων πάθων παθῶν, ὦστερ ἀπὸ ὑππληγοῦς ἀναπεσών, ἐτί μᾶλλον τοῦ υβριστοῦ ὕππου ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βία ὑπίσω σπάσας τῶν χαλινῶν, τὴν τε κακηγοροῦν γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθῆμαζεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἱσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν 496
end, they go forward with him, yielding and agreeing to do his bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face.

And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a pedestal of chastity, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches, the one quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unruly beast very unwilling. And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other, as soon as he is recovered from the pain of the bit and the fall, before he has fairly taken breath, breaks forth into angry reproaches, bitterly reviling his mate and the charioteer for their cowardice and lack of manhood in deserting their post and breaking their agreement; and again, in spite of their unwillingness, he urges them forward and hardly yields to their prayer that he postpone the matter to another time. Then when the time comes which they have agreed upon, they pretend that they have forgotten it, but he reminds them; struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly. The effect upon the charioteer is the same as before, but more pronounced; he falls back like a racer from the starting-rope, pulls the bit backward even more violently than before from the teeth of the unruly horse, covers his scurrilous tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches


255 36."Ατε οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὃς ἱσόθεος
θεραπευόμενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ
ἐρώτος, ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος, καὶ
αὐτὸς ὃν φύσει φίλος τῷ θεραπεύοντι, ἕαν ἄρα
καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινῶν
ἀλλῶν διαβεβλημένος ἢ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρῶν
ἐρώτη πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθὴ τοῦ
ἐρώτα: προϊόντος δὲ ἥδη τοῦ χρόνου ἢ τε ἥλικια
καὶ τὸ χρεών ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν εἰς
ὀμιλίαιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε εἶμαρται κακῶν κακῷ
φίλον οὐδ’ ἄγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἄγαθόν εἶναι. προσε-
μένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὀμιλίαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν
ἡ εὔνοια γιγανσιόντως τοῦ ἐρώτος ἐκπλήττει τοὺς
ἐρώμενον διαισθανόμενον, ὅτι οὐδ’ οἱ ἐξίµαστε
ἀλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοῦραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν
παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἐνθέου φίλον. ὅταν δὲ
χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ
ἀπτεθαι ἐν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαῖς
ομιλίαις, τὸτ’ ἥδη ἢ τοῦ ρέματος ἐκείνου πηγή,
ὅπως ἦμερον Ζεὺς Γαυνμήδους ἐρῶν ὀνόμασεν, πολλή
φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἔραστήν, ἢ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδυ,
ἡ δ’ ἀπομεστομένου ἤξω ἀπορρεῖ: καὶ οἴον πνεύμα
ἡ τις ἥχω ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἀλλομένη
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to the ground, causing him much pain. Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.

Now the beloved, since he receives all service from his lover, as if he were a god, and since the lover is not feigning, but is really in love, and since the beloved himself is by nature friendly to him who serves him, although he may at some earlier time have been prejudiced by his schoolfellows or others, who said that it was a disgrace to yield to a lover, and may for that reason have repulsed his lover, yet, as time goes on, his youth and destiny cause him to admit him to his society. For it is the law of fate that evil can never be a friend to evil and that good must always be friend to good. And when the lover is thus admitted, and the privilege of conversation and intimacy has been granted him, his good will, as it shows itself in close intimacy, astonishes the beloved, who discovers that the friendship of all his other friends and relatives is as nothing when compared with that of his inspired lover. And as this intimacy continues and the lover comes near and touches the beloved in the gymnasia and in their general intercourse, then the fountain of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, called "desire" flows copiously upon the lover; and some of it flows into him, and some, when he is filled, overflows outside; and just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and
πάλιν ὃθεν ὡρμήθη φέρεται, οὔτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ἰεύμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἰόν, ἥ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἱέναι ἀφικόμενον, καὶ ἀναπτερώσαν τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερών, ἀρδεὶ τε καὶ ὀρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ἀυ̨ ψυχῆν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἔρα μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ, ἀπορεῖ καὶ οὐδ' ὦ τι πέπονθεν ὦθεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀλλον ὄφθαλμιας ἀπολε- λαυκῶς πρόφασιν εἰπέειν οὐ̨ κ' ἔχει, ὀσπερ δ' ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἔρωτι ἐαυτοῦ ὄρων λέληθεν. καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἔκεινος παρῆ, λήγει κατὰ ταύτα ἐκείνῳ τῆς ὄδύνης· ὅταν δὲ ἰπū, κατὰ ταύτα αὐ̨ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἰδώλων ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεὶ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐ̨ κ' ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἴναι. ἐπιθυμεὶ δὲ ἐκείνῳ παραπλησίως μὲν, ἀσθενεστέρως δὲ, ὄραν, ἀπτεσθαί, φιλεῖν, συγκατα- κεῖσθαι καὶ δή, οὖν εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τούτο ταχῦ ταύτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἱππός ἔχει ὁ τι λέγη πρὸς τὸν ἤνιοχον, καὶ ἄξιοι ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὔθεν εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδρ' εὖνον ἀσπαζόμενος· ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, οἶός ἐστι μη̨ ἀπαρνη- θήναι τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἐρώτι, εἰ δεηθεὶς τυχεῖν· ὁ δὲ ὡμοζυγε αὐ̨ μετα τοῦ ἤνιοχον πρὸς ταύτα μετ' αἰδοὺς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει.

37. Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἢ ποιήσων μὲν καὶ ὁμονοητικον τῶν ἐνθάδε βίον διάγγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμου ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν φ' κακία ψυχῆς
returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes, the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the passages of the feathers, waters them and makes the feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved one with love. So he is in love, but he knows not with whom; he does not understand his own condition and cannot explain it; like one who has caught a disease of the eyes from another, he can give no reason for it; he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror, but is not conscious of the fact. And in the lover's presence, like him he ceases from his pain, and in his absence, like him he is filled with yearning such as he inspires, and love's image, requited love, dwells within him; but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love, but friendship. Like the lover, though less strongly, he desires to see his friend, to touch him, kiss him, and lie down by him; and naturally these things are soon brought about. Now as they lie together, the unruly horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in return for his many troubles; and the unruly horse of the beloved says nothing, but teeming with passion and confused emotions he embraces and kisses his lover, caressing him as his best friend; and when they lie together, he would not refuse his lover any favour, if he asked it; but the other horse and the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and reason.

If now the better elements of the mind, which lead to a well ordered life and to philosophy, prevail, they live a life of happiness and harmony here on earth, self controlled and orderly, holding in subjection that which causes evil in the soul and giving
Ενεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ὦ ἄρετή· τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἑλαφροὶ γεγονότες τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὄλυμπιακῶν ἐν γενικήκασιν, οὐ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἄνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. εάν δὲ δὴ διαίτη διορικοτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφος, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρῆσονται, τάχ

C ἀν ποὺ ἐν μέθαις ἡ τινὶ ἄλλῃ ἀμελεῖα τῷ ἀκολάστῳ αὐτῶν ὑποξυγίῳ λαβόντες τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, ἔυμαχοῦσαν εἰς ταῦτον, τὴν ἕπο τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστῆν αἴρεσιν εἰλέσθην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπράξαμεν τὸ λοιπὸν ἡμὴ χρῆσαι μὲν αὐτῇ, σπανία δὲ, ἄτε οὐ πάση δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράπτοντες. φίλω μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτῳ, ἦττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἄλληλους διὰ τε

D τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένω διάγωσι, πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ὑγομένων ἄλληλοι διδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι, ἂς οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἔχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. εὖ δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἀπτεροι μὲν, ὁμηκτοὶς δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὡστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἀθλὸν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ἕπο γῆς πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἐτί ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργομένους ἡδὴ τῆς ἐπουρανίου πορείας, ἄλλα φανῶν βίον διάγωσι καὶ δομομονεῖν μετὰ ἄλληλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἐρωτοῖς χάριν, ὅταν γενώται, γενέσθαι.

E 38. Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ θεία οὔτω σοι δωρήσεται ἡ παρ’ ἐραστοῦ φιλία· ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρωτοῦσις οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνη θυνητῇ κεκραμένη, θυντά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομουσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπανομομένην ὡς

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freedom to that which makes for virtue; and when this life is ended they are light and winged, for they have conquered in one of the three truly Olympic contests. Neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can confer upon man any greater blessing than this. If however they live a life less noble and without philosophy, but yet ruled by the love of honour, probably, when they have been drinking, or in some other moment of carelessness, the two unruly horses, taking the souls off their guard, will bring them together and seize upon and accomplish that which is by the many accounted blissful; and when this has once been done, they continue the practice, but infrequently, since what they are doing is not approved by the whole mind. So these two pass through life as friends, though not such friends as the others, both at the time of their love and afterwards, believing that they have exchanged the most binding pledges of love, and that they can never break them and fall into enmity. And at last, when they depart from the body, they are not winged, to be sure, but their wings have begun to grow, so that the madness of love brings them no small reward; for it is the law that those who have once begun their upward progress shall never again pass into darkness and the journey under the earth, but shall live a happy life in the light as they journey together, and because of their love shall be alike in their plumage when they receive their wings.

These blessings, so great and so divine, the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, dear boy; but the affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and follows mortal and parsimonious rules of conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the
Ἀρετήν τῇ φίλῃ ἤδη ἐνθεοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας

ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν παρέξει. αὐτὴ σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἑρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅ τι καλλώστη καὶ ἄριστη δέδοταί τε καὶ ἐκτένισται παλινῳδία, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὄνομασιν ἥγαγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρήσθαι. ἄλλα τῶν προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάρων ἔχων, εὐμενής καὶ ὑλεως τὴν ἐρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην, ἢν ἐδωκας, μήτε ἀφέλη μήτε πηρώσης δι’ ὅργην, δίδου δ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιοιν

Β εἶναι. τῶ πρόσθεν δ’ εἶ τι λόγῳ σοι ἄπηνες εὗπομεν Ἐρωτα μετὰ φιλοσοφῶν λόγων τὸν βίον ποιήσαται.

