AN INTRODUCTION TO

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

BOOKS I—IV.

(Book X. Ch. vi—ix. in an Appendix)

WITH A CONTINUOUS ANALYSIS AND NOTES

Intended for the use of Beginners and Junior Students

BY THE

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PREFACE.

The object of this work is to provide a simple introduction to the subject of the Ethics for beginners generally, and especially for those who are commencing it with a view to the Oxford Final Examination. It may also perhaps be found useful in the Upper Forms of Public Schools. The chief aim throughout has been clearness and simplicity, even at the risk of occasional repetition and diffuseness. Technical phraseology has been as far as possible avoided, and the principal technical terms occurring are explained in a Glossary.

The author hopes that this specific object of the work will be borne in mind throughout the whole of it.

Thus the Introductory Sketch, which simply aims at giving a beginner an intelligent notion of the subject upon which he is entering, makes no pretence to be exhaustive. Several important systems and writers are omitted altogether. The object has been to select systems which have a distinct
(perhaps one-sided) character: such as are typical of some well-defined bias or direction of thought. In fact names and references have been added in the notes almost as an afterthought, to give the clue to further inquiry to those who may desire it.

In the Glossary likewise, the explanations given of some of the more important technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy are altogether popular and rudimentary. To have attempted anything like an adequate account of such difficult words as ἀρχή, φύσις, ψυχή, δύναμις, etc., would have defeated the purpose of the work altogether, and repelled those for whose benefit it is intended.

The same considerations must serve as an apology for language sometimes consciously loose and unphilosophical in the Analysis and Notes. The attempt to put such a treatise as that of Aristotle into such a 'modern' light as may be intelligible to a reader ex hyp. unacquainted with philosophical phraseology, seems necessarily to involve the sacrifice of technical accuracy. This desire to appeal as far as possible to modern sympathies has occasioned a certain amount of diffuseness in parallel quotations from recent popular writers.

The best thanks of the author are due to several friends who have kindly assisted him by their advice in various parts of the work: and he will feel grateful for any further criticisms or suggestions that may be offered to him.
PREFACE.

The difficulty of the task has become more apparent on acquaintance with it, and this experiment is now made not without hesitation and a full consciousness of its execution.

EDMUND HALL, OXFORD,
June 1871.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

A new edition of this work being now called for, I take opportunity of introducing several corrections, and considerable additions to the Glossary and Notes.

The additional matter (except in the case of actual corrections or obvious improvements of detail) has been for the most part either embodied in the Glossary or collected in 'Supplementary Notes and Illustrations.'

The reasons for adopting this method have been (1) to disturb as little as possible the existing arrangement of Text, Analysis, and Footnotes; (2) to admit of the occasional introduction of discussions and references, which may make the Book (as I venture to hope) more useful to a higher class of Students, especially in the earlier stages of their acquaintance with so difficult an author as Aristotle; (3) to allow of a considerable enlargement of the illustrations from modern authors. This kind of illustration, while interesting to all students, is, I believe, especially
valuable for Passmen, because calculated to impart something of a living interest to what they are apt to consider as empty formulæ, and mere 'dry bones' of speculation. Most of these illustrations are from Shakespeare, as it seems to me that the numerous and striking coincidences between these two of the greatest observers of human nature and life are especially instructive from the certainty of their complete independence. I have also allowed myself some liberty in introducing illustrations from Dante for the opposite reason, that his phraseology and theories are, so to speak, saturated with Aristotelian language and lore. We can thus trace the influence on one of the greatest minds, intellectual and imaginative, that the world has yet seen, of one whom he regarded as his master and guide both in Speculative and Practical Philosophy, of one who was to him not only 'il Maestro di color che sanno,' but also 'il Maestro di nostra vita.'

I am indebted to several friends for kindly suggesting corrections and improvements. My especial thanks are due to the Rev. J. R. Magrath, Senior Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, for much valuable advice and assistance throughout the work.

E. M.

S. EDMUND HALL, OXFORD,
October 1877.
INTRODUCTION.

Much difficulty is sometimes felt, especially by beginners, in distinguishing the spheres of Ethical and Religious teaching. A dilemma like that which traditionally proved fatal to the Alexandrian library represents not inaptly the feeling with which the Science of Ethics is regarded in its relations to Religion. It is thought that if its conclusions agree with those of Religion they are superfluous, if they differ from them they are wicked. We will first then endeavour to gain a clear conception of the purpose and limits of the Science of Ethics, as contrasted with those of Religion.

We may consider this and kindred sciences to have their origin somewhat as follows.

Man is obviously compounded of two distinct natures, which may be roughly described as Body and Soul. He desires to know more of each of these natures. The nature of his Body is investigated by the Science of Physiology, which reveals to him that it is composed of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, etc. His Soul (using the word broadly for the immaterial side of man's nature) is similarly discovered by the Science of Psychology to contain Reasoning, Imaginative (or Artistic), Moral, and other powers. Further inquiries in each of these last-named departments give rise to the practical Sciences of
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Logic, Æsthetics, Ethics, etc., which are Sciences because their main object is to ascertain the laws and facts of these several portions of our compound nature; practical because the enunciation of these laws and facts, when discovered, constitutes ipso facto practical rules for the direction of the faculties to which the investigation refers. In each case notice that the process is one of a careful but simple observation of facts, followed by a judicious enunciation of the laws which bind those facts together. In a word the method is what logicians call Inductive. This cannot be too clearly insisted upon. Let us therefore explain it a little more fully in each of the cases mentioned. The primary object of Logic is to ascertain under what laws, principles, limits, men do, as a matter of fact, reason and think. The statement of these laws becomes the groundwork of practical rules for reasoning. The primary object of Æsthetics is to ascertain what constitutes, as a matter of fact, good and bad taste in art of all kinds according to the decision of those competent to judge. The enunciations of these principles become the practical rules to which the Sculptor, Artist, Poet must conform. So, lastly, the primary object of Ethics is to ascertain, as a matter of fact, what are the principles, feelings, or motives which regulate men’s conduct as moral agents, what is the distinction which men do actually draw between Right and Wrong? by what faculty or faculties are they enabled to draw such a distinction? on what sanction do such distinctions rest? The answers to such questions, when formulated, become ipso facto practical rules for the conduct of life. But in all these cases the practical rules are as it were adjuncts to the
science strictly so called. The main object of the science is to discover, and group under general laws, the facts in each department of human nature, by the ordinary powers of accurate observation. It is due to the nature of the subject-matter in each case that the facts when formulated become practical rules. Now we see how the spheres of Ethics and Religion do not interfere. The object of Ethics is to ascertain the facts of a certain department of human nature so far as they are matters of observation. Practical rules of conduct are secondary, and in a manner accidental. On the other hand the main object of Religion is generally thought to be to provide us with practical rules of conduct and an adequate sanction for obeying them. The discovery of facts of, or theories about, our moral nature is in this case what is secondary and accidental. Again, if Science (whether Ethics or any other Science) accepts a proposition as true which does not rest upon observation but on authority, it ceases so far to be Science. On the other hand Religion, or at least revealed Religion (and it is about this only that we are now speaking), often claims our obedience on the grounds of the authority to which it can appeal. Consequently the aim, the purpose, the fundamental principles, of Religion and Ethics are perfectly distinct. One does not supersede or clash with the other. It is now a trite saying that Revelation is not meant to teach us Physical Science; it is equally true that it is not designed to teach us Ethical or Moral Science.

Let us now suppose the Science of Ethics started on its independent career. What will be the main question or questions which it will seek to answer? It finds mankind, as
a matter of fact, approving, and, as it would seem, instinctively approving, certain actions, and condemning others. Not, be it observed, the same actions universally. Very far from it. But it finds the same sentiment of approbation and disapprobation however variously applied in detail; a sentiment which is reflected in language by the words Right and Wrong.

And (to recur for a moment to the question above discussed) these phenomena are just as conspicuous when revealed religion is unknown: they are indeed in that case more important, scientifically speaking. They arise independently of religion, and therefore call for a solution independent of it. What then are these notions of Right and Wrong, asks the Science of Ethics, which, apart from external aid and instruction, the human mind spontaneously and universally recognises? What is the exact meaning of the distinction? What precisely constitutes the exact difference between Right and Wrong in actions? Further, by what faculty or faculties do we recognise it? Again, by what motive are we impelled to regulate our practice by these notions? What is the nature and sanction of the Feeling of Duty? Or once more, as Aristotle himself puts the question, What is the Chief Good for man? What is the ultimate aim of all his efforts and aspirations? What is he living for? What is he hoping to attain to?

Such are the main problems which present themselves for solution to the Science of Ethics, and they arise (let it be noticed) from observation of the actual facts and phenomena of that department of human nature with which the
Science in question is concerned. We will reduce them to these four questions:

1. What constitutes the difference between Right and Wrong in actions?
2. What is the faculty in ourselves which is able to recognise that difference?
3. What is the nature of the feeling of Duty or Moral Obligation?
4. What is the 'Chief Good,' or ultimate aim of human action?

A brief account of the answers that have been given to each of these questions by the best known systems of Moral Philosophy will serve as a general introduction to the subject before us.

I. The various answers given to this question reduce themselves to two types. One is that Right and Wrong may be resolved into manifestations of some other familiar notions, such as (e.g.) Advantageous and Disadvantageous. The other is that they cannot be resolved at all, but are ultimate ideas which are incapable of analysis. The former systems may be called Utilitarian systems of Morality, because they consider the

1 Note.—Owing to the difficulty of finding one word to include all systems non-Intuitive, I use Utilitarian here and elsewhere in this Introduction in its widest sense, to include all Systems which reduce Virtue to a question of Utility or Advantage whether it be of one's-self only, or of others only, or of one's-self and others conjointly. These are sometimes distinguished as Selfish, Benevolent, and Utilitarian Systems respectively.
recognition of Right and Wrong to depend upon a calculation of Utility or Advantage. The latter are called Intuitive Systems because they refer the perception of Right and Wrong to a special faculty which simply approves and disapproves without being able always, or even usually, to assign its reasons: in other words to an Intuitive Faculty. But we must not encroach upon our second question. We will now therefore illustrate these two divergent theories as to the nature of Right and Wrong in themselves.

(A) Utilitarian Systems.

(a) Some assert that all Morality is a thinly-disguised selfishness, that man has and can have, no motive for action but self-interest, and that even benevolence, gratitude, and love are but forms of the desire of power, the wish to exhibit our superiority, the appreciation of possible advantages to be derived from the goodwill of others. (β) Others again that virtuous actions are simply the observance of the varying enactments of law, framed at first by the rulers in their own

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1 Hobbes, Mandeville, La Rochefoucauld, etc. Take as a specimen Hobbes's account of Love—'a conception a man hath of his need of the person desired.' Or Mandeville's statement that 'men do not really admire such actions as those of Regulus or Decius, but only observe that men of such dispositions are very useful for the defence of any state, and therefore by panegyrics, etc., encourage such tempers in others.' Or La Rochefoucauld (Maxime 264): 'Pity is a clever foresight of ills into which we may ourselves fall. We assist others in order to secure their services for ourselves under similar circumstances: and the services we render are strictly speaking conferred upon ourselves in advance.'
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interest\(^1\), and observed afterwards by others from fear of civil punishments or hope of rewards, \(i.e.\) from a calculation of self-interest. \((\gamma)\) Others\(^2\), that 'honesty is found by experience to be the best policy,' that virtue conduce to health of body, and peace of mind, that it secures the honour and goodwill of society, and, as some add\(^3\), above all the friendship and goodwill of Heaven. Hence taking a far-sighted view of their best interests in this world, and still more, regarding the overwhelming balance in favour of virtue in the probable arrangements of the next, men prudently choose virtue and avoid vice. \((\delta)\) A more refined system\(^4\) teaches us that human nature is by its very constitution endowed with so strong a feeling of sympathy that it cannot but experience pleasure and pain at the happiness and misery of others, and that it is thus impelled to strive after what makes for the general welfare, to dislike whatever has a contrary tendency; and that this

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\(^1\) The ancient Sophists, Hobbes, Mandeville, etc. \(e.g.\) Hobbes says, 'The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there \(i.e.\) in a state of nature) no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice.'

\(^2\) Butler to some extent—See especially \textit{Anal.} pt. i. c. iii.—though his Utilitarianism is qualified by the frequent assertion that 'duty' and 'conscience' are really supreme, yet 'Conscience and self-love, if we understand

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our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident,' etc. See Summary at the close of Sermon iii.

\(^3\) Especially Paley.

\(^4\) Hume and Hutcheson maintain that Right is what con- duces to Utility in general, as contrasted with mere personal and selfish Utility, as Hobbes would say. Hume, Adam Smith, and Bentham in different ways connected these opposing theories through the medium of the feeling of Sympathy.
instinct of sympathy overrides the instinct of self-interest: in a word, that Right is that which tends to produce the greatest aggregate amount of happiness, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number;' Wrong, the reverse of this. (ε) Finally we ought to notice a theory\(^1\) which serves as a sort of connecting link between the Utilitarian and Intuitive systems—viz., that originally Virtue was chosen for its advantages, but that soon it came to be sought without a conscious sense of the advantage to be derived from it. It had been found from the first so uniformly to be advantageous that the calculation whether it was so in any special case was omitted, and virtue as such, and so apparently for its own sake, was chosen. Just in the same way that money is sought after, first with a view to its use, and then, as the habit of hoarding grows, for its own sake, and without any thought of using it.

Such are some of the answers given by various systems of Ethics, which resolve Right and Wrong into some form of Utility or the reverse. We pass on now to the

(B) Intuitive Systems.

The following will serve as specimens of this type of solutions. It is said that Right and Wrong are distinctions *sui generis*. They cannot be further analysed or explained. They differ from any other notion as much, for example, as Light differs from Sound. All we can do is to recognise them and accept them simply as we do the phenomena of Light, Sound, etc. Thus Right is something which commends itself necessarily and naturally to us. To explain this (a) some

\(^1\) Hartley, Mackintosh.
maintain that it exhibits a certain propriety, and an accordance with 'the fitness of things' 1 which we cannot choose but recognise, though we cannot analyse the feeling, or explain the grounds of our approbation. The distinction between Right and Wrong would thus be eternal and invariable. (β) Or if 'accordance with the fitness of things' be thought vague and beyond the reach of verification, at least it is said there is in Right and Wrong a conformity or suitableness (and the reverse) to the nature of Man 2 in the truest sense and highest development of that nature; very much in the way that fresh and bracing air is naturally wholesome to our bodily constitutions provided they are in a sound and healthy state, or that certain tastes and smells are agreeable to us, whatever they may be to other animals or organisms, from some suitableness to our organs of sense which we are unable to explain.

Thus these and similar systems regard the distinction between Right and Wrong as a specific and essential difference in the nature of things, which we must simply recognise as a fact, just as for instance we recognise the contrast between Hot and Cold, Black and White, Bitter and Sweet.

It is no part of our purpose to criticise the merits of these several systems, but only to state them in outline: we will therefore now proceed to our second question, viz.:

II. By what faculty in ourselves is the distinction between Right and Wrong recognised?

The answers given to this question fall under two general

1 Cudworth, Clarke. Plato's 'Ideal' System. [e.g. Plato in the Euthyphron contends that a quality or act is not holy because it is loved by the gods, but is loved by the gods because it is holy.] 2 Butler.
types, as is pointed out by Hume. The one, that the recognition of Right and Wrong is derived from Reason; the other, that it is derived from Sentiment. To these may be added the view which Hume himself maintains, that 'Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.' To illustrate these types:

Those who (as we have seen) maintain that Right and Wrong consist in an immutable 'conformity to the nature of things' hold further that Reason in general (i.e. Intuitive Reason), or a special department of Reason (i.e. Practical Reason), is the faculty by which such distinctions become known to us.

Those who refer the origin of the notions of Right and Wrong to Sentiment in some form or another may again be divided into two classes, (1) those who trace it to some already recognised Sentiment, such as Self-Love or the Desire of Utility; and (2) those who assert that the notions of Right and Wrong, being primary and fundamental notions, require a special sense or faculty for their recognition. The latter class, with whom we are chiefly concerned, argue somewhat as follows. Looking at the case of our bodily senses we observe that differences of Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, Touch, can only be appreciated each by a special sense. If any of those senses be wanting the distinction of objects corresponding to it is lost. One sense cannot do the work of another, except perhaps in a very slight degree and by artificial training. Thus each sense has a special and appropriate object of its own. Another characteristic of the Senses is

1 Cudworth, Clarke, Whewell, etc.
that they are 'Intuitive,' i.e. they tell us as a fact that one object is green, another red, that one sound is loud, another soft, and so on; but they cannot say why the rose is red or the leaf green, much less inform us as to the essential distinction in the nature of things between red and green. Here then we have an exact parallel (it is argued) to the recognition of the distinction between Right and Wrong. That distinction we feel to be sui generis, and whether the feeling be, as the Utilitarian would say, a deception or no, at any rate we do feel that we mean by it something different from the distinction between Advantageous and Disadvantageous or any other such antithesis that might be suggested; just as the difference between a good and bad Smell is distinct from the difference between a good and bad Taste. If this be so, then, on the analogy just explained of the bodily senses, it will require a special faculty for its recognition, just as much as Taste and Smell require different faculties; and further, that faculty must be Intuitive, because it is clear that we continually apply the terms Right and Wrong instinctively, and without being able to say exactly why we apply them, much less to explain what constitutes the precise difference implied by the words. Hence this faculty is not inaptly described as the Moral Sense1. But, it is said by

1 Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, etc. The latter insists on the fundamental distinction between 'Natural' Good (e.g. Riches, Health, etc.) which we pursue from a view of Interest or from Self-Love, and 'Moral' Good (e.g. Honesty, Generosity, etc.) in reference to which he sums up his theory as follows:—

(i.) 'That some actions have to men an immediate goodness; or that by a superior sense, which I call a Moral one, we
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others, this Moral faculty not only affirms Right and Wrong of certain acts, but it also involves a sentiment of approbation and disapprobation of them. The Senses in fact suggest here a further analogy. To recognise the distinction between Harmony and Discord so as to derive satisfaction or the reverse from sounds, it is necessary not only that we have the sense of hearing, but also that we have to some extent what is called ‘a musical ear.’ To appreciate harmonious and inharmonious combinations of colour it is necessary not only to possess the sense of sight, but also to have what is called ‘an eye for colour.’ Hence, it is urged, the recognition of Right and Wrong, involving as it does also the approbation and disapprobation of them, is analogous to the operation of the cultivated ear and eye rather than to that of the simple Senses of hearing and seeing. In a word the element of Taste is so conspicuous in the operations of this moral faculty that some have preferred to describe it as a Moral\(^1\) Tast\(e\) rather than a Moral Sense. Others observing perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them.

(ii.) That what excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible pleasure, much less the future rewards from sanctions of laws, or any other natural good, which may be the consequence of the virtuous action, but an entirely different principle of action from Interest or Self-Love.\(^3\)

*An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil*—Introduction.—See further § I. viii.

\(^1\) *e.g.* Hume: ‘As virtue is an end and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward,
that this perception together with approbation (or the reverse) of Right and Wrong is further accompanied by a feeling of Duty, or of Obligation to regulate our own actions accordingly, lay stress upon this portion of the complex phenomenon and describe the moral faculty as Conscience.

Thus the complex phenomenon is threefold. It involves (1) The recognition of Right and Wrong; (2) Approbation or disapprobation based upon that recognition; (3) A Sense of obligation to regulate our own actions accordingly. As each of these functions respectively is considered the most important the Moral Faculty is described as Moral Sense, Moral Taste, or Conscience.

III. This brings us naturally to our third question, What is the Motive for Moral Action? or in other words, the nature of Moral Obligation?

The distinction which we have met with before reappears in this part of our subject. Some regard the Motive to Moral Action as something sui generis; others as a particular application of some other already recognised Motives. Among the latter we may class those who view it as merely a natural merely for the immediate satisfaction it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.'—(Inb. p. 326.) Compare also Ethics, II. iii. 7 (καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται), and the argument in III. ix. 2-5.

1 e.g. Butler.
prudential regard for our own interest, or as an instinctive benevolent desire for the good of our fellow-men, or as a combination of both these impulses. Those also who adhere to the theory of a Moral Taste give a somewhat similar answer to the question, viz., that the pleasure derived from the gratification of that Taste disposes us to act so as to secure it, as naturally as a musician would seek for the enjoyment of good music. So far then the answer given would deny the existence of Duty or Moral Obligation in any distinctive sense. It is merely a phase, or a special application, of some other familiar instinct.

Many Intuitive Moralists however claim for this feeling of Duty a character perfectly distinct and independent. They affirm it to be different from a sense of approbation, or of gratification; from a desire of self-interest, or of general expediency. It is declared to be a primary fact of our nature¹, and as primary, to some extent inexplicable, just as is the case with the axioms of Mathematics or the fundamental Laws of Thought. That it is so is evidenced by an appeal to the various languages of men² which provide a distinct word for the idea of ‘Duty,’ ‘Ought,’ ‘Obligation,’—distinct that is from Self-

¹ e.g. Kant.
² Compare the following argument of Hume for the reality of our conceptions of Moral distinctions:—‘Had Nature made no such distinction founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words “honourable” and “shameful,” “lovely” and “odious,” “noble” and “despicable,” had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.’—Inquiry concerning Principles of Morals, § 5.)
Interest, Benevolence, Utility, Approbation, or any other motive that can be assigned—while each and all indicate it by a metaphor, the imperfect applicability of which bears witness to the difficulty of expressing the thing signified. Two metaphors generally occur—that of a *debt due*, or that of a *binding* or *compelling* force. Of the former, *χρειά*, *χρη*, 'debeo,' 'due,' 'duty,' 'ought' (owed), are examples: of the latter, *δέχομαι*, 'religio,' 'obligation,' 'bound.' Imperfect metaphors they are, because a *debt* implies a creditor, as well as some service received from him which is to be repaid: *obligation* implies a superior power by which the compulsion is exercised. But in the case before us, though we feel that there is a 'due' or 'debt,' we have no distinct conception of the accessory circumstances just enumerated, or at least not necessarily so: and the 'obligation' is one which is not strictly binding or compulsory. The debt is one which we are free to repudiate, the obligation one which we are free to neglect. These metaphors thus indicate efforts on the part of the mind to express a feeling which it cannot adequately explain to itself or others because it is *sui generis*, the effort to do so however evidencing the real existence of some such feeling.

Thus we see the same broad twofold division runs through the various answers given to the three questions we have now discussed, a division depending on the consideration whether (1) the distinction of Right and Wrong in themselves, (2) the faculty by which it is appreciated, (3) the motive by which it is acted upon, *are, or are not, sui generis*. It is not however the case that systems which adopt either of these
opposed lines in answer to any one of the questions necessarily adopt the same line in regard to the others.

IV. Whatever be the character of the motive power of our moral nature, whether it be a calculation of self-interest, or a desire for the good of others, or the instinctive gratification of a Taste, or a Sense of Duty generically distinct from other motives, the question still remains open, What is the ultimate end to which our moral nature tends? What is it, by the conduct which it adopts, struggling or hoping to reach at last as its ideal consummation? or, as Aristotle phrases it, 'What is the Chief Good for man?' This is a question scarcely, if at all, inferior in importance, and certainly not so in practical interest, to the three already considered. Aristotle, as we have seen, regards it as the main question of Ethical Science.

We cannot then do better than answer this question in his own words. That final end and aim is Happiness, i.e. a state in which there shall be no deferred hopes, no unsatisfied desires. All are agreed upon this, high and low, learned and unlearned, but the conceptions of the conditions constituting such a state are as various as the varieties of human aims and human characters. Each selects his own favourite desire or pursuit, and considers the state of Happiness to depend mainly upon its gratification. (It will be remembered that we are now speaking of Man apart from the influence of revealed Religion on his aspirations or his conduct.) Still in the midst of this variety certain leading types may be noticed, which are generally speaking characteristic of different
stages of growth in Society or in the Individual. (See Ethics, I. v.)

1. The whole occupation of savage life (where society means little more than local proximity of habitation), is to secure by hunting and fishing the precarious support of daily life. The highest happiness conceivable is the abundant supply of the best food without toil, trouble, or anxiety. Heaven is a perpetual banquet. The full and free gratification of Bodily pleasure (γευσιν) constitutes Happiness.

2. When the growth of civilisation (by organization of labour, mechanical improvements, etc.) is able to secure the supply of these simple wants of the community, then the desire for power over others and social distinction (τιμη) becomes the ruling passion. Successful kings, rulers, generals, are the ideals which command the admiration of mankind at large. Nobler spirits however regard these distinctions as deriving their value from Active Virtue and Goodness of Character (ἀρετή), and endeavour to persuade themselves and others that the desires of human nature would all be satisfied if this type of Character were fully attained.

3. In a state of still more advanced cultivation and refinement, this divergence between higher and lower natures, the one pursuing ἀρετῆ, the others τιμη, becomes yet more marked. The former—experience having shown the practical attainment of their ideal standard (ἀρετῆ), at least on any large scale, to be hopeless—take refuge in literature, philosophy, intellectual cultivation (θεωρητικὸς βίος). The latter, and the majority,—finding out of the pursuit of distinction and power that 'the quest is not for them,'—betake themselves to the accumulation
of wealth (χρηματιστικὸς βίος). Hence the familiar remark that both high literary cultivation, and also wealth with its natural accompaniment of luxury, are signs in societies of full maturity verging towards decay.

In the life of the Individual we may trace a somewhat similar progress in his various conceptions of Happiness. Pleasure is the sole thought of youth; Ambition to excel, in its lower or its higher forms, is the characteristic of manhood; and the closing scene is marked either by 'years that bring the philosophic mind,' or by 'avarice, the prevailing passion of old age.'

Such are the chief types of that aim or end of life which men are found, as a mere observation of fact (see p. xiv.), to place before themselves as the Chief Good, the attainment of which they think would wholly satisfy the desires of their nature. In this last, as in the case of the other three questions, it becomes the office of the Science of Ethics to judge of the merits of these conflicting theories, and if all must be pronounced imperfect, to point out if possible 'a more excellent way.'

1 We are now in a position to explain the broad features of Aristotle's system of Ethics in particular, as delineated in the following Treatise. We may perhaps notice these three distinctive characteristics:—

(1) His attention is directed to the external rather than to the internal aspect of morals². The central question of this

¹ The student may omit pp. xxx. to xxxv. until he has acquired a certain familiarity with the text of the Ethics.

² This idea will be found clearly worked out in Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay vii.)
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system is, What is the Chief Good for Man? What is the Final End of action, the End-in-itself? So again it will be seen that a large portion of Books II. III. and IV. is occupied with the distinction between Virtues and Vices as manifested in outward actions, while we hear little or nothing of the faculty in ourselves by which that distinction is apprehended further than that it is 'right reason' (ὁρθὸς λόγος); and the sense of Duty or Obligation is scarcely touched upon (Cf. perhaps III. i. 24 ὅν δὲὶ ὀρέγεσθαι). So again we find a full discussion of Voluntary and Involuntary actions (B. III. chaps. i.—v.), but not of the Nature of the Will in itself or of its relation to the other parts of our moral constitution.

It must be clearly understood that this is no depreciation of Aristotle's system. It simply amounts to a statement of the totally different standpoint of ancient and modern times. The accumulated experience of more than two thousand years, together with the influence of Christianity pervading, even when not explicitly recognised, all modern thought, has given us an utterly different position at starting in Ethical Science, just as in Natural Science now-a-days a schoolboy starts with appliances and discoveries at his disposal which enable him to leave the wisest of the ancients far behind before he has mastered the very alphabet of his subject.

(2) The political or rather social character of Aristotle's system of Morals will also attract our notice. The science of Ethics is regarded at the outset as a branch of Political or Social Science (πολιτικῆ τις I. ii. 9), while at the close of B. X. it is said absolutely to require the sanction and compelling powers of Civil Government to enforce its precepts in
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practice. Throughout the treatise the discussion of various moral questions is justified by the argument that Statesmen have employed or might employ such knowledge (e.g. ἀπερί in I. xiii. 2-4; ἡμί ib. § 8; add I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, and III. v. 7, etc.). This characteristic again is due to the circumstances of the writer’s age and country. If we consider (1) the absence, comparatively speaking, of domestic life among the Greeks; (2) the fact that in the ancient Greek states, which were cities and not countries, representative government was comparatively unnecessary, and practically regarded with disfavour¹; (3) the practical disabilities and general contempt visited upon trading and commerce; we can see how, under all these circumstances, a man’s social and political life acquired an importance which it is difficult for us, with our domestic habits, our vast empires, and our commercial pursuits, at all to realize. It was in fact the only avenue to distinction. Poets, philosophers, artists, were almost always statesmen or soldiers. The wealthy did not merely pay a larger sum to the aggregate of national taxation. A rich man raised and equipped so many horsemen, or he fitted out a vessel of war (which was usually commanded by himself), or he undertook the expenses of an embassy, or of a public festival. Hence the prominence of civic virtues in Aristotle’s ² and other

¹ Aristotle says in the Politics that one who does not himself share in political life might as well be a resident alien (ὁσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων).

² e.g. The primary importance of Courage, which is, in Aristotle’s conception, almost restricted to military Courage. With the Spartans this Virtue was so pre-eminent that others were entirely subordinate to it: e.g. Theft was encouraged because of the cour-
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ancient systems of morality. Hence too the tendency to regard virtues generally from their social or political side. The relative badness of different vices is frequently estimated by Aristotle in reference not to the depravity of character which they either imply or tend to generate, but to their effect on society. With many ancient moralists, and notably with Plato, the consideration that 'public benefits' may result from 'private vices' is so strong as to obscure the sense of wrong in such cases altogether, e.g. when community of wives, the practice of abortion, the destruction of weakly children, pious frauds, etc., are not only sanctioned, but advocated, on the ground of advantages that may be secured thereby to the State. That Aristotle's Ethical System

age cultivated by its execution. That the Greeks in earlier times generally displayed an excessive regard to this Virtue is noticed by Gladstone, *Juventus Mundi*, p. 380. It was not the treachery nor the adultery but the effeminate cowardice of Paris which chiefly moved their indignation. The very name for Courage is ἄνδρεία, Manliness. Also the distinction drawn between μεγαλοπρέπεια and ἀειευθεία (II. vii. 6, IV. ii. 1), and we may perhaps add that between μεγαλοψυχία and φιλοτιμία (in its good sense) (II. vii. 8, IV. vi. 1) are socially rather than morally important. The limitations imposed upon the sphere for the exercise of Courage in III. vi. may be so explained. (Plato's Definition of Courage exhibits still more strongly this tendency, which in fact distorts his whole Ethical system. See *Rep.* p. 429, B. Courage is 'such a power as will preserve under all circumstances that precise estimate of things to be feared which the legislator has imparted in education.')

2 e.g. ἄσωτία is preferred on this ground, among others, to ἀνελευθερία, IV. i. 32, 44. Compare IV. v. 12, in reference to Anger.

3 We even find a moralist (Archytas) quoted in Cic. *de
should have a 'political' hue is almost as much a necessity of his age and country as that the language in which he wrote should be Greek; that this colouring but seldom disguises important moral questions is a merit peculiarly his own.

(3) Thirdly, the attentive student will be struck by a tendency in Aristotle to regard Virtue very much on its intellectual side. This again was an inheritance from the times in which he lived, and with his master Plato it is found in a vastly greater degree. With Plato Virtue is Knowledge and Vice is Ignorance. No man, according to his system, can deliberately act against knowledge. When any man chooses the Wrong he must do so with the conviction, at least for the moment, that it is preferable to secure the forbidden pleasure and risk the future consequences than to undergo the present pain of the self-denial. This is simply a miscalculation, and Vice is due therefore to an error of

Senect. xii. § 40, denouncing sensuality on the main ground that it leads to actions politically dangerous.

1 'Every nation, from its peculiar circumstances and position, tends to some particular type, both of beauty and of virtue, and it naturally extols its national type beyond all others.'—(Lecky, Hist. Eur. Morals, vol. i. p. 82.)

2 'If we compare the different virtues that have flourished among Pagans and Christians, we invariably find that the prevailing type of excellence among the former is that in which the will and judgment, and among the latter, that in which the emotions are most prominent. Friendship rather than love, hospitality rather than charity, magnanimity rather than tenderness, clemency rather than sympathy, are the characteristics of ancient goodness.'—(Lecky, Eur. Mor. vol. i. p. 200.)
judgment, a mistake, an intellectual blunder, and is consequently with Plato, at least in theory, involuntary. We find no such exaggeration of the intellectual portion of moral action in Aristotle, but on the contrary frequent protests against it. But we do find, as compared with our modern ideas, little account taken of the emotional or impulsive side of Virtue. Though Aristotle insists in III. ii. at much length on the compound character of Moral Choice (προαίρεσις) —which is an essential condition of all Moral Action (see II. iv. 3)—as involving an element of Impulse (ὀρεξίς) as well as of Judgment (δύναμις), yet in his detailed account of the Virtues it often strikes us that he makes the Moral Agent too self-conscious; there is a sort of cold and studied propriety, an absence of impulse and enthusiasm, even in virtues which seem to involve a large element of impulse in actual practice, such as Courage, Liberality, Benevolence, and High-Mindedness. No doubt it might be said that this unruffled philosophic self-control is his ideal of Moral perfection. We are not now discussing the merits of such an ideal. We are simply noting that Aristotle’s conception of Moral Virtue does in a marked way, compared with our modern habits of thought, fall under this type. Finally, the beginner should be warned of the difficulties

1 The often-noted absence of humility in Aristotle’s ideal character, the High-Minded Man (IV. iii.), is an instance of this. Humility viewed on its intellectual side (as a Greek would view it) becomes a low estimate of one’s-self and especially of one’s moral character, which, if undeserved, is mere folly; if deserved, implies the reverse of a Virtuous condition.

2 See notes on IV. i. 27, ii. 10, iii. 24.
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which lie before him in the way of (i.) literal translation, (ii.) analysis and distinction of argument, in this Book.

i. It is difficult, or rather in many cases impossible, to translate the technical language of Aristotle by any precisely equivalent terms in English. It is very rare to find two technical words in different languages precisely agreeing in their significance, in their extent, and still more in their associations. The words of different nations, like their coinage or their weights and measures, are often incommensurable. We cannot exactly translate francs into shillings or kilomètres into miles. Hence we must not be startled if we read that it is absurd to 'praise' (ἐπαυεῖν) the gods (I. xii.), or if we find physical functions such as nutriment and growth attributed to the 'soul' (ψυχή) (I. xiii.), or if we are told that moral science is a branch of 'political' science (πολιτική) (I. ii.). The explanation is that our words 'praise,' 'soul,' 'political,' have different meanings and associations from those of the most nearly corresponding Greek terms. Still more impossible is it to translate passages the force of which depends on the double meaning of a Greek word or phrase (e.g. ἀκόλογος in III. xii., λόγον ἔχειν in I. xiii., τέλειος 'final' and 'perfect,' I. vii. 4), or upon the etymology of a technical term (e.g. ἡθική in II. i. 1).

In all such cases as we have mentioned, we must either (1) paraphrase, i.e. describe rather than translate the words in the text (e.g. this will be found recommended in I. ii. for πολιτική), or (2) adopt different English words at different times for the same Greek word according to the particular side of the complex idea which is for the time prominent, e.g.
we may sometimes translate ψυχή 'soul,' sometimes 'mind,' sometimes perhaps 'vital principle.' It must always be borne in mind that the object of translation is not 'verbum verbo reddere,' but to convey to a modern hearer as far as possible the same ideas and impressions as the original would have produced in a contemporary.

ii. It would be an error to regard this work in the light of a modern treatise carefully written and revised by its author, put forth as the formal result of his labours in one special field of knowledge, and intended by him to occupy a definite position among his collected works. So far is this from being the case that the Nicomachean Ethics as they have come to us are generally thought to consist of fragments of two or more distinct treatises which were never intended to form parts of one whole. And more than this, they have sometimes been regarded as merely notes of different courses of oral lectures, taken down by one or more pupils, perhaps, and perhaps not, revised by Aristotle himself. We find (1) promises of subsequent discussion unfulfilled, or announced arrangements departed from; (2) inconsistent theories or statements in different Books; (3) confusion in the grouping of arguments or in the statement of single arguments; (4) sometimes a series of arguments appears in a sort of skeleton form, as if they were merely heads or memoranda; (5) sometimes arguments in support of a point from which the discussion has passed on, seem to be added like after-thoughts, just

1 See II. vii. 16.
2 This applies chiefly to other Books than I.-IV.
3 As perhaps in I. viii. 10 etc., I. ix. 4.
4 See II. iii., v.; III. ii.
as they occurred to the author, instead of being placed in their natural position\(^1\); (6) misquotations occur from well-known authors, which have evidently been cited from memory and not verified\(^2\); (7) perhaps the note-theory might explain occasional instances of confusion, such as that in respect of φθόνος and ἐπιχαίρεκακία (II. vii. 15); or the sudden collapse of an unfinished discussion, as in IV. ix.\(^3\) These blemishes, and especially the last four, are just such as might be expected in oral lectures, or notes from such lectures, but not in a revised or finished treatise. Hence the student must not expect to be always able to analyse satisfactorily, or distinguish quite clearly, the several arguments in the text, as it stands; not to develop a finished plan of treatment for each subject under discussion.

\(^1\) e.g. I. viii. 12, etc.; II. iii. 7; III. iii. 14, etc.

\(^2\) e.g. Calypso for Circe, II. ix. 3; and perhaps the illustration from Homer about Thetis, IV. iii. 25; but see Suppl. Notes.

\(^3\) To the arguments given above might be added two considerations derived from the diction: (i.) the frequent use of ἀκροατάι, ἀκούειν, etc. Shilleto (note on Thuc. i. 90) remarks on this: 'If the Nic. Ethics and some other works of Aristotle were not syllabuses of lectures, what is the meaning of more than once calling δ ἐπεισδευμένος (the pupil) ἀκροατής, and of the expression ματαίως ἀκούστει καὶ ἄνωφελῶς?' He proceeds to defend the reading προφητευον for πρότερον in Eth. II. iii. 5—'as we said in our lecture the other day,' and suggests that the frequent use of ἄλα νῦν ἄλα in the Politics [i.e. the Ethics continued] points in the same direction. (ii.) The use of accusative and infinitive without any strict grammatical construction; which quasi-reminiscence of Or. Obl. is suggestive of the process of jotting down notes. This is very common in the Politics, and in the Ethics we may cite as examples, IV. iii. 25 (διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.), ib. § 28 (ἐβρωνα δὲ κ.τ.λ.), etc.
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE NOTES.

cf. 'confer,' 'compare.'
q.v. 'quod vide,' 'to which refer.'
sc. 'scilicet,' 'namely.'
s.v. 'sub voce' (e.g. 'see Glossary s.v. τελεσ' means 'see the Glossary under the word τελεσ').
l.c. 'loco citato,' 'in the passage quoted.'
h.l. 'hoc loco,' 'in this passage.'
ib. 'ibidem,' 'in the same place or passage.'
k.τ.λ. 'καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ,' 'et cetera.'

The references to Books, Chapters, and Sections are made in different figures, thus: II. iii. 5 means Book II., Chapter iii., Section 5.
## List of Terms Explained in the Glossary

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*Note: The page numbers are indicated in the margin.*
Πρᾶξις—ποιήσις.

Πρᾶξις (1) has the general sense of outward action, in contrast with inward and mental activity (θεωρία, for which see below). (2) It is applied to a particular kind of outward actions, viz., such as have no tangible result distinct from the action itself; where our aim is not at making something but at doing something. e.g. The practice of the Art of Navigation, or the Art of Healing: for the safety of the ship or the health of the body is not a result of a distinct and tangible character. (3) Since the most important cases of such actions are Moral Actions, where either the action itself is the result in view, or the character which it tends to form, πρᾶξις acquires the still more limited sense of Moral Action.

Ποίησις is applied to actions which leave some definite and tangible result, actions which aim at making something; as is the case in most of the Arts: e.g. in house-building or ship-building the house or the ship is such a result, in composing poetry (ποιήσις), the poem (ποιήμα); in sculpture or painting, the statue or the picture.

The adjectives πρακτική, ποιητική, θεωρητική, naturally follow the same distinction. See in illustration, X. viii. 7. So in Pol. I. iv. 4, Aristotle describes a Shuttle as ὄργανον ποιητικόν, its value consisting in its productions, but a Bed or Clothing as ὄργανα πρακτικά, their value consisting in their use.

θεωρία.

Θεωρία is grouped with ποιήσις and πρᾶξις by Aristotle, and he regards these three as the only possible forms which intelligent activity can take. Observe they are all forms of activity (ἐνέργεια). Activity of the productive or artistic powers is ποιήσις. Activity of the powers of action, and especially moral action, is πρᾶξις. Activity of the powers of intellect or contemplation is θεωρία. In the first, there is outward action and a tangible result; in the second, there is outward action but no tangible result; in the last, there is neither outward action nor tangible result; still it is not a passive state, but one of internal, mental activity, 'the depth, and not the tumult of the soul' (Wordsworth). (See Pol. IV. (VII.) iii. sub. fin.) As Pope writes (Essay on Man, ii. 106), the 'strength of mind is exercise, not rest.' But further, it must be distinguished from
the mental activity displayed in the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge. It is the active fruition of knowledge already possessed. (See X. vii. 5, οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς γλυκεῖται πλὴν τὸ θεωρήσας.) It is, to use a homely illustration, like 'chewing the cud' of knowledge, dwelling upon it, assimilating it. Persuasion, or discovery, of a truth leads to belief or knowledge of it; if it be a matter of personal interest, faith in it follows; finally it may become as it were a part of our very selves, our intellectual food, the thought upon which our minds for ever dwell and meditate. This last condition would constitute θεωρία of it. These stages are admirably expressed by Wordsworth:

One in whom persuasion and belief
Had ripened into faith, and faith become
A passionate intuition.

This 'passionate intuition' is θεωρία. It is this intellectual energy in repose, this active yet tranquil contemplation and enjoyment of Truth and Knowledge already possessed, that, under the name of θεωρία (in B. X.), Aristotle considers to be perfect and ideal Happiness, as realized only in the life of the gods.

Art—Science.

Science is knowledge for its own sake (scire ut sciamus). Art is knowledge for some practical end (scire ut operemur). It is objectionable to say that Art is 'Science turned to account,' because an Art is generally prior in time to its related Science. In fact the existence of an Art in a rude state is generally the stimulating cause of the study of the related Science. e.g. The Science of Astronomy was originally cultivated with a view to the Art of Navigation, or the Art (or practical Science) of Astrology: the Science of Anatomy with a view to the Art of Surgery: the Science of Chemistry with a view to the Art of Alchemy.

So much for the general distinction of the terms. There is however an ambiguity about the word 'practical,' which causes some difficulty in the application of the words Art and Science (e.g. Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Astrology, Navigation, etc., are called by either title). This makes it desirable to have an intermediate term, 'practical Science.' Let the reader refer to the difference already explained (p. xli.) between πρᾶξις and πολησις, and he will then understand the following distinction: 'Art' is strictly applicable to cases of πολησις, 'Practical Science' to cases of πρᾶξις, 'Science' (as above explained), to knowledge for its own
sake. Hence Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics are 'practical Sciences.' (See further, Introduction, p. xiii.)

Speaking broadly, ἐναντίον corresponds with Science, and τέχνη with Art. We find however ἐπιστήμη used in reference to practical applications of knowledge (e.g. I. i. 5, vi. 15, II. vi. 9, III. iii. 8) and τέχνη, at least by implication, referred to Moral action, i.e. πράξεως, not πολέμιος (II. i. 4, vi. 9, etc.). We must not therefore press the correspondence too closely.

Also it must be observed that τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη with Aristotle more usually refer, not to Art and Science regarded as external results of man's genius (i.e. a body of practical rules, or a system of abstract knowledge), but rather to the mental states by which we stand related to the objects of practical or theoretic knowledge respectively.

a priori—a posteriori.

These terms refer to what is prior, or posterior, to observation and experience.

An a priori argument means one which starts from principles which are (or were thought to be by those who invented these terms) prior to, and independent of, experience. Such for instance are Mathematical and other Axioms. These have been held to be prior to experience, either as being 'innate ideas,' or as not depending for proof on experience. Without entering into this controversy further, we may assert that the phraseology a priori, having arisen in this manner, is now used to describe arguments starting from general principles.

An a posteriori argument, on the other hand, is one that derives its whole force from experience and observation of facts. Its premisses are not general principles or obvious truths, but statements of facts of experience.

Consequently the Mathematical Sciences are purely a priori Sciences. They start from general principles such (e.g.) as Euclid's Axioms, and end in particular, or at any rate less general, statements, such as Euclid's Propositions. They proceed, as Aristotle would say, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

On the other hand the Physical Sciences are purely a posteriori Sciences. They assume no general principles, but start from observed facts, and end in the discovery of general laws, e.g. that of gravitation. They proceed ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς.

As to the Science of Ethics, or Morals, both methods have at different times been advocated and adopted. See note on I. iv. 5.
GLOSSARY.

δύναμις—ένεργεια.

We first explain the principal meanings of δύναμις, which may be connected thus:—δύναμις is (1) power or capacity, in a literal or general sense; (2) power merely, i.e. power existent, but not exercised; dormant, not in operation (see below); (3) power regarded as the source and spring of practical results, such as is given us by Arts in contrast to Sciences (see p. xliv). Hence δύναμις is sometimes used as a sort of equivalent term for τέχνη, e.g. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων, I. ii. 3; and again i.b. §§ 5 and 6. See also V. i. 4.

The most important of the usages of the word is (2). In this sense it stands in contrast with ένεργεια, somewhat as 'potential' and 'actual,' 'latent' and 'developed,' are contrasted in English. Take these illustrations. The flower exists potentially but not actually (δυνάμει but not ένεργειά) in the bud, or in the seed; the ear of corn in the 'bare-grain'; the oak in the acorn. So the photographic picture, which exists potentially on the collodion film, becomes actual when brought out by the developing fluid. Again, an infant has not actually the power of speaking or reading any more than a horse or a dog. Still there is an important difference between the two cases, because experience tells us that there is that in the infant which may be developed into these powers, whereas no amount of training would develop anything of the sort in the lower animals, any more than cultivation could produce an oak from an imitation acorn though undistinguishable to the eye from a real one. It is convenient therefore to say that these powers exist in the infant potentially (δυνάμει), in distinction to cases where they do not exist at all. So again if we have information given us in cipher, or in sympathetic ink, or in a sealed document, we have the information δυνάμει but not ένεργειά. This distinction is also sometimes indicated by the antithesis of εξίς and ένεργεια, or of κτήσις and χρήσις. Passages in illustration will be found in I. viii. 8, II. i. 4. See also the use of δύναμις in contrast with πάθος and εξίς in II. v. 2.