39. Φαίδρος. Συνεύχομαι σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες,

C εἶπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι, ταῦτα γέγνεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δὲ σοι πάλαί θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὅσῳ καλλῷ τοῦ προτέρων ἀπειράγοισίν ὡστε ὁκνῷ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φαινή, εὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατείναι. καὶ γὰρ τις αὐτῶν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἔναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ λοιδορῶν ὠνεῖδιζε, καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λοι-
dορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφου τἀξ’ οὐν ἀν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ἀν τοῦ γράφειν.

D Σωκρατῆς. Γελοῖον γ’, ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἑταίρου συνχῦν διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτόν οὔτως ἤγει τινὰ ψοφοδεὰ. Ἅσως δὲ καὶ

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narrowness which the common folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last. There, dear Love, thou hast my recantation, which I have offered and paid as beautifully and as well as I could, especially in the poetical expressions which I was forced to employ on account of Phaedrus. Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept these words with favour; be kind and gracious to me; do not in anger take from me the art of love which thou didst give me, and deprive me not of sight, but grant unto me to be even more than now esteemed by the beautiful. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses.

PHAEDRUS. I join in your prayer, Socrates, and pray that this may come to pass, if this is best for us. But all along I have been wondering at your discourse, you made it so much more beautiful than the first; so that I am afraid Lysias will make a poor showing, if he consents to compete with it. Indeed, lately one of the politicians was abusing him for this very thing, and through all his abusive speech kept calling him a speech-writer; so perhaps out of pride he may refrain from writing.

SOCRATES. That is an absurd idea, young man, and you are greatly mistaken in your friend if you think he is so much afraid of noise. Perhaps, too, you think
PLATO

tὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἴει νομίζοντα λέγειν ἄ ἑλεγεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐφαίνετο γάρ, ὦ Σῶκρατες· καὶ σύνοισθά ποι καὶ αὐτός ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμειν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνουνται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβοῦμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γλυκὺς ἀγκών, ὦ Φαίδρε, λέληθέν

Ε σε:¹ καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀγκώνι λανθάνει σε, ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἐρωτήσει λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων, οἳ γε καὶ ἐπειδὰν τινα γράφωσι λόγου, οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὡστε προσπαραγράφουσι πρώτους, οἳ ἄν ἐκαστάχοι ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτοὺς.

258 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις τούτῳ; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος ὁ ἐπαινέτης γεγραπται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδοξέεν ποὺ φησι τῇ Βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ ὅσει τὸν αὐτοῦ δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεύς, ἐπειτα λέγει δὴ ² μετὰ τούτῳ, ἑπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν

¹ After λέληθέν ἐσε the MSS. read ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ ἀγκῶνος τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλον ἐκλήθη. Schanz and Burnet bracket these words, following Heindorf.
² Schanz, following Madvig, brackets ἀρχῇ. Burnet brackets συγγράμματι below.
³ Schanz, following Krische, inserts τὰ after δὴ.
the man who abused him believed what he was saying.

PHAEDRUS. He seemed to believe, Socrates; and you know yourself that the most influential and important men in our cities are ashamed to write speeches and leave writings behind them, through fear of being called sophists by posterity.

SOCRATES. You seem to be unacquainted with the "sweet elbow,"¹ Phaedrus, and besides the elbow, you seem not to know that the proudest of the statesmen are most fond of writing and of leaving writings behind them, since they care so much for praise that when they write a speech they add at the beginning the names of those who praise them in each instance.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean? I don’t understand.

SOCRATES. You don’t understand that the name of the approver is written first in the writings of statesmen.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. The writer says, “It was voted by the senate (or the people, or both), and so-and-so moved,” mentioning his own name with great dignity and praise, then after that he goes on, displaying his own wisdom to his approvers, and sometimes making a very long document. Does it seem to you that a

¹ This is a proverbial expression, similar in meaning to our “sour grapes.” The explanation given in the MSS., that the sweet elbow gets its name from the long bend, or elbow, in the Nile may be an addition by some commentator; at any rate, it hardly fits our passage.
B ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα· ή σοι ἂνλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ, γεγραμένη ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου οἱ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλιφὴ καὶ ἁμοιρός γέννηται λογογράφιας τε καὶ τοῦ ἄξιον εἶναι συγγράφειν, πενθεῖ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἕταίροι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον γε οὐκ ὡς ὑπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἔπιτηθεύματος, ἀλλ’ ὡς τεθανμακότες.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; ὅταν ἰκανὸς γέννηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεὺς ὁπότε λαβὼν τὴν Δικοῦργον ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἄθανατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἀρ’ οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἥγεται αὐτός τε αὐτόν ἐτι ξῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ο'Iει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὡς καὶ ὑπωστιοῦν δύσνους Δυσία, οὐεἰδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὡν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἀν τῇ ἐαντοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐεἰδίζοι.

D 40. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἥδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, ἀλλ’ αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον δὴ.

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thing of that sort is anything else than a written speech?

PHAEDRUS. No, certainly not.

SOCRATES. Then if this speech is approved, the writer leaves the theatre in great delight; but if it is not recorded and he is not granted the privilege of speech-writing and is not considered worthy to be an author, he is grieved, and his friends with him.

PHAEDRUS. Decidedly.

SOCRATES. Evidently not because they despise the profession, but because they admire it.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Well then, when an orator or a king is able to rival the greatness of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and attain immortality as a writer in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Do you think, then, that any of the statesmen, no matter how ill-disposed toward Lysias, reproaches him for being a writer?

PHAEDRUS. It is not likely, according to what you say; for he would be casting reproach upon that which he himself desires to be.

SOCRATES. Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace.

PHAEDRUS. How can it be?

SOCRATES. But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly.

PHAEDRUS. Evidently.
ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μή γράφειν; δεόμεθα τι, ὃς Φαίδρε, Δυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλου, ὡστε πῶποτε τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ἰδιωτικὸν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητής, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης;

Ε ἘΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτᾶς εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα κἂν τις ὡς εἴπειν ἔφη, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἔνεκα; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ ἐκείνων γε ὅν προλυ- πηθήναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, ὃ δὴ ὄλγον πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναῖ ἔχουσιν διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδες κέκληνται.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ, ὡς έοικε· καὶ ἀμα μοι δοκούσιν ὡς εὖ τῷ πνύγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττυγες ἁδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι καθοράν. εἰ οὖν ἁδοιεν καὶ ὡ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγομένους, ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ύφ' αὐτῶν δὲ ἁργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἀν καταγελάων, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδα ἀττα σφίσιν ἔλθόντα εἰς τὸ κατα- γώγιον ὁσπερ προβάτω μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήσειν εὐδειαν· εὰν δὲ ὀρῶσι διαλεγομένους καὶ παραπλέοντας σφας ὁσπερ Σειρήνας ἀκηλῆ- τους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ' ἀν δοεῖν ἀγασθέντες.

41. ἘΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐχούσι δὲ δὴ τὶ τούτο; ἀνήκοους γάρ, ὡς έοικε, τυγχάνω ὑν.

ΣΗΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμονσον ἀνδρὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι· λέγεται δ' ὡς ποτ' ἦσαν οὕτως ἀνθρωποί τῶν πρὶν Μοῦσας γεγονότως, γεγομένων δὲ Μοῦσῶν καὶ φανερής ὀὖτως ἢρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ύφ' 510
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SOCRATES. What, then, is the method of writing well or badly? Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who ever has written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in verse or in prose, be he poet or ordinary man?

PHAEDRUS. You ask if we want to question them? What else should one live for, so to speak, but for such pleasures? Certainly not for those which cannot be enjoyed without previous pain, which is the case with nearly all bodily pleasures and causes them to be justly called slavish.

SOCRATES. We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

PHAEDRUS. What is this gift? I don't seem to have heard of it.

SOCRATES. It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so
U ἰδονῆς, ὡστε ἀδοντες ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἐλαθὼν τελευτήσαντες αὐτούς· εἰς ἃν τὸ τεττῆγων γένος μετ' ἐκεῖνο φύεται, γέρας τούτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδέν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀσιτόν τε καὶ ἀποτον εὐθὺς ἄδειν, ἐως ἃν τελευτήση, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα ἐλθὼν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν, τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾶ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλουτε ποιοῦσι προσ\-

D φίλεστέροις, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὔτω, κατὰ τὸ εἴδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ προσβυτάτη Καλλιότη καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανία τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντας τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἱ δὲ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανῶν καὶ λόγους οὐσαί θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱάσι καλλιστὴν φωνὴν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἐνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν.

Ε 42. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκόν, ὅπερ νῦν προὐδέμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅτι καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅτι μὴ, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὅχι ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥήθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διά
νοιοι εἰδυίαν τ' ἀληθεῖς ἃν ἐν ἐρείν πέρι μέλλη;

260 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐτωσοί περὶ τοῦτον ἀκήκοα, ὡς Φίλε
Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἴναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἑσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
dόξαν\' ἀν πλήθει, οὔπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά, ἀλλ' ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ

1 Schanz, following Badham, puts γενόμενον after εὐθύς.
overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honours each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honoured her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favour of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honouring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, we ought to talk.

SOCRATES. We should, then, as we were proposing just now, discuss the theory of good (or bad) speaking and writing.

PHAEDRUS. Clearly.