Again, the distinction may be applied both to existence and action. As regards the former, δύναμις is applied to that which can be, but is not: as regards the latter to that which can do, but does not. See especially the use of δύναμις in I. xii.
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τέλος, τέλεος.

Τέλος = our word 'End' (1) in its literal sense of a 'termination'; and (2) in its other sense of a 'motive' or 'aim': of which the latter use is much more common in Aristotle. (3) It is also used in reference to his doctrine of the 'end-in-itself,' or 'final end' of all human action, described in other words as 'the Chief Good.' Often however these meanings are combined in a manner which it is all but impossible to represent in translation, e.g. I. ix. 3, τὸ τῆς ἄρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος. Similarly τέλεος means 'complete;' 'perfect,' and also 'final': e.g. in I. vii. it is difficult to retain this double signification in translation.

Aristotle's doctrine of the 'end-in-itself' may be thus explained:—There must be an end or purpose (in sense (2)) for which man exists in the world, as there is for everything else (see I. vii. 11). There must also be an end or limit (in sense (1)) to man's desires and efforts, else they would be in vain and useless (see I. ii. 1). That end once attained, man would 'rest and be satisfied.' There could be nothing further to look to or to wish for. Hence it is called the 'absolute end,' or the 'end-in-itself.' To discover this in theory, and to secure the attainment of it in practice, is regarded by Aristotle as the main object of Ethics. This is spoken of as τὸ τέλος, e.g. III. ix. 5. Also as τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος, I. vii. 8, and τὸ τῶν ἄνθρωπίνων τέλος, X. vi. 1.

ἄρχη.

'Ἄρχη means literally a 'starting-point' or 'beginning,' or, as Aristotle himself explains it, ἃ ἐστὶν ἡ γνώσει ἡ γνωστικὴ τὸ πράγμα, 'that by which anything exists, or is produced, or is known.' Thus it is a very general term.

As a cause of existence or production. In this sense it may be used for any of the Four Causes (explained p. lii) ; see Metaph. I. iii. We find it in the Ethics for Efficient Cause, as when man is said to be the ἄρχη of his own actions (III. v. 5); and when Volition is described as the ἄρχη of the movement of the limbs (III. i. 6); for Final Cause, as when Happiness is said to be the ἄρχη of our actions (I. xii. 8).

As a cause of knowledge. At either end of the scale of knowledge there must be a starting-point (ἄρχη), which is taken for granted with-
out demonstrative proof, otherwise προεισώ ὀντω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον. Hence the general principles or axioms, at the top of the scale, and the particular facts of perception or observation, at the bottom, must be assumed to start with, and hence both are sometimes called ἀρχαί. Hence (says Aristotle) νοῦς τὸν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, 'There is an intuitive faculty for the truths we start with in both directions.' An example of one kind would be, 'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space.' An example of the other, 'This is a straight line, a triangle,' 'This magnet attracts iron,' etc. See the following passages in illustration: I. vii. 20, τὸν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν θεωροῦνται κ.τ.λ., 'Of the truths we start from some are apprehended, etc.; the last word, purposely vague, expresses at any rate an immediate apprehension, independent of proof. Again, τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχὴ (ib. and I. iv. 7), 'The fact is a beginning and a point to start from.'

In the quotation, I. vii. 21, ἀρχὴ . . . πλείον ἡ ἡμισὶ παντός, we have ἀρχὴ in its literal meaning, but the dictum is applied by Aristotle to the technical sense of the word also.

Since the Greeks seldom employed any other than the a priori method (see p. xlv) in the pursuit of knowledge, ἀρχὴ comes to stand often for 'general principle,' 'first principle,' or 'axiom.' This will explain its use in I. iv., where λόγοι ἄπλε τὸν ἀρχῶν = 'arguments starting from general principles'; λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς = 'arguments leading up to general principles.'

ψυχή.

This word, generally translated 'Soul,' has no precise English equivalent. It stands for all that is immaterial in man, including Mind, Desires, Will, and even Life. On the one hand, 'Soul' includes too much. It is impossible to disconnect theological and religious ideas from the word 'Soul,' which are quite foreign to the conception of Aristotle: e.g. To employ such expressions in translation as 'the life of the Soul,' 'the good of the Soul,' would be misleading. On the other hand, 'Soul' includes too little, as it does not reach to mere physical life, such as Animals and even Plants possess (see I. xiii. 11). Again, the word 'Life,' or Vital Principle, is too narrow, excluding Reason, Moral action, etc. So also is 'Mind,' excluding all else beside Reason.

The following passages will serve to show how impersonal, and how widely different from our notion of 'Soul' is Aristotle's conception of ψυχή. 'If the eye were a living creature, sight would be its ψυχή'
GLOSSARY.

(De An. II. i. 9). So again the Soul is said to bear a relation to the Body like that of Form to Matter. Again (and this throws light on the abbreviated discussion in Eth. I. xiii.—note especially the expression in § 15, ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς), in De. An. II. ii. Aristotle explains that there are different kinds of Life (cf. Eth. I. vii. 12, etc.), such as Motive, Nutritive, Sentient, Intelligent, and that to each of them, ἡ ψυχὴ ἡστιν ἄρχη καὶ τοῦτος ὑποτάξαι, each kind of Life corresponding either to a different kind of ψυχή, or to a different part of the ψυχή (De An. II. ii. 8; cf. Eth. I. xiii. 10), but in either case the higher kinds or parts possess all the qualities of the lower, as well as their own (De An. II. iii. 5). The Nutritive ψυχή belongs to Plants; the Sentient (+ Nutritive) to Animals; the Intelligent (+ Sentient + Nutritive) to Man.

Compare Dryden (Knight's Tale)—

'First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last;
Rich of three souls.'

In reference to the two important controversies as to (1) the Origin; (2) the Immortality of the Soul, we may note—(1) Aristotle considers that Man derives the θερπτική ψυχή from the Female (hence the state of the embryo at first is that of mere vegetative life), the αλοθητική ψυχή from the Male; while of the διανοητική he says, λείπεται τῶν νοῦν μονῶν θυμάδεν ἐπειδήνεν καὶ θείον ἐλναι μονόν (De Gen. Anim. II. iii. 4, 7, 10). Thus it would seem that Aristotle (like Dante, Purg. xxv. 77, etc.) combines in some sense the Traducianist and Creationist theories of the Origin of the Soul. (2) As to its future existence, Aristotle never explicitly pronounces himself, not even in Eth. I. x. and xi. It would appear, however, even from the above very imperfect sketch, that a personal immortality could not attach to ψυχὴ as understood by Aristotle; and it is clear, throughout the present and other treatises, that such a notion did not at any rate enter into his Ethical theories. (See further Grant's Aristotle, Essay V.)

On the whole, we may perhaps best translate ψυχὴ conventionally by 'Soul' as a general rule, adopting the words 'Life' or 'Mind' occasionally, when the passage refers especially to those parts of the complex idea.

ἀρετή.

Ἀρετή means 'excellence' in all its various senses and applications. (It is obviously connected with the same root as ἄριστος, Ἀρνυ, etc. Compare the connexion of virtus in Latin with vir.) Hence we find it
applied to the eye, and to the horse, in II. vi. 2; to a musician (by implication) in I. vi. 14; and by Plato to the dog, to a pruning-knife, etc. etc. in short, to anything that has any work or function to perform; the ἀρετή in each case consisting in the good performance of that work. We cannot describe this general sense of the term better than in Aristotle's own words in II. vi. 2: 'Every excellence (ἀρετή) perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes its work to be well performed.'

There are however two special kinds of excellence to which the word ἀρετή is most frequently applied:—(1) Excellence of our intellectual or rational nature. Instances of such excellences are, prudence, wisdom, intelligence, argumentative power, retentive memory, acuteness, etc. etc. (2) Excellence of our moral nature; i.e. a well-regulated condition of the appetites, passions, and desires. Instances of such excellences are, temperance, courage, gentleness, high-mindedness, etc. etc., in other words, the moral virtues. It is in this restricted sense of the term that we translate it by 'Virtue.' These two kinds of excellence will be found in I. xiii. 20.

In this case, as in others that have been mentioned, the meanings are often so blended in Greek that we cannot translate by one word in English.

προαίρεσις.

In any deliberate action the following steps or processes may be traced:—

(1) Desire or wish for some end to be attained (βούλησις).
(2) Reflection or deliberation upon the several means by which the end may be reached (βούλευσις).
(3) Deliberate Choice of some one means or series of means as the most eligible (προαίρεσις). This choice once made, the action follows accordingly.

Thus the distinction between βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις resembles that with which we are familiar between 'holy desires, good counsels, and just works' (or at least resolutions to act).

προαίρεσις sometimes corresponds nearly with 'purpose,' or 'resolution,' or even 'will,' but as these translations, and especially the last, would often be misleading, it seems best to adopt 'deliberate choice.' This translation has the further advantage of displaying the composite nature of the process, which Aristotle constantly insists upon, it being not merely 'choice' or 'purpose,' nor merely 'deliberation,' but a choice succeeding upon deliberation.
The following passages from the *Ethics* may be referred to in illustration. For a general account of προαιρεσις, especially in its compound character, and its relation to processes or faculties more or less similar to it, see III. ii. and III. iii. 17, 18. (Compare also VI. ii. 5, where προαιρεσις is described as ἡ ὑβεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ δρέξις διανοητική.) It has to do with the Means, not (like βούλησις) with the End in action, III. ii. 9. It is coupled with πρᾶξις in I. i. 1 and I. vii. 1. It occurs in the sense of ‘purpose,’ or a ‘particular state of the Will,’ in contrast with ‘action’ or ‘performance,’ in II. iv. 3, VIII. xiii. 11, X. viii. 5; and similarly in IV. vii. 12 (on which see Suppl. Note). It is an essential condition of a Virtuous Act, see II. iv. 3, and the Definition of Virtue as ἐξ ηες προαιρετική κ.τ.λ., in II. vi. 15. It can only be good under the guidance of φρόνησις, VI. xiii. 7. Finally, in two passages it seems to waver between the ordinary sense of ‘purpose’ or ‘intention,’ and ‘the design or plan purposed’ (*id quod disputationone propositum est,*—Bonitz); viz., I. xiii. 4, κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαιρεσι; X. ix. 1, τέλος ἐχειν τὴν προαιρεσιν.

**The Four Causes.**

A complete knowledge of any Being or Object implies an acquaintance with Four different Causes to which its Existence is in different senses due.

(1) The *Matter* of which it is composed. The *Material Cause.*

(2) The *Form* by which it is distinguished. The *Formal Cause.*

(3) The *Force* which has brought about the particular combination of Matter and Form which constitute the Being or Object under consideration. The *Efficient Cause.*

(4) The *Purpose* or *Object in View* in such a combination. The *Final Cause.*

(2) and (4) require further explanation.

(2) ‘Form’ is to be taken not merely for external shape, but for whatever is characteristic or essential. The same *Matter* may be made into a hundred different objects, but the same *Form* (within certain limits) belongs to one class of objects only, and hence ‘formal’ came to mean ‘essential’; and the ‘formal cause’ = ‘the essential nature’; *i.e.* the group of such qualities or characteristics as are essential to the existence of anything in its barest form, or to the simplest conception we can have of it; which qualities are therefore always present in all different types.
or developments of it.\(^1\) Thus the 'formal cause,' when described in words, becomes the Definition of the object.

In Aristotle's phraseology, 'Formal Cause' is identical with \(σύνε\) (when \(=\) essence), and with \(τὸ τῇ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐνα), which will be found explained in note on II. vi. 17. See Metaph. I. iii. 1.

Hence to take a single example—a Statue:—

The Material Cause is the marble or metal of which it is made. Its Formal Cause is in one sense the shape by which we recognise it as a statue, and in another, the qualities which would constitute the scientific definition of 'Statue.'

Its Efficient Cause is in one sense the Artist, in another the Chisel, or the Furnace.

There is a Final Cause the purpose with which it was made, e.g. the gain of the artist, the decoration of some public place, honour to be paid to some great man, etc. etc. Again, the Final Cause of a clock is to mark time. As soon as a certain combination of wood, brass, etc., fulfils this condition, we call it a clock, and thus 'marking time' may be said to be the cause of its being a clock rather than anything else.

(4) The Final Cause (an expression familiar to us from the theological 'Argument from Final Causes,' or 'Argument from Design'), is the Purpose, End, or Object-in-View of anything. In all cases however we may trace (as Aristotle shows, B. I. c. i. and c. ii. \(i\).\(i\).) both proximate and ultimate purposes. All purposes if traced far enough resolve themselves into this one, that there is some \(good\) to be gained by the action; or, in more technical language, all ends ultimately converge to the Chief Good or \(τὸ ἄγαθον\). Thus, strictly speaking, there is only one really Final Cause. The term however is applied to any subordinate end or inducement to act. (See further \(s.v. τέλος, τέλειος\).)

It will further follow that the Efficient Cause must be \(prior\) to, but need not be \(simultaneous\) with, its Effect; the Formal Cause must be \(simultaneous\) but need not be \(prior\); the Material Cause must be \(both\).

(Cf. Post. Anal. II. xi.)

\[θεὸς—φύσις.\]

It may be worth while to explain very briefly once for all Aristotle's conception of God and Nature in relation to the world, as several passages

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\(^1\) In this sense Bacon speaks of the Form of Light and of Heat. Compare Wordsworth's use of the word in the passage:—

For the Man Who in this spirit communes with the Forme Of Nature, i.e. the great essential types of Nature's varied operations.
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in the Ethics would mislead those who adopted without some precaution the two English words in question.

Aristotle's philosophical conception of God excludes the ideas of the Creation, the Moral Government, and even the Providential Government, of the world. Creation and providential government are excluded, since Aristotle maintains that the world is eternal, and distinctly asserts (in X. viii. 7) that πνήσεως (creative energy) of any kind is unworthy of God, and also in B. X. and elsewhere, that God is absolutely unmoved, unchangeable, unaffected by anything external to himself; his existence consisting in thought thinking upon itself (νόησις νοήσεως νόησις), or in a conscious fruition of perfect knowledge (see above s.v. θεωρία). Moral government is excluded, partly for the same reasons; and also because πράξεως (or moral action) is likewise in the same passage of B. X. distinctly stated to be unworthy of the divine nature. Also in VII. i. 2, it is asserted that the condition of excellence in θεός is τιμωτερον ἀφετήριον. (Cf. the distinctions made in I. xiii.)

In short, any kind of agency was held by Aristotle to be unworthy of the Divine perfection. Such action would be ἀναγκαῖος, βλαίος τις (see note on I. v. 8). This was the main point of the much misunderstood theory of Epicurus as to the gods. (See Grote's Aristotle, ii. p. 486.)

Yet Aristotle maintains that God, though unmoved, is the cause and source (αὐτῶν καὶ ἀρχή) of all motion. This paradox is thus explained: God is not the efficient but the final cause of all motion (see above, s.v. 'The Four Causes'). In other words, the universe moves under the attraction of, and by striving after, the supreme Good, which is God: in its endeavours thereafter, it for ever, so to speak, circles and revolves about God as a centre, who thus, himself unmoved, becomes

The one far-off divine Event
To which the whole Creation moves.

So Dante:—

(Dio) Solo ed Eterno che tutto il cielo move
Non moto, con amore e con disio.

(Parad. xxiv. 131.)

Still it should be noted that Aristotle often speaks popularly of Divine agency, feelings, etc., in a manner quite inconsistent with his formal theories, e.g. Eth. I. ix.; X. viii. 13; ix. 6. Cf. Rhet. II. ix. 2, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσίαν. It should be added also that Aristotle (like Plato), following the popular usage, speaks indifferently of 'God' and 'Gods' (e.g. I. xii. 3; X. viii., etc.), yet his conception of the nature of God, taken strictly, excludes altogether the idea of plurality of Gods.
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The precise meaning of φύσις, and its relation to θέσεις, in Aristotle, is perhaps as difficult to define as it would be to formulate accurately our own conception of Nature. Aristotle doubtless would not, in strict speaking, regard Nature as a personal or rational agent (see Eth. III. iii. 7, note), though he often (as we do) uses language which would imply it. Confining our attention chiefly to such passages as occur in the Ethics, or obvious illustrations of them, we may note:—

(1) Optimism in Nature. See Eth. I. ix. 5, εἶπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἴδαν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκαν. [Compare De Caelo, I. iv. fin., ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Also Pol. I. ii. 8-10. Again, in various passages cited by Bonitz, s.w., ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ περιεργὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον, οὐδὲ ἄτελες, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον ἀποβλέπουσα.]

In regard to this Optimism we may observe:—

(a) It is assigned to a conscious and intelligent purpose in Nature in such passages as De An. II. iv. 5, ἢσπερ γὰρ ὁ νόος ἕνεκα τοῦ ποιεῖ, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἡ φύσις, etc. etc. Also such expressions as ὁμιουργεῖ, βούλεται, ἀποδίδεισιν, and many others, are frequently applied to φύσις.

(β) Nature, like Art, often falls short of its aim, being thwarted by Necessity, or Chance, or the Matter it has to work upon. Hence the limitation ὡς οἴδαν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν above. Cf. De Caelo, II. ν. 3, ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον, and see Pol. I. vi. 8, ἡ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τούτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται. With this we may compare the exquisite simile of Dante—

"La natura . . .
Similmente operando all’ artista,
Cha ’l abito dell’ arte e man che trema."—(Par. xiii. 75.)

*Nature . . .
Resembling thus the Artist in her work,
Whose faltering hand is faithless to his skill.

(2) φύσις is the source of order, fixity, and regularity in the Universe (e.g. seeds and animals reproducing their like), being intermediate to Necessity on the one side (implying the impossibility of any variation), and Chance on the other (implying the absence of any law). Cf. De Caelo, III. ii. 8, ἡ τάξις ἡ οἰκεία τῶν αἰσθητῶν φύσις ἐστίν.

Hence we may perhaps explain τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, I. viii. 11, and φώσει βουλητῶν, III. iv., as contrasted with the irregular tastes of individuals. [Comp. Ilhet. I. xi. 3, where ἡδέα φώσει, and ἡδέα θεοι are contrasted, especially, ἑτέρω ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἄελ τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις.] So Eth. I. iii. 2, καλὰ καλ δίκαια φώσει as opposed to νόμω. (Cf. φώσει opposed to κατὰ
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συμβεβηκός, De An. I. iii. 3.) See also the distinction between φυσικὸν and νομικὸν δίκαιον, as explained in Eth. V. vii. 1; the former, however, not being rigidly invariable (as though due to ἀνάγκη; see note on III. iii. 7), though exceptions are so comparatively rare as ‘to prove the rule’; just as (Aristotle adds) the right hand is φύσει stronger than the left in spite of the existence of ἀμφιδέξιον. So again, γνώριμα τῇ φύσει elsewhere occurs as synonymous with γνώριμα ἀπλῶς in Eth. I. iv. 5. Under this head also compare Eth. II. i. 2, οὐδὲν τῶν φύσει δυνῶν ἀλλως ἐθίζεται.

(3) φύσις and θέωσ seem sometimes almost identified, as our own usage might lead us to expect; e.g. in Eth. X. ix. 6, that which belongs to us φύσει is said διὰ τινας θελας αλλιας ὑπάρχειν. Many passages occur elsewhere in which direct creative and providential functions are attributed to φύσις.

(4) φύσις is often used in reference to the operations of Nature in a limited sphere, such as the constitution of Man, or of some other Animal, or class of Objects. Though it is difficult to discriminate such a usage precisely, yet something like ‘human nature’ seems to be the prominent idea in the following:—Eth. II. i. 3, etc., ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ neither φύσει nor παρὰ φύσιν; III. v. 18, 19, whether our end and aim in action φύσει ἣ ὑπωσθήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται. See X. ix. 14, in reference to πατρικοὶ λόγοι, children προὔπάρχουσι στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθείς τῇ φύσει. Compare further with this usage the sense in which some moralists have held that Human Virtue consists in ‘following Nature.’

(5) φύσις and τέχνη are frequently put into relation and comparison, e.g. Eth. I. ix. 6; II. vi. 9. These passages may be illustrated by others in which it is more definitely laid down that Art follows and supplements Nature; and also that the mode of their operations is similar, e.g πάσα τέχνη . . . τὸ προσέλεπον τῆς φύσεως βοηθεῖται ἀναπληρῶν (Pol. IV. (VII.) xvii. 15); ἣ τέχνη τὸ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἢ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεί ἀπεργά-σασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται (Phys. II. viii. 8). Dante, referring to the Physics by name (Inf. xi. 101), amplifies this Aristotelian idea by making Nature the child of God, and Art the child of Nature (si che vostr’ arte a Dio quasi è nipoile), and therefore includes in the same punishment those who have offered violence to God, or Nature, or Art.
BOOKS I. II.
I. Explanation of Terms, 'End,' 'Good,' 'Chief Good'
—Different kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality.

I. All human action, of whatsoever kind, implies an end or purpose, i.e. the attainment of some good. The Chief

The main purpose of the Science of Ethics is, in Aristotle's conception, the discovery of the Chief Good, or Final End of all man's actions and aspirations, the attainment of which would leave him nothing to desire. He commences, therefore, in this chapter with first laying down broadly the conception of the Chief Good, and points out the prima facie difficulty in accepting such a conception of it. Next (in ch. ii. and iii.), having asserted that it is a reality notwithstanding (i.e., that there is a Chief Good or Final End), he settles some preliminary points as to the utility, scope, method, etc., of its investigation. Then, in ch. iv., he passes on to the question, What is the Chief Good? and finding that the general agreement that it is Happiness vanishes as soon as we further ask, In what does Happiness consist? he usually puts the main question thenceforth in the modified form, What is Happiness?

1. μεθόδος is strictly a method or process of science, and is therefore contrasted with τέχνη, which stands for a process of art. (See Glossary, s. v. Art and Science). πράξις = action, and especially moral action. προαιρεσις = purpose or resolve which
2 καλὸς ἀπεφήναντο τὰ γαθῶν, ὧν πάντες ἔφηται. Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἶσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ αὐτῶς ἔργα τινὰ· Οὐ δὲ εἰσὶ τέλη τινά.

Good is well described as the ultimate end of all our actions and desires. Ends differ from one another in a

precedes action. The opening sentence then amounts to this:—Whether we are working to produce anything (τέχνη), or to know anything (μέθοδος), or to do anything (πρᾶξις), or even are forming resolutions to act (προαιρεσις), in all these cases we must have an end or purpose (in other words, some good), in view.

1. τὰ γαθῶν, literally 'the good,' i.e. the chief good, or 'summum bonum.' 'End' and 'good' are nearly synonymous. The 'end' of an action is the 'good' we hope to secure by the action; it being obvious that every end must at least appear good or desirable, at the time it is chosen, to the person choosing it. 'Tis real good or seeming moves us all.—Pope. See III. iv. and III. v. 17. The first words of the next chapter assert the identity of the Final End (the conception of which is developed in this chapter) and the Chief Good, the definition of which is the main object of the whole treatise.

1. Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] Though the general conception of a Chief Good can be readily explained, as has just been done in the words οὗ πάντες ἔφηται, yet the variety of our ends and aims (διαφορὰ τῶν τελῶν) is such that we cannot assume that all things do converge to any one such end; in other words, that there is a Chief Good, much less say what it is. The former point is established in ii. 1; the solution of the latter is the subject, more or less, of the whole treatise. See especially, however, iv. 1 and vii. 1.

2. If we take a walk simply for the sake of walking, or to 'kill time,' the action (ἐνέργεια) of walking is itself so far the end that we look for no ulterior result (ἔργον). If we walk to get an appetite, or for the sake of health, then the appetite or health is a further end beyond the action of walking, and is therefore, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, an end of higher value to us than the act of walking. In this passage, however, Aristotle is thinking chiefly of acts of ποίησις, which are distinguished from acts of πρᾶξις by having definite and tangible products resulting from the action. (See Glossary.)

3. τέλη obviously correspond with ἔργα, and πρᾶξις with ἐνέργεια, in the previous sentence.
παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνερ-
3 γειών τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὖν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη ἱατρικῆς 
μὲν γὰρ ύγιεία, ναυτηγικῆς δὲ πλοίου, στρατηγικῆς δὲ 
4 νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. "Ὅσαι δ′ εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων 5 
ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικῆν ἢ 
χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων 
εἰσὶν αὕτη δὲ καὶ πάσα πολεμικὴ πράξις ὑπὸ τὴν 
στρατηγικῆν τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρόπου ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἐτέρας: 
ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἑστὶν 10 
αἱρετότερα τῶν ὑπ' αὕτα τοιοῦτος γὰρ χάριν κάκεινα

variety of ways. (a) They differ in kind: sometimes the action is itself the end; sometimes a definite result beyond the action. And notice that when there is such an end beyond the action it is obviously something better than the action itself, which is subordinate to it. (β) But further, (β) in general character; the character of ends is as various as the character of the actions of which they are ends: e.g. health, victory, wealth, a boat, a house, the equipments of a horse, etc. etc., are all ends of different actions, and differ inter se accordingly.

4 (γ) In the midst of this variety, however, we may trace a relation of subordination, or degrees of finality, in ends. One art often embraces a variety of others, and their ends being subservient to the production of its end are of inferior value; for the ends of the higher and more comprehensive arts are

6. δύναμις is here equivalent to τέχνη. Art, differing from Science in that it supplies the power to produce practical results, is not unfrequently described as δύναμις. See in next ch. § 3. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων, i.e. 'of which of the sciences or arts.' (See Glossary under δύναμις, and also under Art and Science.)

10. ἀρχιτεκτονική] i.e. master-science, or arch-science, if we allowed such a compound. ἀρχι-
tεκτόν is literally a ruler or director of workmen. (See next chapter, § 4, and esp. the expression αὕτη διατάσει in § 5.)
However, this subordination must stop somewhere; i.e. there must be some Final End.

Now we may safely infer that this subordination of ends cannot go on ad infinitum, because we should in that case be endowed with a desire (viz. of finality) which would be objectless and useless: in other words, we may infer that there is thing in vain,' or, as we read in ix. 5, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶον τε καλλιστα ἔχειν, οὔτω πέφυκε, 'All things are by nature ordered in the best possible way.' The fact that human nature is created with a desire for some final good proves that such a good must exist. That it should not exist is as inconceivable as that nature should have created an animal re-
one supreme and Final End, to which all other ends converge; 2, 3 and that is, in fact, the Chief Good. (a) If this be so, it must be useful to define it, because we shall be more likely to 4 hit the mark when we have a distinct view of it. (β) The science to which pertains the knowledge of the Chief Good is naturally the supreme of sciences, and this is the Science of Social Life. We argue this supremacy on two grounds—(1) quiring a particular sort of food, and then have placed it where that sort of food could not be procured. Take as another illustration the precisely similar argument for a future state (which is still often regarded as the strongest, apart from revelation) based upon the aspirations of mankind for immortality, and for a higher ideal than can be reached in this life. 'It is not at all probable (says Dr. Clarke) that God should have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied, desires which had no objects to answer them, and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never really to come to pass.' 1, καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον] ‘even upon life.’ These words are emphatic. The knowledge of the Chief Good might perhaps be thought to be theoretically interesting, but not practically important—just as Optics and Acoustics increase our knowledge, but do not help us to see and hear better. The objection here implied may be compared with that sometimes made to the utility of the study of Logic, viz., that men do reason correctly without it. The answer would be similar to that given in the text. 5. δεινάμεων] See note on i. 4. 6. κύριος = authoritative or supreme—as explained by the first argument in § 5. 1. ἀρχιτεκτονική] (see note on i. 4). This epithet is justified by the second argument in § 6. § 7 merely sums up the two preceding arguments, inverting their order.
this science regulates the study of all the other sciences in a community; and (2.) it employs their results, even in the case of the most esteemed of them, in its own service, and thus their ends are subordinated to its end. (If it be argued that the good of society, which is the end of this science, is only another name for the good of the individual men who constitute society, we reply that the science which secures this good on a large scale is still the supreme science.) Hence the Science of Ethics is a branch of the Science of Social Life.

'Social Science' have acquired a technical and inappropriate meaning. Paraphrased, it means the science which investigates the conditions of the perfection of social life, or of man living as a member of a well-ordered community. Aristotle remarks elsewhere, Man is created by nature a social animal, and therefore unless he lives in a society a portion of his nature is undeveloped. We cannot therefore treat of the well-being of man without considering him as a member of a society, nor therefore without also considering the conditions of the well-being of society. See further note on vii. 6.
In this subject we must be content with

1. \(\deltaλγ\) and \(\upsilonτοκεμένη\) are philosophical terms. The former = 'matter' or 'material,' and the latter (as is seen from its etymology) = 'underlying' or 'subject.' Hence the words together = 'subject-matter.'

3. \(\deltaμιουργούμενοι\) \(\deltaμιουργός\) is a workman. Hence \(\deltaμιουργούμενα\) are 'products of art.' See note on vii. 18. As we do not expect a model in cork or wood to be as well finished as one in ivory, so we ought not to expect an argument in a subject variable and fluctuating to be as rigid as one in mathematics.

6. We may notice, once for all, that \(\deltaοκεί\) in Aristotle's phraseology does not necessarily imply (like our expression 'it seems') that what follows is the writer's own opinion. Here, for instance, he proceeds to argue against the statement introduced by \(\deltaοκεί\) in § 3. It would generally be better to translate, 'it has been thought.'
the premisses, such must also be our conclusions, in respect of exactness.

(8) The aims of the teacher being thus qualified, so also must be the demands of the learner. He must neither require too rigid accuracy, nor be content with any needless generality. Such exactness as is admitted by the subject-matter, neither more nor less, should he demand. But this discrimination

1. ὡς·ἐπὶ·τὸ·πολὺ is equivalent to one word, and means ‘general’ or ‘variable.’ τὰ ὡς·ἐπὶ·τὸ·πολὺ γεννόμενα are things which happen as a general rule in such and such a way; ‘generalities’ as opposed to ‘certainties.’

3. ἀποδέχεσθαι means ‘to allow,’ in the old English sense of ‘to approve’ (e.g. ‘The Lord alloweth the righteous’); hence h. l. ‘to accept as satisfactory,’ ‘to acquiesce in.’ See IV. vi. 3, where ἀποδέχεται, ‘he will allow,’ stands in opposition to δυσχερανεῖ, ‘he will disapprove.’

6. παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] It would be equally absurd to be satisfied with plausible arguments from a mathematician, as to insist upon rigid demonstration from an orator. Mathematics being an exact science, no considerations of the probability of a theorem being true, however great, are of the slightest use. Rhetoric being the ‘art of persuasion,’ the logical value of its arguments is entirely subordinate to their persuasiveness.

8. ἔκαστος δὲ κρίνει κ.τ.λ.] ‘Quique perito credendum est in suā arte.’ The right of criticism in any subject depends on special training in that subject. We bow to the dictum of the painter in painting, to that of the musician in music. In general matters we look, in like manner, to the man of general knowledge and cultivation. This is evidently the sense re-
implies special education and special qualities in the learner, else he will have neither the right nor the power of exercising such a judgment. The young therefore are not fit students of (1) mature

Ethical Science, partly from their ignorance of life and its experiences, and partly from the strength of their passions, which

they have not yet learned to master. And we must further exclude all who, however old in years, are but children in

quired; and so the following passage would certainly be clearer if it read thus:—Καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἄρα δὲ οὐκ ἐπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπειρὸς γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον

τράχεων, οἱ λόγοι δὲ τοῦτων καὶ περὶ τοῦτων. Ἐτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικός ὑπὸ ματαιῶς ἀκούσται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ τράχεις. Διαφέρει δὲ οὕθεν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ζῆδος νεαρὸς: οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἐλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ξύν καὶ διόκειν ἐκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνάγνωσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν.

The following explanation of terms may be useful:—
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τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιομένους καὶ πράτ-8 τουσι πολυωφελεῖς ἄν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἴδεναι. Καὶ
περὶ μὲν ἄκρατον, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τὶ προτι-
θέμεθα, πεφροιμισθῶ τοσαῦτα.

1 IV. Δέγομεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ 5
προαιρέσις ἁγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστιν ὁ λέγομεν

8 character; all, that is, who live under the sway of passion
and not reason. For Ethics is a science in which right
knowledge profits nothing unless it is accompanied by right
practice; while right practice will ever derive the greatest
advantage if supplemented by right knowledge.

CHAP. IV.—What is the Chief Good?—Conflicting opinions—
Determination of the method to be adopted.

All allow I
that ‘Hap-
piness’ is
the Chief
Good.

ἄκρατής is a man who acts
wrongly after a struggle be-
tween good and bad desires.

ἐγκρατής is a man who acts
rightly in a similar case.

ἀκάλαστος is one in whom vice
has become a habit, and the
desire of good is eradicated;
he does wrong without a
struggle.

σωφρόνων is one in whom virtue
has become a habit; bad
desires are conquered; he
does right without an effort;
or, as Bishop Butler expresses
it, ‘particular affections be-
come absolutely coincident
with the moral principle.’
Anal. p. 101 (Angus’s edit.).

See, in illustration, I. xiii. 15;
III. ii. 4. Hence the ἄκρατής is
precisely in the case described
in the text: he knows right but
does wrong.

IV. Compare Pope, Essay on
Man, iv. 1:—
Oh Happiness! our being’s end and aim! Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate’er
thy name—
That something still which prompts the
eternal sigh,
For which we bear to live, or dare to die.

Or again, line 21, etc.

Some place the bliss in action, some in
ease,
Those call it Pleasure, and Contentment
these;
Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end
in pain;
Some, swelled to gods, confess ev’n
virtue vain:
2 as we put it at first, What is the Chief Good? In name all alike agree that it is Happiness: but when we further ask
3 What is Happiness? one says one thing, and one another, and even the same person says differently at different times.

Pleasure, wealth, honour, health, some abstract ideal of good.

Or indolent, to each extreme they fall,
To trust in everything, or doubt of all.
Who thus define it, say they more or less
Than this, that Happiness is Happiness?

2. πρακτών is emphatic. See note below on line 13.
4. χαριέντες] 'men of culture.'
6. This divergence of opinion may be illustrated by the fact that an ingenious writer (Varro) claimed to have counted 285 different theories on this subject.

10. συνειδότες κ.τ.λ.] We always value that most which for the time we want. In sickness we think no good can compare with health; in poverty we think nothing would make us so happy as money; when conscious of ignorance ourselves we are dazzled by a display of knowledge which is beyond us.

13. This is Plato's theory of the 'Idea' of Good, criticised by Aristotle at length in chapter vi. The Chief Good, according to Plato, is the Quality or Condition invariably present in everything Good, the possession of which causes the same term 'Good' to be applicable in each case. We speak of a good man, or horse, or poem, or poison, or antidote, etc. etc. We should not apply the same term 'Good,'
4. See the Glossary on the terms \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori}, and also s.v. \textit{άρχη}. [4. See the Glossary on the terms \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori}, and also s.v. \textit{άρχη}.]

Aristotle elsewhere explains that general laws are better known than particular facts in the perfect or ideal order of knowledge (\textit{γνωριμότερα φύσει or ἀπλῶς}), but particular facts are better known than general laws in the order of human knowledge (\textit{γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν}). We are more familiar with the fall of an apple, or the motion of a particular star than with the law of gravitation. A being with more perfect knowledge would be more familiar with the general
before general laws. We must therefore start from facts. 

But seeing that the very facts of moral science are unintel-

laws governing the universe, than with particular instances of their application. As we ascend in the scale of intelligence 'the individual withers and the world is more and more.' Hence, practically, γνώριμα φύσει come to be Laws, Principles, Universals; γνώριμα ἡμῖν, Facts, Particulars.

1. Observe the emphasis on ἡμῖν γε. 'Perhaps then we at any rate must begin from what is known to us.' Aristotle does not assert that there may not be a more ideally perfect way of approaching the subject. Compare the two methods of ethical teaching explained by Bishop Butler (Introd. to Sermons): 'There are two ways in which the subject of Morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, etc. (ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς). . . . The first seems the most direct formal proof: . . . the latter is, in a peculiar manner, adapted to satisfy a fair mind, and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life.' So also Hume (General Principles of Morals, p. 221, ed. 1800): 'As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances (λόγου ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς). The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established (λόγου ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature' (ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). To begin with γνώριμα ἡμῖν is, of course, to proceed ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, and not ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

2. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡθαι] The facts of morals (in the sense of this passage) are the notions (in their most simple and rudimentary form) of right, wrong, just, unjust, duty, etc. The study presupposes that these notions are, at least to some degree, intelligible to us; that when the terms are used they convey some sort of meaning to us (τὸ διώτι), though we may not be able to define them accurately, or to say what constitutes rightness, wrongness, etc. (τὸ διώτι), or even to prove that there are any real distinctions in the
ligible without some preliminary training in good habits, we must further presuppose such a training. Nor is it necessary nature of things corresponding to the notions expressed by these and similar words. Still, even such a dim appreciation as this implies some training in good habits, and it would scarcely be found in a perfectly untutored savage. Nay, more, even in civilized life it is only experience of a virtue (τοὶς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαῖ) which can make it intelligible to us individually. Hence the idea of 'humility' was unintelligible to the Greeks; it was never practised, and so their language had no word for it. Missionaries find it impossible to explain or express to savages some of the fundamental ideas of the Christian religion for the same reason. The condition 'τοὶς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαῖ' has not been fulfilled.

2. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι] 'For the fact is a starting point;' or, 'the assumption of moral facts (without their reason or theory) will enable us to make a start.' All that we need presuppose, and that much we must presuppose, is the primæ facie fact of moral distinctions, and a capacity for their recognition in the learner, though he may not at first know how to apply them to the details of action. Without this much, Ethics would have nœraison d'être (see Introd. p.xvi); there would be no subject-matter for the science to treat of, or faculties to which it could appeal. This will appear plainly if we look at the case of one or two other sciences. The Science of Painting (1) assumes, or does not question, the existence of colours; and (2) presupposes that the learner is able to distinguish colours—that he is not blind. The Science of Music (1) assumes the existence of harmonious and discordant sounds; and (2) presupposes that the learner can appreciate the difference—that he is not deaf. That would be the meaning of Ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι as applied in these two cases. Similarly the Science of Morals assumes (1) a distinction between Right and Wrong; and (2) a capacity in the learner to recognise that distinction (hence δεί τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαί). The grounds in Nature which constitute differences of colours, or harmony and discord of sounds, or the essential distinction between Right and Wrong,—these lie not at the threshold, but in the inmost shrine of the respective sciences. These questions would correspond with τὸ διότι, with which, as Aristotle says, we have nothing to do at the commencement.
CHAP. V.—Criticism of the chief typical theories as to the nature of Happiness.

1. Returning from this digression, let us consider some typical views as to the nature of Happiness. Some say that it consists in bodily pleasure, others in honour, others in philosophic happiness.

2. Three main theories about Happiness, which may at least be inferred from the actual lives of men, are suggested for examination in this chapter; two more come in incidentally. That they are justly selected as typical and progressive views of the nature of Happiness is shown at length in the Introduction, p. xxix.

8. ὃθεν παρεξεζῆμεν] viz., the promise in § 4 of the last chapter.

9. ‘They are not unreasonably inferred from their manner of life to suppose happiness to consist in pleasure.’ Most men have no conscious theory about Happiness and the Chief Good, but what they really think may be inferred from their practice.

10. φορτικὸς = ‘troublesome,’ burdensome;’ and then (like βάναυσος) ‘coarse,’ ‘vulgar.’ It is applied to buffoons in IV. viii. 3. See also X. viii. 7.
3 μένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν ὅψιν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδοδέες φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίου προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγον διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανα-πάλλω. Οἱ δὲ χαρίειτε καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τούτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δὲ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ξητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τῶγαθὸν δὲ 5 ὁικεῖον τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντεύομεθα. Ἐπὶ δὲ ἑοίκασι τὴν τιμήν διόκειν, ἵνα πιστεύοσιν ἐάντοις ἡγαθοῖς εἶναι· ἥτοι ἡ ζητούσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ᾽ οἷς γεγυμόσκονται καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἠρετῇ δὴλον οὖν ὅτι 3 contemplation. As to the first, it is the life of mere animals, though the ignorant have the example of the great and 4 powerful to justify their choice. As to the second, we object: 5 who may refuse it however well it be deserved; and (2) Honour is only sought as a kind of recognition of merit, and on the ground of virtue. And if so, Virtue is, according to the principles already laid down, a more final end than 6. Sardanapalus was the last king of Nineveh, whose name became proverbial for luxury and effeminacy. 5. πρακτικοῖ] 'of an active turn.' 6. ἐπιπολαιότερον] 'too superficial.' See note on iv. 4. 7. ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι] Compare Pepe— What's fame? A fancied life in others' breath, A thing beyond us, e'en before our death. And with the next clause compare— All fame is foreign, but of true desert. 9. ὁικεῖον τι] 'something peculiarly one's own.' 10. Compare Bacon's Essay on Praise, which commences,— 'Praise is the reflection of Virtue (ὅνα πιστεύωσιν ἐάντοις ἄγαθοις εἶναι), but it is as the glass or body which giveth the reflection. If it be from the common people it is commonly false and naught, and rather followeth vain persons than virtuous' (ὦτοι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ.) 12. ἐπ᾽ ἠρετῇ] 'on grounds of merit.' We do not care to be held in honour by worthless
6 honour, which cannot therefore be the Chief Good. If it be further asked, Is Virtue itself the Chief Good? we reply, No: (9) Virtue; because a man may be virtuous and yet through various accidents lead a life of forced inactivity or of positive suffering, and this could not without paradox be called a happy life. As to the third, we reserve what we have to say for the present. We ought perhaps to add that wealth cannot be the Chief Good, because wealth is obviously a means and not men, or upon trivial or discreditable grounds. Cf. IV. iii. 17.

6. δέσων διαφυλάττων refers to the discussions in the rhetorical schools, where, a subject or thesis (θέσις) being proposed, the pupils took different sides of the question to defend (διαφυλάττειν) as an exercise, irrespective of their own views on the subject.

8. ἐγκυκλίων] sc. λόγοις. i.e., 'Popular treatises,'—such as might be met with in the ordinary round of life.

9. ἐπίσκεψις] 'a thorough investigation.' This will be found in B. X.

10. βλαύος τις may be explained either (1) 'under a sort of constraint,' opposed to ἐκούσιος (as in III. i., etc.), because no one would toil for wealth if he could secure the luxuries etc. which wealth procures without this toil; (ἀναγκαῖος is used to express the same idea in X. vi. 2); or (2) 'unnatural' (= παρὰ φύσιν), because it is a perversion of the nature of things to make an end of wealth, which is essentially a means, as much as it would be (e.g.) to accumulate railway-tickets without any intention of travelling.
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γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάρων. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρῶτοι οὐκ 
θέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι, δὲ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἁγαπᾶται. 
Φαίνεται δὲ οὖν ἐκεῖνα· καύτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ 
καταβεβληταί.

VI. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον 
ἐσωτερικοῦ καὶ διαπορήσατι τῶς λέγεται, καίτερ 
προσώποι τῆς τοιαύτης ξητίσεως γνωμένης διὰ τὸ 
φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. Δόξεω δὲ ἂν ἵσω 
βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς ἁληθείας καὶ 
τὰ οἰκεία ἀναίρειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὑντας.

an end, and, as such, men seek it of compulsion and not of free 
choice, in order to secure the results to which it leads.

CHAP. VI.—Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief 
Good is the abstract 'Idea' of Good.

We proceed to the last of the important theories as to the 
nature of the Chief Good above mentioned (iv. 3), viz., that it 
is some one abstract ideal entering into each several mani-
festation of 'good.' Respect for the authors of this theory 
makes the discussion unwelcome, but the love of truth renders 

4. καταβεβληταί] 'have been 
constructed.' The metaphor is 
probably from καταβάλλειν 
θεμέλια, 'to lay down the foun-
dations of a building.'

CHAP. VI.—This chapter 
simply continues the proposed 
examination of the theories of 
the Chief Good selected in ch. iv. 
as being the most important and 
worthy of notice. See note on 
iv. 3 for a brief explanation of 
the theory criticised in this 
chapter.

5. τὸ καθόλου] literally 'the 
Universal,' i.e. the theory of one 
abstract and universal Good 
present in all particular mani-
festations of Good, and yet separ-
able from them. This was 
called by Plato the 'Idea' of 
Good.

8. τὰ εἴδη] much the same as 
tὰς ἱδεὰς, i.e. the theory of 'Ideas.'

5ίλους ἀνδρας] Especially 
Aristotle's own master and 
teacher, Plato.
2 it necessary. We argue against it as follows:—(i) There can be no one abstract 'Idea' of several objects of which some are necessarily prior or posterior to others. (This is allowed by the authors of the theory, who on this account denied its application to numbers.) Now this is evidently the case with the numerous objects called 'Good,' since we have Good in Substance and Good in Relation, etc. Therefore 3 there cannot be one abstract Idea of 'Good.' (ii) If all Good

1. Hence the well-known saying, 'Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.'

6. πρότερον τῇ φύσει.] Aristotle (Categ. xii. 1, 2) distinguishes πρότερον κατὰ χρόνον and πρότερον in the following sense (which practically amountsto πρότερον τῇ φύσει): When two things, A and B, are so related that the existence of B necessarily implies the existence of A, but not vice versa, then A is πρότερον 'in the order of Being' as compared with B. He gives as an instance the numbers 1 and 2, which stand in this relation to one another. On this ground (he argues in the text) the Platonists made no 'Idea' of Numbers, such an interdependence in respect of essential priority and posteriority being out of the question among phenomena partaking of one 'Idea' (see further note on § 6). Thus the major premiss would be granted by his opponents. In the minor premiss Aristotle contends that such an essential priority (πρότερον τῇ φύσει) belongs to Substance as compared with Accident or Relation, and as Good is predicated of each, there cannot be a common Idea of Good in these cases.

8. This second argument is little more than a repetition of the first, cloathed in more technical Aristotelian phraseology, and worked out into more detail.
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.  [BOOK I.

ταγαθῶν ἵσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέ-
γεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶν αἱ ἄρεται,
καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρή-
σιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καίρῳ, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαντα καὶ
ἐτερα τοιαύτα), ὃδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἶ ἄν Κοινόν τι καθόλου
καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις,
ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνη. Ὅτι δ' ἔτει τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν μία
καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἢν ἂν μία τις
ἐπιστήμην νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαί καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγο-
ρίαν, οἷον καίροι ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικῇ ἐν νόσῳ δ' 10

were included under one 'Idea,' it ought to be predicated
under one Category only: but it can be predicated under all
and each of the Categories. Hence again it cannot be reduced
to one 'Idea.' (iii) The knowledge of things reducible to one
Idea must be one and indivisible, whereas of things Good
there are many divisions of knowledge, and that even of Goods

1. ἵσαχως λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] 'can be predicated in as many
ways as Being itself.' The expressions which follow are taken
from the phraseology of Aristotle's Categories. Only the
first six out of the ten usually given are mentioned in the text.
They have been variously held to be a classification of things,
words, or thoughts. For a clear and succinct account of Aris-
totle's Categories, and the controversy respecting their nature,
the student is referred to Dean Mansel's edition of Aldrich's
Logic. Note B. in the Appendix (Ed. iii.) The argument in the
text is, that as 'good' may be predicated of each and all of the
several modes of existence classified in the Categories, such
variety cannot be reduced under one 'Idea.'

7. Ὅτι δ' ἔτει] Aristotle now argues that the divisions of Knowl-
edge relating to the various manifestations of Good indicate
a still further subdivision even than the distinction of Categories.
It should be remembered that ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle refers rather
to a mental state (see VI. ii., and Glossary, s. v. Art, Science) than
to a concrete body of know-
ledge. He argues therefore that if the various manifestations of
Good were reducible to one 'Idea,'
the knowledge of one would be the knowledge of all.
which can be brought under one Category. (iv) Again, What is this abstract 'Idea' of anything? and how does its definition differ from that of any object in which it is embodied? and if there is no difference how can the 'Idea' lay claim to a separate existence? We cannot admit the answer that the 'Idea' is eternal, while the objects in which it is embodied exist only in time, for mere length of duration does not alter the intrinsic nature of anything. In short we pre-

2. 'Απορήσεις δ' ἦν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλουται λέγειν αὐτοεκαστὸν, εἴπερ ἐν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἢ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος, οὐδὲν διοίσονσιν εἰ δ' οὔτως, 5 οὐδὲ ἢ ἀγαθὸν. Ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄδιδον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἐσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανότερον δ' ἐστὶν τὶ Πυθαγόρειοι

and therefore prior to and independent of all relations of time. They existed independently of the Deity himself, and were voluntarily adopted by Him as the types which the created world should embody. Another, but later, view of the Platonists was, that they existed only in the Divine Mind, as His ideas (in the modern sense) of what creation should be. In either case, however, they would be independent of relation to Time.

8. Πιθανότερον κ.τ.λ.] There is not exactly a logical opposition between the theory of the Pythagoreans and that of Plato. They deal with the question of the relation between Unity and Goodness from somewhat differ-
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK I.

λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἁγαθῶν συστοιχία τῷ ἐν ὕσ ἀν καὶ Σπευσιππὸς ἐπακολουθήσαν δοκεῖ.

8 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἐστὼ λόγος, τοὺς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποθανεῖταί διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ πάντως ἁγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρήσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἰδοὺ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἁγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἡ φυλακτικὰ πώς ἡ τῶν ἑναντίων κολυ-

fer the Pythagorean formula (apparently adopted even by Speusippus) that 'All Unity is Good,' rather than that of Plato, that 'All Good is one.' (v) If our opponents take the ground of distinguishing 'Goods' into two classes, according as they are (1) desired for their own sake, (2)
desired for their results, and then should limit the application of the theory under consideration to the first of these classes, we should ask for some instances of this class. Probably intellect, sight, certain pleasures and honours, would be admitted as Goods desired for their own sake. (a) If they are not, and if in short nothing but the ‘Idea’ of Good is admitted to be desired for its own sake, then the first of these classes is useless, having no objects included under it. (β) If they are, then supposing them to have one ‘Idea’ in common, they must have one Definition; but as this is obviously not

9. ωφελίμων is used as equivalent to τῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθῶν.

9. μάταιον ἐσται τὸ εἴδος] ‘The class (viz. that of absolute, as opposed to relative Goods) will come to nothing.’ If the Platonist maintains that only absolute Goods have one Idea, and then refuses to admit that there are any absolute Goods, except the one ‘Idea’ of Good, then the supposed class of absolute Goods to which the ‘Idea’ refers has no contents, and is therefore useless. εἴδος (as in §8) is not here to be taken in the technical sense of ιδέα.

13. ἔτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες κ.τ.λ.] This, if not a direct petitio principii, is an off-hand and dogmatic way of disposing of the very kernel of the whole question, to which the opponents would doubtless at once demur.
the case, we conclude that there cannot be one 'Idea' even of this limited class of Goods. (vi) If asked ourselves to account for the application of the one term 'Good' to such a variety of objects (which of course cannot be a mere coincidence), we should suggest that it is in virtue of a certain analogy between them, though we cannot now pause to fully investigate or justify such a theory. (vii) Finally, such a

2. τῶς δὴ λέγεται.] These words represent a supposed attempt on the part of the Platonist to shift the burden of establishing a theory on his opponent. 'If you reject my theory, how do you account for the acknowledged

{ απὸ τύχης accidental
�μῶνυμα }
{ ἐὰν διάνοιας intentional

The last-named abound in every language as a means (inter alia) of economizing the number of words—e.g. 'foot' of an animal and of a mountain, 'hand' of a man and of a clock, etc. etc. Aristotle here asserts his preference for some such explanation as this in reference to the various applications of the word 'Good.'

3. ὁμονύμοι] When the same word was applied to different objects in more than one sense, they were termed ὁμονύμα. The following classification of ὁμονύμα is implied in the text:

{ ἃφ' ἐνὸς coming from one source.
πρὸς ἐν tending to one result.
κατ' ἀναλογίαν by virtue of resemblance or analogy.

In short, a theory respecting an abstract Ideal of good belongs to Metaphysics (ἄλλης φιλοσοφίας), and its truth or falsehood is indifferent to Ethics, which deals with the practical well-being of Man. We may therefore dismiss the subject as far as this treatise is concerned.
theory as this, whether true or false, may be dismissed from further consideration in a treatise which is rigidly limited to the inquiry into that which is practically useful to and attainable by man. And if it be argued that the knowledge of the abstract Idea of Good will advance us towards the knowledge of human good, we reply that this argument though plausible is unsupported by experience. The Sciences, pursuing each the knowledge of some special good for man, know nothing of this abstract 'Idea' of Good. Still more striking is it that

3. τοιούτον τι ζητεῖται] See ii. 1 note.

6. παράδειγμα] 'model,' or 'exemplar.' Compare Aristotle's own argument in ii. 2. Plato frequently maintains the practical utility of the 'Idea,' as a παράδειγμα—e.g. Rep. p. 484 C, p. 501 B, etc. etc. As a question of fact, Plato and Aristotle would of course admit that men do not avail themselves of these abstract Ideals in practice. As to whether they might do it, Aristotle asserts that it would be impossible, but Plato maintains the reverse, and declares that all real progress is hopeless until this shall be the case.

10. τὸ ἐνδεές ἐπιζητούσαι] 'seeking to supply that which is lacking.' Science is ever seeking to supply defects of knowledge, Art defects of practical power. (See Glossary, s.v. Art, Science.)
the Arts, with their practical aims, derive no help from it, nor, as far as we can see, could they ever do so.

CHAP. VII.—Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good.

§§ 1-8.—Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good stated with a view to its Definition.

§§ 9-16.—A Definition constructed out of another such characteristic.

§§ 17-21.—The Definition not to be treated as mathematically exact.

After these refutations of others we must now endeavour ourselves to answer the question, What is the Chief Good?

3. ὡς τὴν ὑγίειαν] Not only does the physician disregard the abstract ‘Idea’ of health, but he does not aim at producing even health in any general sense, but the health of the one particular individual whom he has in hand. This, it must be admitted, is captious. Indeed, here and elsewhere in the Chapter, in spite of the profession of § 1, Aristotle shows little sympathy with, scarcely even fairness to, the theory he is criticising. This argument, if it proved anything, would be a defence of empiricism against scientific knowledge.

CHAP. VII.—Here commences the constructive part of the treatise. Ch. iv. having set forth the conflicting theories on the subject before us, and chapters v. and vi. having been destructive, i.e. having shown which of these theories are not true, or in other words, What the Chief Good is, not, we now proceed to inquire What the Chief Good is. The chapter naturally falls into three divisions—(1) §§ 1-8, (2) §§ 9-16,
One characteristic of it is this: The good of any art, science, action, or purpose, is always the end in each several case, however many other points of difference there may be between them. So that the Chief Good of action will also be the Final End of action. This however is the same conception as that to the main question with which the Book opened. All that follows is simply the confirmation and defence of the Definition here given.

9. Μεταβαίνων κ.τ.λ.] ‘By a different course then the argument has come round to the same point,’ viz. the same point as in ch. i. The conclusion in each case is the identity of the Chief Good and the Final End. The slightly different courses are as follows:—In this passage we argue, The ‘good’ and the ‘end’ are identical in all individual cases, and therefore the Chief Good and the Final End will be identical also. Thus ἐκάστης in l. 3 and ἀπάντων in l. 8 are the emphatic words. In ch. i. we argued, Every action, etc., aims at some Good, and therefore the
with which we started. We may however further explain this idea of Finality. Any End which is itself but a means to a further End, or indeed which ever can be such a means, cannot be final. And hence we obtain this conception of the Chief Good, that it is something always desired for its own sake, and never with a view to anything beyond it. Obviously, Happiness fulfils this condition, and we can think of nothing

Chief Good is what all things aim at, i.e. it is the ultimate aim or Final End of all things; and hence again the Chief Good and the Final End are identical.

5. We cannot adequately translate τέλειον, which combines the meanings of ‘perfect’ and ‘final.’ (See Glossary s. v. τέλειος.) That the Chief Good fulfils this positive condition follows from the primary conception of it given in the opening words of the Book, and in the beginning of ch. ii. 11. τοιούτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Thus the steps of the argument are:—The Chief Good is τελειότατον: then (after the notion of τελειότης has been expounded) Happiness is shewn to fulfil this condition: the result of which is, that Happiness, as before, is found to constitute the Chief
else which does. This however will not help us to a clearer
6 Definition of the Chief Good. The same may be said of
another characteristic of the Chief Good, viz. that it is entirely
Self-sufficient, by which we mean that it needs nothing besides
itself to make life all that we could desire. (We must not
however understand this to mean that it would enable a man
to be independent of his fellow-men and live happily in isola-
7 tion. That would be a spurious self-sufficiency, being a
mutilation, not an elevation, of human nature.) Happiness

Good, but we are not as yet any
nearer to a Definition of it. In
§§ 7, 8 similar steps occur.
4. ἐκ τῆς αὐτάρκειας] That
the Chief Good fulfils this con-
dition as it is defined in § 7 fin.,
follows again from ii. 1. For if
we desire everything else only
for the sake of Happiness, the
possession of it would render all
such minor desires superfluous:
we should be ‘μηδένος ἐνδεεις.’
5. τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκεις λέγομεν
κτ.λ.] ‘When we use the term
‘αὐτάρκεις,” we do so not in refer-
ence to a man’s self alone, in the
case of one living a life of isola-
tion, but also in reference to his
parents, etc.’
8. φύσει πολιτικὸς ἀνθρωπος
‘Man is by nature a social ani-
mal.’ Nature intended man for
society as much as she intended
him to use two hands or to walk
on two feet. A man who should
accommod himself to live out of
all relation to his fellow-creatures
would not have gained in real
independence any more than one
who should go always on one leg,
or should use only one hand.
The error thus protested against
by Aristotle was conspicuous in
the teaching of the Cynics.
eis äpeiron proeiswv. "Alla touto men eisai theis episkopetion, to de autarhes theimew munoumeun autetov pous ton bion kai mnedenvs enedai toio touton de twn eudai-
8 monian oymetha einai. "Eti de pantovn aitetohtatvn, mou
sunvaribhmovmenhn, sunvaribhmovmenhn de olyouv os aiteto-
teran meta tou elaxiston ton agathon uperokh yapagathon ginetai to prostatheumenon, agathon de to meizov
aitetoteron aei. Tëleion de ti fainetai kai autarhes
h eudaimonia, ton prakenon ouu paiados.
9 'Alla isos twn men eudai monian to ariiston legenw
omologoumenov ti fainetai, potheita de enargesteron
10 ti estin eti lechynai. Tacha de yenoi 'an tout', ei
again fulfils this condition of Self-sufficiency, but we cannot
yet advance to a Definition of the Chief Good. Once more,
8 the Chief Good is sui generis. If it were only the chief good
of a class, the addition to it of any other good in the class,
however small, would make it better, which is inconsistent
with the supposition that it is itself the Chief Good. Happi-
ness is then perfectly Final and Self-sufficient, and is the end
of all human action.
9 All this, however true, is too vague to construct a defini-
tion upon. Another consideration may perhaps serve this
10 purpose. Could we ascertain the proper function of man

5. mou sunvaribhmovmenhn k.t.l.] 'provided it be not counted in
the same class with other Goods; but if it be so counted in,' etc.
The expression 'Chief Good,' by which we are obliged to translate
the simple to agathon is misleading. agathon must be held to
include in itself all other Goods, such as health, wealth, honour,
etc., in the most perfect degree, i.e. the utmost amount of them
really desirable. Clearly if A

be only the principal Good of a
class made up of the Goods A,
B, C, D, etc., then A + B, or
even A + Z, is a greater good
than A alone. Therefore no
single member of the Class can
ever be the Chief Good. It must
be something sui generis, in a class
by itself.
12. The conception now started,
that Happiness consists in the
fulfilment of man's proper func-
tion (or as we might say, the
as man, his Chief Good would surely consist (as in all similar cases) in the perfect fulfilment of that function; and this is a more definite conception of it than those already suggested. We ought perhaps first to show that man, as man, has such a proper function, and this we should argue (1) from the fact that man in every individual character and relation of life (e.g. as an artist or any other sort of workman) has a definite function, and therefore man simply as man cannot be purposeless; and (2) from the consideration that every part of man, the eye, the hand, the foot, etc., has its proper function, and therefore man as a whole has one also. Now, granting this, it is clear that this function must be something purpose of his being, the object for which he was created and sent into the world), is found sufficiently fruitful to form the basis of a Definition.

7. ἄργον has precisely its etymological force (ἀ-ἄργον) 'without any work.' Translate 'has no work assigned to him by nature.'

11. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἰδιὸν | 'We are seeking for that which is peculiar to himself.' This would be explained by Plato's definition of the ἄργον of anything, viz. 'that which it either alone, or better than anything else, is able to perform.' Hence he says, though we might prune a vine with a sword, a chisel, or a pruning-knife, the operation would be so much better performed with the last instrument that we say that it is its ἄργον. It is ἰδιὸν τι, something peculiarly appropriate to it.
peculiar to, and characteristic of, man. This excludes that mere existence which he shares with the animal and vegetable world, and also that conscious life (or life endued with sensation) which is common to the brute creation. There remains then what we may call a life of action belonging to the rational part of our nature; including by the term 'rational' that which recognises the sway of Reason as well as that which exerts Reason. This being the function of man, we now seek the perfection of that function. First it must be in active operation. Hence the Chief Good from this point of view will be 'An active condition of the soul guided by, or not opposed to, Reason.' But further, such an active condition

4. πρακτική is easier to explain than translate; 'moral,' 'active,' 'practical,' being in different ways misleading. Man is sometimes said to be the only animal that can form a conception of actions as distinguished from events. πρακτική is co-extensive with 'action' in the sense here indicated. 'Τις' implies that the expression in the Greek is felt to be not quite satisfactory. Τότου δὲ κ.τ.λ.] This distinction is more fully explained in ch. xiii. Its relevancy here has been thought so questionable, that some Editors have treated the sentence as an interpolation, though against ms. evidence.

6. καὶ ἐνέργειαν] as opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν ορ καθ' ἐξών. Sec Glossary, p. xlvi., also viii. 9. The various steps by which each term of the Definition is gained should be carefully noted.

7. εἰ δ' ἐστίν] The apodosis to this εἰ is found in § 15 init., τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. We are reminded that the sentence is still unfinished by the twice repeated εἰ δ' οὕτω in l. 6 and l. 9 of the next page.

8. ψυχής is translated 'soul'
admits of various degrees of excellence. The function of a good or of an ordinary artist is generically the same, only by one it is well performed, and by the other not necessarily so. Therefore we must include this condition of excellence in our Analysis for want of a better word (see Glossary s. v. ἀρετή). It seems to stand here as a sort of substitute for πρακτική above, because πρακτική (ὡς) must belong to this part of man (as Aristotle plainly states in viii. 3), in contrast with θρετικὴ and αἰσθητικὴ (ὡς), which belong to the body. Similarly κατὰ λόγον corresponds to τὸν λόγον ἔχοντος above.

1. τῷ ἔνει] This is the emphatic idea in the sentence. 'The work of anyone and of a good anyone are the same in kind.' . . . the superiority in respect of excellence being (in the latter case) added to the description of the work. e.g. If the 'anyone' be a musician, 'to play,' in the former case, 'to play well' in the latter case, would describe the work of each. 'Well' is the ὑπεροχὴ κατ' ἀρετὴν which is added.

3. δὴ = as it obviously is. Supply εἰ again before ἀπλῶς.

9. οἰκεία ἀρετή] 'appropriate excellence.' It should be remembered that ἀρετή is simply 'excellence,' though it is most frequently applied to a particular sort of excellence, viz. moral excellence, and so is translated Virtue: just as πρᾶξις and πρακτική come to be similarly restricted in meaning (see Glossary under ἀρετή and πρᾶξις). This general meaning of ἀρετή is explained by Plato's Definition, that the appropriate excellence (οἰκεία ἀρετή) of anything is that quality by which it is able to perform its own function well. Aristotle's account of ἀρετή in II. vi. 2 should also be referred to.
Definition; and as there are various kinds and degrees of excellence, we must also specify the highest excellence. And so the Chief Good becomes 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its highest excellence.' One other condition: it must be a permanent settled state, the habit of a life, not the accident of a moment. We add then the words 'in a complete life,' and so our Definition stands thus: Happiness is 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its highest excellence in a complete life.' Let this serve as an outline sketch at any rate of our conception of the Chief Good.

3. **bios tēleios** ['a complete life,' not necessarily 'a completed life'; or 'life as a whole,' though not necessarily 'a whole life;' else we get into the difficulty raised at the beginning of ch. x. 'Can we not call a man happy till his life is completed?' We should not describe a man as having good spirits, or excellent health, unless we had known him for a certain time, and had had opportunities for observing him under various circumstances; in fact, till we can judge of his life as a whole. Sometimes even a few observations enable us to form such a judgment, and for practical purposes these represent

**bios tēleios.** So it is in the case of Happiness. All we need is a sufficiently complete period of duration to be sure that it is a settled habit of life, and not a momentary or transient gleam of joy. It is a well-known point of distinction between 'pleasure' and 'happiness,' that pleasure is perfect at any moment, whereas happiness implies duration and permanence.

7. **upotupwosai** is a metaphor from sculpture, **anagraphai** from painting: but it should be remembered that ancient statues were frequently painted.

8. **pantos** is emphatic here and in 1. 3, next page. In Morals, as in
or Happiness. Time and individual experience will fill in further details in a subject like this, just as they advance our knowledge of the Arts. We make however two provisos: 1. Exactness of treatment (as we have already said) must not be indiscriminately demanded. 2. The reason, as well as the fact, must not in all cases be required. As to the first, let us not forget that two considerations limit the amount of precision to be required in any case. (1) The nature of the subject-matter, of which we have spoken already (iii. 2); and (2) our immediate object in handling it: as for instance a car-

the Arts (both being [1] practical, and [2] not, like Mathematics, exact), every one's experience may contribute something to their progress, and every additional fact adds something in confirmation of their very principles; and moreover, every one is interested in their progress, and in the subjects of which they treat. In the exact science of Mathematics, on the other hand, though progress in the knowledge of facts and the efficiency of methods is continually being made, nothing can ever add to the clearness and certainty of its fundamental Definitions and Axioms. Besides, it is not every one (παντὸς) who can understand or feel interest in such a subject.

6. καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀληθὺς 'dependent on the subject-matter,' e.g. a model in cork or deal could never be finished like one in ivory.

7. οἶκειον τῇ μεθοδῶν 'suitable to the process in hand,' e.g. it would be possible perhaps to make the corner of a deal table precisely 90°, but there would be no object gained by such exactness. It would not be οἶκειον τῇ μεθοδῶν. Cf. restrictions on discussion of ψυχῇ in c. xiii. §§ 8, 10, 16.

Both these considerations apply to the case of morals. The subject-matter does not admit of exactness, and the practical purpose in view does not require it.
μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθὴν ὁ μὲν ἵππαρ ἐφ’ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τὶ ἐστὶ ἢ ποίον τι θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθος. Τὸν αὐτὸν ὁδ' ἁρτοπού καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλεῖο γίγνηται. Οὔκ ἀπαρτητέον ὁ οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτίαι ἐν 5 ἀπασιώ ὁμοίως, ἀλλ’ ἱκανὸν ἐν τοῖς τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ

penter does not always make the most perfect square even that the wood admits of, if he is engaged on rough work. As to our second proviso, some propositions, e.g. certainly first principles, are exempt from the necessity of demonstrative

As i.e. the former, we may compare Bp. Butler, Analogy, p. 105 (ed. Angus): 'Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold universally in every case. It is enough that they hold in general.'

1. ὀρθὴν] Understand γωνίαν, i.e. a right angle.

6. τὸ ὅτι (the fact that a thing is so and so) is constantly opposed to τὸ διότι (the reason why it is so) ; e.g. In Euclid's Axioms and Definitions the fact alone is stated (τὸ ὅτι); in his Propositions the reasons for asserting the fact are given (τὸ διότι).

τὸ δ’ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχὴν] 'The fact is something primary and a starting-point.' It is so at any rate in Morals, where the fact that we feel sentiments of approbation or disapprobation on certain occasions forms the starting-point of the inquiry. See note on iv. 7 (Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι), and Introduction, p. xiv. Translation fails to preserve the full meaning of ἀρχὴ, including not only 'first principle,' but also 'beginning' or 'starting-point' (see Glossary). Indeed all sciences require to make assumptions independent of demonstrative proof (as Aristotle points out elsewhere), at both the higher and the lower ends of the scale of knowledge. General principles rise above, and facts of observation fall below, the limits of such proof; and both are sometimes called ἀρχαῖ. e.g. the Mathematician assumes the Axioms on the one hand, and on the other assumes the existence of triangles, circles, and other figures, the properties of which he investigates. In the latter case, τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχὴν applies.

7. Axioms or first principles rest upon such grounds as the universality of their belief, the necessity of their belief, and the greater certainty attaching to
proof, and the primary facts themselves of any science are in some sense first principles. Now first principles rest upon evidence of different kinds in different cases; and though never demonstratively proved, they must be, each in its own appropriate way, fully established and clearly defined. This is of the utmost importance, and it is just an instance in which 'well begun is half done.'

them than to any other principles that could be alleged in their support (Sir W. Hamilton). If any higher principles could be found (the necessary condition of demonstrative proof), the others would ipso facto cease to be first principles.

1. ἐπαγωγή h. l. probably = 'by appeal to experience': i.e. (as VI. iii. 3 seems to show) 'that amount of experience which is the condition, not the cause, of necessary truths' (Grant's note l.c.): e.g. in Mathematics we need some experience to comprehend what is meant by straight lines, right angles, etc.; but the ἄρχαί, or Axioms relating to them, are not (like Physical Laws) proved by such experience.

2. αἰσθήσει 'by perception'; probably referring to the facts of Physics, which are 'the truths we start from' (ἄρχαί) in such subjects.

3. Μετείναι δὲ πειρατέον ἔκασ-
VIII. Σκεπτέον δ' περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὅν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς. τό μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεί τά πάντα συνίδει τὰ υπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ φευγεί ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ ταληθὲς.

Chap. VIII.—Other views, popular and philosophical, on the subject of Happiness compared with the above Definition.

We will now compare our Definition with the views held by others, and test it by the facts of experience. (a) It is a

τας ἥ πεφύκασι] 'We must endeavour to investigate them, each in its natural way.'

Chapters viii.-xii. form a sort of parenthetical section, in which Aristotle compares his Definition just found with various received opinions on the subject, and considers its bearing upon certain popular difficulties and questions of the day (esp. ch. ix. x. and xi.). His object throughout is to show how much there is in common between his own theory and others, while he asserts the superiority of his own. The latter consideration justifies a new treatment of the subject; the former not only conciliates opposition, but is itself an argument in favour of any new theory on the ground explained in § 7. This is a truth generally forgotten in controversy. The following are the contents of the five chapters:—ch. viii. Sundry popular and philosophical notions about Happiness compared with Aristotle's Definition; ch. ix. Common views as to the acquisition of Happiness, on what it depends; ch. x. xi. The popular difficulty whether a man cannot be called happy (as Solon said) while still living, with questions arising therefrom, considered from the point of view of Aristotle's Definition; ch. xii. The relation of Happiness, upon Aristotle's theory, to another familiar classification of Goods.

1. ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὅν ὁ λόγος] 'We must not only consider this question from the point of view of our conclusion and of our premises.' We had similar expressions in ch. iii. § 4.

4. τὰ υπάρχοντα] l.l. 'all facts' from υπάρχειν in the sense of 'to exist.' If a general theory is true, all the facts of experience in detail must be consistent with it.

5. The words Νευμηνέων . . . ἀγαθά state the popular opinion which is to be compared with Aristotle's Definition given
The time-honoured saying of philosophers that all goods are either of mind, body, or estate, and that those of the mind are the highest. On two grounds our Definition may be said to imply this: (1) because it describes Happiness as an active condition of the soul or mind; (2) because 'activity' or 'moral action' itself is not an external but an internal good. Others say that Happiness is living well and doing well. This again may be considered to be embodied in our Definition.

To these general theories succeed others which enter more into detail as to the precise character of Happiness, such that...
6 μονίαν ἀπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνμησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἴδονής ἢ οὕκ ἄνευ ἴδονής ἐτεροί δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐτερπίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλγός καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὑροῦσι διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὀλοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν γε τι ἢ 8 καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἄρετὴν ἢ ἄρετὴν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ταύτης.

9 γὰρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. Διαφέρει δὲ ἵσως οὐ 10 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρῆσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἐξεῖ ἢ ἐνεργεία. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξιν ένδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὀποῖο τῷ καθεστώτι ἢ καὶ ἄλλος πως ἐξηγηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οίον

under limitations, in accordance with our Definition: such as

(a) That Happiness consists in Virtue:

2. φρόνησις is practical, and σοφία speculative, wisdom. σοφία is in fact nearly = philosophy. The distinction is fully explained by Aristotle in B. VI. These two theories are not referred to again in the discussion which follows here.

(b) Neither of them (the many or the philosophers) are likely to be entirely at fault, but rather to be right in some one point at least, or even in most points. There is no error but it contains some germ of truth, however distorted or obscured.

11. κτήσει ἢ χρῆσει ... ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ] See Glossary, p. xlvi. Though at the Olympian games there may be better men among the spectators than among the combatants, yet they are not crowned, because their prowess is not proved or exhibited. It is latent, it exists ὅννάμει and not ἐνεργεία.
10 must be not dormant, but in active exercise. (b) That Happiness implies Pleasure. This we agree to, and moreover claim that our Definition asserts it in a far higher and more real sense than that usually intended. (1) Because a virtuous life (**ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν** in our Definition) is necessarily one of pleasure, seeing that every one who is really virtuous takes pleasure in acting virtuously, and so the pleasure is inherent in the very actions themselves. (2) Because the

5. §§ 10-12] The emphatic words are καθ’ αὐτὸν (l. 6) and φύτευ (l. 11). The superiority of the pleasures derived from Virtue to other pleasures is argued, because (1) the former are intrinsic or inherent in the acts themselves (l. 5-10), and (2) they are natural and not artificial (l. 10, to l. 3, on next page). But in the statement of his conclusion in p. 42, l. 3—5, having repeated the words καθ’ αὐτὰς and ἐν ἐαυτῷ, Aristotle recurs to his former argument, stating it, however, more strongly, and then again summing up in p. 43, l. 4.

5. ἐπηβολοὶ] See x. 14 (note).

6. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἣδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν] ‘For the feeling of pleasure is something internal,’ i.e. it is not separable from the occasion which causes it, as two external objects might be separated. The pleasure and the act which is its source are separable in thought but not in fact (λόγῳ δύο ἄχριστα πεψκόστα, as Ar. says in xiii. 10). Hence the pleasure of Virtuous acts is inherent in, and inseparable from, the acts themselves. ψυχικῶν (cf. ψυχικὰς, § 2) clearly refers to ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια in the Def. of Happiness.
pleasures of Virtue, being natural pleasures, never clash or interfere with one another, as our artificial pleasures do; and further, being both natural, and also, as we just now said, inherent in the very actions themselves, there is no need of any adventitious pleasure besides (as the theory we are con-

4. περιάπτου] literally 'something fastened round'; so an appendage, a charm, or amulet. It here indicates an arbitrary reward (which Hegel irreverently described as a 'Trinkgeld') for Virtue.

έχει τὴν ὡδονῆν ἐν ἑαυτῷ] This touches upon a very important question in Morals, the relation of Virtue to the Pleasure or Satisfaction which its practice involves. The view in the text is admirably expressed by Seneca: 'We do not love Virtue because it gives us pleasure, but it gives us pleasure because we love it' (Non quia delectat placet, sed quia placet delectat); and again, 'Pleasure is not the motive, but the accompaniment of virtuous action' (Non dux sed comes voluptas). Again, 'Honesty is the best policy, but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man' (Whately). We must carefully distinguish between the conscious aim and the actual tendency of actions.

Happiness (according to Aristotle) must be the actual tendency of Virtue, but it cannot be its conscious aim. In fact, when it is the conscious aim, we run the risk not only of destroying the Virtue of the act, but even of losing the Happiness. The pleasure of Virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express condition of its not being the object sought. There are many other things which exhibit the same phenomenon (see some good remarks on this in Ecce Homo, ch. x. p. 113, 3d ed.) Just as in speculation, 'Wisdom is ofttimes nearer when we stoop than when we soar;' so in practice, Happiness is best secured by those who least consciously aim at it. Aristotle discusses at length in III. ix. an apparent exception to the statement of the text which occurs in the case of Courage, the exercise of which is accompanied by pain and loss.

5. Πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους] The addition to the former statement
Aristotle for all.

13

amination degree include, 

sidering would imply) to make a virtuous life happy; nor

of the argument in § 10 consists in

this: Aristotle said before that

the Virtuous man loves Virtue, and

and therefore finds pleasure in it. He

He now goes further and says

that unless a man feels pleasure

in it he is ipso facto proved not
to be virtuous at all. This

would be further illustrated by

the contrast between σώφρον

and ἐγκρατής (explained above

in iii. 7); for the conduct of

the latter fails of being strictly Vir-
tue, because it is accompanied

with pain and difficulty. See

also II. iii., where it is main-
tained that pleasure accompany-
ing actions is the test of the
formation of the habit of doing

them.

5. 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ] 'But more-

over they are also.' This for-
mula, as usual, introduces the

answer to a supposed objection,
or possible misunderstanding.

It might be thought that plea-
sure is the exclusive, or at least
distinctive, characteristic of such
acts, but this is not the case.
Thus we have three points of
superiority claimed for Aristotle's
theory of the connexion of Plea-
sure with Happiness over the com-
mon view which we are consider-
ing. (1) Pleasure is present in
a higher manner,—it is inherent:

(2) It is of a higher sort,—it is
natural, not artificial: (3) It is
more comprehensive, as it includes
also τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἄγαθον as
fully as τὸ ἥπιον.

7. σπουδαῖος] lit. 'serious' or 'in
earnest,' just as φαῦλος is 'light'
or 'trifling.' Then the two words
come to be used respectively for
morally good and bad. Aristotle
by the judgment of the best among men, and also that in Happiness this combination is found. The last opinion we shall consider is this:—(c) That external prosperity is a condition of Happiness. This we are also disposed to agree to, up to a certain point, partly because many noble actions cannot be performed without means or appliances; and partly because (as we have already admitted) the absence of certain con-

appeals in a similar way to the decision of the σπουδαίος as final in III. iv. 5, and still more emphatically in X. vi. 5, and to the decision of the φρόνιμος in his Definition of Virtue, II. vi. 15. (See note in each case.)

7. μίαν τὴν ἀρίστην] Though they are all inseparably united in Happiness, yet if one be more prominent or characteristic than the rest we might select it alone for the purpose of Definition.

9. εἴπομεν] viz. v. 6 (τὸν δ’ οὖτω κ.τ.λ.).

10. ἀξορήγητον] lit. ‘unfurnished with a chorus,’—and so generally ‘without appliances.’ The state provided the chorus for dramatic performances. This duty (called χορηγία) was one of the λειτουργίαι at Athens. (See note on IV. ii. 11.) Cf. conversely κεχορηγημένος in x. 15. The same statement is more fully illustrated in X. vii. 4.

CHAP. IX. — *ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS.*

λοις· οὐ πάντα γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἱδέαν παναισχυνὴν δυσχηνὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἀτέκνος, εἰτὶ δ’ ἵσως ὅτι τω Πάγκακοι παῖδες εἰεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἄγαθοι ὤντες τεθνάσων. Καθάπερ οὖν εὑπομεν, ἐοικε προσδείσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐμερίας· οθέν εἰς ταύτα τάττουσιν ένιοι ἅ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἔτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

4. Some degree then of external prosperity is enough to mar Happiness. Some have even identified Happiness with external prosperity just as others have identified it with Virtue. It will be seen that we cannot go so far as this in either case.

CHAP. IX.— *On what does the acquisition of Happiness depend?*

1. Such being our views as to the connexion of Happiness with external circumstances and internal conditions of character, various causes have been suggested for the acquisition of Happiness.

4. Some degree then of external prosperity is demanded on two grounds, (1) because it assists towards the active exercise of Virtue. From this point of view too much of it is almost as great a hindrance as too little, and indeed always it is more or less a source of danger (as Aristotle explains elsewhere, e.g. X. viii. 6). Compare Bacon on Riches: ‘As the Baggage is to an Army, so is Riches to Virtue: it cannot be spared or left behind, but it hindereth the March.’ (2) The other ground is, that the total absence of it in important particulars is obviously enough to interfere with Happiness. See x. 12, where the same two reasons are repeated (λύτας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει κ.τ.λ.). Also ix. 7 (Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ.).

7. "Οθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.] As Happiness has just been shown to imply both Virtue and also external prosperity in some degree, the former consideration would imply that its acquisition was in our own power (μαθητῶν, ἐβιστῶν, ἀσκητῶν), the latter that it was independent of ourselves (κατὰ θείαν μοίραν, διὰ τύχην). Taking the latter first, Aristotle indicates somewhat hesitatingly that θεία μοῖρα cannot be the immediate cause of human Happiness, apart from all effort or conduct of our own. He then excludes τύχη at once, on the
it is natural to inquire upon what its acquisition depends:—
whether it be on learning; on moral, or other, training; on Divine dispensation; or on chance. The best of all human goods is certainly the most likely of all to be the gift of Heaven; and whether thus given directly, or through the medium of instruction or discipline, to be of all human things

ground that it is clearly better that the Chief Good should not depend on chance. Arguments are then adduced in favour of considering Virtuous action as the main cause, or at least as an indispensable condition, of Happiness.

1. μαθητῶν refers to intellectual teaching; εὐστῆτων to moral training; ἀσκήσεως to any sort of training or practice.

5. ἀλλὰς σκέψεως] i.e. it is a question rather for Theology than Ethics. The Science of Ethics only notes the observed fact that Happiness depends in different degrees both on our own efforts and on external circumstances. It leaves to Theology the question whether theories of

‘Natural Laws’ or ‘Special Providence’ will best explain the facts.

6. εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτος . . . τῶν θειοτάτων] The intervention of natural laws does not exclude Divine agency, which, having first established the laws, works through them as means. ‘If He thunder by Law, the thunder is yet His Voice’ (Tennyson).

This paragraph seems added to conciliate religious prejudices, which might be shocked by the bare statement that Happiness is secured by our own efforts, to the apparent exclusion of Divine help. It need be none the less a gift of God, though He wills only to ‘help those who help themselves.’
4 the most divine. It is moreover something within the reach
of all, if it be sought after, or at least of all who are not in-
capacitated for Virtue. Chance at any rate we may exclude
from the inquiry at once, if it is better, as it most clearly
is, that this greatest prize should depend on our own efforts
rather than on chance. We argue for some such view as this,
because (1) our Definition implies something of this sort,
when it describes Happiness as an active condition in accord-

dence with us. See Glossary on
θέου and φύσις, and compare
(a similar argument to this in
ii. 1, and note there. The argu-
ment in this passage appears to
be: Nature does all for the best;
for indeed in like manner (όμοιος)
every art and every intelligent
dause does its best, whatever
that may be; and therefore a
fortiori Nature, the First of
Causes, above all others, does
what is best; its best being of
course the absolutely best.

10. κατ’ ἀρετήν] It is taken
for granted here and elsewhere
that Virtue depends on our own
efforts.

1. Εἰ ἦ δὲ ἀν καὶ πολύκουν] 'It would also be within common
reach,'—a consideration in favour of supposing Happiness to be in
some degree at least the result of our own exertions (which
Aristotle has rather hinted at
than stated directly as yet, in
the words εἰ μὴ θεῷ πρέπειτο σ.τ.λ.),
—'for every one can obtain it
except those incapacitated, etc.'

7. aitia in this context refers to
any sort of conscious or inten-
tional causation as contrasted
with τυχή.

ἀριστή aitia seems to be
Nature (φύσις l. 5), which
would convey to a Greek a
notion similar to that of Provi-


(2) in our original conception of Ethical Science:

(3) and in the common language of men.

1. οὐσίων] i.e. Goods other than Virtue just mentioned. These it is true are not wholly under our control. Observe the same two grounds as before (viii. 15, 16) for the need of some measure of external Goods.

3. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] viz. ii. 5.

4. Hence πολιτικῇ has a wider sense than the ‘science of government,’ because it aims at making good men, as well as good citizens. See note on xiii. 3. The point of the argument here is that πολιτικῇ aims at securing Happiness through the means of Virtuous conduct and character, and this implies that the acquisition of Happiness depends mainly on ourselves.

7. If it sound strange to say that neither the lower animals nor children can be called happy, we must remember the full meaning attached to the term in the Definition of ch. vii., and not be misled by the popular application of the word ‘happy’ in English. See further, X. vi. 8 (note).

9. τοιαύτης] viz. πρακτικής τῶν καλῶν from 1. 6. οὐδὲ παις] ‘not even a child.’ This is a stronger case than that of the lower animals just cited, because a child has Happiness ἐν
characterized by incapacity for Virtuous practice,—the former absolutely, the latter temporarily: for both Virtue and Happiness are imperfect unless exhibited in ‘a complete life’; the changes and chances to which life is exposed being so many and so various.

Hence arises the question, Must we (as Solon used to say) wait till we see the end of a man’s life before we can call him happy till his life is completed?

In §§ 1-5 Aristotle points out the difficulties involved in every solution or interpretation of this question, especially as it cannot be separated from the wider question of the condition of the departed. In § 6 he returns to the consideration of the dictum of Solon, proposing afterwards to apply its solution (gained by the help of his own theory of Happiness) to that of the wider question just mentioned. It is so applied in ch. xi.
μονιστεύον ἵνα ἄν ἣν, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεῶν τέλος ὀρᾶν;
1  Ἐι δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὗτος, ἄρα γε καὶ ἐστὶν εὐδαιμον
tóτε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον,
ἀλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειαν τινα τὴν
3 εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεότα εὐδαιμονα,
is it natural to suppose that the happiness of a dead man, even though he be unconscious, is marred by misfortunes occurring to his family on earth. Aristotle however is only stating a popular belief.

2 happy? Those who say this mean, either that he is happy when
dead—which is absurd, especially if happiness consists in ac-
tivity (ἐνέργεια) as our Definition asserts, and indeed Solon pro-
bably never meant this;—or that we can then safely apply the
term ‘happy’ to him, as being now beyond the reach of trouble.
But are we so sure that he is beyond its reach? Do not the for-
tunes of the family or friends that he has left behind affect him
still? But this again opens another difficulty. If we suppose

any other than δ Πραμακάς ξυμ-

ϕοραῖς περιστερῶν. This might
be thought an exceptional case,
and so the question is put, ‘Can
we not then call even any ordi-
nary man happy while he lives,
by reason of the changes and
chances of life?’
9. δοκεί] ‘It is supposed,’
see note on iii. 2.

δοκεί γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] ‘It is
thought that both good and evil
may occur to the dead, if indeed
they can to the living without
his being conscious of it.’ (Edi-
pus for instance would not have
been considered a happy man
even if he had never discovered
his incestuous marriage, but had
gone on till death in ‘happy’
ignorance of it. His ‘ignorance’
would not have been ‘bliss’ from
the Greek point of view. This
at least is assumed in the text,
and the argument drawn from it
is, that it is equally natural to
suppose that the happiness of a
dead man, even though he be
unconscious, is marred by misfor-
tunes occurring to his family on
earth. Aristotle however is only
stating a popular belief.
that they do affect him, then it would seem that the happiness of a complete life may be marred after death, and that even
the dead may change from happiness to misery and vice versa
with the fluctuating fortunes of their descendants on earth.
And yet on the other hand, it is very hard to suppose that these do not affect the dead at all. How then are we to escape
from this concourse of difficulties? Perhaps this large question concerning the condition of the dead, into which we have
wandered, may best be solved by first giving an answer to the simpler one,—Was Solon right in saying we must never call a

2. κατὰ λόγον] 'accordingly.' A quasi-mathematical expression = 'in proportion.'
5. καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι κ.τ.λ.] also in their several degrees of removal (i.e. in their several generations) it is possible for them to be related in every variety of way to their progenitors; i.e. some giving them pleasure and others pain.
6. ἀτοπον] This is 'out of place,' because even the dead (καὶ ὁ τεθνεῶς) would not at this rate be exempt from the difficulty felt by Solon.
8. ἀτοπον] Why this is 'out of place' is more fully explained in x. 1. It would be λίαν ἀφιλον καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. Notice here and elsewhere Aristotle's respect for popular feelings and beliefs.
10. The πρότερον ἀπορθηθείν is the dictum of Solon, χρὴ τὸ τέλος ὅραν. The τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητουμενον is the relation of the dead to the fortunes of their friends,
7 πέραν όσον δει καὶ τὸτε μακαρισθείς ἐκαστὸν οὐχ ὅσον μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν; πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτε ἐστιν εὐδαιμον, μὴ ἀληθεὺσεται κἀ\n5 αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ξύναις εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπεληφθεῖν καὶ μηδαμὸς ἐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλείσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς; ἔριξαν γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολοουθήμεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαιμόνα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλεόντα τινα τῶν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σα-}
10 Θρῶς ἔδραμεν. Ἡ το μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὅρθον; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὑ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδείται τούτοις ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ ἐπιπαθεῖ, κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, man happy while still living? Now surely if we can ever say with truth that a man has been happy, it must have been possible at some time or another to say that he is happy. The supposed difficulty in doing so is that Happiness is most stable, and the chances of Fortune most variable. The solution is obvious. These chances ought never to be made the test of Happiness at all. The fact is that external prosperity, however necessary a condition of Happiness (and this we have amply admitted before), cannot be its cause. We say again, as we said in our Definition, that Virtuous Actions are the true cause of Happiness, as Vicious actions are of misery.


The difficulty is due to making changing circumstances the test of Happiness which is most stable.

8 7, 8. The question arose out of attempts to explain that dictum.

4, 5. διὰ three times repeated is somewhat awkward. It will be seen that the first διὰ explains μὴ ἀληθευσεται: the second and third explain τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι εὐδαιμονίζειν.

13, 14. Observe the contrast between πρὸς δεῖται = 'has further need of' (i.e. this is not a primary condition of Happiness) and κύ
17 and iv. 7.
10 To the truth of that Definition in this respect, the very difficulty that has now arisen bears witness. It is the recognised stability of Happiness that makes us so cautious in our application of the term. But what is there so stable as Virtuous action? Not intellectual knowledge. This may be forgotten. But active Virtue \( \textit{vi nominis} \) must be in continual practice, and is thus necessarily permanent and stable, and the more so as it exists in its noblest forms and highest degree in perfect Happiness. How then will a man who thus lives stand in

1. \( \tau \omega \lambda \gamma \omega ] \) 'our Definition,' which asserts Happiness to be \( \kappa \alpha \tau' \ \delta \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \nu \). The present difficulty (\( \tau \nu \nu \ \delta \iota \alpha \pi \iota \rho \iota \delta \nu \)) turns upon the universally believed stability of Happiness, which makes us reluctant to apply the name where change may come. But this stability is intelligible if Happiness depends on Virtue, as our Definition asserts, because Virtuous practice is more stable than anything else, as the reasons now to be adduced sufficiently prove. Thus the difficulty itself is a support to the Definition.

4-8. This may suggest one reason among others why 'Knowledge (\( \epsilon \pi \iota \sigma \tau \iota \mu \alpha \iota \)) shall vanish away, but charity (\( \epsilon \nu \epsilon \rho \gamma \epsilon \epsilon \iota \) \( \kappa \alpha \tau' \ \delta \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \nu \)) never faileth.'

5. \( \tau \iota \tau \omega \nu \ \delta \varepsilon \ \alpha \upsilon \omega \nu ] \) is 'of Virtues in active exercise,' \( \epsilon \nu \epsilon \rho \gamma \epsilon \epsilon \iota \) \( \kappa \alpha \tau' \ \delta \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \nu \).

8. \( \tau \delta \varepsilon \tau \xi \tau \mu \iota \mu \varepsilon \nu \) 'the quality we are seeking for,' viz. stability.

10. Happiness being according to the Definition \( \kappa \alpha \tau' \ \delta \rho \epsilon \tau \eta \nu \) \( \alpha \rho \iota \sigma \tau \eta \nu \).
How then does the virtuous man stand related to the changes of fortune?

12 relation to the gifts of Fortune? If they be small, whether good or bad, they will not affect the balance of his life. If they be great, and also good, they will naturally add a lustre to his happiness; but if evil, they will mar it, inflict on him pain, and impede his activity in virtue. Still the very greatness of such troubles affords scope for nobleness of character, when they are keenly felt and yet complacently endured.