SOCRATES. If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?

PHAEDRUS. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so;
πούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.

Σωκράτης. Οὕτωι ἀποβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ, οὐ Φαίδρε, δ ἄν εἴπωςι σοφί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μὴ τὸ λέγωσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

Φαιδρος. Ἀρθῶς λέγεις.

Σωκράτης. Ὡδὲ δὴ σκοπώμεν αὐτὸ.

Φαιδρος. Πῶς;

Β Σωκράτης. Εἰ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππουν, ἀμφότερον δὲ ἵππουν ἄγνοιμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδῶς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαίδρος ἵππουν ἥγεται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζώων μέγιστα ἔχειν ὀντα—

Φαιδρος. Γελοιόν γ' ἄν, οὐ Σωκράτες, εἰη.

Σωκράτης. Οὐπώ γε· ἀλλ' ὅτε σπουδὴ σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεὶς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὅνου, ἵππουν ἐπονομάζουν καὶ λέγον ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οὐκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ προσευγεθεὶν δυνα-τὸν σκεῦη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὑφέλιμον.

Φαιδρος. Παγγέλοιον γ' ἄν ἥδη εἰη.

Σωκράτης. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κρείττον γελοίον ἣ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρὸν εἶναι; 2

Φαιδρος. Φαίνεται.

Σωκράτης. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡς σοφός ἔχουσαν πείθῃ, μὴ περὶ ὅνου σκιάς 3 ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιοῦμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ

1 Schanz, following Schaefer, reads λέγουσιν.
2 εἶναι ἡ φίλον ΒΤ. Schanz follows Bekker in omitting ἡ φίλον.
3 Schanz follows Spalding in omitting σκιάς.

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for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.

Socrates. "The word," Phaedrus, which the wise "speak must not be rejected," but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.

Phaedrus. You are right.

Socrates. Let us then examine it in this way.

Phaedrus. How?

Socrates. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—

Phaedrus. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.

Socrates. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—

Phaedrus. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.

Socrates. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?

Phaedrus. To be sure.

Socrates. Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the "shadow of an ass" under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them

1 Homer, Iliad ii. 361. 2 A proverbial expression.
πλήθους μεμελετηκώς πείση κακά πράττειν ἀντ’ ἀγαθῶν, ποίον τινα οἴει μετὰ ταύτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὑν ἐσπειρεθερίζειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῆ.

43. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν, ὡ γαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λεολοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἢ δ’ ἵσως ἄν εἴποι τι ποτ’, ὡ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν ἁγνοούντα τὰληθὲς ἀναγκαίῳ μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἅλλ’, εἰ τις ἐμὴ ἔγυμβουλή,1 κτησάμενος ἐκεῖνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνει· τόδε δ’ οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδὸτι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταύτα;

Ε Ἔσκρατης. Φημῆ, εὰν οἱ γε ἐπίνιτες αὐτὴ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνη. ὀσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι θεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἅλλ’ ἀτεχνὸς τριβὴ’ τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἥφαι οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε μὴ ποτε ὑστερον γένηται.2

261 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὡς Σώκρατες: ἅλλα δεῦρο αὐτοῦς παράγων ἐξέταξε, τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναία, καλλί-παιδά τε Φαίδρου πείθετε, ὡς εὰν μὴ ἰκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἰκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δή ὁ Φαίδρος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτᾶτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὀλον ἡ ῥητορική

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1 εἰ τις ἐμὴ ἔγυμβουλή Schanz, following Stephanus.
2 Schanz brackets τοῦ ... γένηται.

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to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?

PHAEDRUS. No very good harvest.

SOCRATES. Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly? Perhaps she might say: "Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion."

PHAEDRUS. And will she be right in saying this?

SOCRATES. Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.

PHAEDRUS. We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.

SOCRATES. Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.

PHAEDRUS. Ask your questions.

SOCRATES. Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an
PLATO

ἀν εἰ ὑπενέχεται συμφαγῷ τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι,

Β ἄλλα καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἢ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὕδεν ἐντιμότερον τὸ γε ὅρθον περὶ σπουδαίᾳ ἢ περὶ φαύλα γιγνόμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταύτ᾽ ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἄλλα μᾶλλον μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ᾿Αλλὰ ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ῥοῦσσεός τεχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἢς ἐν Ῥιλώ

C σχολάζοντες συνεγραφήσατην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμίδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δία ἐγώγη τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τίνα Θρασύμαχον τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ῥοῦσσεά.

44. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ῥισως. ἄλλα γὰρ τούτους ἑώμεν' σὺ δ᾽ εἶπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι, ἢ τί φήσομεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτ᾽ αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἄδικου;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τούτῳ δρῶν ποιήσει

D φανῆσαι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἄγαθα, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὐ τάναντία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν οὖν Ῥελετικοῦ Παλαμίδην

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art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?

PHAEDRUS. No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in law-suits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.

SOCRATES. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?

PHAEDRUS. Nor of Nestor's either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.

SOCRATES. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?

PHAEDRUS. Exactly that.

SOCRATES. About the just and the unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

PHAEDRUS. Just so.

SOCRATES. Do we not know that the Eleatic
λέγοντα οὐκ ἵσμεν τέχνη, ὅστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰ αὐτὰ ὤμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, μένοντά τε αὐ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστηρία τέ

Ε ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ’, ὡς ἔσοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἰπερ ἐστιν, αὕτη ἄν εἰη, ἢ τις οἶος τ’ ἐσται πάν παντὶ ὦμοιοὶν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἰς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλον ὦμοιοντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἅγειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῇδε δοκῶ ξητοῦσιν φανείσθαι. ἀπά-

τη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἡ ὡλίγον;

262 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐν τοῖς ὡλίγον.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μετα-

βαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑναντίον ἡ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὦμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὖν οἶος τε ἐσται, ἀλῆθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἐκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὦμοιότητα σμικράν Β τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγνωσκεῖν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν 520
Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

PHAEDRUS. When there is little.

SOCRATES. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, he must.

SOCRATES. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognise in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

PHAEDRUS. It is impossible.

SOCRATES. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are
καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δήλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι᾽ ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύη.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅτι τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστοτε ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὃ μὴ ἐγνωρικῶς ὃ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μὴ ποτε.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δόγμαν ἀρα τέχνην, ὡς ἔταιρε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δοξᾷς δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοιαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει.

45. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλεις οὖν ἐν τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ, ὃν χεῖς, καὶ ἐν ὧς ἡμεῖς εἰπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμέν ἄτεχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψειλὸς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἰκανά παραδείγματα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς D ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντε τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδῶς τὸ ἀλήθειας προσπαλίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τους ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγγυο, ὃ Φαίδρε, αἰτίωμαι τους ἐντοπίους θεοὺς· ὅσοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφητάι οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλής φῶς ἐπισπερνοῦσι τὰν ἰδίων εἰεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ ποι ἔγγυον τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. "Εστῳ ὃς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φής.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ἰθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγνωτι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ-
PHAEDRUS deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

PHAEDRUS. It does happen in that way.

SOCRATES. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

PHAEDRUS. Never in the world.

SOCRATES. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

PHAEDRUS. Probably.

SOCRATES. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

PHAEDRUS. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

SOCRATES. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps, too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS. So be it; only make your meaning clear.

SOCRATES. Read me the beginning of Lysias' discourse.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and
στασαι, καὶ ὃς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἄξιόν δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔραστής ὃν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—

263 σοκράτης. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἀμαρτάνει καὶ ἀτεχνὸν ποιεῖ, λεκτέον. ἡ γὰρ;

φαιδρός. Ναι.

46. σοκράτης. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δήλον τὸ γε 

τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἕνα στασιωτικὸς;

φαιδρός. Δοκῶ μὲν ὁ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἐτὶ δ' 

eιπὲ σαφέστερον.

σοκράτης. Ἡ ὅταν τις ὁνόμα εἴπῃ σιδήρου ἡ 

ἀργύρου, Ἄρ' οὖ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;

φαιδρός. Καὶ μάλα.

σοκράτης. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἡ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ 

ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἄλληλος 

tε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

φαιδρός. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

B σοκράτης. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν 

dὲ τοῖς οὖ.

φαιδρός. Οὗτω.

σοκράτης. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, 

καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μείζον δύναται;

φαιδρός. Δήλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

σοκράτης. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητο-

ρικὴν μετέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεὶ ταῦτα ὅσῳ διηρή-

σθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἐκατέρω 

τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν δ' τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι 

cαὶ ἐν δ' μὴ.

C φαιδρός. Καλὸν γοῦν ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴδος 

eἰπ̄ κατανεονηκῶς ὁ τοῦτο λαβὼν.

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you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—

SOCRATES. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

PHAEDRUS. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

SOCRATES. When one says "iron" or "silver," we all understand the same thing, do we not?

PHAEDRUS. Surely.

SOCRATES. What if he says "justice" or "goodness"? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

PHAEDRUS. True.

SOCRATES. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

PHAEDRUS. Evidently in the class of doubtful things.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.

PHAEDRUS. He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Επειτά γε οίμαι πρὸς ἐκάστῳ γυνόμενον μη λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ὄξεως αἰσθάνεσθαι, περὶ οὗ ἄν μέλλῃ ἔρειν, ποτέρου δὲ τυχχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἐρώτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφίσβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῶν ἀμφίσβητησίμων δὴ ποιν. ἢ οἴει ἂν σοι συγχωρήσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τε ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἔρωτι, D καὶ αὕθες ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχχάνει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αριστα λέγεις. ἀλλ' εἴπε καὶ τὸδε—ἐγὼ γὰρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθυσιαστικὸν οὐ πάντα μέμνημαι—εἰ ὑρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεῦ, ὦσο λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νῦμφας τᾶς Ἀχελώου καὶ Πάνα τὸν Ἐρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἡνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς υπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἐρώτα ἐν τι τῶν Ἐ όντων, δὲ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἢδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὑστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο; Βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνώρωμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ. δὲ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνου.

47. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων 264 γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὃν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ὃν σοῦ 526
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?

PHAEDRUS. To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?

SOCRATES. Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.

SOCRATES. Oh, how much more versed the nympha, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?

PHAEDRUS. If you like; but what you seek is not in it.

SOCRATES. Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your
τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὡν ἂν εὐ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἐοίκε ποιεῖν ὅσα γε ὁ ξητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τελευτῆς εἴξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανει ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἀρχεῖ ται ἄφ’ ὡς πεπαυμένος ἂν ἡδη ὁ ἐραστῆς λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν εἴπον, Φαίδρε, φίλη κεφαλῆς;

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἔστιν γέ τοι δή, ὃ Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δὲ τάλλα; οὗ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβληθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἐκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθήναι, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ληθεύτων; ἐμοι μὲν γὰρ ἐδοξεῖν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότη, οὐκ ἄγεννῳ τὸ ἐπίον εἰρησθαι τὸ γράφοντι σοῦ δ’ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικῆν, ἢ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ’ ἀλληλα ἔθηκεν;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Χρηστὸς εἰ, ὅτι μὲ ἡγεῖ ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διϊδεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τὸ δὲ γε οἷμα σε φάναι ἂν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡσπερ ξώδον συνεστάναι σωμάτι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀκρα, πρέποντ’ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; 

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκέφται τοῖνυν τὸν τὸν ἑταίρον σου λόγον, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ εὐρήσεις 

D τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὁ Μίδα τῷ Φρυγί φασὶ τινὲς ἐπιγεγράφθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ποῖον τούτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός;

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lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases.

SOCRATES. He certainly does not at all seem to do what we demand, for he does not even begin at the beginning, but undertakes to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end, and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved. Am I not right, Phaedrus my dear?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly that of which he speaks is an ending.

SOCRATES. And how about the rest? Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?

PHAEDRUS. You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.

SOCRATES. But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organised, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. See then whether this is the case with your friend's discourse, or not. You will find that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

PHAEDRUS. What sort of inscription is that, and what is the matter with it?
Ἐστὶ μὲν τοῦτο τόδε: Χαλκὴ παρθένου εἰμὶ, Μίδα δ᾽ ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι. ὃφρ᾽ ἀν ὑδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρα μακρὰ τεθῆλη, αὐτοῦ τῇ δε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου, ἀγγελεῖ παριουσὶ Μίδας ὁ τῇ τῇ τεθαπταί.

Ε ὁτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡ ὑστατὸν τι λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς που, ὡς ἐγγύμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὡς Σώκρατες.

48. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἄξον, ἐσώμεν καὶ τοι συνάγει καὶ νῖτοι, μοι δοκεῖ παραδείγματα, πρὸς ἀ τις βλέπων ὁνύμαι ἀν, μείσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνα τι έις δὲ τοὺς ἐτέρους λόγους ἱσμεν. ἢν γὰρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς 265 δοκῶ, προσήκον ἴδειν τοῖς βουλομένους περὶ λόγων σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποιοῦ δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναντίω ποὺ ἡστην τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὡς τῷ ἔρωτι, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡμην σε τάλαθες ἐρεῖν, ὧτι μανικέως ὃ μέντοι ἐξήτουν, ἔστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γὰρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανίας δὲ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν μὲν υπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ υπὸ θείας ἐξαλ-λαγῆς τῶν εἰσθότων νομίμου γυγυμένην.
Socrates. This is it:

A bronze maiden am I; and I am placed upon the tomb of Midas.
So long as water runs and tall trees put forth leaves,
Remaining in this very spot upon a much lamented tomb,
I shall declare to passers by that Midas is buried here;

and you perceive, I fancy, that it makes no difference whether any line of it is put first or last.

Phaedrus. You are making fun of our discourse, Socrates.

Socrates. Then, to spare your feelings, let us say no more of this discourse—and yet I think there were many things in it which would be useful examples to consider, though not exactly to imitate—and let us turn to the other discourses; for there was in them, I think, something which those who wish to investigate rhetoric might well examine.

Phaedrus. What do you mean?

Socrates. The two discourses were opposites; for one maintained that the lover, and the other that the non-lover, should be favoured.

Phaedrus. And they did it right manfully.

Socrates. I thought you were going to speak the truth and say "madly"; however, that is just what I had in mind. We said that love was a kind of madness, did we not?

Phaedrus. Yes.

Socrates. And that there are two kinds of madness, one arising from human diseases, and the other from a divine release from the customary habits.
B φαιδρος. Πάνω γε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεών τέταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικῆς μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικῆς, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικῆς, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἐρωτος ἑρωτικῆς μανίαν ἐφησαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τὸ ἑρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἵσως μὲν ἀληθοὺς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενου, τάχα δ' ἄν καὶ ἀλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ

C παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ἱμμὸν προσπεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τα καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμὸν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἐρωτα, ὁ Φαίδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἐφορον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἄγιδὼς ἀκούσαι.

49. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τόδε τοῖνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδει πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἐσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ

D ὄντι παιδιὰ πεπαίσθαν τούτων δὲ τινῶν ἐκ τύχης ῥθέντων δυνότειν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναιτο τις, οὐκ ἀχαρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνων δὴ;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἷς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵν' ἐκαστὸν ὀριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὐ ἄν ἄει διδασκεῖν ἔθελη, ὡσπερ τὸ νυνὶ δη περὶ Ἐρωτος ὁ ἐστὶν ὁρισθεν, εἴτ' εὑ εἰτε κακῶς ἐλέξθῃ. τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὕτο αὐτῷ ὀρμολογοῦμεν διὰ ταῦτ' ἐσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

1 Schanz brackets τεττάρων θεών.
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.
SOCRATES. And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and perhaps being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we chanted a sportive and mythic hymn in meet and pious strain to the honour of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear.

SOCRATES. Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to praise.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.

PHAEDRUS. What principles?

SOCRATES. That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Το δ' ἐτερον δὴ εἰδος τί λέγεις, ὡς Σωκράτεσ;

Ε ἘΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Το πάλιν κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ἢ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν κατα-

γυνύαι μέρος μηδὲν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον ἀλλ' ὁσπερ ἄρτι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τῷ κοινῷ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην,

266 ὁσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὀμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαία, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἴδος ἡγησαμένω τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἑπ' ἀριστερά τεμνό-

μενος μέρος, πάλιν τούτῳ τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανήκειν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔφευρόν ὄνοματόμενον σκαίον τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ' ἐν δίκη, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν 

δεξιὰ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγῶν ἡμᾶς, ὀμώνυμον μὲν ἔκεινο, θείον δ' αὖ τιν ἔρωτα ἔφευρὼν καὶ 

προτεινάμενος ἐπήνυσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἰτίων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθεστατα λέγεις.

50. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων δὴ ἐγώ γε αὐτὸς τε ἐραστῆς, ὡς Φαίδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συνα-

γωγῶν, ἵν' ὁιὸς τε ὧ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· εῶν τέ 

τιν' ἀλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἑπτα πολλὰ 

πεφυκόθ' ὅραν, τούτων διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' 

ἐχνιν ὡςτε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους 

ἀυτὸ ὅραν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς 

C οἴδεν, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦτο διαλεκτικοὺς. τὰ δὲ 

νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Δυσίον μαθόντας εἰπτε τί 

χρῆ καλεῖν· ἢ τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ ἐστιν ἢ λόγων τέχνη, 

ἡ Ἐρασύμαχος τε καὶ οἱ ἀλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ.
PHAEDRUS. And what is the other principle, Socrates?

SOCRATES. That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. But tell me now what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have

1 Homer, Odyssey v, 193. ἐκεῖτα μετ' ἱχνία βαίνε θεοῖ (and he walked in the footsteps of the god).
μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἀλλοις τε ποιοῦσιν, οὐ ἀν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεύσιν ἐθέλοσιν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονες γε ὄν ἐρωτᾶς. ἄλλα τούτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἐθ’ ἤμᾶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς φής; καλὸν ποῦ τι ἂν εἶν, ὅ τούτων ἀπολειφθέν ὁμος τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως δ’ οὐκ ἀτυμαστέον αὐτὸ σοὶ τε καὶ ἐμοί, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειτόμενον τῆς ῥήτορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ποῦ συχνά, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὰ γ’ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένους.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. προοίμων μὲν οἶμαι πρώτων ὡς δεὶ τοῦ λόγου λέγονται ἐν ἀρχῇ ταῦτα λέγεις—ἡ γὰρ; τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

ΕΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ’ ἔπ’ αὐτῆ, τρίτον τεκμηρία, τέταρτον εἰκότα: καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τὸν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βιζάντιον ἄνδρα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μὴν; καὶ ἔλεγχον γε καὶ ἐπεξε- λεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορία τε καὶ ἀπολογία. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐηνόν εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, δ’ ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος εὑρε καὶ παρεπαίνους; οὐ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ παραφόγοις φασίν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν’ σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ. Τιςίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὑδείς, οὐπρὸ τῶν
become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?

phaedrus. They are royal men, but not trained in the matters about which you ask. I think you give this method the right name when you call it dialectic; but it seems to me that rhetoric still escapes us.