Hence we conclude that if (as we have said) Virtue and Vice

1. τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] ‘a cube without flaw,’—a mathematical metaphor to express perfection. Squares, cubes, circles, spheres (i.e. ‘regular’ figures and solids), are familiar metaphors to express perfection in various languages.

2. αὐτὰ ‘of themselves.’ This parenthesis is explained by viii. 15. 16. For the converse statement in 1.8 [ἀνάπαλν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] see viii. 16.

9. λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See these two reasons expounded in viii. 15, 16 (note).

11. εὐκόλως] Contrast δύσκολος in IV. vi. 9.

12. δὲ ἀνάλυσιαν] Such was the view of the Stoics. Aristotle on the contrary maintains that natural feelings, though under control, are not to be crushed or eradicated.
alone determine the happiness or misery of life, external circumstances (which in all cases the virtuous man will make the 14 best of, like a good general) can never altogether destroy Happiness and change it into misery, though we do not pretend that they will not in some degree affect it. We conclude further (and this was another of the difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter), that the happy man is not easily

9. Notice the contrast between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος, the latter being the higher state; though the distinction is by no means always maintained. The words 'happiness' and 'felicity' respectively are the best English equivalents, and in Latin 'felix' and 'beatus.' ‘The happy man could never become wretched, though he would not be in a state of perfect felicity if he fell into troubles like those of Priam.’ The Stoics would say that he could be. They maintained that the virtuous man would be perfectly happy even while being broken on the wheel. Aristotle says that external circumstances however great or various can never constitute either happiness or misery, but they can make the difference of greater or less degrees of either one or the other. Virtue and Vice alone have power to constitute these states. To regard external goods as the cause of Happiness would be like giving the lyre the credit of a brilliant musical performance. (See Pol. IV. (VII.) xiii. 8.)
moved; and that as it will take a great deal to mar happiness, so it will take a great deal to restore it if once disturbed.

15 Finally then we ask, granted the conditions of perfect virtue, a sufficient supply of external goods, and both these for an adequate duration of time, why may we not call a man happy while he still lives? Some may desire that in view of the uncertainty of the future, and the perfect finality of happiness, we should add, provided such a life be crowned by a fitting death. Still it must be remembered that in calling men happy, we of course mean only happy as mortal men can be.

16 Chap. XI.—Now we can return to the solution of the other

3. ἐπίθετον] (ἐπὶ, βάλλω) 'having hit upon.' ἐν αὐτῷ, viz. χρόνῳ.

9. Thus then the question raised by Solon is answered. We can call men happy while still alive, but happy as men, and not as gods; being as men still liable to the dangers incident to humanity; and this being understood, we need not explicitly add 'καὶ βιωσόμενον υπάρξει τῷ λεχθέντα, μακαρί- 10 οὺς ὁ ἀνθρώποις.'

How far then is the condition of the dead affected by the fortunes of the living?

Solon's question may now be answered. We can call a man still living 'happy.'

Chap. XI.—Now we can return to the solution of the other
difficulty, viz. whether the happiness of the dead can be altered by the fortunes of the living. To suppose the dead wholly untouched by these fortunes seems cold, and runs counter to received beliefs. To estimate accurately the various degrees of influence exercised by such occurrences great and small would be endless. This then may serve as a general solution.

In life itself, different circumstances affect us in very different

Aristotle returns to the question of the condition of the dead in relation to the fortunes of the living. He applies to its solution (as he promised in x. 6) the results arrived at in reference to Solon’s problem thus:—if the fortunes of life are no obstacle to our calling a man happy while still alive and still exposed to their full force, a fortiori they cannot seriously interfere with the happiness of the dead who are removed from their immediate influence.

The sentence is somewhat complicated. Two conditions are stated:—(1) If misfortunes even in this life differ in degree when they concern ourselves, and similarly when they concern our friends (εἰ δὴ . . . ἀπάντας); (2) If absence from the actual scene of their occurrence in this world, and a fortiori if removal to another world altogether, dull their effect upon us (διαφέρει . . . πράττεσθαι); then the result (the apodosis of the sentence) is,—These points, and especially the latter (ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν), must be taken into consideration (συλλογιστέον δὴ) in determining the question before us. Unless indeed we go further still, and make the question not one of degree but of fact, i.e. not How far are the dead affected? but Are they affected even at all? (μᾶλλον δὲ ἵσως τὸ διαπορείσθαι κ.τ.λ.), τὸ διαπορείσθαι = ‘the utter doubt and uncertainty.’

7, to i. 8 next page. Εἰ δὴ . . . ἀντικειμένων] The sentence is somewhat complicated.
degrees, when they concern ourselves, and naturally also when they concern our friends. After our death, such circumstances, being acted on another stage, must affect us infinitely less.

5 We must then make full allowance for this difference, even supposing we grant the general question that they do affect us somewhat. Hence we conclude that the dead are influenced by such occurrences, if at all, only slightly, and certainly not to such a degree as to change Happiness into Misery, or vice versa.

5. The lines in Hor. A. P. 180-2 will occur to every one:—

Segnius irritant animos demissa peraures
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, et quae
Ipse sibi tradit spectator.
(See Supplementary Notes.)

10. ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνος] 'Either in itself, or to them.' Referring to the two conditions respectively in §§ 3 and 4. The influence of these occurrences, if they do reach the dead, must be trifling anyhow, either in itself (as explained in § 3), or at least trifling in the effect produced upon the dead (as explained in § 4).
CHAP. XII.—Comparison of another popular theory with Aristotle’s Definition.

1 One more popular division of Goods calls for comparison with our theory, before we proceed. It is commonly said that Goods are potential or actual; the former may be good, the latter must be. Further, ‘actual’ Goods are said to be either objects of praise, or objects of admiration, as being beyond praise. It may be asked then under which of these three classes does our conception of the Chief Good or Happiness fall. Obviously not under the first. Nor yet under the second, viz. objects of praise. Praise is only applied to things Goods are sometimes said to be either potential, or praise-worthy, or admirable.

2 Our conception of Happiness would bring it under the last of these.

CHAP. XII. contains the last of the popular opinions and questions to which Aristotle adjusts his theory (see note at beginning of ch. viii.). This opinion is, that Good things may be divided into δυνάμεις, ἐπαινετὰ, and τίμια. The question is, To which class does the Chief Good in Aristotle’s conception of it belong?

3. τιμίων] things on which we bestow τιμή, a much higher tribute than ἐπαινοῦσ, as is explained by IV. iii. 10.

δυνάμεων] i.e. things which are potentially but not necessarily good, their character depending on the use made of them. Aristotle gives as instances elsewhere, power, riches, beauty, strength. Compare what was said in iii. 3. That Happiness is not of this class needs no proof.

4. τὸ ποιῶν τι κ.τ.λ.] literally ‘from possessing a certain character and bearing a certain relation to something else.’ In other words, all praise is relative (δι’ ἄναφορᾶς) as Aristotle says in § 3.
in reference to their results, and because they are well adapted to produce these results. Hence it is applied to justice, courage, strength, etc. Hence also we cannot employ the term 'praise,' involving this notion of commendation, to the Gods, nor is it applicable to the highest goods, which are not desired for their results, but for themselves; nor consequently can it be applied to Happiness. When Eudoxus claimed that

2. ἔπαινος involves the idea of commendation. In this sense it is clear we cannot 'praise' the Deity.

6. δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] If praise is always applied with a view to results, and if results are necessarily higher than the actions or means which lead to them (see i. 2), then there must be something better than praise to apply to the results themselves. For we must suppose some results to be final (otherwise πρόεισιν οὕτω γε εἰς ἄπειρον ii. 1), and these at any rate cannot ex hyp. be subjects for praise.

8. Observe the distinction between μακάρια and εὐδαιμονία, 'felicity' and 'happiness.' See x. 14 (note). Both belong to the Gods, the former only in rare instances to men.

9. Ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕτως γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπανεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὁς θειότερον τῷ καὶ βέλτιον μακάριζει.

5 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδόξος καλῶς συνηγορήσαι περὶ τῶν ἄριστων ἐπαινῷ τῶν προσκυνητῶν ἢγαθῶν καὶ στοιχεῖον, τῷ προσκυνητῷ ζῷον ἂν ἔτην ἕπαινον ἀλλὰ μείζον τῷ καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειότατος μακαρίζομεν. Ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὕτως γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπανεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὁς θειότερον τῷ καὶ βέλτιον μακάριζει.
Pleasure was the Chief Good because though good it was not praised, as being above praise, the principle at least of his argument was sound. 'Praise' then is peculiarly appropriate to virtuous habits, in consideration of the results to which they lead, just as 'panegyric' is appropriate to great deeds. But these refinements of language are carrying us too far. We decide then that Happiness belongs to the third class mentioned above, viz. things admirable, and this we might have at once not being applied to some acknowledged good indicated a high degree of excellence: but wrong in supposing that only God and the Chief Good (I. 3) corresponded to that description.

5. Thus ἐγκόμιον belongs to noble acts; ἐπαίνος to virtuous habits, which result from, and tend to reproduce, such acts; μακαρισμός to Happiness, which results again from those virtuous habits.

5. πρακτικὸς γὰρ] This reason is explained by the first words of § 2.

10. ἀρχὴ] This sense of the word is a little unusual. It is here almost the same as τέλος, just as in English we can speak indifferently of a primary or an ultimate principle in the same sense. The ultimate motive is also the primary motive of an action. If we desire money with a view to obtain a certain luxury, that luxury is the ultimate, and also the primary, motive for the effort to procure money. (See Glossary, s.v. ἀρχή.) Ἀρχή is in fact here equivalent to 'final cause.' (See Glossary, s.v. The Four Causes.)
inferred from the consideration of its being an ultimate principle of action, not chosen for its results, but itself the motive and result for which all else is chosen.

**Chap. XIII.—Commencement of the elucidation of the several terms in the Definition of Happiness, and especially of the word Soul (ψυχή).**

We now proceed to a detailed analysis of our Definition of Happiness. Happiness was said to involve the highest degree of Virtue. We cannot therefore fully understand Happiness without a complete investigation of Virtue. We premise one
2. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεποιήθηκαί βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ὑγα-
θοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ύπηκόονς. Παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κριτῶν καὶ Δακεδαμιονίων νομο-
θέτας, καὶ εἰ τινες ἔτεροι τοιούτοι γεγένηται. Εἴ δὲ τῆς 5
πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὐτὴ, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἢ
5. εἰς την μετανοιαν. Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτεῖν ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γὰρ ταύγαθον ἀνθρωπίνον ἐξαιτοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. 6
4. Κρητῶν καὶ Δακεδαμιονίων] Αρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην, οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ. ψυχῆς 10
5. εὐρέγειαν λέγομεν. Εἴ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
dei τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡστερ καὶ

2 or two remarks. (1) As both the true theory and highest
3 practice of the Science of Social Life aims at the attainment
4 of Virtue, we are strictly within the limits laid down at the
5 outset of this inquiry (2) It is human not ideal Virtue and
6 Happiness which we are investigating, and as these both belong
7 not to the Body but to the Soul, the nature of the Soul must
8 also be expounded. And this also comes within the scope of

and consequently (2) of the nature of the Soul (ψυχῆ).

4. Κρητῶν καὶ Δακεδαμιονίων] These political systems are
5 selected for praise here and elsewhere, because beyond all others
6 they attempted to regulate by legislation all the details of the
7 private morality, the domestic life, the personal expenses, etc.,
8 of the citizens; regarding their character not only as citizens, but
9 as men, see I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, etc. Contrast with this the tendency
10 of modern legislation, which is not to interfere with private
11 morality except so far as the
12 interests of society are compro-
13 mised by it. e.g. No modern
14 state punishes drunkenness, un-
15 less it be public and disorderly.
16 ‘Good government’ (says Buckle)
17 ‘is often inversely to its “ear-
18 nestness” and the amount of its
19 interference.’
20 4. Κρητῶν καὶ Δακεδαμιονίων] On this
21 limitation see note on ii. 1. Cf. also vi. 13.
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. [BOOK I.

tōn ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσοι τιμωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς. Tῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ 8 τῆς τοῦ σώματος γνώσιν. Θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅςοι ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ψυχοῦμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἵσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. 9 Δέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ εὖ τοὺς ἐξωτερικοὺς λόγους ἀρκοῦντως ἐνα, καὶ χρηστεύον υἱόν. Οἶνον τὸ μὲν 10 ἀλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. Ταῦτα δὲ πότε- 10 ρον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστὸν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα περικότα, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοίλον,

8 the Science of Social Life, provided the inquiry be confined within the limits of what is practically necessary to throw light upon the subject of Virtue. For our present object the ordinary popular treatises will suffice. We there find it stated that the Soul consists of two parts, a rational part and an irrational part. Whether these parts be literally separate, like the limbs of the body, or separate in thought only, like the concave and convex sides of a curve, is indifferent for our

1. After πᾶν σῶμα understand again the words 'δεὶ εἰδέναι πῶς.' As the Oculist must study also to some extent the conditions of health of the whole body, so must the social philosopher acquaint himself in some degree with the whole ψυχῆ, though his own practice is limited to a portion of it.

3. χαρίεντες 'accomplished.' Opp. to οἱ πολλοὶ in iv. 2, and somewhat similarly in v. 4.

8. ἐξωτερικὸς means what is adapted for the world outside (ἐξω), ἐσωτερικὸς what is adapted for the inner (ἐσω) circle of philosophic students. Hence 'exoteric' 'esoteric' refer to 'popular' and 'scientific' methods respectively. Some have supposed оἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to refer to a division of Aristotle's own works. It is more probable, however, that they denote ordinary popular treatises.
11 οὖθεν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγο δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὐξηθαι τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἀπάσι τοὺς τρεφομένους θείη τις ἄν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. 5

12 εὐλογότερον γὰρ ἡ ἄλλην τινὰ. Ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινῇ τις ἀρετῇ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φαίνεται δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτή, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἠκολούθη διάδηλοι καθ' ὑπνοι; οἴησ φασίν οὖθεν διαφέρει τὸ ἕμισυ τοῦ 10 βλού τούς ἐυδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. Συμβαίνει δὲ τούτῳ εἰκότως: ἀργία γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἣ λέγεται σπουδαίᾳ καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἰ πῇ κατὰ μικρὸν διεκνοῦνται τινὲς τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτη βελτίω γίνεται τὰ 13 ψυχών τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. Ἀλλὰ 15 περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλοι, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἐπείδη

11 present purpose. 1. Let us first consider the irrational part.—

(a) One portion of this is the source of nutriment and growth which is found wherever there is life, in all creatures, and even in plants, in the foetus as well as in the full-grown animal. 12 There can be no specially human Virtue in this part. In fact it acts with most vigour in sleep, when good and bad men 14 differ not at all, or else in a manner which is of no conse-

4. ψυχή] Observe the wide use of ψυχή, which makes it so difficult a word to translate. We should scarcely regard the 'soul' as the seat of physical life, growth, and nutriment. (See Glossary on ψυχή.)

5. There is no difference in that which is the source of growth and nutrition in the embryo and in the full-grown animal. If there were, when did the change occur? Aristotle insists upon this identity in order to show that this part of our nature is out of all relation to Virtue, Moral or Intellectual (see § 14), as there can of course be nothing of the kind in the embryo. This absence of change or progress cannot be asserted of the other two parts of the ψυχή, the Appetitive and the Rational.
15 τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἁμοιρον πέφυκεν. Ἐόικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλῃ τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἁλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μεντοὶ τῇ λόγου. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ ἀκρατῶς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινούμεν ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἔπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ φαίνεται δὲ ἐν δὲν αὐτῶς καὶ ἀλλὸ τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, δὲ μάχεται

16 τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. Ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλειμμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρομένων κινησά τουναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἔπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐτως ἐπὶ τάναντια γὰρ αἱ 10 ὀρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. Ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρόμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἔπι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρόμεν. Ἡσυς δὲ οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναι τὶ παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναιτιούμενον τοῦτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαίνον. 17 Πῶς δὲ ἔτερου, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τούτῳ 15

The petites desires, ich are tly and some se 10 ional.

15 quence to our present inquiry. (β) There is however another division of the irrational part, which seems to partake of reason in some degree. This is evidenced by the phenomena of Continence and Incontinence, terms which we technically apply to cases where either right or wrong is done after a conscious inward struggle. This struggle occurs between Reason and something opposed to Reason. In the continent man we applaud the triumph of Reason. In the incontinent man, though Reason directs one course, there is something in him which causes him to do the reverse, just as a paralysed limb refuses to obey the control of the Will. We conclude therefore from this that there is something in the Soul distinct from Reason (though in what precise way distinct we need

1. ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς] to throw light upon that being the sole object of this inquiry about ψυχῆ. See § 8.

3. ἐγκρατῶς καὶ ἀκρατῶς] See the precise meaning of these terms explained in note on iii. 7.

6. ἀλλο τι κ.τ.λ.] ‘We find another law in our members, warring against the law of our mind’ (Rom. vii. 23).

15. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.] Otherwise it could not even oppose Reason, as it does in the case
faĩνεται μετέχειν, ὡσπερ εἴπομεν: πειθαρχεῖ γοûν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦν. "Ετι δὲ ῥίως εὐηκωστερὸν ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἰνδρείου πάντα γὰρ ὀμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. Φαῖνεται δὴ καὶ τῷ ἀλογον διηττόν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινοῦει λόγον, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὀλως ὀρεκτικῶν μετέχει πώς, ἢ κατήκοαν ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. Οὔτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ not determine) which is thus able to oppose Reason. Yet since in the case of Continence, and still more in that of perfect Self-control, it harmonizes with Reason, it might be thought itself to share in Reason and so to belong to the Rational part of the Soul. However the irrational part (which we are still considering) is at any rate twofold, viz.—(1) The source of physical life, nutriment, and growth. (2) The appetitive part, the passions and the desires. The former division is of the ἀκρατῆς, much less could it side with Reason as it does in the ἐγκρατῆς (I. 2), or become as it were merged in Reason, as it is in the σώφρων (I. 3). If then the Appettive part were purely Irrational it could not oppose Reason; if it were purely Rational it would not do so.

5. οὐδαμῶς κοινοῦει] The nutritive portion has no relation whatever to Reason. It can neither oppose it, nor obey it. ‘No man by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature.’ The appetitive part, however, has some relation to Reason, because it can ‘by taking thought’ be checked and regulated.

7. οὔτω δὴ κ.τ.λ.] The explanation seems to be this: The words λόγον ἔχειν have two different senses in Greek:— (1) To possess reason; or, to have understanding of (as, e.g. of Mathematics); (2) To pay regard to (as we do to admonitions of parents or friends).

If we confine ourselves to the strict sense of (1), then the Appetitive part belongs clearly to the irrational division (ἀλογον μέρος) of the Soul. If we use the term loosely so as to include (2), then we may regard the Appettive part as λόγον ἔχον, because it can ‘pay regard to’ Reason, and so in some sense shares in it. But the expression λόγον ἔχειν must be employed in a different sense in the case of the Appetites, and in that of the Reason. Compare what Aristotle says of a Slave (Pol. I. v. 9) κοινοῦει λόγον το-
tων φύλων φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὀστερ ποιοτων μαθηματικῶν. Ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τοῦ ἄλογου, μηρίζει καὶ η νοοθέτησις καὶ πάσα ἐπιτύμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. Εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τούτο φανεὶ λόγον ἔχειν, διπτόν ἐσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ὀστερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκούστικόν τι.

19 Αὐτίς καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς, τὰς δὲ ἡθικὰς, wholly irrational, the latter only partially so, because it is at any rate amenable to Reason.

2. Let us now consider the rational part.—Here we have simply to determine the degree of strictness with which we will use the word ‘rational.’ If we use it so as to include the partially-rational appetites, then this part of the Soul may be considered as twofold, viz.—(α) The Reason itself; (β) The appetitive part. Thus the assignment of the appetitive part to the Rational or to the Irrational division of the Soul is a question of words, or of arrangement merely.

Now to apply this to the question it was intended to elucidate,

σοῦτων ὡστε αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. He adds that the lower animals (like τὸ φυτικὸν in the text here) οὐδὲ λόγον αἰσθάνεται.

The result is, that it becomes to some extent a question of words to which of the two divisions of the Soul, Rational or Irrational, we assign the Appetites. The main point is that, in either case, we recognise the three distinct parts φυτικῶν, ἐπιθυμητικῶν, λογιστικῶν. The following scheme will exhibit the two methods of arrangement by which this result may be reached:—

8. We speak of Intellectual equally for both. (See Glossary, Excellences and Moral Virtues. s.v. ἀρετῆ.)

In Greek ἀρετῆ could be used
σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθερίατα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἥθικάς. Λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἠθος οὔ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πράος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τῶν σοφῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐξίσου τῶν ἐξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς 5 λέγομεν.

viz. the nature of Virtue. The part of the Soul relating to nutriment, etc., has nothing to do with Virtue, as we have already seen. The perfection of the purely Rational part gives rise to Intellectual Virtues or Excellences, e.g. Wisdom, Prudence, Intelligence. The perfection of the Appetitive part gives rise to Moral Virtues, such as Gentleness, Liberality, Self-restraint. The term 'Virtue' we apply to any permanent state or habit which is praiseworthy.

1. φρόνησις is inadequately translated by 'Prudence,' which indicates more or less a Moral Virtue. It is explained in B. VI. to be the intellectual element of right judgment which is essential to all moral virtue: 'essential,' because mere blind 'earnestness' without a reasonable exercise of judgment is not Virtue; or (as Dr. Johnson phrased it) 'intellectual imbecility is no excuse for moral perversity.' Aristotle thinks that we are bound to have 'a right judgment in all things,' and would have no sympathy with 'imbecile virtue.' In B. IV. he frequently insists on the necessity of applying intellectual judgment to the details of moral action (e.g. esp. in μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐτραπελία, etc.). For proof that φρόνησις itself is an Intellectual and not a Moral quality, see Supplementary Notes, l.l.

5. κατὰ τὴν ἔξων] 'in reference to his state,' i.e. if his wisdom is a settled state or habit.

Thus the essential or fundamental difference between Intellectual and Moral excellence is, that they belong to different parts of the Soul; the former being the perfection of the Rational, and the latter of the Appetitive, part. Upon this follows a practical difference in the manner of their acquisition or cultivation, which is pointed out in the beginning of the next Book.
II.

1. Διπτής δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσίας, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ήθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διότερον ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δ’ ήθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τούνομα ἐσχήκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνου ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

Moral Virtue differs from Intellectual Excellence, in that it is not innate: because—

1. See note at the beginning of I. xiii. for the connexion of the argument. The divisions of ψυχή led us to a corresponding division of ἀρετή into Moral and Intellectual (I. xiii. 20). These further exhibit an essential difference in the mode of their acquisition, which is first positively stated, and after this statement, the subject of Intellectual Excellence is tacitly dropped (to be resumed in B. VI.), and the discussion proceeds to establish the assertion just made so far as it relates to Moral Virtue, viz. that it is not implanted in us by nature.

2. τὸ πλεῖον] 'for the most part.' This qualification is meant to allow for the exceptional case of great natural genius.

5. This etymological argument is of course untranslatable. ἔθος (Lat. mos) is a habit or custom. ήθος (Lat. mores) is character which is the result of habits. The value of this and similar arguments, such as that derived from the practice of men in legislation in § 5 and III. v. 7, is simply this:—They show the general belief of mankind as reflected in language, but they do not prove that the belief in
2. Éξοι καὶ δήλων ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἥθελῶν ἠρετῶν φύσει ἥμιν ἐγγίνεται: οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλος ἔθεται, ἢ ὅσον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φέρομενος οὐκ ἂν ἔθεσθαι ἀνω φέροσθαι, οὔδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτοῦ ἔθεις τις ἀνω ἱπττων, οὔδ' ἃπερ τῷ πῦρ κάτω, οὔδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν 5 ἄλλως περικότων ἄλλως ἂν ἔθεσθη. "Ὅτι ἄρα φύσει οὔτε ἄρα παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἰ ἠρεταί, ἄλλα περικόσι μὲν ἥμιν δέξασθαι αὐτὰς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ

2 to prove the important point involved in the latter, that no Moral Virtue is implanted by Nature. (1) Nothing fixed by Nature can be altered by practice. No amount of practice will make a stone rise, or fire burn downwards. But our moral habits can be so altered, and therefore they are not implanted by Nature. The same argument proves that as they are not formed by Nature, so they are not formed against Nature. Nature gives us moral capacities; we ourselves by practice develope moral habits.

question is necessarily true; though, as we read in I. viii. 7, such consensus is not likely to be altogether at fault. Other instances will be found in v. 4 (the distinction between κωμεῖσθαι and διακεῖσθαι), III. ii. 17 (προαιρεσις), III. xii. 5 and 6 (άκολασία), IV. ii. 1 (μεγαλοπρέπεια).

1. This point is essential, because if Moral Virtue be implanted by nature, and not acquired by practice, the Science of Ethics has no raison d'être as a practical Science. See § 7, oúdeν ἂν ἐδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἄλλα πάττες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἄγαθοι ἢ κακοί, and the Appetitive part of the ψυχή (ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος) would be as much out of our control as the Nutritive and vital functions (θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐ-ξητικύν), see I. xiii.

6. ἄρα implies an inference from the preceding. It is clear that this same argument proves Virtue not to be contrary to nature; because if nature had decided the question positively or negatively, it would be equally out of our power to alter her decision. Thus we are neither 'predestined' to Virtue, nor 'reprobated' to vice, according to Aristotle. At the same time he would not of course deny that some have more tendency to virtue or to vice than others.

7. πεφυκόσι and τελειουμένοις both agree with ἥμιν, which is dat. after ἐγγίνονται. Cf. Pope, 'Nature its mother, habit is its nurse.'
In the case of natural faculties (e.g. the senses), we have them before we use them. In the case of Moral Virtues (as in artistic skill), we develop them by use, i.e. by trying to practise them: e.g. Temperance is acquired by acting temperately, Courage by acting bravely and so on. (3) The action of legislators bears witness to the general belief of mankind that Moral Virtue is to be acquired by practice. (4) While

natural faculties differ from Moral phenomena in that, in the former case, the antecedents being the same, the consequents are always the same, whereas in Moral phenomena, from the same antecedents, so far as outward circumstances go, opposite results follow. This difference then must arise from something contributed by the moral agent himself.
in nature the same causes invariably produce the same results, in the case of Moral Habits, as in the Arts, the same circumstances and courses of action produce opposite results; i.e. they produce both good artists and bad, just men and unjust. In short, as are our acts, so are the habits which spring from them. Hence it is important what sort of acts should become easier we cannot say. What is the precise change that has taken place in us when (e.g.) the laborious acts of spelling out each word have grown into the easy habit of reading we cannot explain. We really know little more of the phenomena of the formation of habits than Aristotle here states; as

7. ἐγύνοντο is emphatic: 'every one would have been born a good or bad craftsman,' and so all apprenticeship and practice would have been useless.

16. 'All habits have their origin in courses of action similar to themselves.' Habits are simply the result of repeated acts. Why acts from repetition
Virtuous habits differ from others in being in accordance with Right Reason:

1 In a practical treatise like ours we at once follow up what has now been proved by asking, What is the definite character of Virtue to that of I. vii. 1-8, in the investigation of the Definition of Happiness. Aristotle feels his way towards a Definition in each case by first laying down certain broad and general characteristics of the thing to be defined. Two such are arrived at in this Chapter. Next, Chapters iii. and iv. consider questions arising out of the statements here made. Then Chapters v. and vi. contain the systematic construction of the Definition of ἀρετή, and so far may be compared with the formal construction of the Definition of Happiness in I. vii. 9-16.

6. αἱ ἄλλαι] Either ‘the rest of treatises on this subject,—it being a complaint of Aristotle’s elsewhere that this is a general fault of the systems of his time (τῶν χρησιμῶν διαμαρτάνονσι,
2. Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν, καὶ ὑποκείσθω, ἑρθήσεται ὃ ὑστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρέτας. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογεῖσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὁφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὑστερ καὶ κατ' ἄρχας εἴσομεν ὃτι κατὰ τὴν ὅλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστήκος ἔχει, ὑστερ οὖν τὰ ὑγιεινά.

4. Τοιοῦτον ἔνοτος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἐτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ of actions, and, by consequence, of habits, which determine them as Virtuous? We can at once say that they must be in accordance with right reason, but that is vague, and we must hereafter explain what right reason is, and what is its relation to the Moral Virtues. But though we admit this to be too vague we must at the same time renew our protest against demanding anything like mathematical precision in such a subject as this, espe-

they fail of being practical)—or else, ‘treatises on other subjects’ than morals, which may perhaps have a right to be theoretical and independent of practice.

2. αὐτῆς prob. σκέψεως understood from σκεπτόμεθα, or πραγματείας, or possibly ἀρέτης in the sense of Virtue in theory, severed from practice.

4. καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν] see esp. § 7 (fin.) of last Chapter (ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ κ.τ.λ.), πράξεις here being equivalent to ἐνεργεῖα in the passage quoted. Thus πῶς in 1. 3 is emphatic, how we are to do the acts, so that the habits desired may follow.

6. ὑποκείσθω] ‘Let it be taken for granted.’ Compare the somewhat similar way in which τελεύτης and αὐτάρκεια are put aside in I. vii. as vague, though real, characteristics of Happiness.

καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν] This will be found in B. VI., but the subject is touched upon in ch. vi. of this Book, where see the Definition of Virtue, and see also note on I. xiii. 20.

10. κατ' ἄρχας εἴσομεν κ.τ.λ.] For explanations of this see I.
tων καθ’ ἐκαστά λόγον οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβες’ οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
tέχνην οὔθ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ’
αὐτοὺς ἄεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
óstper καὶ ἔπι τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
5 Ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιοῦτο τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πει-5
6 ρατέων βοηθεῖν. Πρῶτον οὖν τούτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ
tοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐιδελας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι,
(δεὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὀρέμων
τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλεῖποντα
but, more
definitely,
like good
bodily
habits,
(1) in their
formation,
they
involve
an
avoidance
of
excess
and
defect,
and
aim
at
moderation:
vii. 17, etc., also (and esp. in reference to the words of l. 10,
p. 75) see I. iii. 2-4.
2. παραγγελία] ‘body of
rules.’ αὐτοὺς in the next line
is of course emphatic.
8. δεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] This is the
clue to the line of thought pur-
sued in this Chapter. It is the
analogy existing between the Body
and Soul in respect of their habits
or acquired capacities. In ch. vi.,
where the formal Definition of
Virtue is investigated, the argu-
ment proceeds from another
analogy, viz. that existing be-
tween Virtue and Art. The
words in the parenthesis express
very well the principle of what
is generally called ‘the Argu-
ment from Analogy.’ e.g. in.
Butler’s ‘Analogy’ the ‘φανερὰ’
are the obvious arrangements of
the Natural world, the ‘ἀφανή’
the arrangements of the Moral
world, as indicated to us by
Religion, Natural or Revealed.
The point of similarity is that
the arrangements in both cases
proceed from the same Author,
and the ‘Argument from Ana-
logy’ is, that they are therefore
likely to resemble one another.
So in the present passage the
φανερὰ are bodily habits, the
ἀφανή habits of the Soul: the
point of similarity that they are
parts of the same complex Being:
and the ‘Argument from Ana-
logy’ is that they are likely to
resemble one another in their
nature and growth.
7 food, drink, and exercise; and so it is of Temperance in respect of pleasure, and of Courage in respect of fear, and similarly of other Virtues, in respect of the subject-matter with which each is concerned. (ii) Our second point is:—

Virtuous habits when formed reproduce the acts by which they were formed. Bodily habits suggest this law also: e.g. Strength is gained by taking food and exercise, and when

9. ἀγροίκοι] perhaps ‘ascetics,’ or ‘boors,’ with probable ref. to the Cynics. ἀνάισθητος τις, ‘A sort of insensible man.’ Τις is a kind of apology for the term ‘insensible,’ because, as stated elsewhere, such phenomenon scarcely exists. See vii. 3 and III. xi. 7.

12. οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις κ.τ.λ.] Observe that the former characteristic of Virtuous Habits had reference to their formation and growth (γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις), the present characteristic has reference to their operation (ἐνέργεια) when formed.

14. φανερωτέρως] is explained by the parenthesis in § 6 above.
9 gained enables us to take more food and exercise. So Temperance is acquired by resisting pleasure, and when acquired exhibits itself in the resistance of pleasure. Similarly of Courage and other Virtues.

CHAP. III.—The test of the formation of Habits is the pleasure or pain by which acts are accompanied.

We can judge at once whether a habit is already formed or is only in process of formation, by the pleasure or pain then we feel pleasure in doing any act, if it be a right act we have formed a habit of Virtue, if a wrong act we have formed a habit of Vice. When we do any act, right or wrong, with pain or without pleasure, we have not yet formed a habit either Virtuous or Vicious in that respect. It would thus appear that Moral Virtue is an affair of pleasure and pain: that Virtue and Vice may be resolved into a question of feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. And so after § 1 the discussion proceeds upon this text as it were, the immediate question with which the Chapter opened having been sufficiently answered.

8. ποιεῖσθαι] the middle voice

A habit is I formed whenever we do the acts related to it with pleasure,
Thus Virtue and Vice depend on our relation to Pleasure and Pain, as may be shown by a variety of arguments.

means 'to consider,' i.e. to make in one's own mind.

3. ἀκόλαστος and δειλός are rather loosely used here in contrast with σώφρων and ἀνδρείας. They imply strictly speaking the formation of a habit of the opposite kind, i.e. a state in which acts of intemperance or cowardice are done with ease and pleasure. The ἀκόλαστος (see note on I. iii. 7) does not restrain himself even ἀχθόμενος. Perhaps, however, ἀκόλαστος is here used from the point of view of III. xi. 5, 6, where Aristotle states that the ἀκόλαστος is pained by the mere absence of pleasure.

11. παντὶ δὲ πάθη κ.τ.λ.] For this statement as far as πάθη are concerned see the Definition of πάθη in ch. v. ὁλως οἷς ἐπεται ἰδονὴ ἢ λύπη, 'whatever is followed by pleasure or pain.'
4 ἀρετὴ περὶ ἑδονᾶς καὶ λύπας. Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων· ἵπτειαν γὰρ τινὲς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἱπτεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

5 ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον ἐντόμεν, τάσας ψυχῆς ἔξεσθαι, ὃς ὑπὸ οίων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν δι’ ἑδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλαν γίνονται, τῷ διάκεισα ταῦτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἡ ἀρετὴ δὲ ὅτε ὁ ὄρνηκεν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. Διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπάθειας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· ὥστε δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλάως λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ ὅρνηκεν ὅτε καὶ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ 

6 ὁσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. Θυὸκειται ἀρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ

4 by pleasure or pain. (iii) The infliction of punishment by means of pain (all remedies being through the medium of contraries) proves that it is intended to remedy an excess of pleasure: in other words, that vice consists in pleasure out of place. 

5, 6 as we saw in ch. ii., whatever promotes or hinders the formation of a Virtuous habit is the sphere of its operation when formed. Now Moral habits are formed (not, as some suppose, by indifference to pleasure and pain, but) by feeling

2. διὰ τούτων] 'by means of these,' viz. pleasure and pain, though the latter only is strictly speaking referred to. The use of διὰ with the accus. = 'because of' must not be confused with this. It occurs just below in l. 6. On κόλασις see note III. v. 7. 

4. πρότερον] viz. in c. ii. § 8. 


In lazy apathy let Stoics boast Their virtue fix’d: 'tis fix’d as in a frost. 

12. ὑπόκειται ἀρα κ.τ.λ.] 'Virtue therefore is established to be,' etc. This seems to close the discussion, but Aristotle adds three supplementary arguments. ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τοιαῦτη This collocation of article, adjective, and substantive always denotes an epithet added emphatically, or by way of limitation, to the substantive. Transl. 'Virtue, at least Virtue of this kind,' i.e. Moral Virtue (ἡ δικὴ ἀρετή), for the statement here made would not be true of ἰδιωτικὴ ἀρετή. Compare a similar limitation in vi. 10.
3. Observe the position of the articles, making τριῶν the predicate. 'The inducements for choosing being three in number, and the inducements for avoiding also three.'

9. πάσι τοῖς ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ.] 'accompanies all the motives which come under the head of choice.' For both the 'good' and the 'useful' are also 'pleasant.' In III. ix. 2-5, the argument implies that τὸ καλὸν is a kind, and indeed a most exalted kind, of ἡδονᾶς.

12. Observe the antithesis between τοῦτο τὸ πάθος and καὶ τὰς πράξεις, — πάθη and πράξεις being, as we were reminded in § 3, the sphere of the operation of Moral Virtue. Also καὶ τὰς πράξεις = 'even our actions,' or 'our actions also,' the continual presence of pleasure and pain as regulating action, being at first
and pain have been more ingrained into our lives, so to speak, by familiarity than any others; and regarded as motives for action also they are constantly present, though in varying degrees, with all of us. With them therefore our whole treatise must be concerned. (vii) Finally, nothing is so hard to contend with as pleasure; nothing is therefore more meritorious, and consequently more virtuous, than to bring pleasure and pain under due control.

On all these grounds therefore we argue that Moral Virtue consists in the proper regulation of the feelings of pleasure and pain.

sight less obvious than the fact of our constant susceptibility to them as mere feelings.

6. Heraclitus was an Ionian philosopher who flourished at Ephesus about 150 years before Aristotle.

5. Heraclitus was an Ionian philosopher who flourished at Aristotle in III. ix. 2, IV. i. 8, 9.
Another difficulty is suggested by the last statement made in ch. ii. How can we become just by doing just acts? Are we not just already if we do them, as \( (\text{mutatis mutandis}) \) is the case in the practice of the Arts? To this we answer—

(1) This is not so in the case of the Arts: (2) Even if it were, the Arts are not a parallel case. (1) It is not so in the Arts—Unless an artist understands the principles of his art for himself, he is not properly speaking an artist. (2) The Arts are not a parallel case.—The Artistic Excellence of any work depends simply on the quality of the thing produced.
But in Moral Excellence we further require in the agent himself, (a) Knowledge of what he is doing, (β) Deliberate choice so to act, and moreover a pure and disinterested choice. (γ) Resolute and unflinching purpose. Of these conditions knowledge is of the least weight, while it is the first and only requisite in the case of the Arts. The two latter conditions, on the other hand, are everything, and they can only be secured by often doing acts of justice, temperance, etc. Hence neither to actions nor to individuals can the terms ‘just,’ etc., be

1. So Pope (Moral Essays) — Not always actions show the man: we find Who does a kindness is not therefore kind.

6. Ταύτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. The artistic or technical merit of a work of art is not affected by the motive of the artist, whether good or bad, e.g. whether his work may have been done with a religious or charitable purpose, or from jealousy or spite. In judging of a moral act, such considerations would be all-important.

7. With πρὸς δὲ τὸ τάς ἀρετὰς supply ἔχειν from l. 6.

8. Knowledge, though an essential requisite, of itself advances us but little in the way of virtuous character. This is explained by §§ 5 and 6 below. See also ii. 1.

τὰ δ’ ἀλλὰ i.e. the other conditions mentioned, viz. deliberate choice and unflinching purpose.

10. πράττειν is the emphatic word. See § 1, above. Also πράγματα μὲν δίκαια (just acts) in the next line stand in contrast with δίκαιος δὲ (just character) in the following clause.
strictly applied, unless there be, beside the outward act, the
inward spirit and purpose of the formed habit in the doing of
it. We were right then in saying that only by doing just acts

5 can we become just. Mere theories of Virtue without practice
can no more form virtuous habits, than physicians' prescrip-
tions if not followed can restore health. And yet this truth
is very commonly forgotten.

7. This is well expressed by
Bp. Butler, Anal. ch. v. (p. 91
Angus's ed.), 'Habits of the
mind seem to be produced by
repeated acts, as well as habits
of the body. And in like
manner as habits belonging to
the body are produced by exter-
nal acts, so habits of the mind
are produced by the exertion of
inward practical principles, i.e.
by carrying them into act, or
acting upon them. . . .

But going over the theory of vir-
tue in one's thoughts, talking
well, and drawing fine pictures
of it; this is so far from neces-
sarily or certainly conducing to
form a habit of it in him who
thus employs himself, that it
may harden the mind in a con-
trary course, and render it
gradually more insensible to all
moral considerations.'

Above all, knowledge without
practice is, in Morals, useless.

8. τὸν λόγον (in contrast with
οὗ πράττουσι) means theory as
opposed to practice.

13. φιλοσοφοίντες] The word
φιλοσοφία in Greek has a much
wider significance than that
We have now to investigate the formal Definition of Virtue, and first, in natural order, to determine its Genus. It is evidently connected with the soul and not with the body.

which 'Philosophy' would convey to us. In the absence of any revealed Religion, and the admitted inadequacy of the popularly received system of Religion, Philosophy would to a thinking Greek supply to some extent the place of Religion. To it alone he could look not only for theories of morality, but for practical rules for the guidance of life. Thus when Plato speaks of men Ἑθελ ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότες (Rep. p. 619), he would convey nearly the same notion, as if we should say 'men who have lived a life of morality without religion.'

Chap. V.—We now commence the formal construction of the Definition of Virtue. And as all Logical Definition consists in assigning the Genus and the Differentia, we first ascertain the Genus of Virtue (τὸ ἑστὶν) in ch. v., and then its Differentia (ποιῶν τι) in ch. vi. Now there are two ways in which we may hunt (θηρεύειν) for a Definition, according to Aristotle. (1) We may take a wide Genus or class which is sure to include the object to be defined besides a good deal more, and then narrow that class by adding qualities or conditions till it becomes co-extensive with the thing to be defined; or we may exclude one by one such members of the class as are obviously beside our purpose. e.g. In this Chapter to define Virtue Aristotle takes the wide Genus τὰ ἐν τῇ ἰδιᾷ ψυχῇ—and since all attributes of the soul may be divided into πάθη, δυνάμεις, and εἴσεις, and as Virtue cannot (for reasons assigned) be either πάθος or δύναμις, we thus obtain εἴσεις as the proper Genus of Virtue. (2) The other method of 'hunting' for a Definition is to take a number of concrete instances in which the quality to be defined is found, and then ascertain what it is which they have in common. e.g. On this plan Aristotle's course would have been to take the several virtues and find what they have in common in the midst of their various distinctions and individual peculiarities, and that common element would account for their being called by the common name Virtue, and would in fact constitute the Definition of Virtue.
Now all attributes of the soul are either emotions, capabilities, or habits. ‘Emotions’ are any affections of the soul accompanied by pleasure or pain. ‘Capabilities’ simply render us capable of being so affected. ‘Habits’ are the permanent relations in which we stand to such affections, which may be either good or bad relations, depending on the manner or degree in which we allow ourselves to be affected by them.  

Virtue is not an Emotion, because—(a) We do not apply the terms right, wrong, praise, blame, to Emotions per se, as precisely having defined πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἔξεις, we can show that

6. ἔξεις is not exactly equivalent to ‘habit,’ by which it is conventionally translated. It is rather ‘state’ or ‘settled condition.’ ἔχειν meant originally to ‘hold on’ or ‘keep on’ (hence such phrases as ἀτιμάσας ἔχειν, ἔχεσθαι τινος), and so ἔξεις was ‘a holding on,’ e.g. ἔξεις τῶν ὅπλων ‘an armed state or condition.’ Hence Aristotle’s Definition ἔξεις καθ’ ἄσ ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ.

7. ἀνειμένως] ‘remissly,’ i.e. in defect, opp. to σφοδρῶς, in excess. This fault in respect of anger is criticised in IV. v. 5, 6. It is possible to take ἀνειμένως as in III. v. 10 = ‘dissolutely,’ but this would repeat, rather than oppose, σφοδρῶς.
4 "Et tōrγιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἳ δὲ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ ὁμικὸν ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πως. Διὰ ταύτα δὲ οὔδε δυνάμεις εἰσίν οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοὶ, οὔτ' ἐπανούμεθα οὔτε ψευδόμεθα. Καὶ ἐτὶ δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμὲν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει εὖ-

4 we obviously do apply them to virtue and vice. (β) There is no deliberate choice in Emotions, as we have already stated (ch. iv.) that there is in Virtue. (γ) We are said to be 'moved' by our Emotions, but 'disposed' by virtue and vice, and this difference of language implies a difference of fact.

ii. Virtue is not a mere 'Capability,' because—(α) The argument above as to the application of praise, blame, etc., applies to Capabilities as well as to Emotions. (β) Capabilities come

1. ἀπροαιρέτως] = 'without purpose,' 'spontaneously.' The objects corresponding to particular passions or emotions being present, the emotion must be felt (though not necessarily encouraged or indulged), as necessarily as heat must be felt on approaching a fire. No reason or deliberation can prevent this.

Compare Butler's Analogy, pt. i. ch. v. (p. 98, ed. Angus). 'The principle of Virtue can neither excite them (viz. such affections) nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so.' And again, 'Particular propensions (by which name Butler describes such affections) from their very nature must be felt, the objects of them being present' (p. 100).

2. προαιρέσεις] The authority for this statement at present is iv. 3. It is afterwards embodied in the formal Definition of Virtue in vi. 15.

4. οὖν κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι] Not 'moved' but 'disposed.' The latter word implying a more permanent affection. The distinction being made in language is a proof that such a distinction is commonly believed to exist. See note on i. 1.
The next point will be to show what sort of a Habit Virtue is. Now speaking generally Excellence (ἀρετή) of whatever kind perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes by nature, Virtue does not, as we have fully proved in ch. i. Hence we argue that if Virtue is neither an Emotion nor a Capability it must be a Habit.

CHAP. VI.—The differentia of Virtue determined, and thus its full Definition arrived at.

1 The next point will be to show what sort of a Habit Virtue is. Now speaking generally Excellence (ἀρετή) of whatever kind perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes amount (neither too much nor too little) of that with which it has to deal (§§ 5-9). He then explains that this is true only of Moral and not of Intellectual Excellence (§§ 10-13). After another argument pointing to the same conclusion derived from there being in all cases only one right and many wrong courses (§ 14), the formal Definition of Virtue is enunciated (§ 15), and the Chapter concludes with removing two possible misconceptions of, or objections to, the theory that all Virtue is a ‘mean’ state (§§ 16, etc.).
but its peculiar function to be well performed. Hence Moral Virtue (i.e. human Excellence) will perfect human nature and cause the proper function of human nature to be well performed. How this will be has been already hinted at (in ch. ii.) from the analogy existing between the functions of the body of man and of his soul and of their respective Excellences, but we now proceed to discuss the question on more general principles. In everything which is capable of division at all, whatever be the nature of the connexion of its parts, we can have an excessive, a defective, and a just amount. These amounts may be taken either absolutely or relatively, and the just amount is always a mean in respect of the excess and defect, i.e. it lies somewhere between them. An absolute mean then is that which is precisely half-way
between a given excess and a given defect, and is therefore always the same and easily found in every case. By a 'relative mean' we indicate that intermediate amount between excess and defect which is best for us; i.e. the mean relative to our interest and advantage. This is of course sometimes more and sometimes less than the 'absolute mean,' and is different for different persons. Now when we say that every practical science places the perfection of its work in its being vellous strength many traditions were preserved.

6. ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνάλογιαν] Arithmetic progression or proportion: i.e. when each term differs from the preceding by a constant quantity. Consequently the absolute or arithmetic mean between two quantities is found by adding them together and dividing by 2.

10. Milo was a celebrated athlete of Crotona, a sort of Greek Samson, of whose mar-
neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, it is
this relative mean that is always intended. And since then
to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or
practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent
practical science of morals. Therefore it will be the charac-
teristic feature of Moral Virtue that it perfects the work of
man by aiming at a relative mean (in other words, at modera-
tion) in all that it is concerned with. Moral Virtue, be it
observed (for all this does not apply to Intellectual Excellence),

Hence it is o with
doral Excellence or
Virtue.
This applies to
Moral Excellence
only, not to

intellectual.

tute excellence in the other sort
of work (Moral). This analogy
must be carefully distinguished
from that between the body and
the soul of man in ii. 5-7.

8. ὀσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις] i.e.
Virtue is better than Art, just as
Nature also is better than Art.
Virtue is often regarded by Plato
and Aristotle as a species of art,
as has been noticed before, and
indeed as its most perfect exem-
plification.

9. The argument only applies
to ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, because it alone
comes within the general case
upon which the whole argument
is based (see § 4, ἐν πάντι κ.τ.λ.),
as being concerned with some-
thing (viz. πάθη and πράξεις) admittting of excess, mean, and
defect. Such is clearly not the
case in regard to Intellectual
Excellence. That this is so with
πάθη is proved in §§ 10 and 11,
and similarly (ὄμοιος) it is as-
serted of πράξεις in § 12. πάθη
and πράξεις are again thus united
as forming the groundwork of
Virtue in § 16 and also in iii. 3.
Aristotle's Ethics.

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οὗτοι καὶ ἐπιθυμήσαι καὶ ὁρμηθήναι καὶ ἔλεησαι καὶ ὀλος ἁσθήναι καὶ λυπηθήναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἂττον,

καὶ ἁμφότερα ὅν τῷ δ' ὅτε δἐ καὶ ἐφ' οἴς καὶ πρὸς οὖς καὶ οὖ ἐνεκα καὶ ὤς δἐ, μέσουν τε καὶ ἀριστον, ὅπερ

12 ἐστὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς. Ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἠλλευψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ὅ ἡ ἁρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν, εῦ ὅς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἠλλευψις σφέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται

καὶ κατορθώται ταῦτα δ' ἁμφοὺς τῆς ἁρετῆς. Μεσότης τις ἀρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἁρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. 10

14 ἢ ἐτὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτώνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὅς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔλκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθῶν μοναχῶς. διὸ καὶ

for Moral Virtue has for its object emotions and actions, both

of which admit of excess, defect, and moderation. This

moderation will consist in a due regulation of time, occasions, objects, motives, manner, etc., in regard to emotions and actions; and such regulation of emotions and actions is con-

fessedly a characteristic of Virtue. Once more, it is possible to go wrong in many ways, right in one way only: just as we may miss a mark in any and every direction and can hit it

9. ταῦτα ἁμφω] viz. both praise and success (ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται) are characteristics of Virtue, as they have just been shown to be of moderation (μέσον). Compare ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἁρετῆς above in 1. 4, where ὅπερ similarly refers to excellence (ἀριστον) as being a characteristic of virtue.

12. The Pythagoreans expressed their teaching on Moral and other subjects by mathematical metaphors, which however have been often taken liter-
neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, it is this relative mean that is always intended. And since then to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent practical science of morals. Therefore it will be the characteristic feature of Moral Virtue that it perfects the work of man by aiming at a relative mean (in other words, at moderation) in all that it is concerned with. Moral Virtue, be it observed (for all this does not apply to Intellectual Excellence),

Hence it is with moral Excellence or Virtue. This applies only, not to intellectual.
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tic of virtue.
12. The Pythagoreans ex-
pressed their teaching on Moral
and other subjects by mathe-
matical metaphors, which how-
over have been often taken lite-
That Wrong
is manifold,
Right is one,
points to
the same
collection.

rally. The doctrine quoted in
the text is a specimen. All that
is infinite (involving the notion
of indefinite) is bad; the finite
is good. Aristotle’s inference
from this, that right lies inter-
mediate to the various courses of
wrong, somewhat resembles the
argument which is called the
‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’
in Mathematics, as it is applied,
e.g. to establish what is called the
first Law of Motion. See fur-
ther, note on I. vi. 7.
18 ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πᾶσα ἐπὶ ἑπτὰς ἔπειτα μεσότητα: ἕνα γὰρ εὐθὺς ὀνόμασται συνελημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαινότητος, οὔν ἐπιχαρεκκαία, ἀνασχυντία, φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία, κλοπή, ἀνδροφοβία: πάντα 5 γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐργάζεται τῷ αὐτῇ φαινεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχι οὐκ ὑπερβολαί αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλεύφεις. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὐν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἄμαρτάνειν οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ημὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ itself and in the abstract that Virtue is a ‘mean.’ Considered in a special aspect and in reference to a special standard, viz. that of Excellence or Goodness, it is no longer a mean but extreme, i.e. it includes not a moderate, but the greatest possible, amount of good. (2) Conversely it must not be thought that because Virtue consists in moderation that a mean or moderate amount of anything is good simply because it is moderate. In respect of things essentially bad the right means the ‘essence’ (i.e. the simplest form, or notion, of the existence) of anything.

(2) τί ἡν εἶναι—‘what was the essence of anything?’

(3) τὸ τί-ἡν-εἶναι—‘the what the essence [of anything] was’; or ‘that which the essence was’; or in other words again, ‘the essence’ [of anything].

(4) τὸν λόγον τὸν τί-ἡν-εἶναι λέγοντα, ‘the definition stating the essence’; i.e. the ‘essential’ or ‘logical’ Definition of anything: quite literally ‘the Definition which says what [the] essence [of a thing] was.’ Thus the whole expression is nearly equivalent to τὸν ὄντα occurring just before, which also means the 'being' or 'essence' of anything, 'essentia' being the exact Latin equivalent of οὐσία.

It remains to explain ἡν and not ἄρετι being used. This is done to indicate that the Essence of a thing is prior to the existence of the thing itself. e.g. Before any individual man existed the essence of man, i.e. humanity, or the ideas constituting humanity, existed as the type after which man was created, just as the idea of a house exists on paper or in the architect's mind before the house itself is built.

3. εὐθὺς ὀνόμασται συνελημμένα κατ' ἑλλαζέων k.τ.λ.) ‘involve the notion of badness the moment they are named.'
A Table or Catalogue of Virtues with their related Vices.

In order to prove that our Definition holds good of all the Virtues in detail, we proceed to classify them, shewing the

8. \( \text{\textit{πως}} \) 'in some sense,' i.e. as is explained in § 17 \textit{fin.}, Virtue if regarded in its special relation to the standard of excellence is an extreme and not a mean.

Chap. VII.—Aristotle's plan now is to prove the correctness of this Definition of Virtue, by showing it to apply in the case of every individual Virtue in detail. This is clearly expressed again in § 11, \( \text{\textit{προέων ὅνων κ.τ.λ.}} \). With a view to this it is necessary to have an exhaustive Cata-
πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενωτέροι εἶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι. περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὰ αἱ πράξεις, δέον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. Αὕττοιν οὖν

subject-matter in reference to which each Virtue is a mean state, together with its related Vices of excess and defect. Arranging them in the order of—1. Excess, 2. Mean, 3. Defect, we have—i. In reference to Confidence and Fear

logue of the Virtues. This is therefore given in the present Chapter, and it forms a sort of ‘Table of Contents’ for the discussion which follows to the end of Bk. IV.; though the actual order here indicated is not always observed.

2. ἀληθινώτεροι = ‘more real,’ not to be confused with ἀληθὲς-τεραι = ‘more true.’

4. διαγραφῆς] the table or catalogue. This will be found in an Appendix at the end of this Book, together with a note on the probable principle of classification upon which it is constructed.

Περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη] Observe that in each case Aristotle first lays down the morally-indifferent (i.e. neither good nor bad in itself, see note on vi. 17) subject-matter, upon the excess, defect, or mean amount, of which the related Virtue and Vices in each case depend. Observe further that this subject-matter is in several cases described by a pair of words converse to one another, e.g. Confidence and Fear, Pleasure and Pain, Giving and Receiving, etc. Now of either member of these pairs we may have excess, mean, or defect, and therefore theoretically there would be two Virtues, each with two related Vices, belonging to each pair. But as excess of confidence is much the same as defect of fear, and vice-versa, (and similarly in the case of the other pairs), the subdivision in each case is a needless refinement, like the distinction between ἔν καὶ θάρρη commonly in Music. Hence it is only carried out in two cases, viz. Courage and Liberality, and no stress is laid upon it in the fuller discussion of Bks. III. and IV.

6. πολλὰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀνώνυμα] It must often be the case that refinements of theory are not of sufficient practical importance to be represented by distinct words in common language, e.g. though in theory excess of confidence (ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλειν) and
3. or pásas] This limitation is fully explained in III. x.

4. [This is explained by III. xi. 5.]

7. [‘insensitive,’ or perhaps ‘insensitive,’ the latter reproducing not only the meaning of the Greek word, but also the somewhat unfamiliar character which Aristotle admits it to have.]

8. [That the former however is much more important is shown in IV. i. 6-11.]

(especially the former)—(1) Rashness, (2) Courage, (3) Cowardice. ii. In reference to Pleasure and Pain (especially the former)—(1) Intemperance, (2) Temperance, (3) Insensitiveness, if indeed such a state exists. iii. In reference to giving and receiving Money (especially the former)—(1) Prodigality, (2) Liberality, (3) Sordidness. iv. In reference to deficiency of fear (en tō φόβεισθαι ἐλλείπειν) are distinct, yet practically the result of both is the same, viz. rashness, and so this one word serves for both cases. It should also be noticed that some languages possess refinements of this kind which others have not; and indeed it is seldom that any one word (in such cases as we are considering) in one language has its precise equivalent, meaning neither more nor less, in another language. (See Introd. p. xxxvi.).
Wealth on a large scale—(1) Vulgar Display, (2) Magnificence, (3) Paltriness. v. In reference to honour and dishonour on a grand scale—(1) Vaingloriousness, (2) High-mindedness, (3) Littlemindedness. vi. In reference to the same in ordinary matters language supplies us only with the terms ‘Ambition’ and ‘Ambitious’ on the one hand, and ‘Want of Ambition’ and ‘Unambitious’ on the other. As

1. άλλαι διαθέσεις] The distinction between Liberality and Magnificence, and between High-mindedness and Laudable Ambition respectively, derives its value partly from the political or social aspect in which the Virtues were regarded by Greek philosophers. Socially the difference is considerable; morally (in the proper sense of the word, i.e. in reference to the character of the agent), the difference, though not perhaps wholly unreal, is less important. The term διαθεσις is here used as equivalent to έξις, though it is sometimes distinguished from it as indicating a disposition or tendency only, in contrast with a formed habit (έξις), e.g. εγκράτεια is a διαθεσις related to σοφρονίσθη as a έξις (see note I. iii. 7).
3. ἀπειροκαλία] ‘bad taste,’ literally ‘inexperience of what is beautiful,’ βαναυσία=βανανία (from βαίνω a forge and αὖω to burn), ‘the practice of a mechanical art,’ and hence ‘vulgarity’ generally. (Liddell and Scott.)
7. Translate ‘As we said that Liberality was related to Magnificence, differing from it in that it is on a small scale, so also there is a certain Virtue related to Highmindedness, the latter being concerned with great honours, while the Virtue in question deals with small honours.’
perὶ τιμῆν ὑσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ perὶ μικρὰν ὑσαί 'ἔστι γὰρ ὡς deὶ ὁρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ deὶ καὶ ἡττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὁρέξεισιν φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. "Ἀνόνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλότιμον φιλοτιμία. "Οθὲν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἐστὶν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αὐτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἔξις ῥηθήσεται νῦν δ' 5 perὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγομεν κατὰ τῶν ψηφιγμένων στροφῶν.

"Εστὶ δὲ καὶ perὶ ὀργῆν ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν deὶ ἀνωνύμων ὅτων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρῶσιν λέγοντες τῇ μεσότητα προαύτης καλέσομεν τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἢ de κακία 9 ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἄγορητός τις, ἢ δ' ἐλλειψις αἰρηγησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀλλαὶ τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἐχοῦσαι

however excess and defect are thus recognised there must clearly be a mean state, though, in the absence of a settled name, either of the above pairs of terms are, according to circumstances, applied to it. vii. In reference to the regulation of the Temper—(1) Passionateness, (2) Meekness, (3) Impassionateness (if there be such a word to describe a state which rarely exists). Three Virtues follow relating to Three Social Virtues. viz.,

5. διαθέσεις] 'The habits as well as the individual characters corresponding are nameless; (or, as the abstract as well as the concrete terms are nameless)—except the term "ambition," corresponding with "ambitious,"' Similarly in English we have no word 'unambition,' to correspond with 'unambitious.'

6. ἔτι in Composition has a reciprocal force, e.g. ἐταμοιβάδις, ἐπιμαχία (offensive and defensive alliance) (see Suppl. Note), etc.

10. ἐν τοῖς ἔξις ῥηθήσεται] See IV. iv. 4.

16. ἄγορητος τις] A sort of 'impassionate' man. 'τις' as it were apologizes for the uncouthness of the term employed: as it
μὲν τινα ήμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαί δὲ ἀλλήλων πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τάληθες τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἢ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ρητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἢν μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πάσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετὸν, τὰ δὲ ἀκρα οὔτ᾽ ὀρθά οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ Ψεκτα. Ἐστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλεῖον ἀϊώνυμα, πειρατέων δὲ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶς ὄνοματοποιεῖν σαφήνειας ἐνεκεκαὶ τοῦ εὐπαρ-ολοκοτῆτος. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθῆς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθῆς τις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀληθεια λεγέσθω, ἢ δὲ προσποίησις ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἐχων αὐτὴν ἀλαξων, ἢ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἰρων.

ι. Peri de tò hôdû tò ὑμὲν ἐν παιδίᾳ| ο μὲν μέσος εὐτραπελεὶς καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐπαραπελεία, ἢ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἐχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ἢ δὲ ἐλλείπον ἀγροίκος τις καὶ ἡ ἐξίς ἀγροίκια. Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦδυ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὑς δεῖ ἠδυς ὄν, φίλος, καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία,

our conduct in and towards Society—and here we must apologize for having to employ somewhat inadequate names to describe our meaning. viii. As regards Truth—(1) Boastfulness, (2) Truthfulness, (3) Self-Depreciation. ix. As regards pleasantness in times of relaxation—(1) Buffoonery, (2) Geniality, (3) Boorishness. x. As regards general

does elsewhere for its inadequacy, when it does not express the precise shade of meaning desired: e.g. χαυνότης τις in § 7, ἀληθῆς τις in § 12, ἀγροίκος τις in § 13, ἀναίθητος τις in ii. 7.

4. ἐν αὐτοῖς i.e. ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεωι.

14. εἰρωνεία = dissimulatio, i.e. a concealment of what you are; ἀλαζονεία = simulatio, i.e. a pretension to what you are not. εἰρωνεία is a difficult word to translate; see further note on IV. vii. 3.

19. φίλος and φιλία are not to
pleasantness of demeanour—(1) Obsequiousness, degenerating into Sycophancy if it be adopted to serve our own interests, (2) Friendliness, (3) Churlishness. We add two conditions, which, though not so much settled habits as occasionally aroused feelings, are yet virtuous and praiseworthy as com-

be translated 'friend' and 'friendship,' but 'friendly' and 'friendliness.' The character described is that of a man who naturally 'gets on' with every one he comes into contact with; one who naturally attracts every one, just as the 'churl' mentioned presently is one who naturally repels every one.

1. οὔσενός ἕνεκα] 'Obsequiousness' is spontaneous and natural to the character in which it is displayed, and so may be in some sense sincere. 'Flattery' is put on, and is adopted to serve a man's own interests and advancement, and therefore is necessarily insincere.

4. Sense of Shame and Indignation are not in the fullest sense Virtues, for two reasons;—(1) They are themselves occasional Feelings (πάθη) rather than permanent States (ἔξεις) in relation to the Feelings. This is more fully expressed in IV. ix. 1. A permanent State, either of Shame for our own wrong doings or of Indignation at the success of others, would be in no sense desirable. (2) Because they cannot exist unless there has been previous wrong-doing on the part of ourselves or others. Hence they are only virtuous on this condition, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, as Aristotle himself expresses it in IV. ix. 7.

On the other hand two reasons are given in the text why they are in some sense Virtues;—(1) They are objects of praise, and this is an indication of Virtue as we have seen in the concluding words of B. I., also in I. xii. 6 and II. vi. 12 (see note). (2) The phenomena of excess, mean, and defect, are exhibited in these two cases, as well as in those already considered (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις κτ.λ. l. 6).
VIII.

15. Excess, of Shame, but of Virtue it is never applicable to this kind of sense, as speaking of the extremes and the misfortunes of others (φθόνος) and rejoicing at the prosperity of others (ἐπιχαρέκασι). These two habits are related like those which arise from excess of confidence or defect of fear, which are not really two but one, and are called by the common name θρασύτης, as was explained in § 2. (2) The mean (νέμεσις) consisting in grieving at the prosperity of others, when it is undeserved, and the excess (φθόνος) in grieving at the prosperity of others in all cases, whether deserved or undeserved, —the defect ought to consist in never grieving at the prosperity of others in any case, but in either rejoicing at it or being indifferent to it. But in order to make any sense of the words as they stand, we must understand with χαίρειν in 1. 7 ἐπὶ τοῖς κακῶς πράττονοις or some similar words, about which nothing has been said or implied. (See Suppl. Notes.)

3. ἄλλοθι καίρος ἐσται] On referring to the end of B. IV. it will be seen that the subject of νέμεσις is not referred to in the fuller discussions which follow. Otherwise the confusion of the present passage would probably have been corrected in some way.

δικαιοσύνη is a difficult word to translate. It not only means 'justice' in the limited sense (though even this, as Aristotle shows in Bk. V., is used in two or three distinct applications),

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

[Book II.]
VIII. III. Τριών δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολήν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἐλλειψιν, μᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς 5 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πᾶσαι ἀντίκεισται πῶς: αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσιν, ἣ 2 δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις: ὡσπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ

hereafter distinguish them, and then show of each kind separately how the law of the mean is applicable to it. The discussion on Intellectual Excellence will follow after that.

CHAP. VIII.—The nature and degrees of the opposition existing between Virtues and the Vices related to them.

1 Excess, mean, and defect are all opposed to one another in various degrees. Compared with the excess, the mean appears but it has also the general sense of ‘uprightness’ or ‘righteousness,’ divested of the religious or theological savour attaching to these words. In this application, Aristotle in Bk. V. describes it as συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή, i.e. Virtue in the aggregate. Bk. V. is occupied with distinguishing and defining these several senses of δικαιοσύνη, and, as is promised here, showing how to each of them separately the law of the ‘mean’ is applicable in different ways.

2. οἱ μοῖρῳ κ.τ.λ.] The words in brackets are probably interpolated by some copyist who thought it might be well to give the contents of Bk. VI., as well as those of Bks. IV. and V. The objections to them are:

(1) οἱ μοῖροι is not true; for the Intellectual Excellences are in no sense ‘mean’ states, and Aristotle never suggests or attempts to prove anything of the kind (see note on vi. 10). (2) Aristotle never speaks of λογικὸν ἀρετῆς in this sense, but always of διανοητικὸν ἀρετῆς, e.g. see I. xiii. 20, II. i. 1, etc. If we retain the words we must attach a very loose sense to οἱ μοῖροι and translate—‘similarly we shall speak about the Intellectual Excellences also:’ in fact understanding ἐρόμεν only, and not ἐρόμεν πῶς μεσότητις εἰσιν.

CHAP. VIII.—The fact that Virtue is a relative and not an absolute mean (i.e. not always
in defect; compared with the defect, it appears in excess.

3 A man who is in either extreme, reserving to himself the title of the mean, applies to the true mean the name of the ex-
treme opposite to his own. Obviously however the opposition between the extremes (excess and defect) is greater than that between the mean and either of them;—partly because the interval between them is greater in actual distance, as we
might say; and partly because sometimes one extreme appears

half-way between the extremes to which it is related) implies
that it will sometimes be nearer to one extreme than the other,
and hence that the degrees of its opposition to them will differ in
different cases. The main re-

sults of this chapter are ;—(1) There is a greater opposition
between the extremes inter se than between either of them and
the mean. (2) Sometimes the
excess and sometimes the defect
is more opposed to the mean. (3) The degree of this divergence
may depend either upon the
nature of the case or upon our
own dispositions in reference to it.
2. τα δὲ πλείστων ἀπέχοντα κτλ. ‘Things which differ most widely are defined to be contraries.’ It will be understood that we are speaking of things falling under the same class (i.e. πλείστων ἀπέχοντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει as Aristotle elsewhere more fully expresses it). All opposition or contrariety implies some degree of similarity. Otherwise Rashness for example might be thought to differ more from (say) Meanness, than from Cowardice.

9. The twofold grounds of opposition between Extremes and the Mean explained in §§ 7 and 8 suggest the first two of the practical rules for attaining the mean given in the next Chapter.

10. Practical applications of this principle will be found in the discussion of Liberality (IV. i. 31, 44), Highmindedness (IV. iii. 37), and Meekness (IV. v. 12). In the first two cases, as in that of Courage, the defect is more opposed than the excess to the mean. In the case of Meekness, as in that of Temperance, it is the reverse. (See Supplementary Note.)
'errors on the right side,' and therefore nearer the mean.

Our own dispositions.—If our natural bent or inclination is to one extreme rather than the other, then that extreme appears more opposed to the mean than the other. Its indulgence would carry us further from the Virtuous mean than would the practice of the opposite extreme.

**CHAP. IX.—The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attaining the Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment in points of detail.**

The various points now established concerning Virtue out in this section. Conversely it might be said that theories which make moral distinctions purely relative err in overlooking the considerations of § 7.

9. ἐπίδοσις] lit. 'increase' or 'addition,' hence, probably, 'bias' or 'inclination.'

**CHAP. IX.—Another result from the mean in Virtue being relative and dependent on circumstances, and also from the**
AVOID the extreme to which our natural inclination tends. The pleasure we derive from actions affords a simple test of this inclination, iii. Beware above all of allowing the pleasure of actions to bias our judgment respecting them.

1. Although as a general rule the Virtue of Courage would be gained rather by acts of Rashness than by acts of Cowardice, yet there may be fearless and hot-brained persons who would arrive at it best by acts of what would seem to them Cowardice. Again, in order to arrive at the just mean in the way of spending (εὐποιεῖς) this rule would probably direct a Scotch man to aim at prodigality (δο-κοτία), but an Irishman to practise what he would consider sordidness (δυσφοιεία).

2. Plainly show that it is difficult to become Virtuous, and a complicated matter to attain the accurate mean. Three practical rules are obvious. i. Avoid the extreme most opposed to the mean in the nature of things. If we must err, it is at any rate best to choose the lesser of two evils.

3. Rule i.

4. Rule ii.

5. Rule iii.


7. Rule v.
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Rule ii. Avoid the extreme to which our natural inclination tends. The pleasure we derive from actions affords a simple test of this inclination. iii. Beware above all of allowing the pleasure of actions to bias our judgment respecting them.

1. αὐτοῖς] Thus for example although as a general rule the Virtue of Courage would be gained rather by acts of Rashness than by acts of Cowardice, yet there may be fearless and hot-brained persons who would arrive at it best by acts of what would seem to them cowardice. Again, in order to arrive at the just mean in the way of spending money (ἐλευθερία) this rule would probably direct a Scotchman to aim at prodigality (ἀσωτία), but an Irishman to practise what he would consider sordidness (ἀνελευθερία).

6. διεσπραμμένα κ.τ.λ.] Straightening a roll of paper by rolling it the opposite way would be another familiar illustration.

8. ἀδέκαστοι] from δεκάς (and this from δέκας, a body of ten), = decuriae, to tamper with the 'decuriae,' and so generally 'to bribe.' ἀδέκαστοι therefore = 'impartial,' literally 'unbribed.'

9. δημογέροντες] The reference is to II. iii. 158:

"On Ilios's towers
Sat the sage chiefs and councillors of Troy.
Helen they saw, as to the tower she came;
And, 'tis no marvel, one to other said,
The valiant Trojans and well-greaved Greeks
For beauty such as this should long endure
The toils of war; for goddess-like she seems;
And yet, despite her beauty, let her go,
Nor bring on us and on our sons a curse."—Lord Derby's Translation.

Similarly, says Aristotle, we must dismiss pleasure from our consideration, while we are deliberating, else unbiased judgment will be out of the question.
The observance of such practical rules will enable us, roughly speaking, to attain the Virtuous mean. And, after all, small deviations from the ideal mean are not important, nor is it easy to say when they become so. In such matters of detail much must be left to the decision of individual judgment.

Indeed the surest way of attaining the mean in practice is to allow such liberty.

4. What follows is another illustration of the often repeated caution in Bk. I., that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce Morals to a rigid or mathematical precision, for 'Virtue itself turns Vice, being misapplied' (Shakespeare). See esp. § 9 just below ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.

13. ἀσθησίς has no technical meaning here, such as Moral Sense. It resembles rather the popular use of the word in English, as when we say 'That must be left to each man's own "sense" to decide.' See further note on IV. v. 13.

14. Observe the word δεῖ. Though the mean is always in theory the best, yet in order to attain it practically, it sometimes becomes a duty (δεῖ) to aim at something in excess or defect of it. See viii. 8 (note), and § 5 of this Chapter.
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<td>i. περὶ θάνατον καὶ φόβους .</td>
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<td>δειλότης</td>
<td>In regard to θάνατον only.</td>
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<td>ii. περὶ ἡδονῆς (καὶ λυπῆς)</td>
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<td>In regard to φόβους only.</td>
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<td>iii. περὶ χρήματων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν</td>
<td>ἀκολασία</td>
<td>σωφροσύνη</td>
<td>ἀναισθησία</td>
<td>In regard to ἡδονῆς only.</td>
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<td>iv. περὶ χρήματα μεγάλα .</td>
<td>{ ἀσωτία</td>
<td>ἐλευθεριότης</td>
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<td>v. περὶ τιμῆς (καὶ ἀτιμῶν)</td>
<td>{ ἀνελευθερία</td>
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<td>ἀνελευθερία</td>
<td>In regard to λήψις only.</td>
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<td>vi. περὶ τιμῆς μικρῶν .</td>
<td>ἀπειροκαλία καὶ</td>
<td>μικροπρέπεια</td>
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<td>In regard to δόσις only.</td>
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<td>vii. περὶ ὀργῆς .</td>
<td>βαρανσία</td>
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<td>viii. περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς</td>
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<td>ix. περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδία</td>
<td>φιλοτιμία</td>
<td>(ἀνώνυμος)</td>
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<td>x. περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ</td>
<td>ὀργιλότης</td>
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<td>(Supplementary.)</td>
<td>ἀληθεία</td>
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<td>xi. . . . . . . .</td>
<td>βουλολογία</td>
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<td>xii. . . . . . . .</td>
<td>ἀρεσκός κόλαξ</td>
<td>φίλος (φιλία)</td>
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In the case of x, the names of the excess and defect are given only in the adjectival form. The former is ἀρεσκός, if his conduct be disinterested; κόλαξ, if it arise from interested motives. Occasional feelings rather than settled habits.
The principle of Classification in the Catalogue on the opposite page appears to be (for Aristotle never explicitly states it) the degree of relationship to society implied by the different Virtues: a natural principle in a treatise which regards Ethics as a branch of the Science of Social Life (πολιτική τις, I. ii. 8). From this point of view the Catalogue breaks up into five divisions:

I. (i and ii) Courage and Temperance are Virtues bearing no necessary relation to society. They might be practised on a desert island. They belong to the lowest part of our nature, which we have in common with the brutes, who are incapable of Society. (In III. x. 1 Aristotle hints that this is his reason for treating of these two Virtues first.)

II. iii—vi) These four Virtues can only be exercised in a society of some kind, and yet they belong rather to ourselves and to our personal character than to our behaviour towards society. This is so especially from Aristotle's point of view, in which Benevolence and such feelings are scarcely, if at all, recognised. See notes on IV. i. 27, IV. iii. 24, etc. Hence the personal element still predominates.

III. (vii) The regulation of the Temper forms a sort of connecting link with the purely social virtues which follow. The personal and social elements in this case are nearly balanced.

IV. (viii—x) Three Social Virtues which derive their whole force and meaning from society, and relate simply to our conduct in and towards society. The social element now preponderates over the personal.

V. (xi—xii) Supplementary. Two virtuous states which (as is explained in the text) are not in the fullest sense Virtues, but yet under certain circumstances are commended.
III.

1. The discussion of the difference between Voluntary and Involuntary actions is important (1) in reference to the

Recalling the Definition of Virtue in II. vi. 17 (ἐξίσ προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὀρθομένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἄν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσεις), we shall obtain the clue to the plan of what follows to the end of Bk. VI., the whole of which portion of the treatise consists of the illustration of this Definition in detail.

(1) ἐξίσ—This was sufficiently explained in II. v.
(2) προαιρετική—This has been rather assumed than proved as yet (see II. iv. 3 and v. 4, etc.). Consequently the nature of προαιρεσίς is now discussed at length in its relation to Moral action, ch. i—v.
(3) ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς—This point is next proved of each of the Virtues in the list given in II. vii. in detail, from III. vi. to end of IV., and of δικαιοσύνη in each of its various senses (for which see II. vii. 16) in Bk. V.

(4) ὀρθομένη . . . ὀρίσεις—The intellectual powers by which the variable relative mean is to be determined form the subject of Bk. VI., and this completes the discussion of the various terms in the Definition of Virtue.

The discussion of προαιρεσίς or Deliberate Choice is approached by determining first the more comprehensive notion of voluntariness; since all that is deliberately chosen must of course be Voluntary, though not vice versa (see ii. 16). The contents of the
first five Chapters are briefly as follows:—

i. A general distinction between Voluntary and Involuntary Actions, together with the intermediate classes of 'Mixed' (if the compulsion [βία] is incomplete), and 'Non-Voluntary' (if the ignorance [ἄγνωσι] is incomplete).

ii. Deliberate Choice is compounded of an element of impulse and an element of judgment.

iii. The relation of Deliberate Choice to Deliberation (βουλήσις), i.e. to the element of judgment in ch. ii.

iv. Its relation to Desire or Wish (βουλήσις), which it presupposes, i.e. to the element of impulse in ch. ii.

v. A digression to refute the view held by Plato and others that Vice is involuntary, while Virtue is voluntary.

3. Observe the frequent recurrence to the social point of view indicated at the commencement in I. ii. 8, μεθοδος πολιτική τις οὖσα, and see Introd. p. xxxi.

4. κολασίς is punishment with a view to reformation (see note on v. 7), and so is naturally put in contrast with τιμή, reward for the sake of encouragement.

6. ἀρχή] the originating or
motive cause of the action: speaking technically, the Efficient Cause (see Glossary p. xlvii.).

9. τὸ δὲ τέλος κ.τ.λ. [The object or motive of an act is to be determined in reference to the time of its performance; so (δὴ) whether the action were voluntary or involuntary is to be determined in reference to the moment of action. If a conscious motive determined the action then, the action itself must have been voluntary, and that fact cannot be altered by regrets or after-thoughts when the danger is past. That such is the case in the actions we are considering is evident, because the movement of the limbs at least is perfectly free at the moment of action (see I. 12).

12. ὀργανικὰ μέρη] the limbs which are instrumental in the performance of the act.

15. ἀπλῶς] i.e. simply or abstractedly, i.e. considered apart from surrounding circumstances.
7 τῶν τουοτων ούδεν. Ἡ ἤν ὑπομενόσιν ἀυτὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἃν δ’ ἀνάπαλων, ψέγονται, τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὸς ὑπομειναί ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῶ ἡ μετρίως φαύλου. Ἡ ἤν ἰσιος δ’ ἐπαίνος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγρώμη δ’, ἃν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἁ μὴ δεῖ, ἠ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἃν ὑπομει- 8 ναι. Ἡ ἤν ἰσιος δ’ ἐστὶν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετῶν παθόντι τὰ δεινῶτατα καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἐὐριπίδον Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοία φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα 10 μητροκτονήσαι. Ἡ ἤστι δ’ χαλεπόν ἐπιστὶ διακρίναι ποιῶν ἀντὶ ποιῶν αἱρετῶν καὶ τὰ ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεινά τοῖς ὑμωσθείσιν ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκομενα λυπηρά, ἢ δ’ ἀναγκαζόνται αἰσχρὰ, οὔθεν ἐπαίνοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ 11

7, 8 cally in our power to abstain from them. Their moral character is various. We praise, blame, or make allowance 9 for them, according to circumstances; but it is impossible to

1. Regarded in their moral aspect these mixed actions fall into three classes. (Note, it is due to their mixed character, and so far as they have an element of voluntariness about them, that they admit of a moral aspect at all.)

1) Praise is accorded, when something painful or humiliating (αἰσχρῶν) is endured from a noble motive, e.g. the case of martyrdom, and the legends of Scævola, Regulus, Lady Godiva, etc.

2) Blame, when shame or disgrace is accepted without adequate reason e.g. the conduct of a traitor who betrays his country or friends to secure his own release from prison.

3) Allowance in love, when the pain or danger is such as to overstrain (ὑπερτείνει) human endurance, e.g. confessions or revelations wrung out by torture. Aristotle adds that there are some acts so disgraceful that no torture could secure allowance for them, e.g. matricide.

11. τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτόνησαι] viz. his father Amphiaraus’s injunctions to do so, under pain of his displeasure.
10 toûs ἀναγκασθέντας ἦ μὴ. Τὰ δὲ ποία φατέον βλαία; Ἡ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὡποτ' ἄν ἦ αὐτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἦ καὶ ὁ πρώτων μηδὲν συμβάλλεται; Ἄ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἔστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δε αἱρέτα, καὶ ἡ ἄρχῃ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἔστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐκούσια. Μᾶλλον δὲ ἐοικεν ἐκούσιοι: οἱ γὰρ πρᾶξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ ἐκούσια. Ποία δὲ ἀντὶ ποιοῦν αἱρέτεον, οὐ ράδιον ἀποδοῦναι: τολ-λαῖ γὰρ διαφοράι εἰδίν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἐκαστα. Εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἴδεα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίντι βλαία εἴναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἐξ' ὄντα), πάντα δὲν εἰθ' ὀντῳ βλαία: τοῦτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσι. Καὶ οἱ μὲν βλα καὶ ἀκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἥδυ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἥδους. Γελοῖον δὴ τὸ αὐτίαςθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἄλλα μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθή-

lay down any general rules on such a subject. We reserve then the term Involuntary for cases of physical compulsion.

Under no circumstances, however, must the violent desire for what is pleasurable or honourable be regarded as causing such compulsion as would make an act involuntary, for (1) This would make all our actions compulsory, and so would prove too much; (2) Such actions are pleasurable, while compulsion is painful. The fault really rests with those who allow themselves to be so easily 'compelled,' who wish to escape the responsibility of their bad actions and yet retain

10. No emphasis is to be laid on τὰ καλὰ here, because practically, no one does argue against the voluntariness of noble acts on the ground that the intense pleasure to be derived from them forces us on. (This is clear from the concluding words of this ch., and also from ch. v.) Logically, however, the higher pleasure of τὸ καλὸν and the lower pleasure of τὸ ἥδυ stand on the same footing, so far as they affect the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions. Indeed, as Ar. argued in Π. iii. 7 (fin.), τὸ καλὸν as a motive for action is in some sense included under τὸ ἥδυ. This reference also illustrates what follows, τοῦτων γὰρ χάριν κ.τ.λ.
raton ὅντα υπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτῶν,
τῶν δ᾿ αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἵδεα. 'Εσικε δὴ τὸ βίασον εἶναι οὗ ἐξωθεὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

12 To δὲ δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἕκοσύιον μὲν ἀπαν ἐστίν, ἀκόςιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυσιν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ὃ γὰρ δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὅτιον, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραῖον ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν ὑπὲρ πέπτραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἴδειν, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἄκων, μὴ λυποῦμενὸς γε. Τοῦ δὲ δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν ὃ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἀκὼν δοκεῖ, ο δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἑτέρος, ἑστώ οὐκ ἕκων ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ἄνομα ἔχειν ἵδιον. 10

14 Ετερον δ᾿ εἰσκε καὶ τὸ δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἄγνοιαν.

12 credit for their good ones. We therefore define a compulsory act to be one caused by some external force to which the agent himself contributes nothing.

13 ii. The other cause of involuntary actions was said to be ignorance. This statement must be guarded by two conditions:—(1) First there must be subsequent sorrow for the act done in ignorance; else it cannot be considered as really involuntary. Still as we cannot exactly say that it was voluntary, we shall for convenience sake describe such actions as non-voluntary. (2) Ignorance must not extend to the

5. ἐπίλυσιν] Compare Jean Paul, 'Joyful remembrances of wrong actions are their half repetitions, as repentant remembrances of good ones are their half abolitions.'

10. As another illustration of the difference between involuntary and non-voluntary, Aristotle elsewhere states that the action of the heart is involuntary, that of respiration non-voluntary: the former is entirely beyond our control, the latter not so.

11. Observe that the expres-
principles of conduct, but only to the details, or acts: else a drunkard or a passionate man, or indeed any one who does wrong, might plead ignorance in some sense, and hence involuntariness. Therefore, for the sake of distinction again, we shall say that one who acts in ignorance of the general principles of conduct, or of what is befitting, or in ignorance affecting the deliberate choice of his actions, acts ‘ignorantly,’ but not ‘through ignorance,’ nor involuntarily. But one who acts in ignorance of some of the details or circumstances accompanying his action, we shall say acts ‘through ignorance,’ and involuntarily. e.g. Ignorance of ‘fact’ or of voluntary. If the ignorance could have been avoided at the outset, the agent is fully responsible for it, and also for all and any consequences that it may lead to.

2. διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων i.e. μεθ yp or ὑργὴ understood from μεθυν ἢ ὑργιζόμενος.

12. περὶ τί ἡ ἐν τίνι refers to the object upon which or whom the act takes place, e.g. a man slaying his son or his father in battle unwittingly. The murder of Laius in ignorance did not make Œdipus, morally speaking, a parricide.

13. ἕνεκα τίνος (like οὐ ἕνεκα in § 18) has not its usual meaning of ‘motive’ (of which ignorance would be out of the question), but that of ‘tendency,’ as the examples show.
17 όινοι σωτηρίασι, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἥρέμα ἡ σφόδρα. "Ἀπαντάς.
μὲν ὃν ταῦτα οὔδεὶς ἀν ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μανωμένος, δήλουν ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα. πῶς γὰρ έαυτὸν γε; "Ὁ δὲ
πράττει, ἀγνοήσειεν ἀν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασίν ἐκ-
πεσεῖν αὐτοῦς, ἢ οὐκ εἴδεναι οτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὡς
τὸν καταπέλτην. Οὐθεὶν ὃ ἀν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολε-
μίον εἶναι ὡς περὶ τὴν Μερόπην, καὶ ἐσφαίρωσθαι τὸ λελογ-
χωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ
σωτηρία πάσας ἀποκτεῖναι ἢ καὶ δείξαι βουλόμενος, 10

ύστερος οἱ ἀκροχειρίζομενοι, πατάξειεν ἢν. Περὶ πάντα
ὅταν τῆς ἀγνωσίας οὕσης ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις, ὧ τούτων
τι ἀγνωσίας ἀκόν δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν
tοῖς κυριωτάτοις κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ

4. οἶνον κ.τ.λ.] 'as men in con-
versation say that they made a
slide ('let the cat out of the bag'),
or else that they did not know
that it was any secret.' These are
of course two different excuses,
either of which would illustrate
what is meant by ignorance of
the act itself. So also would the
other case mentioned, viz. when
a gun goes off accidentally and
kills some one.

8. ἐσφαίρωσθαι τὸ λελογχω-
μένον δόρυ] 'believing the spear
to be rounded at the end when
it was actually pointed,' i.e. like
a foil with a button for fencing.

9. κίσσηριν] pumice-stone,
and therefore not likely to hurt
any one. This illustrates igno-
arce of the instrument.

ἐπὶ σωτηρία] 'with a view to
save; 'e.g. if William Tell had hit
his son, when aiming at the apple.
(Inf. ref. to ἐνεκά τίνος above.)

11. ἀκροχειρίζομενοι] 'spar-
ring.' This example explains
ignorance of the manner or de-
gree of force of an act (πῶς, οἶνο
ἡρέμα ἡ σφόδρα, § 16).
19 πράξεις καὶ οὗ ἐνεκα. Τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκούσιον λεγομένου, ἐτί δὲ τὴν πράξειν λυπηράν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελεῖα.

20 Ὅντος δ' ἀκούσιον τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἐκάστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξεις. Ἡσως γὰρ οὗ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὖδὲν ἐτί τῶν ἀλλων ξώων ἐκούσιοις πράξει, οὔθ' οἱ παῖδες, ἐίτα πότερον οὖδὲν ἐκούσιοις πράττομεν τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἡ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκούσιος τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκούσιος; ἡ γελοῖον ἔνος γε αἰτίου οὖντος; ἅτοπον δ' Ἠσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι δὲν δεὶ ὀρέγεσθαι.

19 voluntary one ‘through ignorance’; provided always that subsequent sorrow attends the discovery of what has been thus done through ignorance.

20 Having now explained the nature of both kinds of involuntary actions, we may define voluntary acts conversely to be ‘those originating from the agent himself, he having a full knowledge of the circumstances under which he is acting.’

21 This definition must be defended against the false view (which it in fact condemns) that acts done from anger or desire are involuntary, though originating in the agent himself. (1) They are not so, because all the acts of the lower animals and even children would then be involuntary. (2) Take this dilemma:—Either it is meant that all acts of anger and desire are involuntary, or that the bad ones are involuntary and the good voluntary. The latter supposition is absurd, because the motive cause (anger and desire) is the same in both cases.

22 The former is absurd because there are occasions when we involuntarily act.

23 [See Suppl. Notes.] The force of γὰρ is to indicate that the following class of actions (viz. τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν), which are intentionally excluded by the Definition just given from involuntary actions, are rightly so excluded. (See Suppl. Notes.) The sense of ‘ought’ to do.
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ought to feel anger and desire, and there can be no 'ought' in
the case if we are then involuntary agents. (3) The actions
we are considering are done with pleasure, whereas involun-
tariness necessarily involves pain. (4) If wrong acts
done deliberately are voluntary, and those done through anger
and desire involuntary, how is it that, making no difference,
we feel that we are to avoid the one as well as the other?

And passion and reason being equally essential parts of human
nature, and springs of human action, it is absurd to attempt
this distinction between the acts which result from them.

CHAP. II.—Deliberate Choice (προαιρέσις) is compounded of an
element of impulse and an element of judgment.

This explanation of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' clears the way for the discussion of Deliberate Choice, which obvi-

anything it is clearly a voluntary act to do it.

3. τι διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] The words τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι belong in
sense to 'τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμαρτηθέντα' only. What difference is
there between deliberate errors and errors of passion from the
fact of the latter being (as it is argued) involuntary, since we
ought to avoid both kinds of error? If one class were volun-
tary and the other involuntary, we should not have the same
feeling about avoiding them both.

6. τὰ ἀλογα πάθη] i.e. τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἕπιθυμιάν, as opposed to
τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν.

CHAP. II.—The object of this
Chapter is to establish the compound character of ἰπραίρεσις or deliberate choice, as consisting of an element of impulse and an element of judgment. This is done by proving that it is not identical with any sort of impulse singly, or of judgment singly. If it were identical with impulse, it must be either desire, spirit, or wish (these being assumed as an exhaustive classification of impulse (ὄρεξις), as Aristotle elsewhere (De An. II. iii. 2) explains). That it is not any of these, is shown in §§ 3—9. If it were identical with judgment (δόξα), or the expression of an opinion merely, it must be either judgment generally (δόξα ἀπλῶς), or judgment when exercised in a certain sphere, viz. matters of practical interest (δόξα τε). That this is not so is shewn in §§ 10—15. It is then affirmed to be a choice resulting from deliberation, thus combining both impulse and judgment.

1. οἰκείοτατον γὰρ 'It (viz. ἰπραίρεσις) appears to be very closely connected with Virtue, and to be a better test of moral character than actions.' The question whether the intention or the outward act is more important in morals is again referred to, X. viii. 5.

6. τὰ ἐξαιρήσεις Acts done 'on the spur of the moment.'