socrates. What do you mean? Can there be anything of importance, which is not included in these processes and yet comes under the head of art? Certainly you and I must not neglect it, but must say what it is that remains of rhetoric.

phaedrus. A great many things remain, Socrates, the things that are written in the books on rhetoric.

socrates. Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not?—the niceties of the art.

phaedrus. Yes.

socrates. And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words.

phaedrus. You mean the worthy Theodorus?

socrates. Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defence. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who invented covert allusion and indirect praises? And some say that he also wrote indirect censures, composing them in verse as an aid to memory; for he is a clever man. And shall we leave Gorgias and
άληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἰδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε αὖ σμικρα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαι-
νεσθαί ποιούσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινά τε ἀρχαίως
tά τ’ ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ
ἀπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἄνηρον; ταῦτα δὲ
ἀκούων ποτὲ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος
αὐτὸς ήρηκενεί ἐφη ὡν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην’ δεῖν δὲ
οὐτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σοφώτατά γε, ὁ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἴμαι γὰρ ἄν
σύμψηφοι αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἡλείον ξένου γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὶ δ’ οὐ;

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσομεν1 αὖ
μουσεία λόγων, ϒς2 διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμο-
λογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, ὅνομάτων τε Δικυμείων
ἀ ἐκείνω ἐδωρήσατο3 πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας;4

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρωταγόρεια δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν
μέντοι τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅρθοεπειά γε τις, ὁ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα
πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ. τῶν γε μῆν οἰκτρογών ἐπὶ
γήρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκυμένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι
tέχνη μοι φαῖνεται το τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος,
ὁργίας τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἀμα δεινὸς ἄνηρ γέγονεν,
καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλείν, ϒς ἐφὴ
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς οὐδὲν
cράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν
ἐοικεν συνδεδογμένου εἰναι, ὃ τινὲς μὲν ἐπάνοδον,
ἀλλοί δὲ ἀλλο τίθενται ὁνομα.

1 πῶς φράσομεν Β. πῶς φράσομεν Τ. πῶς οὐ φράσομεν
Schanz. 2 ϒς Β. ὃς Τ. Schanz.
3 Schanz, following Ast, brackets ἐκείνω ἐδωρήσατο.
4 Schanz reads προσεποίησεν εὔεπείαν (προσεποίησεν after
Cornerius).

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Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length.

PHAEDRUS. O Prodicus! How clever!

SOCRATES. And shall we not mention Hippias, our friend from Elis? I think he would agree with him.

PHAEDRUS. Oh yes.

SOCRATES. And what shall we say of Polus and his shrines of learned speech, such as duplication and sententiousness and figurativeness, and what of the names with which Licymnius presented him to effect beautiful diction?

PHAEDRUS. Were there not some similar inventions of Protagoras, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name.
Ε  ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τό ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἐκαστα λέγεις ὑπο-
μνήσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν
εἰρημένων;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἰ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις
εἴπειν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εσομεν δὴ τὰ γε σμικρὰ· ταῦτα δὲ
ὑπ' αὐγάς μᾶλλον ἰδώμεν, τίνα καὶ πότ' ἔχει τὴν
τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἔρρωμένην, ὥν Σώκρατες, ἐν
γε δὴ πλῆθους συνόδοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εχει γὰρ ἄλλ', ὧν δαίμονε, ἵδε καὶ
σὺ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοι φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ
ήτριον ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

52. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι· εἰ τις προσελθὼν
τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου Ἐρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ
Ἀκουμνενοί εἴποι ότι Ἐγὼ ἐπιστήμη τοιαῦτ' ἄττα

Β  σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὡστε θερμαινεῖν τ' ἐὰν
βούλωμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ μοι, ἐμείς
ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κἀτω διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα
πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἄξιον
ιατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν, ὃ ἃν τὴν τούτων
ἐπιστήμην παραδῶ· τί ἂν οἷει ἄκούσαντας εἴπειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἔρεσθαι, εἰ προσεπτι-
σταται καὶ οὐστινας δεί καὶ ὅποτε ἐκαστα τούτων
ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ οὐν εἴποι ότι οὐδαμῶς· ἄλλ', ἄξιό
τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶν τ' εἶναι
ποιεῖν ἃ ἐροτᾶς;

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PHAEDRUS. You mean making a summary of the points of the speech at the end of it, so as to remind the hearers of what has been said?
SOCRATES. These are the things I mean, these and anything else you can mention concerned with the art of rhetoric.
PHAEDRUS. There are only little things, not worth mentioning.
SOCRATES. Never mind the little things; let us bring these other things more under the light and see what force of art they have and when.
PHAEDRUS. They have a very powerful force, at least in large assemblies.
SOCRATES. They have; but my friend, see if you agree with me in thinking that their warp has gaps in it.
PHAEDRUS. Go on and show them.
SOCRATES. Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say "I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vomit, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things"; what do you think they would say?
PHAEDRUS. They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much.
SOCRATES. If then he should say: "No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about?"
C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἴποιεν ἂν, οἴμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχῶν φαρμακίους ἰατρὸς οἴεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἔπαιν τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλῆς αὐ̃ προσελθῶν καὶ Εὐρυπίδη τις λέγω, ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικρῶν πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικρᾶς, ὅταν τε βούληται οὐκτράς, καὶ τούναντίον αὐ̃ φοβερᾶς καὶ ἀπειλητικᾶς, ὥσα

Δ τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐ̃τὰ τραγῳδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδίδοναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὕτω ἂν, ὡ Σώκρατες, οἴμαι, καταγελῶν, εἰ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῷ ὀλῷ συνισταμένην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, οἴμαι, λοιδορήσειαν, ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχῶν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἄρμονικῷ εἶναι, ὅτι ὅτι τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶον τε ὄξυτάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην

Ε χορδῶν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄγριῶς εἴποι ἂν ὡ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολάς, ἄλλ' ἄτε μουσικὸς ὃν πράτερον ὅτι, ὃ ἀριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταύτ' ἐπίστασθαι τοῦ μέλλοντα ἄρμονικὸν ἐσεθεῖν, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἄρμονίας ἐπαίειν τὸν τὴν σήν ἐξίν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἄρμονίας ἀναγκαία μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι, ἄλλ' οὐ τὰ ἄρμονικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρθότατά γε.

269 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκοιν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸν σφίσιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίη ἄλλ' οὐ
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really had no knowledge of the art.

SOCRATES. And what if someone should go to Sophocles or Euripides and should say that he knew how to make very long speeches about a small matter, and very short ones about a great affair, and pitiful utterances, if he wished, and again terrible and threatening ones, and all that sort of thing, and that he thought by imparting those things he could teach the art of writing tragedies?

PHAEDRUS. They also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition.

SOCRATES. But they would not, I suppose, rebuke him harshly, but they would behave as a musician would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes. He would not say roughly, “You wretch, you are mad,” but being a musician, he would say in gentler tones, “My friend, he who is to be a harmonist must know these things you mention, but nothing prevents one who is at your stage of knowledge from being quite ignorant of harmony. You know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself.”

PHAEDRUS. Quite correct.

SOCRATES. So Sophocles would say that the man exhibited the preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy
τὰ τραγικά, καὶ ὁ Ἀκουμενὸς τὰ πρὸ Ἰατρικῆς ἄλλοι, οὗ τὰ Ἰατρικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

53. ΣΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; τὸν μελίγηρν Ἀδραστον οἴομεθα ἣ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν δὲν νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς διήμεν τῶν παγκόλων τεχνημάτων, βραχυλογίων τε καὶ εἰκονολογίων καὶ οὐσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ' αὐγάς ἐφαμέν εἰναι σκεπτέα, πότερον χαλεπῶς ἃν αὐτούς, ὡσπερ ἔγω τε καὶ σὺ, ὑπ' ἀγροκίας ῥήμα τι εἰπείν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδασκοῦτας ὡς ρητορικῆς τέχνης, ἢ ἀτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους καὶ νῦν ἐπιπλήξαι εἰπόντας. οὐ Φαίδρε τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἄλλα συγγιγνώσκειν, εἰ τινὲς μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατον ἐγένοντο ὄρισασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν ρητορικῆ, ἐκ δὲ τούτῳ τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐχούσες ρητορικῆς ὤνθησαν ὑπηκόειν, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδασκοῦτες ἄλλους ἦγοῦνται σφίσιν τελεῖς ρητορικῆς δεδαχθαί, τὸ δὲ ἐκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὁλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτούς δὲν παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς σφῶν πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτον τι εἰναι τὸ τῆς τέχνης, ἢν οὕτωι οἱ ἀνδρὲς ὡς ρητορικῆς διδάσκοντον τε καὶ γράφουσιν· καὶ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖσ ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ
itself, and Acumenus that he knew the preliminaries of medicine, not medicine itself.

PHAEDRUS. Exactly so.

SOCRATES. Well then, if the mellifluous Adrastus or Pericles heard of the excellent accomplishments which we just enumerated, brachylogies and figurative speech and all the other things we said we must bring to the light and examine, do we suppose they would, like you and me, be so illbred as to speak discourteously of those who have written and taught these things as the art of rhetoric? Would they not, since they are wiser than we, censure us also and say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, we ought not to be angry, but lenient, if certain persons who are ignorant of dialectics have been unable to define the nature of rhetoric and on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they had discovered rhetoric, and believe that by teaching these preliminaries to others they have taught them rhetoric completely, and that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches."