7. The principal difference between ἐπιθυμία (for which 'desire' is too wide, and 'appetite' too narrow) and βουλήσις, or 'wish,' is that ἐπιθυμία is in connexion with a body, while βουλήσις is not. A spirit could experience βουλήσις, but not ἐπιθυμία.
not act with deliberate choice. (This argument applies to
4 Anger also.) (b) The incontinent act in accordance with
5 their desires, but against their deliberate choice; the con-
tinent, *vice versa*. (c) Desire is not opposed to desire, but
to something else, viz. deliberate choice, which checks or
resists it. (d) Desire is limited to what is pleasurable and
6 painful, but deliberate choice is not. (2) Still less can it be
Spirit, for impetuous actions are the very last we should
7 describe as done through deliberate choice. (3) It is not the
same as Wish, though not very dissimilar to it. (a) We may
wish for impossibilities, but we cannot deliberately choose

4. The third argument seems to rest on the notion (found also
in Plato) that conflict or opposition can only occur between two
different parts of our constitution, e.g. between desire and
reason, between impulse and resolution, etc., but that no de-
partment, whether that of reason or desire, or any other, can be
‘divided against itself.’ In fact, it follows from the ‘law of con-
tradiction’ that nothing can do or suffer contraries at the same
time in reference to the same part of itself, etc. A similar
argument was employed in I. xiii. 15, etc., to show the dis-
inctness of the appetitive and rational parts of the soul. Also
it should be remembered that *éti* (as was explained above),
like ‘appetite,’ implies a physical or bodily affection, such as
thirst, hunger, etc., of which the statement in the text is clearly
true.

7. For *θυμός* see *Suppl. Note.*
8 ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἄθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δὲ αὐτοῦ πρακτεῖ ἄν, οἷον ὑποκρίσης τινα νικᾶν ἡ ἀθλητήν προαρέσται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδές, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἄν δὲ αὐτοῦ.

9 'Ετι ὑ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον υγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δὲ ὄν υγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαίμονείς βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐκ ἄρμοζεν ὅλως γὰρ έουκεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ δὲ δόξα ἀν εὑρῇ ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔττον περὶ τὰ αὕτα καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἡ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τῷ ψευδεί καὶ ἀληθεί διαίρεται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.

10 ὁλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταύτων ἰσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδές. 'Αλλ' 8 them. (b) We may wish for things which, though not im-
possible, are out of our own power. (c) Wish refers to ends,
deliberate choice to means. Hence deliberate choice is no
sort of impulse singly. ii. Secondly, it is not judgment, or
expression of opinion, merely. (a) Judgment or opinion may
be on all subjects, whether in our power or out of it. (b) The
excellence, or the reverse, of judgment consists in its being
true or false to fact; that of deliberate choice in its being
morally good or bad. It might however be thought to be

1. ἄθανασίας] 'exemption from death.' This, like vi. 6 (see note),
is an allusion of too passing a
kind to bear on the question of
Aristotle's belief in a future
state.

8. καὶ φαμέν] 'we use the
expression wish to be happy'—
an appeal to common language.

10. δόξα here stands for an
intellectual decision, the mere
pronouncing of an opinion as to a
fact, apart from any impulse or
desire for action. Though it
would be hardly supposed that
προαίρεσις could be identical
with this generally (§ 11), yet it
might be thought identical with
such an expression of opinion on
practical or moral subjects. This
is the δόξα τίς or particular ap-
lication of opinion referred to
in §§ 11, etc.
simply an expression of opinion on subjects practical or moral. This is not the case, for (a) Character is formed by deliberate choice of good and evil, not by opinions on such subjects. (b) Deliberate Choice relates to pursuing or avoiding, opinion relates to questions of fact. (c) The excellence of deliberate choice depends on its direction to right objects; that of opinion on its correctness in fact. (d) We deliberately choose what we know or feel sure about; we form opinions irrespec-
tive of knowledge or certainty. (e) Excellence of deliberate choice and of opinion are not always united in the same per-
sons, e.g. the incontinent. Whether correct opinion precedes or accompanies deliberate choice is unimportant, we

4. λαβεῖν ή φυγεῖν] another appeal to the usage of language. We do not speak of forming an opinion to pursue or avoid, but of forming a resolution or choice to do so.

6. ἢ is ‘or,’ not ‘than,’ as may be inferred from what was said in § 10, just above.

9. ἔνοι] precisely the case of

the incontinent (ἀκατέργαση). See § 4 above.

11. Aristotle here notices, without discussing, the interest-
ing question whether correct views (δόξα) precede good reso-
lutions (προαίρεσις), or vice versa; whether right knowledge usually leads to right practice, or right practice to right knowledge.
16 esti dodek' tiv. Ti ouv h poion ti estin, epeid' tout oerhmeinous outhev; ekousion mou de faivetai, to de ekouv
17 stov ou paiw proairetov. 'Alla ara ge to prozebou-
leunenon; h gar proaireseis meta logon kai diavolias.
'Tpousumai'nein de 'eoike kai tounoma vos ou pro etero 5
aieretov.

1 III. Boulevnontai de poteva peri pantovn, kai paiw bou-
2 leonton estin, h peri evion ouk esti bouli; (lektewon de
isos bouleunton ouk uper ou bouleusesait an tis hliathos
3 h maivomenos, 'all' uper ow o noyn eixw.) Peri de twn 10
aidion oudeis boulevnetai, oin peri to kosomei h tis
4 diame'trion kai tis plenevas, oti asy'mmetro.

16 only maintain that they are not identical. We have then ad-
vanced thus far. Deliberate choice is voluntary and some-
thing more. In fact, as the name indicates, it is 'a choic
following upon deliberation.'

CHAP. III.—The proper objects of Deliberation (bouleuvios).

Proper objects of Deliberation determined. (§§ 1—11).

5. Thus the compound char-
acter of deliberate choice is
established, choice implying an
element of impulse, deliberation
an element of intellect or judg-
ment.

CHAP. III.—Deliberate Choice
having been shown in the last
chapter to consist in choice after
deliberation, we now inquire (1)
what are the proper objects and
limits of deliberation, and (2)
how its objects are related to, or
distinguished from, those of the
compound, deliberate choice?

12. diame'trion k.t.l.] We do
not deliberate about the incommensurability of the side and
diameter of a square, because we
cannot alter it. The diameter =
the side \( \times \sqrt{2} \), and as \( \sqrt{2} \) can-
not be exactly found, the dia-
meter and side are incommensur-
able.
perὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταύτα γινομένων, εἰτ' ἤξ ἀνάγκης εἰτε καὶ φύσει ἥ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οίνον 5 τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἄλλως, οίνον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὀμβρων. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, 6 οἴνον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἴνον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο οὕτως Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἀν 7 τούτων οὐθὲν δὲ ἡμῶν. Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἔφη ἡμῶν πρακτῶν ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ λοιπά. Διὰ τοῦτο 5

ing to a fixed law; (c) Things changeable, which change according to no discoverable law; (d) Things depending on 6 pure chance where there can be no law; (e) In short anything whatever which is not in our own power. (2) Positively, we 7 do deliberate (a) about things in our own power; and each

3. τροπῶν] 'solstices.' The accent shows that it comes from τροπῇ, not τρόπος.
9. αἰτία γὰρ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.] This must be considered as a popular classification of causes familiar to his hearers (such current opinions being often introduced, as we have seen, by the verb δοκεῖν—see note on I. iii. 2), rather than one for which Aristotle would hold himself responsible.

With this proviso, we may suppose the classification to have originated from the observation that causes naturally distinguished themselves as either irrational or rational. The former were further divided into φύσις, ἀνάγκη, τύχη, perhaps on some such notion as the following—

i. Some phenomena, varying within fixed limits, seem to imply the existence of law, yet tempered, as it were, by some power behind it (φύσις), regulating and modifying its applications: e.g. The relations between seed and crop; the variations of hot, cold, wet or dry seasons, subject to the invariable distinction between the seasons themselves; the preservation of the species in the reproduction of animals, notwithstanding endless minor differences in the individuals. Such operations would probably be assigned to Nature (φύσις).

ii. Some events seem to recur under a law invariable and inviolable, as if it worked itself mechanically: e.g. The rising and setting of the sun, the succession of summer and winter, day and night. Such phenomena
speaking generally, more in reference to arts than sciences, there being naturally more generalities and uncertainties in the former; (c) about means and not about ends. In short the Analysis of process of deliberation is this: Some end is set up which we desire to attain to. We consider the means by which it can be attained; and if there are several, which will be the easiest and best means.

Having by choice or necessity settled upon some one means, we then consider how this means can be secured, and in a manner not subject to variations; e.g. The sciences figure; Arithmetic still more so of Anatomy, Harmonics, Geometry would be or conditions. e.g. The sciences implying only the notions of logic are not in this succession and number. sense, because each implies some condition of its existence as a result desired.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that such distinctions are unphilosophical, being liable to disturbance upon every addition to our physical knowledge. (For Aristotle's own view of φύσις see Glossary p. liv.)

The class of rational causes is subdivided into νοὺς and πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπον. The former apparently refers to Intelligence or Design as displayed in the physical world, which in a modern system would be described as Providence, or, still more personally, as God. πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπον includes all results brought about by human agency. This last group alone falls within the sphere of Deliberation.

4. ἐπιστημῶν] The word is used loosely for knowledge generally, including arts, for strictly speaking it would follow from what is said throughout the Chapter that Deliberation is only concerned with practical and not theoretical subjects, and therefore strictly speaking not with Sciences but Arts only (see Glossary, Art and Science). The instances given by Aristotle of such ἐπιστήμαι as we do deliberate about, viz. ἰατρική, κυβερνητική, χρηματιστική, are evidently in the strict sense not ἐπιστήμαι but τέχναι. ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις] ἀκριβῆς means 'accurate' or 'pre-
speaking generally, more in reference to arts than sciences, there being naturally more generalities and uncertainties in the former; (c) about means and not about ends. In short the process of deliberation is this:—Some end is set up which we desire to attain to. We consider the means by which it can be reached; and if there are several, which will be the easiest and best means. Having by choice or necessity settled upon some one means, we then consider how this means can be secured,
Deliberation begins when the object of deliberation affords another proof of the middle between the extremes. The problem being thus brought back to steps within our power (εϊς άν ἕλθωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρῶτον αἰτίου), our investigation is at an end (ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἐσχατών ἔστι), and we at once proceed with the construction of the Proposition as given by Euclid, and thus ἐσχατῶν ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει, becomes ἔρωτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

12 ὄσπερ διάγραμμα. (Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βοῦλευσις, οὔτως μὲν ζήτησις, οὔτως ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἐσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει). Κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντυχὼσιν, ἀφιστασται, οἴον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἴον τε ὅποιον τείς πορισθήναι· εὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Δυνατὰ δὲ ἢ δε ἢμῶν γένοιτ' ἀν' τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν and so on as long as may be necessary, until we arrive at some means in our own power. This last step in the deliberation is the first in the practical effort of securing the end desired. If some necessary means prove impossible to secure, the deliberation ceases and the project is abandoned. If on the other hand the means prove feasible, then too deliberation

1. ὄσπερ διάγραμμα] like a geometrical figure. We might take for an instance Eucl. i. 10. It is desired to draw a perpendicular to a given line from a given point in the line (δὲμενον τέλος τι).

(1) Asking ourselves what conditions will secure this (πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται), we observe that making the adjacent angles equal would do so.

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

(2) Next, how can we make the adjacent angles equal (πῶς διὰ τούτων ἔσται)? By causing them to be parts of two triangles either with two sides and the included angles equal (Prop. 4), or with all three sides equal (Prop. 8).

(3) Choosing the latter as preferable (διὰ πλειώνον μὲν φαινομένου διὰ τίνος ραττα κ.π.λ.), how can we secure a triangle with equal sides (κάκεινο διὰ τίνος)? We see this to be in our power by taking any points in AB, viz. D and E, equidistant from P, erecting on DE an equilateral triangle DFE (by Prop. 1) and joining FP.
The proper objects of wish have been thought to be either what is really good or whatever appears good. They are therefore the same, except that the latter is already resolved upon as the result of the deliberation. When the choice is made, the deliberation ceases.

Thus we define deliberate choice to be a choice following upon deliberation of something in our power.
19 γελλου τῳ δήμῳ. "Οντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὄρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαιρέσεις ἀν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὄρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

20 Ἡ μὲν οὖν προαιρέσεις τῦτο εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἰρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἁγαθοῖς ἔναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου

are therefore the same, except that the latter is already resolved upon as the result of the deliberation. When the choice is made, the deliberation ceases.

20 Thus we define deliberate choice to be 'a choice following upon deliberation of something in our power.'

CHAP. IV.—The proper objects of Wish (βούλησις).

As we should not deliberate about means, unless we had first conceived of some end as desirable, we next inquire into the nature of that faculty, viz. 'wish' or 'desire,' which sets

'in this little kingdom, man,' has made its decision, deliberation is over and action succeeds.

1. βουλευτοῦ ὄρεκτοῦ] This recalls the compound character of προαιρέσεις described in ch. ii., βουλευτοῦ indicating the intellectual, and ὄρεκτοῦ the impulsive, element of the compound process.

CHAP. IV.—In this Chapter we inquire into the nature of the faculty which sets up the end in the first instance as desirable, with a view to which end deliberation (βουλευσις) discusses the means, and deliberate choice (προαιρεσις) decides upon them.

In other words we ask what are the proper objects of wish (βούλησις)? Thus every deliberate act implies the three stages βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαιρέσεις. See Glossary, s. v. προαιρεσις.

This Chapter contains a criticism of the two extreme theories, (1) that the objects of wish are things really good, and so, ultimately, the Absolute or Chief Good (Plato); (2) that they are anything that appear at the time good (the Sophists), and also a solution of the question by Aristotle upon an intermediate ground, since the former theory contradicts facts, and the latter, feelings.
2 ἀγαθῶν. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν τὸ βουλητῶν τῶγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ ἐναι βουλητῶν ὁ βουλεταί ὁ μὴ ὅρθως αἰ-ρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ βουλητῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἥν εἰ, 3 εἰ ὅπως ἐτυχὲ, κακὸν), τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλητῶν λέγουσι μὴ ἐναι φύσει βουλητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν ἄλλο δ’ ἄλλω φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ ὅπως ἐτυχὲ, τάναυτία. Εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φα-τέον ἄπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν βουλητῶν εἶναι τῶγα-θὸν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν ὅπως σπουδαῖοι τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὦσπερ 10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένους ὑγιείαν ἐστὶ τὰ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν τοιαύτα ὅντα, τοῖς δ’ ἐπινύσοις ἐτέρα. Ομοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὰ; ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἐκαστα

2 such ends before us. Two views present themselves:—i. That the objects of desire are really good. ii. That they are what- ever may appear to each individual to be good. We object to the first, that it contradicts facts, as men obviously do desire 3 what is bad; and to the second, that it seems to deny that 4 there are objects per se desirable, and vice versa. The truth seems to be that as when we speak of things being wholesome and so on we mean wholesome to those whose bodies are in a healthy state, so also when we speak of things being desirable, we mean such things as are objects of desire to those whose minds are well regulated. Thus we escape both the above objec- tions: we maintain that there are things naturally and per se

1. τῶγαθὸν] The Chief Good was, according to Plato, the ultim- mate object of all wish or desire, because all that was good in any lower objects was derived from, and limited to, their participation in the Chief Good. See note on I. iv. 3.

10. ὦσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle’s argument is, that all rela- tive terms whatsoever present the same difficulty, if we are to take account of individual exceptions and abnormal circumstances.

5 desirable, and that in the midst of the aberrations and perversions of individual men, who simply follow pleasure and avoid pain, the desires of the good man are an index to us of what is thus naturally and per se desirable.

CHAP. V.—A refutation of the theory that Virtue is voluntary, but Vice involuntary.

1. τάληθές αὐτῷ φαίνεται]
Thus the real standard is an absolute and not a relative one. The σπουδαῖος does not fix the standard, but his known conformity to the standard enables us to use him as a substitute for it. Similarly it is not the barometer but the pressure of the atmosphere which regulates the weather; the barometer is only a convenient index of the phenomena which it does not itself influence. It is in this restricted sense, therefore, that the σπουδαῖος is said in 1. 4 to be κανὼν καὶ μέτρον τοῦ αἴληθος. Compare, 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things.'

CHAP. V.—Aristotle concludes this part of his subject with a sort of supplementary Chapter to refute a theory which, owing to Plato's advocacy, had obtained considerable prominence, viz. that Virtue is voluntary but Vice involuntary. The theory seems to have arisen thus:—In all cases of right or wrong action where a conscious struggle takes place, the two alternatives are presented to us, present pleasure involving future pain and regret, or present pain (of self-denial) with subsequent pleasure and satisfaction. Thus it becomes a matter for calculation, Is the present pleasure so great as to counterbalance the future pain? Is it so great as to make it worth
while to risk the consequences? If a man, decides that it is, and does wrong accordingly, he has simply (it is argued) made a mistake in his calculation, he has committed an error of judgment merely, and all wrong-doing, since it arises out of such a mistake, is therefore involuntary. No one ever deliberately chooses anything but what *at the time* appears to him the better choice (τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καρδὸν ἔστιν as we read in i. 6), and what is more, he cannot help its so appearing to him (see § 17 of this Chapter) any more than he can help an object's appearing red or green to him. Thus when a man chooses the right he chooses knowingly and voluntarily for the best: when he chooses the wrong he chooses it still under a mistaken impression that he is choosing for the best: he acts under an illusion and therefore involuntarily.

There seem to be four main arguments in the Chapter:—

(1) §§ 2—4. An *argumentum ad hominem* against the position of those half-necessitarians who maintain that though Vice is involuntary, Virtue is voluntary.

(2) §§ 5—16. Against the more logical and thorough-going necessitarians who argue that all our actions, virtuous as well as vicious, are merely the necessary result of causes and circumstances external to ourselves.

(3) §§ 17, 18. Against the principal argument by which the half-necessitarians supported their position.

(4) §§ 19, 20. Against a modified form of the same argument.

1. *περὶ ταῦτα* in l. 1 obviously refers to 'means' (*τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*). *περὶ ταῦτα* in l. 3 must have the same reference, and the argument is, that as the exercise of Virtue involves the choice of means, it must be voluntary. This, however, is generally admitted, and the purpose of the Chapter is rather to show that the same inference applies to Vice.
πράττεν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἑσται αἰσχρὸν δὲ, καὶ εἶ τὸ μὴ πράττεν καλὸν δὲ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττεν αἰσχρὸν ὅτι ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Ἐι δ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττεν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττεν, τούτο δ’ ἂν τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς εἶναι, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἡρᾶ τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις 5 εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηρὸς οὐδ’ ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἑυδεῖ τὸ δ’ ἀληθεῖ: μακάριος μὲν ἂρ 5 οὐδεὶς άκων, ἢ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκουσίουν. Ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν οὐ̣ φατέον 10
disputed, we prove it as follows:—i. If it is in our own power to act, it must also be in our own power not to act (else our action was not really in our power but was compulsory), and vice versa. Now if acting (or not acting) in any case be right, the reverse would be wrong. Consequently if to do right is in our power, so also is to do wrong: in a word, if 5 Virtue is voluntary, so is Vice. ii. If, in order to escape this conclusion, it be denied outright that man is himself the

4. ἦν = ‘this was admitted to constitute our being good or bad.’ ἀγαθός καὶ κακός is in attraction with ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. See another instance of ἦν thus used in viii. 14. 9. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοι refers to the previous conclusions about the voluntary nature of βούλευσις and προαιρέσις, with the assertion of which this Chapter opens.

Aristotle now turns to the more thorough-going and more logical position that all our actions, good and bad alike, are the necessary result of our condition and circumstances; in other words, that we are not free and responsible agents at all. His first argument against it consists in what is called ‘shifting the burden of proof.’ It is not for those who accept, but for those who deny, what is prima facie true, to bring arguments in support of their position. The prima facie truth in this case is that man himself originates his own acts, and until some other origin for them can be proved, we have a right, without further argument, to maintain that he does so originate them. Hence φαϊνεται is emphatic.
originating cause of his acts either good or bad, (1) we reply that it rests with those who deny what is to all appearance the case to suggest some other cause, and if they cannot, we infer without further proof that a man does originate his acts, and if so, that they are voluntary. (2) We appeal to the universal practice of mankind in private and in public life, which by rewards and punishments encourages to virtuous, and discourages from vicious, acts. This proves at least that mankind generally consider both virtuous and vicious acts to be in our power. (3) So far are mankind at large from regard-

4. The second and third arguments consist in an appeal to the universal practice and belief of mankind. This further strengthens the assertion made by φαίνεται as explained in the last note, and serves to show that the opponents fly in the face not only of what is prima facie true, but also of what is universally believed and acted upon. (See Supplementary Notes.)

6. κόλασις and τιμωρία differ in that κόλασις is punishment for the sake of him who suffers it, that he may reform: τιμωρία is punishment for the sake of him who inflicts it, that he may be revenged. The idea of the former is 'chastisement;' that of the latter, 'vengeance.'

13. καὶ γὰρ] 'and what is more:' introducing a still more cogent proof.
κολάξουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοιας, οἴον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τούτῳ οὗ αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοιας. Καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἄ δει ἐπίτασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ ἐστὶ, κολάξουσιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δὴ ἀμέλειαι ἁγνείων δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς ἄν τὸ μὴ ἁγνοεῖν τὸ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. Ἀλλά ἵσως τοιοῦτος ἀκείν ἀποκρείεται αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζωντες ἀνεμείνως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ἀκολάστου εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακοπροέννεις, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἑκαστὰ ἐνέργεια τοιοῦτος ποιοῦσιν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετῶντων πρὸς ἵπτιμονν ἁγωνίαν ἢ πράξιν διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἑνεργοῦντες. Τὸ μὲν αὐτῷ ἁγνεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργείων περὶ ἑκαστα αἰ ἐξεῖς γίνονται, κομιδὴ ἀναισθῆτον. Ἔτι δὲ ἅλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἅλογον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἁκολαστον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἁγνοῦν τις πράττει εἶ ὅνιγιαλ συν εἰς ὅνιγιαλ συν εἰς ὅνιγιαλ συν ὁ ἀκολαστον.  

9, 10 (c) Or for any other sort of careless ignorance. (d) Or even for ignorance through incapacity if the incapacity be the result of previous Vice; for single acts repeated form permanent habits. Every one who is not a downright idiot must know this much from daily experience, and it cannot avail to say that he did not wish it to be so in his case: nor does it follow

1. τοῖς μεθύουσι κ.τ.λ.] a law facti non nocet.

of Pittacus of Mytilene.

4. Compare the maxim 'Ignoratio juris nocet, ignoratio character.' See II. ii. 8.
1. ὧν ἡμᾶς ἠν ἔνας τὸν οὐ ἐνιαύτης, ἀδικοῖς ὃν παύεσται καὶ ἐσται δίκαιος· ὧν ἡμᾶς ἀδικοὶ,

15 that he can arrest the formation of the habit at any step after the first. The first steps of moral, as often of physical, disease are voluntary, and though its progress soon passes out of our power, yet as we are responsible for its beginning, we are also answerable for all that it afterwards becomes. (e) The same remarks apply to bodily defects, which we pity if of natural or accidental growth, but visit with reproach if traceable to neglect, excess, or any other avoidable causes, and we may reasonably suppose that defects of body and of soul are blamed on the same principle, viz. when men believe them to be

1. ous ἡμᾶς ἠν ἔνας γε κ.τ.λ.] ‘It does not however follow that if,’ etc.

5. προεμένον] ‘When he has thrown away his health’ (Grant). προεμένον is the word used for squandering money in IV. 1,
voluntary. iii. It is sometimes argued, ‘We all desire what
appears to us good, and we are not responsible for the appearance
presented, or impression made upon us, by external
objects.’ To this we reply (1) that if we are responsible for
our general condition, we must be so in some sense for the
impression which things make upon us, for this depends upon
our condition to a great extent; (2) if we are not so respons-
ible, then all that our opponents say is true: we are not
bearing on the argument in hand
are introduced by εἰ δὲ ταῦτ’,
ἐστιν ἀληθῆ in § 18.

6. ἐξίς has the simple meaning
of ‘state’ or ‘condition.’ The
impression which things make
on us, morally as well as physi-
cally, depends very much on our
condition, and for this we are in
some degree (πῶς) responsible.
Compare Butler: ‘When we say
that men are misled by external
circumstances of temptation, it
cannot but be understood that
there is somewhat within them-
selves to render those circum-
stances temptations, or to render
them susceptible of impressions
from them’ (Anal. p. 78, ed.
Angus).

ii. The argumen
t that we are not re-
ponsible for the impressions
which external objects make
upon us, nor therefore for
acting accordingly, is re-
futed (1) by denying
its truth; (2) by showing
that it proves too much, as
it applies to Virtue as well
as Vice.

2. εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ.] The argu-
ment now returns to the first
class of opponents who maintain
that Virtue is voluntary and Vice
involuntary, and it attacks the
favourite argument on which
they mainly relied. This was
explained in the note at the
commencement of this Chapter.

3. φαντασία here has its ori-
ginal signification of ‘appear-
ance,’ and is little more than a
repetition of φανομένου just
before.

5. Observe the alternatives εἰ
μὲν οὖν . . . εἰ δὲ μή. The con-
sequences following on the latter
supposition are enumerated as
far as the end of § 17, and the
results of those consequences as

οὐ. Εἰ δ’ οὖτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν
κακίων ἐφ’ ἴμιν ἄν ἔσεν. Εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ότι πάντες
ἐφένται τῷ φαινομένου ἁγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ
κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποίος τοῦ ἐκαστὸς ἐστὶ, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ
τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· [εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκαστὸς ἐμφανές τῆς
ἐξεσθῆς ἐστὶ πῶς αὐτίκος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐσται πως
αὐτὸς αὐτίκος;] εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁποιεὶς αὐτῷ αὐτίκος τοῦ κακᾶ
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀγνοοῦν τοῦ τέλους ταύτα πράττειν διὰ
τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἀριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἢ δὲ τοῦ

ii. The argument that we are not responsible for the impressions which external objects make upon us, nor therefore for acting accordingly, is refuted (1) by denying its truth; (2) by showing that it proves too much, as it applies to Virtue as well as Vice.

2. εἰ δὲ τις κ.τ.λ.] The argument now returns to the first class of opponents who maintain that Virtue is voluntary and Vice involuntary, and it attacks the favourite argument on which they mainly relied. This was explained in the note at the commencement of this Chapter.

3. φαντασία here has its original signification of ‘appearance,’ and is little more than a repetition of φανομένου just before.

5. Observe the alternatives εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . εἰ δὲ μή. The consequences following on the latter supposition are enumerated as far as the end of § 17, and the results of those consequences as
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Aristotle's Ethics.

Chapter V.

The choice of ends is voluntary if we do wrong; the choice of the ends at which we aim depends on our nature and constitution, not on ourselves; and a right tendency in this respect will constitute the highest perfection of natural gifts. But all this applies just as much to the choice of good ends as of bad ones. It removes the credit of our good acts as well as the blame of our bad acts. In a word, it proves Virtue to be as involuntary as Vice.

1. φύναι is emphatic. 'One must be born with, as it were, a sense of sight by which,' etc. If a man is born colour-blind he cannot help seeing things differently from other people; he is not master of the appearance presented to him (τῆς φαντασίας ὑπὸ κύριοι). So, it is argued by the opponents, moral, like physical, impressions depend on purely natural causes beyond our control.

2. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον κτ.λ.] Understand ἐστὶ. 'For it is that which is greatest and noblest, and that which none can (μὴ ?) receive or learn from another, but as it is born with him so he will always have it.' We might also understand ἔστι or έξελ before τὸ μέγιστον, and so avoid the change of nominative in the above rendering.

3. Eίτε δὴ introduces Aristotle's own view; εἴτε τὸ μὲν (in 1. 1, p. 144) that of the opponents, which he proceeds to refute; οὐδὲν ἤπειτο, the apodosis to both suppositions.

4. ἀυτῶν] 'depending on himself.' Arnold (note on Thuc. i. 141. 9) compares the English
CHAP. VI.

The proper sphere and objects of Courage.

Proceeding now to the consideration of the Virtues in detail, we commence with Courage. This we have already described as a mean state in relation to Fear and Confidence. Fear may be defined as the anticipation of Evil of any kind, the condition of fear, in our Definition of Virtue of which latter five types are as a whole.

1. The discussion of Courage, though involving occupies four Chapters, of which pain and loss, is no exception to the rule that all Virtue has pleasure in itself.

2. Our position is now proved, that if Virtue is voluntary so also is Vice voluntary.

3. The point we have now reached is this:—We have asserted Virtues to be mean states; we have shown how they are formed, and that they are in our own power and voluntary, and under the guidance of reason. The states or habits it is

that while the end (or the appearance of things to us as desirable) is fixed for us by natural causes, whether it be good or bad, yet that there is scope for the voluntariness of Virtue in the right choice of the means. To this we reply at once that the wrong choice of means, which would constitute Vice, is equally voluntary.

4. Recapitulation.

5. vulgarism 'along of himself.' Cf. vi. 11. παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν 'depending on their experience.'

6. συναιτιον] 'partly responsible for.' Notice that Aristotle admits that our habits are to some extent the result of causes over which we have no control.

7. τῶν ποιῶν τίνες εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] 'The condition in which we are regulates the character of the end which we set before us.'

8. ὁμοιός γὰρ] sc. ἔχουσι, 'they are on the same footing.'

9. υφὶ δὲν τὲ γῆνονται] This refers to such passages as II. i. 6, II. ii. 8, etc.

10. τούτων πρακτικαῖ καθ' αὐτάς] Explained by II. ii. 8.
1. Proceeding now to the consideration of the Virtues in detail, we commence with Courage. This we have already described as a mean state in regard to Fear and Confidence. Fear may be defined as the anticipation of Evil of any kind, and true are not voluntary in the same sense as the single acts which form them. As however their beginnings, though not the subsequent stages of their growth, are in our own power, the habits themselves are really in our own power.

**CHAP. VI.—The proper sphere and objects of Courage.**

1. The proper sphere and objects of Courage.
3. But we speak of Courage in reference to some only of the
4. objects of fear. E.g. We do not call a man courageous for
5. having no fear of disgrace, poverty, sickness, insults to
6. himself or his friends, envy, or even bodily chastisement.

Though the term Courage may sometimes be applied to
these cases, yet, strictly speaking, it has reference only to tho
5. the [προς] 'a man of proper feeling.'

16. μαθηματικόνθα τον ἀνδρείον [This is in
allusion to the Spartan custom of
whipping their youths to make
them fearless of pain, and so
brave soldiers.

17. After ὑπομενετικότερος
supply ἢ ὀ περὶ τῷ μέγιστῳ ἀφοβός.

18. πέρας γὰρ] This passage is
sometimes quoted as a proof that
Aristotle had no belief in any
sort of life after death. He
seems however here to be
speaking popularly in reference to
the circumstances and pros-
spects of ordinary life, and
therefore the passage cannot
fairly be pressed into the above
controversy.
γὰρ, καὶ ουδέν ἐτι τῷ τεθνεώτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
7 κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξει ε' ἂν οὔδε περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν
παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οὗν εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις.
8 Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ
ἐν πολέμῳ ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινοῦντο. 5
9 Ὁμολογοῦν δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαῖοι αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
10 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος
ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδείης, καὶ σοὶ θάνατον ἐπι-
φέρει ὑπόγυμα ὑντα. τοιαύτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλε-
μουν. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδείης
10 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὐτω δ' ὃς οἱ θαλάττιοι οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωφρίσει καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον
δισχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐλπιδέες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
12 Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδριζόνται ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἀλκή ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀπο-
θανεῖν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει. 15

The greatest of dangers, and such, from its absolute finality, is
7 Death. But we limit Courage still further to death of a noble
kind (excluding, e.g. death in shipwreck or disease), in fact,
8 strictly speaking, to death (and circumstances which threaten
death) in war, for this is admitted to be the noblest of all
deaths. Of course the brave man will be brave in all the
other cases that we have mentioned, but in its strict application
Courage is limited to death and danger in war, and cases
where there is some service or some glory to be gained by death.

9. ὑπόγυμος is literally 'under the hand' (γυῖον), and so
'thandy,' or 'near at hand.' It
is otherwise explained as =
'sudden.' In that case comp.
viii. 15. (See Suppl. Notes.)
11. οἱ μὲν = οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, οἱ δὲ
= οἱ θαλάττιοι. The courage of
sailors is often due to the fami-
liarity of experience. On this
kind of courage see further viii.
6, 9. The courage of the truly
brave man is shown in that, though
he desairs of safety and hates
the notion of such an inglorious
death, still he will meet it with-
out flinching.
14. ἀνδριζόνται] 'they also
play the man,' or 'actively display
courage.' On the force of the
middle voice cf. note on ἄθρωσεύ-
εσθαυ in X. viii. 6. There seems
VII. The objects of terror and its degree differ with different individuals, though some things there are which no human being in his right senses could regard without terror. Within these limits of human endurance the truly brave man is unshaken; his confidence as well as his fears, in respect of their objects, degrees, and occasions (in all of which points error is possible), being regulated by Reason, and his motive being always (as in all the other virtues) the ideally noble. Such are the charac-

Courage in its objects, degrees, and occasions is regulated by Reason and stimulated by desire for the ideally noble (τῷ καλῷ), (§§ 1–8.)
And not only the formed habit, but also each individual act of Courage, will be guided by this one motive, the attainment of the ideally noble.

Now both confidence and fear admit of excess. Excess of fearlessness (if we may so speak) i.e. a total absence of fear under difficult circumstances, exists rather in idea than in fact. Excess of confidence gives rise to the extreme of Rashness. The Rash man has also a tendency to swagger, and he makes an ostentation of Courage. To secure the reputation of Courage, for which he is anxious, he imitates its external signs as far as he can.

In real danger however such characters are often wanting. Excess of timidity (which implies defect of confidence) gives rise to the other extreme of Cowardice, which is manifested by over-sensitiveness to pain and by despondency.

Thus Rashness, Cowardice, and Courage relate to the same objects and circumstances; but Rashness and Cowardice manifest excess and defect, while Courage is a mean state, respecting them.

We might add that before the danger the coward is also deficient in confidence, but his Casars would be a familiar example. See especially Henry IV., Part I. Act ii.

The Excess and Defect are Rashness and Cowardice. (§§ 7—12.)
kaðáπερ φασί τοὺς Κελτούς. Ὡ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβαλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. Αὐκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαξῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. Ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἐξει, οὔτως οὔτος βούλεται ἐφόνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μυμεῖται. Διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειελοι. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασύνων μενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Ὡ δὲ τῷ φοβεισθαί ὑπερβαλλον δείλος· καὶ γὰρ ἢ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὁς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ἀκολουθέως αὐτῷ. Ἐξελεύπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβαλλον μᾶλλον λον καταφανῆς ἐστιν. Δύσελπισι δὴ τις ὁ δείλος· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. Ὡ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἑναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐελπίδος. Περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τε δείλος καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρος δὲ ἔχουσι προς αὐτῷ οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβαλλούσι καὶ ἐξελεύπουσιν, ὥ δὲ 15 all circumstances, exists rather in idea than in fact. Excess of 8 confidence gives rise to the extreme of Rashness. The Rash man has also a tendency to swagger, and he makes an ostenta- tion of Courage. To secure the reputation of Courage, for which he is anxious, he imitates its external signs as far as he can. 9 In real danger however such characters are often found want- 10 ing. Excess of timidity (which implies defect of confidence) gives rise to the other extreme of Cowardice, which is mani- 11 fested by over-sensitiveness to pain and by despondency. 12 Thus Rashness, Cowardice, and Courage relate to the same objects and circumstances; but Rashness and Cowardice manifest excess and defect, while Courage is a mean state, respecting them. We might add that before the danger comes 4. ἐκεῖνος, ἢ ἑ. ἀνδρεῖος. οὔτος, ἢ. ὁ θρασύς. 6. θρασύδειελοι] Falstaff would be a familiar example. See espe- cially Henry IV., Part I. Act ii. Sc. 4; Act v. Sc. 4, etc. ἐν τούτοις] ἢ. ἐν οἷς δύναται. 9. 'The coward is also defi- cient in confidence, but his char- acter is more usually displayed by an excessive sensibility to pain.' Cf. x. 1 (fin.), xi. 5.
the Rash are eager, the Brave are calm; in the danger the Brave are full of energy, the Rash fall away altogether.

13 It will follow from what we have said that Suicide is an act of Cowardice rather than of Courage. For the Suicide

Those who condemned it did so generally on one or other of these three grounds:

(1) On political grounds. Suicide deprived the state of services which it had a right to claim. Aristotle urges this in V. xi. 1-3. The Stoics admitted that Suicide was wrong when this result could be shown to be involved in it. Hadrian regarded the suicide of a Roman soldier as equivalent to desertion.

(2) On the ground that it was an act of cowardice, as Aristotle argues in this passage. So Seneca, 'It is folly to die for fear of death,' and Ovid:

Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam;
Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest.

(3) Less seldom on the usual modern ground that it amounts to an abandonment of a post of duty in which God has placed us. This was the point of view of Plato (see Phædo, etc.) and his successors, also of Pythagoras (Cic. de Senect. xx. § 73), who
faces death not because it is noble, but because he regards death as a less evil than that from which he seeks to escape.

**CHAP. VIII.**—**Spurious forms of Courage described.**

In contrast with genuine Courage now described, there are five spurious forms which must be distinguished from it.

1. The **courage of compulsion**, which may perhaps be called 'Social' courage, because it arises from fear of society. Its nobler type is that which is due to fear of loss of character, or of the good opinion of those among whom we live, or even to the influence of the rewards and punishments by which

" forbids a man to desert his post without the order of his commander, who is God."

(Several other quotations from ancient moralists will be found in Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, i. p. 223, etc.)

3. [υπομένει] Understand διάνατον from the general sense of the context. See vi. 12.

15. The whole line runs, Π. viii. 149:

"Τυδείδης ὑπ’ ἐμείο φοβεύμενος ἐκετο νήσος."

Thus the Courage of Dio-
3. **Ωμοιώσαι δ' αὐτή μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι
d' ἀρετὴν γίνεται δ' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὀρεξὶν
4. (τιμής γὰρ) καὶ φυγὴν οὐνέδους, αἰσχροῦ δυτος. Τάξαι
δ' ἀν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχοντων ἀναγκαζομένους
eἰς ταῦτα: χείρους δ' ὅσῳ οὐ δ' αἰδῶ ἄλλα διὰ φόβουν
5. αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἄλλα τὸ λυ-
πηρόν· ἀναγκάζοσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὡσπερ ὁ 'Ἑκτωρ
δὲν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσοντα νόησω,
6. οὐ οὗ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγεῖν κύνας.

5. Καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτουντες τὸ
αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
παρατάττοντες. πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. Άεὶ δ' οὐ δ' ἠ
ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἰναι, ἄλλ' ὑπὸ καλῶν. Δοκεὶ δ' καὶ

3 civil society encourages Bravery, and thus, the motive being
4 noble, in some cases this type approximates very nearly to
5 the genuine virtue. A baser form may be seen in the courage
6 of troops who are driven to battle with the lash, or drawn up
in positions where retreat is impossible. 2. The courage of
mede is represented as due to the fear that Hector would tri-
umph over him, if defeated. Conversely to the case in the
text it has been said, 'Perfect Courage is doing without wit-
nesses all that one could do if the world were spectators' (La
Rochefoucauld, Max. 216).

1. Aristotle here touches
upon a question of the greatest
interest in moral science, How far
does a system of rewards and
punishments destroy the charac-
ter of Virtue by reducing it to a
calculation of self-interest? It
depends greatly on the character of
the rewards and punishments
themselves. If they consist in
physical pleasure or pain, no
true virtue can be developed by
them. If however they be
themselves moral (e.g. testimony
of a good conscience, dread of
shame or self-reproach, etc.), the
stimulus to action which they
afford is but a form of the love
of Virtue and hatred of Vice in
themselves. The case described
in § 3 would illustrate the latter
case, that in §§ 4 and 5 the
former.

10. τύπτουντες] e.g. as Herodo-
tus (vii. 223) says was the case
with the Persian soldiers at the
invasion of Greece.
Experience, which Socrates thought the truest type of Courage. Experience enables soldiers, for example, so to estimate the real danger that they are not alarmed by circumstances that 7, 8 would terrify the inexperienced. Thus experience as it were

1. ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἑκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης φήσῃ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δὲ οἱ στρατιώται δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἡ μάλιστα συνεφράκασιν οὕτω φαίνονται δὴ ἀνдрέων, ὅτι οὐκ ἵσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. Εἶτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι

savage cries of barbarians, which are most alarming to the inexperienced, but which make no impression on the veteran. It was said that at the commencement of the war between France and Prussia, there were served out to the young German troops pictures of the Turcos and their mode of fighting, in order to give them that ἐμπειρία which would render them proof against such terrors. Another reading is καίνα, i.e. there are many ‘surprises’ in war; but this evidently spoils the sense.

5. φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρείον κ.τ.λ.] This would be further illustrated by the example introduced in vi. 11. The indifference of sailors in an ordinary gale is regarded by a landsman as courage (ὅτι οὐκ ἵσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν), whereas in truth their ἐμπειρία reveals that there is no danger, and therefore no occasion for courage.

4. πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] i.e. many dangers in war are unreal, e.g. the ferocious aspect and
puts a weapon into their hands which others have not, and hence their courage. There is however another aspect of this. Experience sometimes points out the real magnitude of a danger which makes little impression on those who are inexperienced, and so sometimes veterans shrink back when raw levies press on. Thus courage which rests on the knowledge that the danger is small becomes cowardice when the danger is known to be great. This therefore is not true

9. τὰ πολιτικὰ nearly resembled our militia as distinguished from regular troops. It is not quite clear to what event reference is made in the text. It is easy, however, to suppose that veterans would be much more sensitive (say) to a flank movement on the part of the enemy, or to a threatening of their communications, than inexperienced troops would be, and would thus be more likely to be disorganized by it. It is experience which makes doctors proverbiaily the most desponding patients, because they understand what symptoms portend.

The following recent occurrence seems in point: 'The troops who behaved worst in this affair (a skirmish near Paris) were the regulars, Zouaves, who fled like deer. The Gardes Mobiles stood their ground' (Paris letter, Sept. 23, 1870).
10 ὃ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιούτος. Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν ἀνδρείοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὡσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρόσαντας φερόμενοι, ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θυμοειδεῖς ἥττηματατον γὰρ ὃ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ἔθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος

σθένος ἐμβάλε θυμῷ
καὶ
μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐγειρε
καὶ
ὅμοιὸς δ' ἀνὰ μίνας μένος
καὶ
ἐξεσεν αἰμα·

πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα έοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἐνεργιν καὶ όρμήν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὃ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγήναι ἡ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν γε ἐν ὑλῃ ἡ ἐν ἐλει ἢ, οὐ προσέρχονται. Οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὄρμαν, οὔθεν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὖτοι γε καὶ οἱ οὖν ἀνδρείου εἶνεν πεινώντες τυπ-τόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμῆρα πολλὰ δρόσων. Οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἡ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. Φυσικωτάτη δ' ἐοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν

11. The courage of high spirit.—It is true that the courageous are high-spirited, and that the outward signs of courage and high spirit are similar, and also that high spirit is a stimulus to courage. But they are not identical, else

4. ἥττημα] 'apt to advance;' 24. φυσικωτάτη] 'more purely connected with ἐμι (ibid) through physical than other sorts of Courage.'
CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

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θυμον εἰναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαιρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὖ ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἰναι. Καὶ οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ δὴ ὅρμηζομενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἱδοναί: οἱ δὲ διὰ ταύτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος: παραπλή-

13 σιον δ’ ἔχουσι τι. Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες οὖντες ἀν-

δρεῖον διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νεικηκέναι ἑσσάρουσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. Παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὡς ἄμφω

θαρραλέοι: ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα
θαρραλεῖ, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττον εἶναι καὶ

14 μὴθεν ἀντιπαθεῖν. Τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκό-

μενοι εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. "Ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς µὴ

συµβῆ τοιαύτα, φεύγουσιν ἄνδρεῖον δ’ ἦν τὰ φοβερά

ἀνθρώπω οὖντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ

15 αἰσχρόν τὸ µή. Διὸ καὶ ἄνδρειστέρον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 15

ἐν τοῖς αἰφινίδιοι φοβοῖς ἀφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι

ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἑξεως γὰρ µᾶλλον, ἤ καὶ ὅτι

ἡττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ µὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ

some of the lower animals, or men of violent passions, would

afford the highest examples of courage. High spirit appears

to be the natural substratum of courage, and requires only

deliberate choice and a right motive to transform it from mere

pugnacity to true courage. 4. The courage of a sanguine
disposition.—This results from a confident belief in success;

in other words, from a belief that there is no serious danger

to fear. A drunken man exhibits this sort of courage. It

fails when danger appears contrary to expectation. Hence

11. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι κ.τ.λ.] This would be an instance

of what is sometimes called 'Dutch courage.' Falstaff's en-

comium on 'Sherris' as the source of Courage in Henry IV.

Part II. Act iv. Sc. 3, may be quoted, under the influence of

which 'the heart great and puffed up... doth any deed of cour-

age; and this valour comes of sherris.'
sudden dangers are a better test of real courage than those which are foreseen. 5. The courage of ignorance.—This form, which results from ignorance of the existence of danger, is not unlike the last mentioned, but is inferior to it as not implying any self-reliance. Such courage vanishes at once if the ignorance on which it depends is dispelled.

CHAP. IX.—How can the exercise of Courage, which involves pain and loss, have a ‘pleasure in itself’?

Thus Courage is a due regulation of confidence and fear, but more especially of the latter, because Courage implies

4. ἀξιωματικὸν ‘self-reliance,’ literally ‘estimate of themselves.’ The sanguine rely so strongly upon the estimate which they have formed of their own prowess or good fortune, that they can face danger in the strength which it gives them.

6. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ.] This incident is described by Xenophon (Hell. iv. 10). The Argives attacked with contemptuous boldness certain Spartans whom they mistook for Sicyonians owing to the Spartans having assumed some Sicyonian armour. The Argives fled at once on the discovery of their mistake.
2. **χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ.]** The regulation of fear implies enduring pain (λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν), the regulation of confidence resembles checking pleasure (ἥδεων ἀπέχεσθαι), and the former is more difficult, and therefore more virtuous, as we have seen before (II. iii. 10, etc.).

8. **μικρὸν δὲν** i.e. insignificant in comparison with the numerous and palpable circumstances of pain and terror. Comp. S. Paul in reference to the same γυμνικὸν ἀγώνες, 'they do it to obtain a corruptible crown,' etc.

11. **ὑπομένει δὲ κ.τ.λ.]** Though he loves life much, he loves honour more: and though the loss of life is painful, the loss of honour would be yet more painful, and therefore he chooses that course which after all secures for him the greatest and highest pleasure.

12. **καὶ ὅσοφ ἀν μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.]**
CHAP. X.

The other Virtue of our lower and irrational nature is Temperance. Theoretically, it is a mean state in reference to Pleasures.

Temperance truly brave may not be so good as those who have little or nothing to lose by death. Mere recklessness of life is not courage. The savage Turcos may be the most serviceable soldiers in a bloody war, or for certain operations of war, but no one would say that they were therefore the bravest men.

CHAP. XI.

The discussion of the Virtue of Temperance, with its related vices, occupies three Chapters (x - xii). In ch. x. the proper objects of Temperance are determined by a method precisely similar to that employed in the case of Courage in ch. vi.

It is first broadly stated that Temperance deals with Pleasures, and then by successive limitations we arrive at the precise class of Pleasures to which it properly refers.

In ch. xi. the excess and defect are described and contrasted with the mean state.

In ch. xii. the comparative voluntariness of Cowardice and Intemperance is discussed; and some supplementary remarks added concerning the nature of Intemperance as illustrated by its etymology.

7. Against the supposition that he had much to lose.

8. See note on § 2. Granting that the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult, the self-sacrifice is greater and more difficult.

9. Observe the emphatic position of contrast, 'as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers, as more rank-and-file soldiers.'
The other Virtue of our lower and irrational nature is Temperance. Theoretically, it is a mean state in reference to the proper objects of the Virtue of Temperance. Truly brave may not be so good as those who have little or nothing to lose by death. Mere recklessness of life is not courage. The savage Turcos may be the most serviceable soldiers in a bloody war, or for certain operations of war, but no one would say that they were therefore the bravest men.

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7. σωφροσύνη is usually, though inadequately, translated by ‘temperance.’ ‘Self-control’ or ‘self-mastery’ would perhaps be nearer to it. The derivation of σώφρων, or σαφήρων, from σῶς (σάος) and φήν, shows that the original idea of the word was that of a man who never ‘loses his head,’ but keeps his mind clear and calm, however assaulted by pleasure or passion. Conversely the ἄκλαστος is one subject to no restraint: κολασις (see note on v. 7) being the technical word for chastisement, or punishment for the purpose of
σι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταῖ. Ὁτι
μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἵδονας ἡ σωφροσύνη, εὑρηταὶ
ἡμῖν ἥπτον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑστὶ περὶ τὰς λύτας.

2 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ
πόλεως οὖν τῶν ἱδονῶν, τύν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρήσωσαν δὲ
ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρήσωσαν 5 δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ, οἶνον φιλοτιμία, φιλο-
μαθεία: ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικὸς ἐστὶν
οὗθεν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς δια-
νοίας: οἴ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἱδονῶς οὔτε σώφρονες

3 οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. Ὁμοίως δ’ οὖν οἱ περὶ τὰς

10 ἄλλας ὡσι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰςιν’ τοὺς γὰρ φιλομῦθους
καὶ διηρήσωσαν καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβουντας
τὰς ἡμέρας ἄδολέσχας, ἀκόλαστοι δ’ οὐ λέγομεν, οὔδε

4 τοὺς λυπομένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἡ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς

σωματικὰς εἰς ἀν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὔδε 15
ταύτας: οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀψεως, οἴον
to pleasures and pains (as we have already said); but, practi-
cally, its operation is limited to pleasures. Next, we limit it
further to certain kinds of pleasures. First, pleasures being
either mental or bodily, we exclude the whole of the former
3 from the sphere of Temperance, as well as certain others, such
as love of gossip, idling, love of money or friends, which,
though not exactly mental, are not at any rate bodily pleasures.
4 Secondly, among bodily pleasures, it is not concerned with

reformation. The derivation of

Aristotle in passing in II. vii. 3.

Not however of mental

pleasures.

Nor all bodily

pleasures.

of the word ἀκολασία is discussed

by Aristotle in xii. 5, etc.

1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] This
(as was remarked in II. vii.) is
almost the only hint as to the
principle of arrangement in the
Catalogue of Virtues.

3. ἥπτον] This was noticed by

7. ἐκάτερος γὰρ] i.e. both ὁ

φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθῆς.
χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφὴ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται καίτοι δοξεῖν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τοῦτος, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἐλευθερία. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένης χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ υποκρίσει οὕθεισ ἀκολάστους λέγεις, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας.

6. Οὔτε τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων χαίροντι γὰρ τοῦτος οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτων ἀνάμνησις ἴμεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμιατῶν. Ἡδον ὅταν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινώσῃ, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βραδαμάτων ὀσμαῖς. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτος χαίρειν ἀκολάστον τοῦτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμιατὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ᾣίδωσι κατὰ ταῦτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑδονή πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγών οἱ κύνες χαίροντι, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει τὴν δὲ αἰσθήσειν ἢ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. Οὔτ' ὁ λέον τῆς φωνῆς τοῦ βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐκδοχῇ ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστὶ, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἕσθεν, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτη παῖνεται. 20

(a) pleasures of sight, such as love of painting, colour, etc.; (b) nor pleasures of hearing, such as love of music; (γ) nor pleasures of smell, except indirectly as they may suggest or recall gluttonous or luxurious desires, just as the scent of the lower animals gives them pleasure only by its suggestion of

7. κατὰ συμβεβηκός 'by a co-occurrence,' i.e. by the same occasion which excites the sense of taste exciting that of smell also.

14. τοιούτως i.e. such as μῦρα καὶ δύσα (l. 10) in contrast with the ordinary θρόματα last mentioned.

15. οὐκ ἐστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The truth of this assertion is made very doubtful by well-known facts, at least as regards smell and hearing.
The excess and defect related to the virtue of Temperance.

The pleasures spoken of in the last chapter admit of a further division into those which are common and natural, such as the desire of food generally; and those which are peculiar and acquired, such as the desire of some particular kind of food; the latter depending (within certain broad limits) upon the sense of Taste; but such is also the case on the mean of Temperance in contrast with both.

6. Aristotle regards the primary function of taste (as of the other senses) to be the discrimination of objects; the transmission of information to the mind concerning things external to it, rather than the communication of pleasure:—in a word, he looks at their powers of perception rather than their powers of sensation. Hence to judge of wine (as a trader), or of seasoned dishes (as a cook), would be the most proper function of the sense of taste as such; but it is not in such an exercise of it that pleasure is conveyed. That depends, according to Aristotle, upon the prolonged contact of the thing tasted with the throat; i.e. upon a particular application of the sense of Touch. It is of course true (though not quite in the sense intended by Aristotle) that...
12 μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριώδεις. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθερίωται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἓδουν ἄφηρινται, οἶνον ἄὶ ἐν τοῖς γεμισάντως διὰ τρύγεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ή τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀῤῇ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινὰ μέρη.

1 XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἐνδοι καὶ ἐπὶθετοι οἶνον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεχὸς ἥγηρᾶς ἡ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφίον, καὶ εὖνῆς, φησιν "Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμαίων" τὸ δὲ τοιάσθε ἡ τοιάσθε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὔδε 10 τῶν αὐτῶν. Διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' kinds of pleasures even of this, which is itself the lowest and most animal of all our senses.

CHAP. XI.—The excess and defect related to the Virtue of Temperance.

1 The pleasures spoken of in the last chapter admit of a further division into those which are common and natural, such as the desire of food generally; and those which are peculiar and acquired, such as the desire of some particular kind of food; the latter depending (within certain broad the sense of Taste depends upon Touch, but such is also the case with all the other senses.

1. ἐλευθερίωται 'the noblest pleasures,' a converse metaphor to ἄνθρωποιδέως in § 3 and elsewhere.

CHAP. XI.—This Chapter treats of (1) the Excess of Intemperance (a) in reference to natural and artificial Desires (§§ 1-4), (β) in reference to Pleasure and Pain generally (§§ 5, 6); (2) The Defect of Insensitiveness (§ 7); and (3) adds a few words on the Mean of Temperance in contrast with both.

6. τῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν] Plato (Rep. p. 558) makes a similar distinction of ἐπιθυμιά, and adds that the gratification of the natural or necessary desires is always beneficial, that of the artificial desires not generally so.

7. ἐπὶθετοί] 'acquired' or 'artificial.'

8. ἥγηρᾶς ἡ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς] 'either solid or liquid food.'
3 natural limits) upon individual taste. Now in natural desires error is rare, and must always take the form of supplying in excess what is in itself a natural want; and this, when it is found, indicates a degraded and almost brutish nature. In the case of acquired desires, error is very common and multiform, extending to the object, manner, degree, etc., of the 2. ἐνα πᾶσι] ‘Some things there are which give every one more pleasure than things ordinary and indifferent.’ i.e. However much individual tastes differ, there are still some things naturally more pleasant than others to every one.

3. ὀλγοι κ.τ.λ.] e.g. Excessive eating is not likely to occur in regard to bread, or any simple food which is desired merely to supply a natural appetite, and not for any special pleasure to be derived from eating it, but rather in regard to some particular viand or favourite

‘Gluttony on oatmeal porridge’ οὐ πᾶν γίνεται.

9. ἀνδραποδώδεις] ‘degraded,’ a metaphor converse to ἐλευθέρους, both words having passed from a social to a moral significance. See last Ch. § 12, note.

11. ἦ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ] In some editions ὡς is omitted, and if so, ἦ = ‘than,’ after the comparative μᾶλλον. If ὡς be retained, the sense may be explained by what is said in I. v. 3 about the excessive and exclusive devotion of οἱ πολλοὶ to Pleasure. See also the concluding words of this section.
The Excess has reference both to pleasure and pain, though in a different sense.

The Defect does not occur in fact.
bility to pleasure, is only imaginary, for not only all men, but even all animals, must have some tastes and preferences. The Temperate man, as we have seen, holds a mean position between excessive devotion and utter insensibility to pleasures. He enjoys them in moderation, and with due regard to the various considerations as to objects, degree, occasions, and consequences which right reason suggests.

be rather a physical than a moral defect. The practical non-existence of ἀναμιθησία and of ἀφοβία (see vii. 7) is a comment on the statement of x. 1, that the virtues of Courage and Temperance relate to feelings which are purely animal and instinctive (belonging to ἀλογον μέρος). In the case of all the other virtues of the catalogue (except perhaps to some extent ὀργή)—see the simi-

lar difficulty about ἄφοβος in ΙΒ. v. 5), it is perhaps conceivable that a man might be without the feelings, or be altogether removed from the circumstances, in which the sphere of the exercise of the virtues lies. In sensibility to fear and to pleasure a man could hardly be wanting without ceasing to be human.

13. οὕτως] i.e. ἰ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἦ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.
 Chap. XII.—(a) Is the external compulsion stronger in Cowardice or in Intemperance?

(b) The nature of ἀκολασία is illustrated by its etymology.

The question may be asked, Which is more voluntary (and therefore more blameable), Intemperance or Cowardice? We reply, Intemperance:—(1) because the pressure arises from pleasure, whereas in Cowardice it arises from pain; (2) because it is both easy and safe to practise resistance against temptations to Intemperance; while the reverse is the case with temptations to Cowardice. A distinction however must be made.

Chap. XII.—We have seen in ch. v. that no vice is really involuntary, still the degree of external pressure, though it never amounts to compulsion, varies in different cases. It is naturally greatest in regard to these two Virtues which relate to those feelings of our animal nature (x. 1) which are ever present, and must be excited under given external circumstances whenever they arise. The object of this Chapter is to determine in which of these two cases there is more external pressure, and, so far, less of voluntary action.

6. καὶ γὰρ] 'and what is more,' introducing, as usual, a fresh argument.

αὐτὰ from the context, though it has no grammatical antecedent, evidently refers to pleasurable objects, or temptations to Intemperance.

8. δόξει o ἄν κ.τ.λ.] e.g. A man may resolve that he will give up his property, and offer himself as a prisoner, or indeed do anything, rather than face the enemy in fight. That would
4. In the case of acts of Cowardice the violence of the present pain (of which there is none in Intemperance) is often such that a man hardly knows what he is doing. But looking at these Vices as habits, a man never deliberately resolves to be habitually intemperate, as he does sometimes to be an habitual coward. Thus in Cowardice the general habit is more voluntary than the single acts, but in Intemperance the reverse is the case.

The Greek term for Intemperance (ἀκολασία), or, as we might translate it, Wantonness, involves the idea of absence of restraint, and it is also familiarly applied to the errors of childhood. Without deciding which is the primary meaning of the term, we may assert that its application is in both cases appropriate.

6. No things need restraint more than desires of pleasure, and imply a deliberate and voluntary habit of cowardice. Another may resolve to fight to the last, but when he sees actual bloodshed be overpowered with horror and throw down his arms. That would be the half-involuntary cowardice of particular acts. (See Supplementary Notes.)

1. αὐτή] i.e. δειλία 'Cowardice in itself.' ταύτα δὲ, i.e. τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν 'the surroundings.'

10. τὸ υστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου] not 'the latter from the former,' but 'the later in conception from the earlier.'

11. Two conditions are noted as requiring κόλασις, viz. tendency to what is vicious, and capacity for rapid growth. Both
γόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς κατ’ ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ἔδωκε καὶ τὰ 7 παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἱδέος ὁρεξίς. Εἰ δὲν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθεῖς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀρχοῦ, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἦξεν ἀπληστὸς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἱδέος ὁρεξίς καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ 5 ἀνοίτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενὲς, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὄσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούο- ϑον. Διὸ δὲι μετρίας εἶναι αὐτᾶς καὶ ὀλγὰς, καὶ τῷ 8 λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαί. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθεῖς λε- γομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον ὀπτερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ 10 τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ἔσιν, όπτω καὶ τὸ ἐπι- 9 θυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σῶφρονος τὸ

children; and moreover in children desires of pleasure are in pre-
7 eminent force. Such desires grow prodigiously by indulgence,
are insatiable, and if unrestrained choke reason altogether.
8 They ought never therefore to be allowed to resist reason,
9 any more than a child to resist his master. When the habit

these conditions are found most
strikingly in each of the two ob-
jects to which ‘Wantonness’ is
attributed, viz. Desire of Plea-
sure, and Children.

5. πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοίτῳ
‘assails the weak man from
every quarter.’

6. ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια
‘the exercise (or gratification) of
desire strengthens that which is
kindled to it in our nature,’ i.e.
strengthens τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν until
it altogether overpowers the
rival part of our nature τὸ λογι-
στικὸν. (See I. xiii.) This seems to
be the idea of εὐπεριστατος ἀμαρ-
tία in Heb. xii. 1,’ paraphrased by
Chryst. ‘παντόθεν ἰσταμένη’

11. It must be remembered
that the παιδαγωγὸς was not the
teacher, but the servant who
conducted the boy to school, and
was responsible for his conduct
when not in the hands of the
teacher. His office somewhat
resembled that of the ‘governor,’
as contrasted with the ‘tutor’ of
our royal princes. This adds
point to the illustration, since
moral and not intellectual disci-
pline is in question in the text.

12. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] This is illus-
trated by the often recurring dis-
tinction between σῶφρων and
ἐγκρατής (see notes on I. iii. 7 and
I. xiii. 17). The σῶφρων has no
bad desires left to contend with.
of self-control is formed, reason and desire are in harmony, and both tend towards one goal, the ideally noble. So much then for the Virtue of Temperance or Self-control.
IV.

I. Δέγωμεν δ' εξίς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι: ἢ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σῶφρων, οὐδ' ᾗ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψειν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν δ' τὰ πάντα οὗν ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. "Εστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἁνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ

CHAP. I.—On Liberality.

Our next subject is the Virtue of Liberality. Prodigality, Liberality, and Sordidness relate simply to the giving and taking of property, but chiefly the former. By 'property' we understand whatever can be exchanged for money. The term 'sordid' is generally restricted to the sense just indi-

CHAP. I.—The discussion of the Virtues in detail proceeds as in the order given in II. vii. Liberality occupies the next place. Refer to note on II. vii. for the principle of this arrangement. This Chapter falls under three heads:

1—5. Preliminary—The use of terms explained.

6—27. Liberality described in its various practical details.

28—45. Prodigality and Sordidness described.

4. κρίσεων] ‘decisions,’ in reference apparently to the Virtue of δικαιοσύνη discussed afterwards, as the words ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς and ἐν οἷς ὁ σῶφρων refer to the two Virtues already treated of in the last Book.

7. ἁνελευθερία] I have, after some hesitation, adopted ‘Sordidness’ rather than ‘Illiberality’ for ἁνελευθερία, as being more applicable to the various types of ἁνελευθερία distinguished in §§ 38-45.
Liberality

explained by what is said in I. v. 8, or by Plato's remark in Rep. p. 333 B, that money laid by is as useless as a pilot on shore or a physician in health. Wealth is an instrument as much as a spade or any other tool, and in like manner, when not being used is for the time useless. The following passage from Bacon's Essay on Riches offers several points of comparison with this and the following Chapter: 'Riches are for spending, and spending for Honour and Good Actions (τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα, § 12). Therefore extraordinary expense must be limited by the worth of the occasion (ii. 11, 15, etc.), but

4. 'Prodigal' is commonly applied in English (e.g. The Prodigal Son), but scarcely the abstract term 'prodigality.' Reasons are given for this connexion between ἀκολούθια and ἀτελεῖα in § 35 of this Chapter. 'Profligate' has a similar double meaning.

7. 'Βούλεται' 'means'; like the French 'veut dire.' Much of the force of this section depends on the etymological connexion of ἄτελες and ἀτελεῖα with σῶξειν, and is consequently difficult to reproduce in a translation.

12. 'The very essence of property is its use.' This would be explained by what is said in I. v. 8, or by Plato's remark in Rep. p. 333 B, that money laid by is as useless as a pilot on shore or a physician in health. Wealth is an instrument as much as a spade or any other tool, and in like manner, when not being used is for the time useless. The following passage from Bacon's Essay on Riches offers several points of comparison with this and the following Chapter: 'Riches are for spending, and spending for Honour and Good Actions (τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα, § 12). Therefore extraordinary expense must be limited by the worth of the occasion (ii. 11, 15, etc.), but

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in its being used well. Property is evidently a thing to be used: Liberality therefore is that quality or virtue which enables us to make the best possible use of property.

Again that use consists in spending and giving: taking and keeping resemble acquisition rather than use. Hence, as we have already hinted, liberality relates to giving more than to taking. This appears also from the following considerations:

—(a) Virtue is always active and positive rather than passive and negative. Giving is the former, taking is the latter.

(b) It is harder, and so more thankworthy, to give rightly

ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man’s Estate, and governed by such regard that it be within his compass’ (i. 19, ii. 12).

12. χάρις] Exactly in the sense found in 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, τούτο γὰρ χάρις, ‘for this is thankworthy’; and in Luke vi. 32, ‘If ye love them which love you, what thank have ye?’ ποιά ύμιν χάρις ἐστίν;

13. καὶ ράον δὲ] Compare the dictum in II. iii. 10, περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον δὲ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνεται καὶ ἀρετή.

14. ἦττον-μᾶλλον [a redundant comparative, and = ἦττον simply. Cf. μᾶλλον εὐτυχέστερον, etc., and Shakespeare’s ‘most un-
10 to ἀλλοτριον. Καὶ ἐλευθέροι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες
οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριστητα ἐπαινοῦν-
tαι, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες
11 οὐδ’ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. Φιλοῦνται δὲ σχέδου μάλιστα
οἱ ἐλευθέροι τῶν ἀπ’ ἀρετῆς: ὥφελμοι γὰρ, τούτῳ δ’ ἐν 5
12 τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ
καλοῦ ἕνεκα. Καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέρος οὖν δόσει τοῦ καλοῦ
ἔνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς: οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὃσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
13 τὰλλα ὃσα ἐπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. Καὶ ταῦτα ἰδέως

than to decline to take wrongly. Those who give rightly are
called liberal; those who refrain from taking wrongly are
called honest and just, but not liberal; while those who merely
take or receive rightly are scarcely praised at all. (γ) Liber-
ality is one of the most popular of virtues, and that because
of its usefulness, and this consists in giving, not in taking.
12 However, as all virtue has a noble end in view, mere giving
freely is not enough to constitute Liberality. Regard must
be had to certain conditions, of which we specify three:—
1. A noble motive. 2. Due consideration of the recipients,
the amount, and the occasion of the gift. 3. Cheerfulness on

kindest cut of all.’ Translate, ‘Men are less inclined to spend
their own money, than merely to refrain from taking that which
belongs to others.’ In other words, ‘it is easier to be honest
than to be generous.’ Many men who are very reluctant to
part with their money, and anxious to hoard, would yet
scorn to gain anything by dishonest or suspicious means.
Avarice is not necessarily accom-
panied by dishonesty.
4. οὐδ’ ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ] The
virtue is in fact too common and
easy to deserve commendation.
Praise on such grounds would be
almost derogatory (φορτικὸς ὁ ἐπαυσ, as Aristotle says in X.
viii. 7).
8. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] These
words are explanatory of ὀρθῶς.
9. ἰδέως ἡ ἀλήτω] This con-
dition is explained by such pas-
sages as I. viii. 10-12 (No one is
virtuous unless he takes plea-
sure in virtuous actions); II. iii.
1 (The test of the formation of
any habit (ἐξε) is that the
actions to which it is related are
done with pleasure); or by the
the part of the giver. There is no grudging or hesitation in true liberality. The absence of any of these conditions would destroy the liberality of the act. Taking however as well as giving is subject to certain conditions: for—(1) The truly liberal man does not care so much for money as to be indifferent to the source from which it comes. (2) He will be reluctant to ask for this as for other favours. (3) His motive in taking is to secure not the money itself but the means of giving. Hence he will not neglect his own affairs, distinction regularly drawn between ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη, the outward acts of which are the same; for this see note on I. iii. 7.

4. ὁ λυπηρός] Understand διόδος.

8. οὗ γὰρ ἑστὶ κτλ.] See ch. iii. 24-26 for this trait in the character of the μεγαλόψυχος.

10. οἷς ὢς καλὸν κτλ.] Cf. § 20 just below. There is nothing noble in taking or receiving, but it is none the less necessary with a view to giving; for liberality is one of those virtues which cannot be exercised without appliances, ἀχορήγητον ὀντα, as we read in I. viii. 15. (See further on this point X. viii. 4.) With the statement in the text compare, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive.'
18 οὖ καλῶν. Ἡ ἐλευθερία, δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἑλάττων.

19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίαν. Κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθερίας λέγεται, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθερίων, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τῶν διδόντος ἐξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διδόσιν. Οὕθεν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθερίωτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἑλάττω διδόντα, μὴν ἀπ' ἐλαττῶνον διδῷ. Ἡ ἐλευθερίωτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπεροῦ τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντως ἀγαπῶσιν μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥστερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ. Πλούτειν δ' οὐ ράδιον τὸν ἐλευθερίων, μὴτε ληττικὸν ὅντα μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δ' 21 πάντως ὀμολογεῖν.

18 nor scatter his gifts indiscriminately (though his tendency would be rather in this direction than the opposite), for thus he would cut himself off from the power of giving on proper occasions. Liberality is always to be measured, not by the absolute amount given, but by the proportion which it bears to the means of the giver. We conclude this part of our subject with some general considerations upon Liberality. Liberality is more often found in those who have inherited, than in those who have made, their money. This is partly because the former do not know what it is to want money, and partly because they have not that sort of parental love to it which men feel for anything which they have themselves

4. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν] ‘in proportion to one’s means.’

5. ἐξει] ‘the disposition of the giver.’ Cf. ‘Non donum sed dantis animum.’

6. οὕθεν δὴ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] The ‘widow’s mite’ affords a familiar illustration of this.

11. ἔργα is used in the sense of ‘productions.’ So Bacon speaks of the children of men who have first founded a family, as being ‘both Children and Creatures (ἔργα), a continuation not only of their kind, but of their work.’
21 aitâ tã chrîmata âλλ' eneka tîs dôsews. Δîo kai êgka-
leiâi tî tûchî òti òi málista aξîoi òntes ëmista plountouôin. ßumîbâiνei ò oûk álôgos tûto'o òu gar
ôiôn te chrîmat' ëxeiν µη épimelouìmenon òptos ëchî
22 òsster òu'd' ëpi tôn ãllîwn. Oû µîn dôsei ye òis ou 5
dei ou'd' òte µî' dei, ou'd' òsa ãllâ toiaûta: òu gar
âv ètî prâttoi kata tîn èleuvhriôtita, kai eis taûta
23 ãnalîwos ouk àn ëkhoi eis ì ò dei ànàlîskëin. "Ωsster
gar èirîntai, èleuvhriôs èstîn ò kathà tîn ouûian da-
pavanòv kai eis ì ò dei' ò ò ûperbâllîwn ñsîtos. Δîo 10
tous tûrânnous ou légoûmen àsîtous: tò gar plîthos
tîs kûtèsos ou dôkei ráðion ènîaï tâis dôseî kai tâis
24 dàpânais ûperbâllîw. Tîs èleuvhriôtîtîs dî mesò-

produced. Again the liberal seldom grow rich, and it
is unreasonable to complain of this, for no one can expect to
22 have what he takes no pains to obtain or to keep. This
tendency to spend however will always be checked (as we
have said already) by careful consideration of the objects
23 and occasions of expenditure, and also of the amount out of
which it is taken. (Hence, we may note in passing, princes,
whose wealth is all but boundless, can scarcely be called
24 prodigal for disregard of this last point at least.) Moreover

1. èveka tîs dôsewos] see note
above on § 17.
2. êgkalîeîai tî tûchî] This
is like the familiar reproach
against Providence: Why do the
unworthy prosper in the world?
The answer to this (as Ari-
spotle says) is obvious; ‘a man
reaps what he sows.’ The har-
vest of success which such men
reap is not that which worthier
men spend any pains upon, and
therefore, naturally, do not ob-
tain it. So in the case before
us, the liberal do not devote
themselves to making money,
and naturally therefore do not
make it.
5. ou µîn guards against a
misinterpretation of what pre-
cedes. Though the liberal man
does not care about keeping his
money, it does not follow that
he is indifferent how it goes.
For similar use of ou µîn cf. I. x.
14, III. vi. 11, etc.
such proprieties must not be disregarded either in giving or taking, in great matters or in small: and though we have admitted propriety in giving to be the more important, yet the two habits will naturally be found together. If the liberal man should have made a mistake in any of these points, he will feel regret in due measure and moderation. And such mistakes may occur, for the liberal man will not be hard to deal with in money matters, nor is he by any means proof against fraud, partly on account of his low esteem for money, and partly because he will always regret more keenly having

5. ἐπεταί γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ] Liberality, though mainly concerned with giving, cannot exist combined with dishonesty in taking. If money were gained unfairly, it would not be liberality to spend a part, or even the whole of it, in charity.

7. ἐπομεναὶ] sc. ἔξεις or ἀρεταί.

11. καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι] For this see II. iii.

12. εὐκοινώνητος] 'an easy man to have dealings with.'

14. μᾶλλον ἀχθομενος κ.τ.λ.] Hence he will rather cheat himself than cheat others even involuntarily. Or again, he would rather find that he has given money to an impostor than that he has turned a deaf ear to a case of real distress. This of course might arise from a true
Prodigality under two types (§§ 28-36).

The first type unites excess in spending with defect in taking (§§ 29—32).

28 spent too little than having spent too much. This and other characteristics of the liberal man are wanting in the prodigal.

29 Both in giving and in taking he will err, and so will the sordid man. Strictly speaking, the former exceeds in spend-

feeling of benevolence, but the assertion in the text probably has reference to the same sort of feeling which makes the magnanimous man prefer giving to accepting benefits (iii. 24). The error on the side spoken of has more of ὁ καλὸν in it. It accords better with that self-esteem, not to say pride, which forms so large an element in an ideal Greek character. Benevolence occupies a very subordinate place in the character of Aristotle's liberal man. There is a strong vein of self-consciousness running through all the manifestations of this strictly speaking unselfish virtue.

1. Simonides was the type of a courtly poet, a sort of embodiment of common-sense worldly wisdom. He figures thus in the introduction to Plato's Republic. Among his recorded sayings we find one that 'it is better to be rich than to be wise, because philosophers are dependent upon the patronage of the rich, and not vice versa.'

7. Two types of prodigals are described. One exceeds in giving and falls short in taking; the other exceeds both in giving and in taking. The former perhaps may be styled the liberal prodigal, and the latter the mean prodigal. The former is an indolent laissez-faire sort of character, who spends freely, but is either too careless or thoughtless to trouble himself about replenishing his wasting resources: e.g. the typical Irish landlord of the close of the last century. The latter is a selfish and unprincipled man who cares not how or whence the money comes so long as he has it to spend. This is said in § 33 to be the commoner type, because indiscriminate giving soon necessitates unscrupulous receiving.
Aristotle's Ethics.

30 λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἣ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἔλλειπε, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συννυάζεται (οὐ γὰρ βάδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πάσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι- λείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἴδιότας διδόντας, οὔτε καὶ δοκούσιν ἀσωτοὶ εἶναι). ἐπεὶ δὲ γε τοιοῦτος δόξεων ἄν οὐ μικρῶ 
31 βελτίων εἶναι τὸν ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐίατος τε γὰρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. Ἡ περὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑλευθερίου· 10 καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δὲὶ οὐδ' εὖ. Εἰ δ' τούτῳ ἐθισθεῖ, ἡ πως ἄλλως μεταβαλλοι, 

3. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς] 'only in reference to small matters.' Similar conduct on a large scale is otherwise characterized; see § 42.
4. The first γὰρ explains οὐ πάνυ συννυάζεται, the second γὰρ (in line 5) explains οὐ βάδιον. ἐπεί γε (l. 7) appeals to the consideration that such prodigality as should unite both characteristics would be vastly superior to the opposite vice of sordidness, and that it would be a very little way removed from liberality itself. This, however, is not usually the case in actual life. See § 33, etc. Consequently the statement οὐ πάνυ συννυάζεται κ.τ.λ. holds good of prodigality generally speaking.
6. οὔτε καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'who (i.e. ἰδιῶται) are in point of fact prodigal.' This is explained by the exclusion of τύραννοι from the class, for which see § 23.
9. ἡλικίας] It is a matter of common observation that avarice (i.e. the reverse of prodigality) is the characteristic vice (or as Simonides is said to have called it, 'the proper pleasure') of old age.
The second type is marked by excess both in giving and in taking (§§ 33—36).

The selfish interest which leads men to accumulate confers ultimately more advantage upon the world than the generous instinct which leads men to give. Indeed it is generally acknowledged now that indiscriminate spending, even if it be with a directly benevolent intention, is most mischievous to society. Though it is true that ‘the folly of one man may be the fortune of another’ (as Bacon says), yet before we infer therefrom that ‘private vices are public benefits,’ we ought to strike a balance between the advantages and disadvantages resulting from each vice: e.g. in this particular case we must not forget that both hoarding and squandering have some good and some bad effects. Each is a perversion or exaggeration of a good tendency. Hence both good and bad results may be traced in each case. Aristotle excludes from his comparison (a passing one it is true) the favourable aspect of the former and the unfavourable aspect of the latter.

blance by supplying the proper motive and consideration as

32 to the circumstances of the expenditure. Again (3) a prodigal
of this type, a weak rather than a vicious man, benefits others,
the sordid no one, not even himself. Most prodigals however
err more actively on the side of taking. They take whence they
ought not. They must take in order to keep going, and they

6. ὃ μὲν ὄφελεί πολλοὺς]
This unqualified statement would not be universally accepted. e.g.
Lecky (Eur. Morals, i. p. 38) maintains the direct contrary.
‘The selfish interest which leads men to accumulate confers ultimately more advantage upon the world than the generous instinct which leads men to give.’ Indeed it is generally acknowledged now that indiscriminate spending, even if it be with a directly benevolent intention, is most mischievous to society. Though it is true that ‘the folly of one man may be the fortune of another’ (as Bacon says), yet before we
concern themselves as little where the money comes from as they do where it goes to. They are neither honest nor generous; for money spent at hazard or squandered on pleasures, flatterers, and other unworthy objects, may be spent lavishly, but not liberally. Hence it is not difficult to see how a prodigal in the proper and limited sense of the word becomes a prodigal in the wider sense noted at the beginning of the chapter. This in fact is what prodigality comes to if it runs its course unchecked, though, as we have pointed out, it is a condition admitting of remedy and guidance. The condition of Sordidness however is incurable: for—(1) Age and want of means, so far from curing the habit, tend to produce it; (2) It seems in some way a more natural vice among men

1. ὀλιγώρως] thoughtlessly, indifferently, unscrupulously.
2. τοῖς μετρῖοις τὰ ἡθη] this being opposed to κόλαξιν apparently means ‘persons of a fair disposition.’
3. 15. ἀδυναμία corresponds to ἀποφίλα in the converse case of the prodigal (see § 31).
than prodigality; (3) It is also widespread, and has many forms. (a) Its complete development implies (as in the case of prodigality) error both in giving and taking. In taking it
exceeds, in giving it falls short. But besides this perfect
growth of the vice, we have two other forms of it. (b) We
find Sordid men who are niggardly in spending, without being

5. ὀλόκληρος] 'in completeness.' The same expression occurs in ν. 7 in reference to various types of Anger. Cf.
James i. 4, τέλειοι καὶ ὀλόκληροι 'perfect and complete.' Add 1 Thess. v. 23.

8. Οὐ μὲν corresponds to οὐ δὲ in the first line of § 40. The class introduced by this οὐ μὲν is subdivided (and the subdivision
marked by another οὐ μὲν and οὐ δὲ in 1. 1 and 1. 6, p. 186) before we come to the οὐ δὲ be-
longing to it. The sentence is
further complicated by an ex-
planatory parenthesis attached to the first of these subdivi-
sions, Δοκοῦσι . . . ἄν δοῦναι.
The following analysis may be
found useful:—

Full-blown Sordidness (ὀλό-
κληρος) implies both (a) falling
short in giving and (b) excess in
taking. There are two imper-
fectly developed types:

(a) only is found in {φειδωλοὶ
γλύσχροι, κύμβικες,
κυμανοπρίσται}

 who do not neces-
sarily err in respect of (β) {some from natural
shame, others from
care of reprisals,
§ 39.}

(b) only is found in {πωροβοσκοὶ
tοκουσταί, etc.,
λησταί
κυβευταί,
λωποδύται}

 who do not necessarily err in respect of (α). Such people are in fact often ex-
travagant, and their 'ill-gotten gains
fly space.'
unprincipled in taking, money:—some from a natural sense of shame, others from fear of reprisals. This class we characterize as stingy, close, niggards, cheeseparers, and by other similar appellations. (c) We have again another class of sordid men, utterly unprincipled in the source from which

1. διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν κ.τ.λ. A sort of honesty may accompany meanness and excessive devotion to money. See note on § 9.

4. κυμινοπρίστης i.e. a man so stingy that he would split a cummin seed. Compare our metaphors ‘skinflint,’ ‘cheeseparer,’ and Juvenal’s ‘one who counts the fibres of a leak’ (Sat. xiv. 133).

6. διὰ φόβον κ.τ.λ. This according to the Sophists was the sole ground and principle of Justice between man and man, and the cause of the very existence of society. See Plato, Rep. p. 358, πλέον κακῶ υπερβάλλειν τὸ άδικείαν ή ἀγαθό τὸ άδικείαν.

12. τοικιστὰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ ‘Money-lenders in small sums at a large rate’; ἐπὶ with dative expressing the conditions of the act.

15. μικρὸν is no contradiction to ἐπὶ πολλῷ above, for though the rate of interest is very large, yet the absolute amount is small.
42 Toûs γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὄθεν δὲ δεὶ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἀ δεὶ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οίον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις παρθούντας καὶ ἑρὰ συλλῶντας, ἄλλα πονηρῶς μᾶλλον καὶ ἅσβεθεὶς καὶ ἁδικοὺς. Ὅ μεντοὶ κυβερνῆσαι καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν ἄισχροκερδεῖς γὰρ. Κέρδους γὰρ ἐνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγματέυονται καὶ ἅνειδὴ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἐνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ᾿ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δὲ διδόναι. Ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὄθεν οὐ δεὶ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι ἄισχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ 10 τοιαύται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. Εὐκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ τητί ἀνελευθερίᾳ ἐναντίον λέγεται μεῖζον τε γὰρ ἐστιν

they take money, and at the same time open-handed in spending it; e.g. panders, usurers, and those who follow any such base and illegal traffic. Still, as before, we are speaking of gain on a small scale; we reserve other and stronger terms for those who plunder wholesale. We ought however to add to our list gamblers, pickpockets, and thieves, who all agree in their indifferencing as to the source from which they take, and are therefore described as sordid, no matter what subse-
quent use they make of the money thus unfairly taken. We conclude by remarking that Sordidness is more opposed to Sordidness is the worse extreme of the two.

4. μεντοὶ (= ‘however’) implies that those following are to be included among the sordid, though the somewhat similar characters just mentioned are excluded on account of the large scale on which their villainies are practised.

6. ἀμφότεροι i.e. κυβερνῆσαι in one class, and λωποδύτης and ληστὴς together in the other. The distinction between the latter corresponds nearly with that between ‘picking and stealing’ respectively. λωποδύτης is literally one who slips into other people’s clothes, a clothes-stealer, and hence a thief on a small scale. The words οἱ μὲν obviously refer to λωποδύται and λησται, and οἱ δὲ to κυβερναῖ.

12. ἐναντίον ‘the opposite to’ —explained by II. viii. 7. μεῖζον κακῶν] The reasons for this have been given in §§ 32, 37, 38.
Liberality than Prodigality is, as being both more mischievous and more common. So much then for the Virtue of Liberality.

**CHAP. II. — On the Virtue of Magnificence.**

Mansificence, as the name implies, differs from Liberality in the largeness of the sums with which it deals. Its general characteristic is magnitude, but this must be in relation to three things: the person who gives, the circumstances of the gift, and its object. Hence every magnificent man is liberal, but not every liberal man is magnificent. The vice of defect is Paltriness. The vice of excess, which we describe as Bad Taste and Vulgarity, errs not in the greatness of the amount spent, but in the inappropriateness in different ways of the expenditure. But of these hereafter. There is a sort of scientific skill implied in Magnificence. This is needed to decide under what various circumstances, as they actually were, Magnificence occurred. A reason explained in 11, the distinction is not very marked, etc., in itself, nor carefully retained in the text. Another reading is see note on II. vii. 6. a instead of irepla, i.e. the objects; but for the reasons explained in 11, the distinction is not very marked, etc. in itself, nor carefully retained.

1. μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην] Obviously men in general are more ready to take than to give.

8. τὰς δαπανήρας μόνον] ‘only the expensive ones,’ i.e. those in which the expenditure is grand: this being the point of difference between μεγαλοπρέπεια and ἐλευθερία. Here and elsewhere throughout the Chapter the argument turns upon the etymology of the word μεγαλοπρέπεια, which implies a combination of greatness and propriety. (See Supplementary Note.)

12. τριηράρχῳ] The duty of equipping a trireme, and (as was usual) commanding it in person, was the most important of the λειτουργίαι at Athens. Cf. note on § 11 below.

ἀρχιστέρωφ] θεσπία was a state embassy or deputation to a festival or public games. ἀρχιστέρωφος was the head of such an embassy, who defrayed its expenses. This duty was one of the lesser λειτουργίαι. See further § 16.

13. ἐν ὃ perhaps refers to the oc-
to three things:—the person who gives, the circumstances of the gift, and its object. Hence every magnificent man is liberal, but not every liberal man is magnificent. The vice of defect is Paltriness. The vice of excess, which we describe as Bad Taste and Vulgarity, errs not in the greatness of the amount spent, but in the inappropriateness in different ways of the expenditure. But of these hereafter. There is a sort of scientific skill implied in Magnificence. This is needed to decide under what various circumstances, as they actually

casion and accompanying circumstances, περὶ ἄ the objects; but the distinction is not very marked in itself, nor carefully retained in the text. Another reading is ἄ instead of περὶ ἄ, i.e. the amount spent.

1. The widow’s mite was an act of liberality but not of magnificence, Mr. Peabody’s donations an example of both. The Vice-roy of Egypt’s gift of a doll, with dress, jewels, etc., valued at £2000, to the Sultan’s child, was neither one nor the other, for the reasons explained in § 11, etc.

6. βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία] see note on II. vii. 6.

11. ἐμμελεῖς] ‘harmoniously,’ literally ‘in tune’ (ἐν, μέλος), just as πλημμελεῖς (πλη, μέλος) is what is out of tune (cf. I. ix. 6, etc.).

12. ἡ ἔξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται] ‘The habit is determined by its outward acts, and by the objects on which it is exercised.’

Conditions required for the exercise of Magnificence (§§ 5—9).
AI δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. Τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. "Λοτε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δὲ εἴναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἡ 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπαρμῆσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλο- 5 πρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα: κοινὸν γὰρ τούτῳ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μι- 9 κροπρεπές. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, occur (for action is the only real test of disposition in this as in other Virtues), great expenditure is befitting and appropriate. The occasion must be worthy of the expenditure, and the expenditure of the occasion. There must also be the same motive as in all the other virtues, viz. the desire for what is noble. Again the magnificent act must be done cheerfully and ungrudgingly: there must be no close calculations; no considerations of 'How much, or how little, will it cost?'

In the following sentence the 

δαπάναι correspond to the ἐνεργεῖα, and the ἔργα to the ὅπε ἐστὶ (which = περὶ ἃ of § 2) in the particular case under consideration, viz. Magnificence. Compare a similar passage in III. vii. 6 (and note there); and in explanation of the necessity of action (ἐνεργεία) for the perfect determination of a moral habit (ἐξῆς) see further X. viii. 4, 5. The δὴ in l. 1 and l. 2 marks the application of the general principle to the particular case. Divested of technical language the passage in §§ 5 and 6 means: 'Magnificence, to be determined and recognised as such, must be actually put in practice on certain definite occasions. It consists, as we have seen, in large expenditure on a befitting occasion. Hence there must actually occur both the expenditure and the occasion: and to form a correct judgment of these in practice implies a sort of scientific skill.'

2. ἔργα] the 'works' or 'results.'

5. We had similar conditions insisted on in the case of liberality, i. 12-14.

6. Here, as in the case of liberality, we miss any recognition of benevolence or the desire to do good. See note on i. 27.

7. ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπεῖς as is explained in § 21. σκοπῶν πῶς ἰν ἐλάχιστον κ.τ.λ.
σκέψατ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἡ πόσον καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.

3. ἐν τούτοις . . . μεγαλαπρέπετευον] The object of this passage is to explain that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree only (which it commonly does, οἶον μέγεθος), but in kind also. It involves a sort of scientific instinct (so to speak, see § 5), which, even without adding to the cost, disposes of it to the best advantage. Whatever it spends it makes the very most of.

As to the translation:—οἶον μέγεθος is parenthetical and explains that τὸ μέγα may be, and commonly is, literal greatness of amount (μέγεθος). Translate, ‘which may take the form of greatness of amount.’ ἐν τούτοις δὲ, literally ‘but in these things,’ and so nearly = ‘still,’ ‘notwithstanding.’ καὶ (l. 1, p. 192) is ‘even.’

In illustration of the parenthesis οἶον μέγεθος, cf. §§ 17, 18 (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων κ.τ.λ.), where we have an instance of μέγα, which is not μέγεθος, i.e. of appropriate greatness which is not greatness of bulk. With the statement involved in καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσυ δαπάνης κ.τ.λ., compare Bacon’s Essays (on Expense), ‘Ordinary Expense . . . should be so ordered that the bills be less than the estimation abroad.’ Tacitus (Hist. ii. 80) attributes a gift of this kind to Mucianus, ‘Omnium quae dicret atque ageret arte quádam (cf. ἐπιστήμον § 5) ostentator.’ It is a familiar fact that some people spend profusely and yet ‘have nothing to show for it,’ while others contrive to do a surprising amount with slender means. The former lack, and the latter on a small scale possess, that peculiar skill which Aristotle in the text ascribes to the μεγαλαπρέπης, of making the most display from a given expenditure. Speaking generally, the French have this gift much more than ourselves. We notice again how the scientific or intellectual rather than the moral side of Magnificence is insisted on (See Introduction p. xxxiv.).

It should be added that the passage is also sometimes written with a parenthesis enclosing the
parts a special lustre to the acts of a magnificent man beyond what would be achieved by mere liberality even with the same expenditure. For a work and a possession are not to be estimated in the same way. In the latter case there is only a question of intrinsic value; in the former we must take into consideration the grandeur and the moral effect produced on the beholders. The perfection of any work or action is its magnificence, and that must be exhibited on a grand scale.

We pass on now to the occasions which are fitting for the display of Magnificence. We notice first, the service of re-

words οἶνον μέγεθος . . . οὐσίας. The sense will then be, ‘The greatness of the magnificent man, being a sort of greatness of Liberality (or Liberality on a large scale),—Liberality having reference to the same objects,—even from an equal expenditure,’ etc.

This however seems rather to mar the force of καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης. It is probable that there is some corruption in the text. οἶνον μέγεθος looks like a gloss.

7. μεγαλοπρέπεια combines the ideas of ‘magnificence’ indicated in its etymology, and ‘munificence’ implied by its technical limitation to money matters in this Chapter. As we have no one word exactly co-extensive with this, we may adopt ‘munificence’ or ‘magnificence,’ according to the idea most prominent in the context, but see Suppl. Notes, p. 289.

9. κατασκευαῖοι probably refers to the adornment and permanent furniture of the temples. κατασκευὴ denotes permanent, and παρασκευὴ temporary and moveable, decorations. Compare κατασκεύασται just below, § 16.
Aristotle’s Ethics.

12 To koivon eufiletimeta estin, oion ei' toux xorrigeiv ouonta deiw lampros h' truparrxeiv h' kai estian th' polia. 'Ev apasi kai o'sper eirnetai kai proros ton prwt-tonta anafereita to tis' oiv kai tivon uparchounton 'axia gar dei touton eivai, kai me' monon to' ergho alla kai

13 to' poiouvte prepein. Diw penth's mene oivk 'an ei' megaloprepheia' ou gar 'estin 'ap' oiv pollla dapani'seis pretopo-ntos. o' de epixeirwv 'elisios: parar' th' 'axian gar kai

14 to' deon kat' uret'hen de to' orh'dos. Prepein de kai ois ta touastra protuparixe di' auton 'h dii' th' progyonon 10 'h oiv autois metesstin, kai tois euqeneisi kai tois evdikous kai o'sa touastra panta gar tausta megathos echai kai

15 axioma. Malosta mene oivn touvouts o' megaloprepheia, kai ev tois touvoutois dapanismasin h' megaloprepheia,

12 ligion, and next, great public or patriotic services. In all these cases however regard must be had to the social position, and to the means, of the doer, as well as to the work done.