PHAEDRUS. Well, Socrates, it does seem as if that which those men teach and write about as the art of rhetoric were such as you describe. I think you are

1 Tyrtaeus, ed. Bergk, first ed. frg. 9, 7, οὐδ᾽ εἰ Ταῦτα ἔστω Πέλασος βασιλεύτερος εἶναι γλῶσσαν ὅ Ἀδριάστου μειλιχύηρν ἡχοῖ, "not even if he were more kingly than Pelops and had the mellifluous tongue of Adrastus." Perhaps the orator Antiphon is referred to under the name of Adrastus, cf. chapter xliii. above.
τῷ ὀντὶ ῥητορικῷ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἢν τις δύνατο πορίσασθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὡς Φαίδρε, ὡστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκὸς, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὁσπέρ τάλλα. εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῷ εἶναι, ἐσεὶ ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἑπιστήμην τε καὶ μελήτην ὁτου δ' ἄν ἐλλύπης τοῦτον, ταύτη ἀτελῆς ἐσεὶ. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἦλ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος.

Ε. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ τῇ δῇ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὡς ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περίκλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῇ δῇ;

54. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πᾶσαι ὁσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἄδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι τὸ γὰρ ψηλόνον τοῦτο καὶ πάντη τελεσιουργὸν ἐοίκεν ἐντεῦθεν ποθὲν εἰσίεναι. δ' καὶ Περίκλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτῆσατο προσπεσῶν γάρ, οἷναι, τοιοῦτο ὁντι Ἀναξαγόρα, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπληθεῖς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνείας ἀφικόμενος, δὲν δὴ πέρι τῶν πολὺν λόγων ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἰλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

Β. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ αὐτός ποῦ τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς, ὁσπέρ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δή;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἑν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σῶματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ 546
right. But how and from whom is the truly rhetorical and persuasive art to be acquired?

Socrates. Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasydamus.

Phaedrus. Where then?

Socrates. I suppose, my friend, Pericles is the most perfect orator in existence.

Phaedrus. Well?

Socrates. All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it.

Phaedrus. What do you mean by that?

Socrates. The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.

Phaedrus. How so?

Socrates. In both cases you must analyse a nature, in one that of the body and in the other that of the
μέλλεις μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀλλὰ τέχνη, 
tῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὑγείαν 
kαὶ ῥώμην ἐμποτίσεις, τῇ δὲ λόγος τε καὶ ἐπιτη-
δεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἣν ἄν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν 
παραδώσεις.

φαίδρος. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

ζοκρατῆς. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἄξιως λόγον κατα-
νοήσαι οἴει δυνατῶν εἶναι ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ ὄλου 
φύσεως;

φαίδρος. Εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτεις γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκλη-
πιαδών δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἀνευ 
tῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ζοκρατῆς. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγειν χρὴ 
μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἰπποκράτεις τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα 
σκοπεῖν, εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

φαίδρος. Φημί.

55. ζοκρατῆς. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί 
ποτε λέγει Ἰπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἄληθὴς λόγος.
ἀρ’ οὐχ ὦδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτου οὖν φύσεως 
πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἡ πολυειδὲς ἔστιν, οὐ πέρι 
βουλησόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον 
δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἐπειτα δὲ, ἀν μὲν ἄπλοι ἦν, 
σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκε 
eis τὸ δρᾶν ἔχων ἡ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἕαι 
δὲ πλεῖω εἰδὴ ἔχῃ, ταύτα ἀριθμῆσάμενον, ὅπερ 
ἐφ’ ἐνός, τοῦτ’ ἰδεῖν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν 
αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἡ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

φαίδρος. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζοκρατῆς. Ἡ γοῦν ἀνευ τούτων μέθοδοι ἐοίκοι 
ἐὰν ὀσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ· ἀλλ’ οὐ μὴν ἀπεικα-
stέου τῷ γε τέχνη μετιόντα ὅτιον τυφλῷ οὐδὲ 
kωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς, ἃν τῷ τις τέχνη λόγον 
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soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.

PHAEDRUS. That, Socrates, is probably true.

SOCRATES. Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?

PHAEDRUS. If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend; however, we ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to see also if our reason agrees with him on examination.

PHAEDRUS. I assent.

SOCRATES. Then see what Hippocrates and true reason say about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by what?

PHAEDRUS. Very likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES. At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues any study scientifically ought not to be comparable to a blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical teaching
διδὼ, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τὴς φύσεως τούτου, πρὸς ὁ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ἐσται δὲ ποιν ψυχῆ τούτο.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

271 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα: πειθῶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἑπιχειρεῖ. ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι ὁ Ἐρασύμαχος τε καὶ ὁ ἀλλὸς σπουδὴ τέχνης. ῥητορικὴν διδὼ, πρῶτον πάση ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδείν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοίον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σῶματος μορφήν πολυειδές· τούτῳ γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτω τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διατάξαμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παρῆματα διεισὶ τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόστων ἐκαστοῦ ἐκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκουν, οία οὖσα ύφ’ οὖν λόγων δε ἢ ἢν αἰτίαν εξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πειθεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἀν, ὡς ἐσικ’, ἔχου καταρτ. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, ὁ ϕίλε, ἀλλὰς εὐδεικ- νύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ

C γραφήσεται οὔτε τί ἀλλο οὔτε τούτο τι ἀλλ’ οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὅν συ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανούργοι εἰσι καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἀν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τούτον λέγοις τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθὼμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν.

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is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that to which his words are to be addressed, and that is the soul, is it not?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then this is the goal of all his effort; he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not that so?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric, will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what we call explaining its nature.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And secondly he will say what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Thirdly, he will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not.

PHAEDRUS. That would, I think, be excellent.

SOCRATES. By no other method of exposition or speech will this, or anything else, ever be written or spoken with real art. But those whom you have heard, who write treatises on the art of speech nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of the soul, though they know it very well. Until they write and speak by this method we cannot believe that they write by the rules of art.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτον;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αύτὰ μὲν τὰ ρήματα εἶπεῖν οὐκ εὐπτεῖς· ὥς δὲ δεὶ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἑθέλω.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δὴ.

56. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡμείς ὁ λόγος δύναμις τυγ-
χάνει ψυχαγωγία οὕσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ρητορικὸν ἐπεστὶν ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὡσα εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖν καὶ τοῖνοιοιδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοὶ διείσδυσαν τούτων δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγον αὐτῷ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἰδη, τοιώνδε ἐκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοὶ δύο τῶν τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τήν οἰκεῖαν εἰς τὰ τοιάδε εὑπειθεῖς, δὲ τοιοὶ διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· δει δὴ ταῦτα ἰκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεωμένον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖσ πράξεσιν οὖν τοι πραττώμενα, ἡξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολούθειν, ἡ μηδὲν εἶναι πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὡς τότε ἥκουν λόγων ἡζυνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τοι ἰκανῶς ἔχῃ, οἴος ὑφ’ οἶων πειθεῖαι, παραγιγνόμενον τοῦ δυνατὸς ἢ δι-

272 αισθανόμενος ἐαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι οὔτος ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, περὶ ᾿ης τότε ἥσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἕργῳ παροῦσά ὦ, ἢ προσοιστέουν τοῦσδε ἢ ἅτοις λόγοις ἐπὶ τήν τῶνδε πειθῶ, ταῦτα δ’ ἢ ἔχουντε ἐκαστι, προσλαβόντες καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέων καὶ ἐπισχέτεων, βραχυλογίας τε αὐ καὶ ἐλεεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἐκάστων τε ὁς’ ἃν

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PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. What is this method?
SOCRATES. It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.
PHAEDRUS. Speak then.
SOCRATES. Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds: these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes

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eίδη μάθη λόγων, τούτων τήν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγρύντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστίν ἡ

B τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ’ οὐ’ ἄλλ’ ὁ τι ἄν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπῃ λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γρά-
ϕων, φη δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὃ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. τί δὴ οὖν; φήσει ἵσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὃ Φαίδρε τε
καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖν οὔτως; ἢ ἄλλως πῶς ἀπο-
dεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Αδύνατον ποι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως-
καίτοι οὐ σμικροῦ γε φαίνεται ἔργον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἑνεκα

C χρή πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετα-
stρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ τίς πὴ βάνω καὶ βραχυ-
tέρα φαίνεται ἐπ’ αὐτὴν όδος, ἢν μὴ μάτην
πολλῆν ἢ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἔξον ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν.
ἄλλ’ εἰ τινά πὴ βοὴθειαν ἐχείς ἐπακηκηκοὸς Δυσίον
ἡ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμμυνησκόμενος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἔνεκα μὲν πεῖρας ἐχοὶμ’ ἂν,1 ἄλλ’
οὔτι νῦν η’ οὔτως ἐχω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλει οὖν ἐγὼ τιν’ εἰπὼ λόγον, ὃν
τῶν περὶ ταῦτα τινῶν ἀκήκοα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὃ Φαίδρε, δίκαιον
eῖναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

D ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ σὺ γε οὔτω ποιεῖ.

57. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φασὶ τοῖνυν οὐδὲν οὔτω ταῦτα
dεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ’ ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περι-
bαλλομένους. παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ καὶ ἄρχας
εἰπομεν τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας
μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων,

1 Schanz reads λέγοιμ’ ἂν.
of speech which he has learned, then, and not
till then, will his art be fully and completely
finished; and if anyone who omits any of these
points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by
the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the
better man. "Now then," perhaps the writer of our
treatise will say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, do you
agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be
described in some other way?"

Phaedrus. No other way is possible, Socrates.
But it seems a great task to attain to it.

Socrates. Very true. Therefore you must examine
all that has been said from every point of view, to
see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears,
that one may not take a long and rough road, when
there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard
from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help
us, try to remember it and tell it.

Phaedrus. If it depended on trying, I might, but
just now I have nothing to say.

Socrates. Then shall I tell something that I have
heard some of those say who make these matters
their business?

Phaedrus. Pray do.

Socrates. Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus,
has a right to an advocate, as they say.

Phaedrus. Do you be his advocate.

Socrates. Very well. They say that there is no
need of treating these matters with such gravity and
carrying them back so far to first principles with
many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this
discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician
need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth
καὶ ἄνθρωπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἡ τροφή, τὸν μέλλοντα ἰκανὸς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὔδέν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων

Ε ἀληθείας μέλειν οὔδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τούτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ὡς δὲν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἔρειν. οὔδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πραχθέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ἢ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἐν τε κατηγορία καὶ ἀπολογία· καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δή εἰκὸς διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεί: τούτο γὰρ διὰ πάντως τοῦ λόγου γνωρίζοντο τὴν ἀπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Αὐτά γε, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, διελήλυθας ἄ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τό μόνον βραχέως τού τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τούτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΕΛΚΡΑΘΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω τοῖς καὶ τὸδε ἡμῖν

Β δὸ Τισίας, μὴ τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΕΛΚΡΑΘΗΣ. Τοῦτο δῆ, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφοῦ εὐρών ἄμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἐγραφεῖν, ὡς εὖν τις ἀσθενής καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἵσχυρον καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἰμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο ὄφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστηρίον ἄγηται, δὲ δὴ τάληθες μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τὸν ἀνδρικὸν συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνῳ

C ἰστην, ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ καταχρῆσασθαι τῷ πῶς δ' ἂν ἔγω τοιόσδε τοιόδε ἐπεχείρησα; δ' ὡς οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ
in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

PHAEDRUS. You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before,¹ but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

SOCRATES. Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

PHAEDRUS. That is just what he says.

SOCRATES. Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, "How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?" The coward will

¹ See 259 E.
τὴν ἕαυτον κάκην, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ψεῦδεσθαι ἑπιχειρῶν τάχ’ ἄν ἐλεγχόν πη παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τάλλα δή τοιαῦτ’ ἀττα ἐστὶν τὰ τέχνη λεγόμενα. οὐ γὰρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

Φαῖδρος. Τί μήν;

Σωκράτης. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ’ ἐοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένη τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ’ ἄν τυχχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὁνομαξόμενος.

D ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταίρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή—

Φαῖδρος. Τὸ ποίον;

58. Σωκράτης. "Οτι, ὦ Τισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες, ὡς ἄρα τούτῳ τὸ εἰκός τοῖς πολλοῖς δι’ ὁμοίωτητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγύγνώμενον’ τὰς δὲ ὁμοίωτητας ἀρτί διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχ’ ὑπ’ ἄλληθειαν εἰδῶς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὐρίσκειν. ὡστ’ εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἂν εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νυνὶ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἔαν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκοουσμένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, καὶ κατ’ εἰδὴ τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὅντα καὶ μὰ ἰδέα δυνατός ἢ καθ’ ἐκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὐ ποτ’ ἔσται τεχνικός λόγων περὶ καθ’ ὅσων δυνατον ἀνθρώπῳ. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτῆσηται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας. ἂν οὐχ ἔνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πρῶτες πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, άλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πάν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τισία, φασίν οἱ σοφῶτεροι ἡμῶν, ὁμοδούλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετάν τον νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὦ τι μή παρέργουν, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἑξ ἀγαθῶν· ὡστ’

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not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try
to invent some other lie, and thus give his oppo-
nent a chance to confute him. And in other cases
there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so,
Phaedrus?

PHAEDErus. Certainly.

SOCRATEx. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems
to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some
other, whoever he may be and whatever country he
is proud to call his own! But, my friend, shall we
say in reply to this, or shall we not—

PHAEDErus. What?

SOCRATEx. “Tisias, some time ago, before you
came along, we were saying that this probability of
yours was accepted by the people because of its
likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who
knows the truth is always best able to discover like-
nesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about
the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not,
we will put our trust in what we said just now, that
unless a man take account of the characters of his
hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to
comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will
never attain the highest human perfection in the art of
speech. But this ability he will not gain without
much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to
undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before
men, but that he may be able to speak and to do
everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing
to the gods. For those who are wiser than we,
Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practise
to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary
consideration, but his good and noble masters.
Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished;
ei makrā ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσης· μεγάλων γὰρ ἔνεκα περιτέον, οὐχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἐσται μήν, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν, εάν τις ἐθέλῃ, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα εξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα.

phiairos. Παγκάλως ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ οἶδος τε τίς εἰη.

sokrathe. Ἄλλα καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντι τοι τοῖς Β καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὃ τι ἂν τῷ ξυμβῇ παθεῖν.

phiairos. Καὶ μάλα.

sokrathe. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἴκανῶς ἐχέτω.

phiairos. Τί μήν;

sokrathe. Τὸ δὲ εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀρετής, πὴ γυνώμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχω καὶ ὅπῃ ἀρπαγῶς, λοιπῶν. ἡ γάρ;

phiairos. Ναῦ.

59. sokrathe. Οἰσθ' οὖν ὅτι μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἡ λέγων;

phiairos. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δὲ;

C sokrathe. Ἀκοὴς γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δὲ ἄλλης αὐτοῦ ἱσασθε. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὑρομεν αὐτοῦ, ἄρα γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπί-

νων δοξασμάτων;

phiairos. Γελοῖον ήροῦ: ἂλλ' ἂ φῆς ἀκηκοέναι, λέγε.

sokrathe. Ἡκουσα τοῖνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Ἀἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἔκει παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὐ καὶ τὸ ὁρνευτὸ ἄρπαν, ὁ δὲ καλοῦσιν ἱβιν' αὐτῷ δὲ ὅνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεόθ. τοῦτον δὲ

D πρῶτον ἄριθμον τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεπτείας τε 560
for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires."

PHAEDRUS. I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

SOCRATES. But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

PHAEDRUS. Assuredly.

SOCRATES. But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

PHAEDRUS. Not at all; do you?

SOCRATES. I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

PHAEDRUS. A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

SOCRATES. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most
καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα βασιλέως δ' αὐ τότε οὐντός Αἰγύπτου ὁλῆς Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ἢν οἱ Ἐλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Ῥήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα, παρὰ τούτον ἔλθὼν ὁ Θεῦθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἐφή δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο, ἢντινα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὑφελίαν, διεξίοντος δὲ, ὃ τι καλὸς ἢ μη καλὸς δοκοὶ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν Ἐ ἔφευξε, τὸ δ' ἐπήψε. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἔπ' ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν ὁ Θεῦθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ὃ λόγος πολὺς ἀν εἰη διελθεῖν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς γράμμασιν ἰν, τοῦτο δὲ, ὃ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἐφη ὁ Θεῦθ, σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικώτερους παρέξει. μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ηὐρέθη. ὁ δ' εἶπεν ὃ τεχνικῶτατε Θεῦθ, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι, τὶν ἐχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὑφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι 275 χρῆσθαι καὶ νῦν σὺ, πατήρ δὲν γραμματῶν, δὲ εὐνοιαν τοῦναντίον εἴπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθῶν λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἁμελητησία, ἀτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἐξώθην ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἐνδοθὲν αὐτοὺς υφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμμιμησκομένους οὐκοὺς μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ηὗρες. σοφίας δ' τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις' πολυνήκουι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἀνευδιαχῆς πολυγνώμονες Β εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ουντες 562
important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, "This invention, O king," said Theuth, "will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered." But Thamus replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant
καὶ χαλέποι ξυνεῖναι, δοξόσεφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὡ Σῶκρατες, πάντως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποὺς ἄν ἐπέληξα λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἱ δὲ γ', ὃ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἰερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἐφήσαν μαντικοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς, ἀτε οὐκ οὐσὶ σοφοῖς ὁσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς C καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθή λέγοιεν: σοὶ δ' ἰσως διαφέρει τὸς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδατός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἶτε ἄλλως ἔχεις;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὑρθώς ἐπέπληξας, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ἢπερ ὁ Ὀθῆβαιος λέγει.

60. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ παραδεχόμενος ὅσ τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσώμενον, πολλῆς ἀν εὐθείας γέμω καὶ τῷ ὁντι τῆν Ἀμμώνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος D εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἦ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὑρθότατα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινὸν γὰρ ποι, ὁ Φαίδρε, τούτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοίων ξώγραφίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκεῖνη ἐκγόνα ἐστὶν ὡς ἥττα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶ. ταῦτ' ὅτε καὶ οἱ λόγοι: δόξαις μὲν ἄν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἐρή τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τῇ σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτ' ἄει. ὅταν δὲ E ἀπαξ γραφή, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοὺς ἐπαίσιν, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς παρ' 564
and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise.

PHAEDRUS. Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

SOCRATES. They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

PHAEDRUS. Your rebuke is just; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

SOCRATES. He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who
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οίς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς
dεῖ γε καὶ μὴ· πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη
λοιδορθεῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἄεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς
γὰρ οὔτ᾽ ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ταῦτά σοι ὀρθότατα εἴρηται.

276 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ᾽; ἄλλον ὅρῳμεν λόγον τούτου
ἀδελφὸν ὑγίσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὁσῳ
ἀμείνῳ καὶ δυνατότερος τούτου φύεται;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνό-
μενον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁς μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῷ
τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἄμυναι ἑαυτῷ,
ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγάν πρὸς οὐς δεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ξώντα
καὶ ἐμψυχον, οὔ ο γεγραμμένος εἰδωλον ἃν τι
λέγοιτο δικαίως.

B 61. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τόδε δὴ μοι
εἶπέ· ο νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, ὃν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο
καὶ ἔγκαρπτα βούλοιτό γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῆ
ἀν θέρους εἰς Ἀδῶνιδος κῆπους ἀρῶν χαῖροι
θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραις ὡκτὼ γιγνόμενοι, ἢ
ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν δρόη ἃν,
ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ· ἔφ᾽ οίς δὲ ἐσπούδακε, τῇ γεωργικῇ
χρώμενος ἂν τέχνη, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον,
ἀγαπώ ἃν ἐν ὄγδοις μην ὅσα ἐσπείρειν τέλος
λαβόντα;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτω ποι, ὡ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν
σπουδῆ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρως ἃν, ἢ λέγεις, ποιοῖ.

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have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.

PHAEDRUS. You are quite right about that, too.

SOCRATES. Now tell me; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature?

PHAEDRUS. What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say?

SOCRATES. The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

SOCRATES. Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τόν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἥττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡ κιστά γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἀρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὑδατι γράψει μέλαιν σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἰκανῶς τάληθε διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοὺν δὴ τὸ γ' εἰκόσ.

D ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γάρ: ἄλλα τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς έοικε, παιδιάς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἐαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενοι, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας εὰν ἱκηταί, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταυτῷ ἵχνος μετίοντι, ἡ σοθησεταί τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυμένους ἀπαλοῦς: ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιάς ἄλλαις χρώνται, συμποσίοις τε ἀρδουτε αὐτοὺς ἐτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἁδελφά, τότ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων 1 ἔγω παῖζων διάξει.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τού ἐν λόγωι δυναμένου παῖζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὑν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστι γάρ, Ὡ φίλε Φαίδρε, οὕτω πολὺ δ', οἴμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, ὁι ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἰκανοι καὶ οὗχι ἀκαρποὶ ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὃθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἠθεσι

1 ois BT. od Schanz.

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PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman?

PHAEDRUS. By no means.

SOCRATES. Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

PHAEDRUS. No, at least, probably not.

SOCRATES. No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

PHAEDRUS. A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

SOCRATES. Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable
φυόμενοι τούτ’ ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἵκανοί, καί τὸν ἐχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατὸν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πολὺ γὰρ τούτ’ ἐτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

62. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκείνα ἡδή, ὁ Φαίδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὀμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἰδεῖν ὑμικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Δυσίον τε ἀνείδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τέχυν καὶ ἀνευ τέχυς γράφοιτο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλώσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐδοξέ γε δὴ πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρὶν ἄν τις τὸ τε ἀληθὲς ἐκάστων εἰδῆ πέρι ὅν λέγει ἡ γράφει, κατ’ αὐτὸ τε πᾶν ὀρίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται, ὀρισάμενος τε πάλιν κατ’ εἰδῆ μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθη ἐπερὶ τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διδῶν κατὰ ταύτα, τὸ προσαρμόττων ἐκάστη φύσει εἰδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὔτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῆ τῶν λόγων, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἀπλοὺς δε ἀπλῆ; οὐ πρότερον δυνατὸν τέχυν ἐσεσθαι καθ’ ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγου γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ο ἐμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

1 Schanz omits καὶ.
of continuing the process for ever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, that is far nobler.

SOCRATES. And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

PHAEDRUS. What others?

SOCRATES. Those which brought us to this point through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speech-writer, and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said.

SOCRATES. A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

1 See 257 a.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τούτο γε οὕτω πῶς ἑφάνῃ.

63. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ’ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγον λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν,

καὶ ὅτι γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτ’ ἃν οὐνείδος ἢ μῆ, ἀρα οὔ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἐμπροσθεν —

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅς εἶτε Δυσίας ἢ τις ἄλλος πῶς ἔγραψεν ἢ γράφει ίδία ἢ δημοσία νόμους τιθεῖς, εὐγνώμονα πολιτικῶν γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὔτω μὲν οὐνείδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἶτε τίς φησιν εἴπε μῆ, τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ύπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδικών πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύ

Ε γει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ µὴ οὔκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὔδε ἁν ο πᾶς ὁχλὸς αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅ δ’ ὑγειραμμένον λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου παιδιὰν τε ἡγούμενος πολλῆν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι, καὶ οὔδενα πῶς ἐγράφω οὐν ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ’ ἀνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἁξίου σπούδης ἐργαθηναι, οὔδ’ λεσθήναι ὡς οἱ βαρυωδοῦμενοι ἀνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ένεκα ἑλέ

καὶ τῷ ὅντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδώτων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, εὐ δὲ τοῖς διδασκοµένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὅντι γραφομένοις ἐν ἕνω χεῖ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνοις τῷ τε ἐναργής εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἁξίου σπούδης· δεῖν δ’ τοὺς τοιοῦτοις

1 Schanz, following Schleiermacher, brackets νόμους τιθεῖς.
2 Schanz brackets οὔδ’ . . . ἑλέχθησαν.
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Yes, certainly, that is just about our result.

SOCRATES. How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it.

PHAEDRUS. That is true.

SOCRATES. But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in metre or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people's minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered
λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον νῦες γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεῖσι ἐν, ἔπειτα

B εἰ τινὲς τούτου ἐκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἁμα ἐν ἀλλαιοιν ἀλλων ψυχαίς κατ' ἄξιαν ἐνέφυσαν·

tοὺς δὲ ἀλλοις χαίρειν ἑών — οὕτως δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει, ὃς Φαίδρε, εἶναι οἷον ἐγὼ τε καὶ

C σὺ εὐξαίμηθ' ἂν σὲ τε καὶ ἔμε γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάππασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαι τε καὶ εὐχομαι ἃ λέγεις.

64. ἘΦΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢδη πεπαιδθὼ μετρίως ἢμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σὺ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε

D Λυσία, ὅτι ὦ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν νάμα τε καὶ μουσεῖον ἡκούσαμεν λόγων, οὐ̱ ἐπέστεκλλον

λέγειν Αὐσία τε καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλος συντίθησι·

λόγους, καὶ Ὁμήρῳ καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλος αὐ̱ ποίησιν

ψιλήν ἢ ἐν φοδὶ συντίθεικε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ

ὄστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγ-

γράμματα ἔγραψεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τὸ ἁληθὲς ἔχει

συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν εἰς ἔλεγχον

ἰὼν περὶ ὁν ἐγραψε, καὶ λέγον αὐ̱τός δυνατὸς τὰ

γεγραμμένα φαύλα ἀποδείξαι, οὐ̱ τι τῶν ἐποιε

μᾶν ἔχοντα δεὶ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ̱

οίς ἐστούδακεν εἰκείνων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐ̱τῷ νέμεις;

ἘΦΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν σοφὸν, ὃς Φαίδρε, καλεῖν

ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῶ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ

δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφον ἦ τοιοῦτον τὶ μᾶλλον τε ἡν αὐ̱τῷ

ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχωι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὐ̱δέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπον.

ἘΦΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐ̱ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα

ἂν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἐγραψεν ἄνω κατὰ στρέφων ἐν

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the speaker's own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words,—that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become.

PHAEDRUS. By all means that is what I wish and pray for.

SOCRATES. We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs, and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws:—If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.

PHAEDRUS. What titles do you grant them then?

SOCRATES. I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great and befits God alone; but the name "philosopher," that is, "lover of wisdom," or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

PHAEDRUS. And quite appropriate.

SOCRATES. On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or
Ε χρόνω, πρὸς ἀλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἄφαιρών, ἐν δίκη που ποιητὴν ἣ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερεῖς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ ἐταίρῳ φράζε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δε; σὺ πώς ποιήσεις; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ τὸν σὸν ἐταίρον δεὶ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα τούτον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἰσοκράτη τὸν καλὸν· ὁ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες; τίν αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νέος ἔτι, ὁ Φαίδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὁ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποίον δή;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Δυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἐτι τε ἢθει γεννυκωτέρῳ κεκράσθαι· ὡστε οὐδὲν ἄν γέννω τὸν προιόσπης τῆς ἠλωός εἰ περὶ αὐτοὺς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέον ἡ παῖδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἀψαμενον λόγων, ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῷ μη ἀποχρῆσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζῳ τις αὐτῶν

Β ἅγοι ὀρμὴ θειοτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὃ φίλε, ἔνεστὶ τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἔγω μὲν παρὰ τῶν ἑκέναν ὡς ἐμοῖς παιδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Δυσία.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ταῦτα ἔσται· ἄλλα ἰωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πυῆγος ἦπιώτερον γέγονεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένω πρέπει τοῖς δὲ πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι όσοι τῇ δι θεοί, δοίητε ¹ μοι καλὸ γενέσθαι ταύδοθεν· ἐξωθεν

¹ Schanz reads δοιτέ.
PHAEDRUS

written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

Socrates. Tell this then to your friend.

PHAEDRUS. But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by.

Socrates. What friend?

PHAEDRUS. The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is?

Socrates. Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him.

PHAEDRUS. What is it?

Socrates. I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favourite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favourite.

PHAEDRUS. It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.

Socrates. Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

Socrates. O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful
δὲ ὁσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλοῦσιον
C δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφὸν τὸ δὲ χρυσὸν πλήθος εἶη
μοι ὅσον μὴτε φέρειν μὴτε ἀγεῖν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ
σώφρων.—"Ετ' ἄλλου τοῦ δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαίδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἡμῖκται.
Φαίδρος. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχομαι κοινὰ γὰρ
τὰ τῶν φίλων.
Σωκράτης. Ἰωμεν.
in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.—Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.

PHAEDRUS. Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common.

SOCRATES. Let us go.
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The Loeb Classical Library edition of Plato is in twelve volumes.
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