13 It would be out of place for a man of small or moderate means to aspire to be magnificent. It is a virtue reserved for those of great wealth, inherited or acquired, good birth, high station, and so forth. To these cases we may add great and rare

1. eufiletimeta] ‘objects of
landable ambition.’

2. xorrigeiv . . . truparrxeiv . . . estian] These leitourgiai at Athens resembled High Sheriffs’ duties among ourselves, being imposed without remuneration on the rich citizens, kai joined with estian implies that this office of providing a feast for the citizens was less costly than the others. See § 2 for other references to these offices, and note there.

4. to' groups the words that follow into one idea forming grammatically a sort of nominative to anafereita. (Compare to' ti-yn-eivai in II. vi., etc.) ‘There is also a reference made to the agent, viz. who he is, and what are his means.’

11. oiv autois metestivn] ‘their relations or connexions.’

12. megathos kai axioma] ‘grandeur and dignity.’

14. touvouts] i.e. the two classes of objects already men-
10. **The service of Religion and the service of the State, as contrasted with the less striking cases which follow, viz. great and rare occasions in private life.**

but also **some occur in private life.**

2. *o̱sa ɛis̱a̱pα̱ξ*] Compare ‘A man ought warily to begin charges, which, once begun, will continue; but in matters that return not he may be more magnificent’ (Bacon).

3. *ει̱ de̱ peri̱ ti̱ πα̱σα̱ hydrate πόλι̱ς*] The entertainment of the Viceroy of Egypt by Lord Dudley in 1867 would be an instance in point.

5. *οi̱ ε̱ν̱ αξι̱ω̱ματι̱] ‘the leading men in it.’

6. *τα̱ de̱ δω̱ρα] ‘presents have something of the nature of offerings,’ which have been specified already in § 11 as occasions fitting for Magnificence.

14. *ενταύθα de̱ k.t.l.] ‘It is possible to do a thing handsomely though it be no great matter in itself: but the handsomest actions are naturally those
Aristotle's Ethics.

18 Kai diapherei to evo tov ergâ mou megâ tov evo tov dastrapnematv. Sphaîra men gar h lûkuthos h kallîsthe exei megalostrpê- peian paideikov swrov, h de tovto tipî mikrôn kai ánê-

19 leûtherv. Dia tovto epi tov megalostrpeous, evo oun tov gar geni, megalostrpetos polevov to gar tovtova ouk evnterblendov, kai exeov kat' aixian tov dastrapnematov.

20 Toioutos men ouv ouv o megalostrpetos, ouv o iperbaallon kai bavanous to parâ to deon analîskewn iperbaallei òspoter eiçhtai. 'Evo gar tois mikrois tov dastrapnematov polla analîskie kai lambtrvnetai parâ melos, ouv eranistâs gamikôn éstîon, kai koumbois xorrhgon evo ti paródrô

18 toy-presents to children, but not such greatness as to constitute magnificence in its proper sense. This is strictly speaking

19 a grand outlay on a grand occasion. Still even in the smallest matters the Magnificent man will act magnificently, and strive

20 if possible never to be outdone. In contrast with all this note the character of the Vulgar man. On small occasions he will spend large sums, and make a vulgar show, and that not from any noble motive, but simply to display his riches, and to draw

which are on the largest scale, and next come those which are handsom in matters of smaller degree. This seems from the context to be the meaning of ev tovtois.

3. timiî mikrôn kai âneleûtherv [The cost is small and not a matter for liberality.] Thus the condition ev ekástos to próton (§ 17) would be violated.

4. dia tovto i.e. because there is a 'great' even in small matters.

10. parâ melos [in bad taste.] Contrast eranistâs in §5. eranvotaî are persons associated for festive purposes on condition of each bearing his share of the expense, or of each entertaining the rest in turn, as is here supposed. It would be vulgar display and not magnificence for any one, when his turn came, to furnish the club dinner with the splendour of a marriage feast.

11. parôdos [literally 'a coming forward' or 'appearance;' technically applied to the first entrance of the Chorus in a Greek play (the Chorus usually not being on the stage from the commencement), and then to the song which accompanied that The Excess is Vulgar display.
porphúran εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῶν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἴομενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὁλύγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δὲ ὁλύγα, πολλά. 'Ο δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλῶσας εἰν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ο ἃν ποιῆ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἄν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ὀδυρόμενοι, καὶ πάντ᾽ οἴομενοι

attention to himself. When he ought to spend much, he will spend little; and when he ought to spend little, he will spend much. On the other hand, the Paltry man always spends too little. If ever he does spend largely, he will spoil everything by some petty economy. He will be always hesitating and calculating how cheaply he can get off, and will be continually entrance. The emphatic word here is κομμῳδοῖς, comedy naturally requiring less splendour than tragedy.

4. οὐ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] This follows naturally, because his only object being to display himself and his riches, he pays no regard to the proprieties of circumstances and expense, which it needs a careful scientific discernment (§ 5) to observe properly. Consequently if a proper occasion for great expense happens to be one for little personal display, the βάναυσος holds aloof.

6. τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλῶσας] This is a point of difference between ἀνελεύθερα and μικροπρεπεῖα. The latter being the defect where great expenditure is in question, the Paltry man is one who tries to combine cheapness and display. He wishes to make a show and yet hates to part with his money. The Sordid (ἀνελεύθερος) cares only for keeping his money on any terms. εἰν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ] e.g. If a man should make a handsome donation to a Charity and send in the bill for the carriage and packing. Or, as Theophrastus says, 'He will give a grand feast and stint the supply of wine, and the dishes will hardly go round; or when he is celebrating a marriage feast, he will hire the waiters on condition that they find their own food,' and so on. He is the sort of man who cannot feel that in reference to such cases it is better 'to do the thing well, or not at all.'

7. μέλλων] 'with hesitation or reluctance.'
22 μείζω ποιεῖν ἃ δεί. Εἰςὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἔξεις αὐταὶ κακίαι, οὐ μὴν οὖνίδη γ' ἐπιφέρονσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβερὰ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχέμονες.

1 III. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὄνοματος έοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποία δ' ἔστὶ πρῶτον λά—

2 βωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὔθεν τὴν ἔξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν 3 ἔξιν σκοπεῖν. Αὐκεῖ δὲ μεγαλοψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων

22 grumbling that whatever he does spend is excessive. Still, vices as these are, they are not of the worst dye, for they are neither very injurious, nor very offensive, to society.

CHAP. III.—On the Virtue of Highmindedness or Self-Esteem.

1 The very name Highmindedness, which we give to the virtue of well-grounded Self-esteem, implies that there is something great about it—(whether we consider the habit in the abstract or portray an individual character in the concrete is indifferent)—and that greatness may be described as great.

CHAP. III.—μεγαλοψυχία is another very difficult word to translate. The exact etymological equivalent 'Magnanimity' has by the usage of language acquired too restricted a sense. Perhaps we must content ourselves with the awkward compound, 'Highmindedness.' On the inadequacy of this and the related terms see further the Supplementary Note at the end of this Book.

The groundwork of this and the related types of character described in this Chapter is the amount of, and the relation between, a man's merits and his own estimate of them. A more tangible and practically applicable test is substituted in § 10, viz. his relation to Honour (τιμή).

The Chapter falls under the following divisions:

§§ 1—8. Terminology explained.

§§ 9—17. Highmindedness described generally as the desire to deserve, and to secure, Honour.

§§ 18—34. The characteristics of Highmindedness in reference to sundry practical details of life.

§§ 35—37. The related vices of Excess and Defect.

6. Διαφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ.] In this case the latter method is con-
In the absence of great self-esteem based upon great merits. In the absence of great case an adequate estimate of ourself, being necessarily a low one, is not Highmindedness, but rather sober judgment. A too high estimate of self is Vaingloriousness, provided it be not only too high but also high absolutely. Conversely a lower estimate than facts would warrant, be it small or great in itself, is Littlemindedness, and above all when a man's merits are really great, because then the contrast is more spicuously adopted. We have almost an individual portraiture of a μεγαλόψυχος in this Chapter. Pericles has even been suggested as the original.

6. According to the Greek estimate beauty implied bulk. Perhaps our word 'handsome,' as used in contrast with 'beautiful,' conveys the same idea. Comp. Pol. IV. iv. 8, τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλῆθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσόδις γένεσθαι.

8. ὁ δὲ μεγάλον κ.τ.λ.] A man may estimate himself at a low rate and yet more highly than he deserves, in which case he would hardly be called 'vain.' e.g. Whately says of his tutor at College that 'he would be generally described as an eminently modest man. He never rated himself high either in abilities or attainments, and yet he overrated himself to a great degree, else he never would have undertaken the office of a College tutor.' This is just the case described in the text. See
8 µὴ τοσούτων ἢν ἀξίως; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος 
τὰ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τὸ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος τοῦ ἡμῖ 
καὶ ἁγίαν αὐτὸν ἀξίως. Οἱ δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλ-
9 λειπούσιν. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἐαυτοῦ ἀξιοῖ ἀξίως δὴ, 
καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. 5
10 Ἡ δ’ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἑκτὸς ἀγαθά. Μέγιστον δὲ 
τοῦτ’ ἄν θείμεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ ὁ ὑπ’ ἑλίμω 
ἔφενται οἱ ἐν ἀξίωματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις 
ἀθλοῦν. Τοιούτων δ’ ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ 
τῶν ἑκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Περὶ τιμῶν δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγα-
11 λόγους ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται 
οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμῆς οὐκ ἀναπώκοι τιμῆ 
12 οἱ μεγάλοι ἁγίουσιν ἐαυτοῦς, καὶ ἁγίαν δὲ. 'Ὁ δὲ 
8 striking. In perfect Highmindedness self-esteem is in a sense 
extreme, because it is always in proportion to merit, which is 
in that case extreme. It is in the observance of that propor-
tion that the familiar law of the mean is exhibited; while its 
violation gives rise to the related Vices of Vaingloriousness 
and Littlemindedness. So much for the phraseology which 
we propose to employ. Now how is merit estimated or re-
compensed by men? Chiefly by Honour. Honour therefore 
is the aim of the Highminded; to obtain Honour on condition 
of deserving it. The Little-minded man falls short in his 

further note at the end of this 

1. He is extreme in the great-

ness of his self-estimate, moderate 
in the propriety of it. A simi-
lar paradox was explained in re-
gard to Virtue generally in II. 

9, 10 

vi. 17.

6. 'Ἡ δ’ ἀξία] i.e. the expres-
sion, ‘worth’ or ‘worthy of,’ has 
reference to some external good 
as the standard by which it is 
measured. The index of merit,
estimate of himself both in reference to his own merits and also in reference to the standard of the Highminded. In reference to that standard the Vainglorious man on the other hand cannot exceed, but in reference to his own merits he does so. Highmindedness, being based upon merit, implies the possession of the other virtues, and that in the highest degree. Undignified flight, for example, or injustice of any kind, would be utterly incompatible with a well-merited self-respect. True Highmindedness is, as it were, 'the head and

2. ἀξίωμα] The vainglorious man's estimate of himself cannot of course exceed the highminded man's estimate of himself, but it does exceed the estimate which his own merits warrant.

7. Καὶ δόξεις κ.τ.λ.] He not only possesses every Virtue, but every one on a grand scale, just as the μεγαλοπρεπής was explained (in ii. 10) to possess the particular virtue of Liberality on a grand scale.

9. παρασεισαντι] understand τὰς χεῖρας, i.e. 'swinging the hands in precipitate flight.'

οὕδ' ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.] His high sense of the dignity of his moral nature is such (πάμπαν γελοίος φαίνεται μὴ ἀγαθόν ὄν) that he scorns to do an unjust or base action. This has sometimes been censured as if it was mere pride, but we should not forget that mutatis mutandis Christianity
tis εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν μείζουσι γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπῶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόπυθυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

17 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτυμίας ὁ μεγαλόπυθυχος ἐστί, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρῶν ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνοι καὶ ἐλαττώνων ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελῶς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῆ οὐ μὴν ἄλλα ἀποδεξαίται γε τῷ μη ἔχειν αὐτοῦ μετέχως αὐτὸ ἀπονέμειν. Τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν οὐλογορήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἀξίως. 10 Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτυμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἦσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτῶν. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ὁ μεγαλόπυθυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον crown’ of all the virtues. Need we wonder that it is rare and difficult to attain to? The Highminded man, when he receives high honour from good men, will feel pleasure, though in a moderate degree, for he knows that he is obtaining his due, or rather, less than his due, but still the best it is in their power to give, and as such he is willing to accept it. The paltry homage of ordinary men he will despise as unworthy of him, and so he will also their contempt, which he knows is undeserved. With the same dignified attitude will appeal to a somewhat similar motive, e.g. Rom. vi. 2, 11, 21, etc. etc. So Plat. Rep. p. 486 a.

1. μείζουσι ... ποιεῖ] Highmindedness is not so much a separate virtue as a combination of all virtues in one perfect character, each and all being enhanced by the full consciousness of their possession, or (as a modern might phrase it) ‘the testimony of a good conscience’ in respect of them. (See Suppl. Note.)

3. καλοκαγαθίας] ‘Nobility’ seems to hit the double significance of this word, καλοκάγαθος, if it has not (like ‘optimates’ in Latin) passed from a moral to a social significance, yet implies the latter in combination with the former.

5. ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων] He only cares ‘laudari a laudatis viris.’ Comp. I. v. 5.

10. ἐπὶ μικροῖς] ‘on trivial grounds.’
he regard riches, power, and prosperity and adversity generally. Riches and power are but means to honour, and he who estimates it so soberly will not be dazzled by them. Hence men think him supercilious. Indeed these very advantages are thought to tend to Highmindedness because they secure

8. Men expect to receive, and do receive, honour in respect of riches, power, or good birth. Hence the possession of these advantages will in fact help the Highminded man to that honour which is his due, though he deserves it on higher grounds. Hence too, as honour intensifies self-respect, Highmindedness itself is thought to be fostered by any of those external advantages which in the opinion and practice of mankind entitle their possessor to honour. In strict truth, however, goodness, and goodness alone, is the proper ground for self-respect, or for the esteem of others. In § 21 it is added that superciliousness, which is an external accompaniment of Highmindedness, is also a result of the possession of such advantages as these.

It is interesting to notice that the Greek words for moral excellence are generally derived from those which express outward beauty, good birth, strength, ability, etc. The primitive import of such words is generally found in Homer, and their ethical meaning can scarcely be said to be fixed before Socrates. e.g. καλός and αἰσχρός (cf. ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίχρης, I. viii. 16), γενναίος, εὐθλός (i.e. ἐθλὸς = ἑδέλ’ ‘noble’) χρηστός. This bears witness to the confusion noticed in the text between material prosperity and moral worth. The other side of the picture appears in the dictum of Tennyson’s Farmer, ‘The poor in a lomop is bad.’
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

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1. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ 20 τιμῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· δ' ἀμφοὶ ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἄξιοτα πιθής. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγαθα ἔχοντες, οὔτε δικαίως ἐαυτοὺς μεγάλους ἄξιοσίν, οὔτε ὑρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται.

21 ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦσ' οὐκ ἐστι ταῦτα. Ἡ περισταὶ δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἄγαθα γίγνονται. 'Ανευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ δίδων φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ 10 εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἴμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκεῖνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τι ἄν τύχοσι πράσσουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὑμιοῦ ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρόσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράσσουσι, καταφρονοῦσι 15 δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. 'Ο δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ 22 (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Οὐκ

20 honour among men to their possessor. In truth, merit alone deserves honour, but when merit and these advantages are united, honour is accorded more freely. Without merit they cannot form the ground of that self-esteem which constitutes

21 Highmindedness, nor again can they justify the supercilious-

22 ness in which their possessors ape the Highminded. Unlike him, they have no superior merit to warrant that feeling, nor

23 discrimination in its exercise. The Highminded man will

1. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ] 'For they are in a position of superiority.'

13. δ' τι ἄν τύχοσι πράσσουσι] is explained by the words τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράσσουσι just below.

Μιμοῦνται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] The μεγαλόψυχος is imitated by inferior characters,

1. 'Who stand aloof from other men in impotence of fancied power.'

(Thynneou.)

He stands aloof in a well-founded consciousness of superiority.

14. δικαίως καταφρονεῖ] 'A due contempt for inferiors' is not regarded by Aristotle as in itself objectionable. It is per-
not court danger, but if it be great and worthy of him he will face it without regard to his life, which he does not think worth preserving at the cost of honour. He loves to confer and is ashamed to receive benefits, and he hastens to requite them with increase. In fact men are apt to remember those

haves a corollary to the somewhat over-conscious self-respect inculcated as the basis of the Virtue under consideration. The following passage from an Essay of Archbishop Whately on 'Generosity' perhaps exhibits this trait in the more favourable aspect in which it appeared to Aristotle:—"If a man who feels himself capable of generous and exalted conduct, measures others by his own standard, he must be first disappointed, and then dissatisfied' (from which 'contempt' would be an easy step) 'with almost all the world: for very few have even any conception of real heroic generosity. As a celebrated ancient once said, "As he never excused a fault in himself, he could not tolerate any in others."

6. προσοφλήσει ὃ υπάρξας] 'the one who began it will be left in his debt besides'; and so debtor and creditor will change places.

7. Δοκοῦσι used thus impersonally seems to refer to mankind generally, not to the μεγαλόψυχοί in particular, though he so far shares the feeling as to hasten to requite benefits received, and so to wipe out the feeling of obligation.

So remarks Thucydides, II. xii., § 7, 'He who has conferred a benefit is glad to keep alive the obligation by renewed acts of kindness: while he who has received one is less keen about it, knowing that any service he may render will be regarded as payment of a debt, and not as an act of favour.' The point is further worked out by Aristotle himself in IX. vii. In the same spirit remarks La Rochefoucauld (Maximes 238), 'It is not so dangerous to do harm to the majority of men, as to go too far in doing
them good.' 'There is scarcely any one who is not ungrateful for great benefits' (Max. 299). An Eastern despot is said to have beheaded a man who had saved his life in order to avoid remaining under an obligation which nothing could ever repay.

Again notice the absence of the recognition of Benevolence, or any desire to benefit others. (See Introduction, p. xxxv.) Both Aristotle and Thucydides look mainly at the pleasurable sense of superiority on the part of one who confers a benefit.

3. διό καὶ τὴν Θέτων] Passing illustrations of this sort are apparently introduced by Aristotle from memory, and are not unfrequently incorrect. This would not be unnatural if they occurred to the author during an extemporary Lecture. (See Introduction, p. xxxvii.) Thetis (Homer, H. i, 503) seems to do the reverse—

ζεῦ πάτερ, Εἵποτε δή σε μυτ' ἄθανατοις ὀνόμα
οί σιν ὑπάρχεισ

*Π ἐπει ἡ ἐργή. (See Supplementary Note.)

The reference in the case of the Lacedæmonians is uncertain. A case is related by Xen. Hell. VI. v. 33, in which however benefits conferred as well as received by themselves are mentioned by the Spartans.

6. δεῖσθαι here means, 'to ask for,' not 'to stand in need of,' as we judge from the High-minded man being said to do so reluctantly (μόνιμος) and also from the natural contrast between seeking and conferring favours (ὑπηρετεῖν). Compare δεητικὸς in § 32.

7. τοὺς ἐν ἄξιώματι] 'men of repute.' See § 15 of the last Chapter.
He is only roused to action on great occasions.

His plain-spokenness.

His independence, undemonstrativeness,

---

4. ἐντίμα] 'objects of common esteem.' ἄργον καὶ μελλητήρ = 'inactive and hesitating.'

11. εἰρώνεια is explained afterwards in ch. vii. to be a conscious depreciation of one's own merits or powers, and must not be mistaken here for 'irony.' A man of such pre-eminent dignity and merit as the μεγαλόψυχος must 'let himself down' with the majority of those he meets. He therefore consciously lowers his own pretensions on most occasions, and this would be εἰρώνεια. The word ἄληθευτικός is of course to be supplied again after οὔσα μὴ.

14. θητικὸς = 'slave.' (θής), ταπεινὸν = 'mean' or 'grovelling.' The word (as has been noted elsewhere) has a bad meaning in classical Greek, though no better word could be found by Christian writers to express the new idea of 'humility' as a virtue.
30 ὁμοθέν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἔστιν. Οὐδὲ μηνισίκακος οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχοι τὸ ἀπομιμημονεύειν, ἀλλὸς τε καὶ κακά, 31 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπολόγος οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρει οὔτε περὶ ἔτέρου οὔτε γὰρ ἑνα ἐπαίνη- ται μέλει αὐτῷ, οὔθ᾽ ὅτις οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγονται οὔθ᾽ αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν; διόπερ οὔδὲ κακολόγος, οὔδὲ τῶν ἐγχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δὲ ὑβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ μικρόν ἥμιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικὸς σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οὗς κεκτήσαται μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὀφελίμων αὐτά- 30 31 32 33 34

30. is not apt to express astonishment, nor to remember injuries.
31 He is no gossip: he is a man of few words, sparing alike in his praise and in his reproaches. He will not be anxious about trifles: he will prefer to possess what is grand and unproductive rather than what is merely useful. His gait, another's mode of life though he will do so for a friend. He is not apt to express astonishment, nor to remember injuries.

1. οὐ γὰρ ... ἀπομιμημονεύ-  ὕρων] He is not apt to bear anything long in mind, good or ill, but especially (ἀλλὸς τε καὶ) the latter. For the former see § 25.

7. δὲ ὑβριν] He is not abusive except when he wishes to express his disdain. If he does speak ill of people, he will do it to their face, and in order deliberately to brand them with contempt, not because he cannot control his own feelings, and still less to gratify any personal impulse of malignity or revenge. Our Lord's withering denunciations of the Pharisees might come under this head. In fact νέμεσις (see II. vii. 15) would sometimes find expression in ὑβρις or Scorn. (See Supplementary Note.)

ἀναγκαῖον] 'things which cannot be helped.'
8. ὀλοφυρτικὸς] 'querulous.'
12. στάσιμος] 'stately.' Compare La Rocheffoucauld (Max. 142), 'C'est le caractère des grands esprits de faire entendre en peu de paroles, beaucoup de choses, les petits esprits au contraire ont le don de beaucoup parler et de rien dire.'
his voice, and his manner of speech will be grave, dignified, and deliberate. Such is the Highminded man. The related characters who are in excess and defect in the matter of self-estimation are, as we have seen, the Vainglorious and the Little-minded. They are misguided, rather than actively vicious.

4. There is an obvious contrast between kakotai (actively vicious) and kakon echet (having something wrong about them). Aristotle means to say that men would hardly form so low an estimate of themselves unless there was something to partially justify it. ‘There cannot be so much smoke without some fire.’

9. ὅκνηρος] ‘wanting in energy,’ ‘diffident.’

10. ἡ τοιαύτη δοξα κ.τ.λ.] In other words, the absence of moral aspiration is most injurious. The moral influence of a man’s estimate of himself is very important. Witness the elevating effect of a conscious feeling that a man has powers beyond the perhaps humble sphere in which he finds himself placed, and conversely the depressing effect of the feeling (whether due to constitutional indolence, despondency, etc.), that one will never accomplish the task in hand. Many thus fail, simply because they have made up their minds that they cannot succeed. It is remarked by Nassau Senior in his Notes on Turkey, that the general spread of corruption among Turkish officials seems to date from the time when an oath of office was first imposed, in which the strictest integrity was promised; and he accounts for this by the supposition that the officials, unable to keep the oath completely, became reckless when they had once broken it. In other words, the conscious degradation of perjury (leading
We note however that there is probably some ground at the bottom of even undue self-depreciation; and also that such characters have a tendency to sink to their own standard.

The Vainglorious man is conspicuous by his ignorance of himself, and seeks by a vulgar display of such external advantages as he does possess to secure for himself that admiration to which his merits do not entitle him. Littlemindedness is more opposed to Highmindedness than Vaingloriousness is. It is a worse error, and also a commoner one.

to μικροψυχία, or a low moral estimation of one’s-self), extinguished all scruples as to minor offences, and all desire to avoid them, and so the whole character settled down to the level of the estimate of itself already formed. We may extend the remark to the moral influence of the estimation of society on the character of individuals. Recovery from some sins is rendered all but hopeless, out of all proportion to their relative guilt, simply by the arbitrary ban of society upon them. The offender in fact acquiesces himself in this estimate of his degradation and soon comes to deserve it. Thus ἂν τοιαύτη δόξα χείρως ποιεῖ. This is familiarly expressed in the proverb, ‘Give a dog a bad name,’ etc.

5. τοῖς ἐντιμοῖς] See note on § 27.

10. χείρων ἐστίν] Though Aristotle gives no reasons for this statement, we may suggest, (1) Its tendency to make men grow worse (§ 35), and (2) Its outward aspect being the reverse of that of Highmindedness. Both
IV. 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμῆν ἐστὶ μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἄρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἑλέχθη, ἡ δόξειέν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθερίας πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. Ἀμφοὶ γὰρ ἂν αὐταὶ τῷ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστάσιν, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέσιν ἥμας ὡς δεῖ. "Ὡσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει

We may now descend to the level of ordinary life, and describe another Virtue which, with its related Vices, has for its object Honour on a moderate scale, just as we before dis-

these reasons were given in ch. i. for preferring Prodigality to Sordidness.

Further, χαυνότης and μικροψυχία must be carefully distinguished from ἀλαζόνεια and εἰρώνεια which are discussed in ch. vii. Inter alia, note that while μικροψυχία is here said to be worse than χαυνότης, Aristotle regards εἰρώνεια as a less evil than ἀλαζόνεια. See vii. 17. Hence too we must not confuse μικροψυχία with Humility, though it is true that the character of Highmindedness as described in this chapter shows that Humility would find no place as a Virtue in Aristotle's system.

γίγνεται μᾶλλον] The deficiency of moral aspiration is much more common than vaingloriousness. The dignity of our moral nature, the worth (αξία) that belongs to man as man, and the motive for moral action supplied by such a reflection, is totally unrecognised by the majority of mankind. [See further a Supplementary Note, too long to be introduced here, on the character of the μεγαλοψυχος, p. 234.]

In this Chapter habits are discussed differing from those in the last chapter in degree rather than in kind; just as Liberality was related to, and yet differed from, Munificence. We must recollect that the real subject-matter to which Highmindedness refers was explained to be 'Self-Esteem in relation to merits' (last ch. § 3); but that practically it might be viewed as concerned with the pursuit of honour on a grand scale (§ 10). In this chapter Aristotle takes the latter point of view at once as his starting-point, with the proviso that only honour on a moderate and ordinary scale is now in consideration.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] Referring (as in § 4 below) to II. vii. 8.
kaί δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστι καί ὑπερβολή τε καί ἐλλειψις, οὔτω καί ἐν τιμής ἀρέσκει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καί 3 ἴττου, καὶ τὸ ὤθεν δεῖ καί ὃς δεῖ. Τὸν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς καί μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὤθεν οὐ δεῖ, τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον, ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς 5 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. Ἑστὶ δ' ὦτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινούμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καί φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καί σώφρονα, ὡσπερ καί ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι εὐπομεν. Δῆλον δ' ὦτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιμούτου λεγομένου, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀλ' φέρομεν τὸν 10 φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν, ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. Ἀνωνύμου δ' οὕσης τῆς μεσοτήτος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἐστεκεν ἀμφισβητεῖν το ἀκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ καί ἐλλειψις, καί τὸ 5 μέςον. Ὁρεάγονται δ' τιμῆς καί μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ 15 ἴττου, ἔστι δ' ὦτε καί ὃς δεῖ· ἐπανεῖται γοῦν ἢ ἔξις

tinguished the Liberality of moderate means from the Munificence appropriate to vast wealth. The term 'Ambition,' by which this habit is sometimes described, is not definitely restricted to it, being sometimes employed also to denote an excessive pursuit of Honour. 'Ambitious' and 'Unambitious' may either of them be terms of praise or of blame. The point to notice however is that there is a right and a wrong


CHAP. V.

Aristotle

S

ETHICS.

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3

refjUTToiovvTa TToXXtt teal Siafa povTa. O plevo vevv e

Set, /col9 Set, opytbo9, ert Set, /cat9 Set, /catore, real ocorr povov, eTraiveirai, irpaos &r)ovro av trj, eitrep 4 Trpaos arapa>; eivai, KCLI //,T) ayearQai, VTTTO rov irdoovs, aXX* 5 a>9 av o Xo709 rdfy, (ovro) Kal eVt rourot? /cat 6?rt roorov-

4 Toz/ XP OVOV X&heiraiveaf. Apaprdveiv Be e?rt TT)I/ eXXeti/rtz/* ov 70/3 rtyu-wP^Tt/co? o 5 paXkov (Tv^vwfJbovLKo^.

H 8* eXXet^t?, etV dopjrjo-la 4ecri/r, 6tr^e erai. Ol yap /JLTJ opyetl, KCU ol fj/r^ Set, 6yLt^S* ore, ytt^S ot9 Set* So/cet 7^ OVK alaOdvea-Oai ouSe re echat dfjuvvTiKos. To Se /cat TOU9 ot/cetoi9 irepiopav

sort of Passionateness, Anger being the feeling in itself morally indifferent in which the excess or defect takes place. We General shall then apply the term Meek to a man, though he is roused to anger on right occasions and in due measure, ever may be given of is naturally of a tranquil disposition, and never allows his Meekness, anger to get the better of his reason. His leaning is towards a deficiency in the feeling of anger, and forgiveness of injuries feet rather than revenge. That deficiency, in Tnger impassionateness (if we may venture so to call it), is a fault. The^d effect leads to a neglect of self-defence, and a submission to insult sort of im itself morally indifferent, neither as Be ye angry and sin not, good nor bad. See note on II. and S. Mark. iii. 5, where anger vii. 2. That feeling is in this is attributed to our Lord.

Due moderation in the regulation of the Temper may be termed Meekness. There is no one term in settled use to describe this virtue, nor indeed the related vices. We may perhaps employ the term 'Meekness,' though it suggests rather a deficiency in this respect. The excess we may describe as a

Chap. V.—See what was said in the note on the Catalogue of Virtues, at the end of B. II. on the position occupied in the list by πραότης, as being intermediate between the personal virtues that precede and the social virtues which follow it.

10. ὀργιλότης τις] 'Passionate-ness' and 'impassionateness' seem to express the ideas re-

quired, and their somewhat uncouth character reproduces that of the Greek originals for which Aristotle apologizes by adding τις here and in § 5.

11. τὸ μὲν πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργὴ] It will be remembered that all Virtue and Vice are held by Aristotle to consist in the moderate, excessive, or defective indulgence of some feeling in

No settled phraseology exists in regard to this Virtue.

(6 the latter in both directions) in fact, though our phraseo-

logy may not sufficiently indicate it; and this defect of lan-

guage is the sole cause that we have apparently in this case the opposition of two extreme habits inter se, without a settled mean state in contrast with both of them.

Chap. V.—On the regulation of the Temper.
sort of Passionateness. Anger being the feeling in itself morally
3 indifferent in which the excess or defect takes place. We
shall then apply the term 'Meek' to a man who, though he
is roused to anger on right occasions and in due measure,
is naturally of a tranquil disposition, and never allows his
4 anger to get the better of his reason. His leaning is towards
a deficiency in the feeling of anger, and forgiveness of injuries
5 comes more naturally to him than revenge. That deficiency,
impassionateness (if we may venture so to call it), is a fault.
6 It leads to a neglect of self-defence, and a submission to insult

itself morally indifferent, neither
good nor bad. See note on II.
vii. 2. That feeling is in this
case Anger. We are accustomed
to give a bad sense to 'Anger,'
and to describe the nobler forms
of the passion by 'Indignation.'
That 'Anger' had not always
this restricted sense in English
may be seen from such passages

as 'Be ye angry and sin not,'
and S. Mark, iii. 5, where 'anger'
is attributed to our Lord.
1. ἐφ' οἷς [on right occasions]
(ἐπὶ with dative as usual ex-
pressing the conditions of the
action).
2. οἷς δὲ ἐὰ [with right persons]
(dative of reference).
7 άνδραποδώδες. 'H δ' υπερβολή κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται: καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον οὐ μὴν ἀπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. Οὔ γὰρ ἄν δύναι, εἶναι τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ έαυτῷ ἄπολλυσι, καὶ όλόκληρον ἡ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.

8 Οἱ μὲν οἷς ὀργίλου ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονταί, καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἰς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως: ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχονσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' αὕτωι τούτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργήν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδοδόσιν ἢ φανερῷ εἰσὶ διὰ τὴν ὄξυντη, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται.

The excess falls under four types (§§ 7—11):

The passionate.

The quick-tempered.

The sulky.

The excess in question. (1) The passionate, who are soon angry, without due cause, and in too violent a degree, but soon come round. Their passion, being utterly unrestrained, speedily exhausts its force. (2) The quick-tempered, who are angry in a moment and at anything and everything—hence their name. (3) The sulky, who are hard to appease; and their anger, nature and revengefulness (χαλέπτοι).

5. όλόκληρον] see note above on i. 38.

6. The four classes described in §§ 8—11 have naturally many points in common. Their characteristic features seem to be respectively, (1) Violence and ungovernableness of temper (ὀργίλου)—(2) Extreme irritability and touchiness (ἀκρόχολου), —(3) A sulky and irreconcilable temper (πικροί)—(4) General ill-
being suppressed, lasts long, and is only removed by revenge. Its concealment prevents any attempts on the part of others to appease it, and makes its subjects a curse to themselves as well as to their best friends. (4) The ill-tempered, whose anger is generally ill-directed, unrestrained in degree and duration, and seldom to be appeased without revenge. Excess is worse than Defect in the case of anger. It is more common, and it is also more practically inconvenient. It is impossible

5. τῷ μὴ ἐπιφανεῖς] Compare what Tacitus says of Mucianus (Hist. iii. 53, fin.), 'callide eoque implacabilius.'

6. πέψαι] literally 'to digest' ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. without the external aid of 'smoothing down' (συμπειθεῖν) mentioned in the previous line.

8. χαλέποι] literally 'harsh and hard to deal with,' nearly what we mean by 'a thoroughly nasty temper.' It will be noticed by referring to § 8, that the point in which χαλέποι are distinguished from ὀργίλοι, is that the former retain anger πλείω χρόνων. 10. τιμωρίας ἡ κολάσεως] For the distinction see note on III. v. 7. There is no emphasis however on the distinction here, the former only being really applicable.

13. οἱ χαλέποι is here used as a generic term for all the four different forms of excess just described.

§ 11. ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

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diálutou, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. Παύλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδόῃ· ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἠδομὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λυπῆς ἐμποιοῦσα. Τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανεῖς εἰναι οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοῖς οὐδείς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. Εἰςὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοὺς μᾶλλον φίλοις.

1. Χαλέπους δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐδ' οἷς τε μὴ δει χαλεπαῖνουτας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλ-

12. λαττομένους ἀνευ τιμωρίας ἡ κολάσεως. Τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται: ἀνθρωπικῶτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. Καὶ

13. πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλέποι χείροις. 'Ο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

The ill-tempered

Excess is the worse extreme.

Precise practical rules are impossible

The ill-tempered

Excess is the worse extreme.

Precise practical rules are impossible
In their conduct and deportment in society some men, whom phraseology we may perhaps describe as obsequious, shrink under any circumstances from making things unpleasant: they would rather sacrifice a principle than say or do anything disagreeable. Others again seem to enjoy running counter to everyone and everything, and care not how much pain they cause. These we may call cross-grained and quarrelsome. In an intermediate position are those whose approbation and disapprobation are regulated upon principle, who love to give pleasure, though they do not shrink from inflicting pain when it is needful: characters whom we may describe as friendly.

We now come to unnatural to separate the group of Virtues, three in number, which relate to our conduct in and towards society. The order is not of great importance, but it seems to depart from Aristotle's own summary in viii. 12, below. Here it is (as a sketch) departed from. There it was from Aristotle's own summary in vii. 12, below. The order is not of much importance, but it seems to be avoided in the regulation of temper is abundantly clear. The practical details must be left to individual feeling and judgment.

where nearly the same words occur. εκ τῶν λεγομένων, 'from what we are now saying.'

8. τὸ λόγῳ] see note II. ix. 7, 8.
9. αἰσθήσεις, 'individual feeling.' Questions of casuistry such as these cannot be determined by scientific rules. So much depends upon the infinite variety of circumstances bearing upon any given action, and even granting all such circumstances could be taken into accurate account, so much still depends on the physical and moral constitution of the agent, that individual feeling (αἰσθήσεις) or, as a modern writer might say, 'each man's conscience,' must in the last resort decide such points.
CHAP. VI.—On Friendliness, or Amiability.

In their conduct and deportment in society some men, whom we may perhaps describe as ‘obsequious,’ shrink under any circumstances from making things unpleasant; they would rather sacrifice a principle than say or do anything disagreeable. Others again seem to enjoy running counter to every one and every thing, and care not how much pain they cause. These we may call ‘cross-grained and quarrelsome.’ In an intermediate position are those whose approbation and disapprobation are regulated upon principle, who love to give pleasure, though they do not shrink from inflicting pain when it is needful: characters whom we may describe as ‘friendly,’
5 λαβόντα. Διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἑστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὀμίλει, οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. Ὅμοιώς γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνότας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἄσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς 5 ἀρμόζειν οὐ γὰρ ὀμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθυνίων 6 φροντίζειν, οὖν αὖ λυπεῖν. Καθόλου μὲν οἷν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὀμιλήσει, ἀναφέρον δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοιχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. 7 Ἐοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἥδονας καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς 10

5 and their disposition as 'friendliness.' That disposition differs from 'friendship,' because it has not its root in affection, but in a natural inclination to give pleasure and avoid giving pain: and moreover because it is not limited to particular persons, but is felt towards all in due measure and proportion.

6 This natural tendency to please is controlled however by 7 several considerations, such as the following:—(1) Can it be

For he that holds the mean position is just such a man as we should wish to call 'a good friend,' if the element of affection were superadded. Friendliness + Affection = Friendship. In Greek, however, there are no two words exactly corresponding to this distinction between 'friendliness' and 'friendship,' and so φίλη has to be employed for both.

3. τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι] 'because it is his nature to do so.' He makes himself generally pleasant and agreeable (or if necessary the reverse), not because he likes (or dislikes) you, but because it comes naturally to him under certain circumstances, and it makes no difference whether he knows you personally or not, except so far as acquaintanceship introduces some element of feeling (see § 8 below, and cf. § vii. of next Chapter, τῷ τῷ ἐξ ἔνω τοιούτῳ εἶναι). See also Bacon's Essay on 'Good Nature' throughout, and especially 'Neither is there only a habit of goodness directed by right reason (cf. ἐξ ἐκατὸ τῶν ὄρθων λόγων), but there is in some men, even in Nature, a disposition towards it: as on the other side there is a Natural Malignity. The lighter sort of malignity turneth to a crossness or frowardness' (cf. δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος).

9. συνηδύνειν] 'to contribute
exercised with propriety and with advantage? e.g. it is better to give pain than to sacrifice a principle, as we have said; nor again should we hesitate to stand in a man’s way to save him at the cost of small present annoyance from bringing great future disgrace or injury upon himself. (2) Regard must be had to the social position of those with whom we are associating, our degree of acquaintance with them, and so on.

1. τούτων δ' ὅσας] this must refer to ἥδονας only and not to λυπᾶς. ‘Such pleasures as he cannot conscientiously join in he will frown upon.’ He will not only not do such things, but he will have no pleasure in those that do them.’ Cf. viii. 8, δὲ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκοῦν, τοῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.

Notice the combination of natural kindliness of disposition with a stern and uncompromising hatred of moral wrong. There is nothing weak and effeminate about this natural kindliness (φιλία). It is in the best sense of the word a manly feeling. Moreover, the combination spoken of is quite true to human nature. The ‘Apostle of Love’ was also one of the ‘Sons of Thunder,’ and some of the most vehement denunciations in Scripture occur in his writings. Even persecution (to take an extreme case) has been conscientiously sanctioned and practised by men otherwise conspicuous for their kindliness and benevolence of nature. Witness M. Aurelius, S. Louis of France, etc.

2. The student will notice the usual distinction between μὴ καλὸν, ‘morally wrong,’ and βλαβερὸν ‘materially harmful,’ corresponding to the distinction between καλὸν and συμφέρον in the preceding section.

Cf. iii. 26.
(3) Ulterior consequences must always be taken into consideration. Great subsequent pleasure or profit may sometimes be secured by slight momentary pain. The Excess has two types, distinguished by their motives. If it be merely an exaggerated and disinterested desire to please, we call it 'Obsequiousness.' If it be adopted from motives of self-interest, we term it 'Flattery.' The Defect has been sufficiently characterized already. Owing to the want of a definite

 babies; the moment he sees them he declares that they are the very image of their father, and kisses and fondles them, though he cares nothing about them.'

 8. κόλαξ\ The ancient 'Parasite' and the Mediaeval Courtier would be typical instances. e.g. Polonius and Osric in Hamlet, Act III. Sc. ii. (I. 393), and Act V. Sc. ii. (I. 98, etc.). It is recorded that one of the courtiers of Philip of Macedon wore a shade over his left eye and walked lame, because the king had lost the sight of his left eye and been wounded in the leg. The modern servility of 'the Alexandra limp,' shows that the race is not extinct.
and recognised name for the mean state, the excess and defect sometimes appear to be opposed to one another immediately.

CHAP. VII.—On Straightforwardness or Truthfulness.

1 Turning now to the behaviour of men in regard to the pre-

1. 'Αντικείσθαι δέ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] So it was also in the case of φιλοτιμία, iv. 6.

CHAP. VII.*—We next proceed to consider the virtue of Truthfulness or Straightforwardness in words and actions considered out of any relation to the pleasure or pain caused to others.

The excess and defect here must not be confused with χαυνότης and μικροψυχία in ch. iii. See further note on iii. 37 and also that on μεγαλόψυχος, p. 235.

4. ἀνώνυμος κ.τ.λ.] otherwise Aristotle would hardly have had recourse to the strange description ἄλαζονειας μεσότης, 'mode-

General explanation of the Habits in question and their phraseology (§§ 1—6).

* See Supplementary Notes on this Chapter, passim.
2 tensions which they make in society, we observe that the Braggart lays claim to qualities which he does not possess at all, or possesses in a degree below his claims; the Dissembler disclaims or depreciates his own merits; the Truthful man, with a genuineness that embraces his whole life and conversation, represents himself just as he is, neither more nor less. The Simulation or Dissimulation thus described may be practised with or without a special motive; but, generally speaking, men's words, acts, and lives are a true reflex of their character and disposition, unless there be some special motive for

1. προσποιήμα 'pretensions.'
2. εἴρων is a very difficult word to translate. As ἄλαζὼν is one who boastfully lays claim to qualities that do not belong to him, so εἴρων is the reverse of this, and εἴρωνεα therefore is a conscious and intentional concealment or disclaiming of good qualities that really belong to one. 'Irony' is too wide, it may take this form among others. 'False Modesty' and 'Reserve' are too unconscious and often unintentional. 'Dissembler' and 'Dissimulation' are too closely allied with deceit, at least in modern English, though it does not seem that they were always used with this bad connotation: e.g. in Bacon's Essay on 'Simulation and Dissimulation.' Perhaps on the whole either 'Dissimulation' or 'Self-Depreciation' come nearest to what we want: but the word in Greek itself is used in different senses, as we see from § 14.16 of this Chapter.
3. This distinction is further discussed in § 10, etc. With some persons the habits of bragging or of self-depreciation are so ingrained that they are exhibited even when it is impossible to imagine a motive, and where detection seems inevitable, and, as Aristotle proceeds to remark, except there be a definite motive such conduct is a true index of a character corresponding.
6 καὶ οὖτω ζη, ἐὰν μὴ τινὸς ἕνεκα πράττῃ. Καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεύδος φαύλιων καὶ ψεκτοῦ, τὸ δ' ἀληθεύουσα καὶ ἑπαυνετῶν. Οὖτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὁν ἑπαυνετὸς, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν. Περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρὸτε-5
7 ρον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύουσος λέγομεν, οὔτ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συνετείνει (ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταύτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μιθῆνος τοιοῦτον διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ 8 καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀλησεῖν τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Δόξειε 10 δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικῆς εἶναι. Ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύον, ἀληθεύει καὶ ἐν οἷς δια-
8 φέρει ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεύδος εὐλαβή-
9 σεται, ἢ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἦλαβεῖτο ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἑπαυνετῶν. 'Επὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦσ 15 ἄποκλινει. ἐμμελεστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ μεῖζον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων 10

6 the contrary. And seeing that any falsehood is in itself reprehensible, we have no hesitation in according praise to Truthfulness and censure both to Boastfulness and Dissimulation, but especially to the former. Now to speak of each 7 character in order. The Truthful man is not only truthful in his dealings, or where his interest is involved, but all his life and conversation are truthful, from the natural love which he 8 has of truth in itself; and similarly he shuns falsehood even in matters indifferent, and therefore much more in all other cases. This habit is evidently in itself a virtue. If however such a man should err, it will be on the side of depreciating, 10 rather than exaggerating, his own merits. Boastfulness has several types. (a) It may be without a definite motive, 'Truthfulness' pervades the whole character in which it is found (§§ 7—10).

13. ὡς αἰσχρὸν is in contrast with καθ' αὐτὸ. Falsehood under circumstances involving disgrace, contrasted with falsehood per se.
coming naturally as it were to a man. In that case it is rather foolish than actually vicious. (β) It may be assumed with a view to secure honour, or with a view to make gain; the latter being the worse form. And observe that Boastfulness is a moral state, the character of which is determined mainly by its motive or purpose. For the force of

1. φαύλω μὲν ἐοικεν 'is a bad man in some sense.' This is in natural contrast with the statement in § 8, δοξεῖε δ' ἀν κ.τ.λ.

4. ὃς ὁ ἀλαζων As the ἀλαζων is the character whose different types Aristotle is now distinguishing, it seems out of place to give as an example of one of them 'ὁ ἀλαζων.' Two other readings are proposed (α) ὃς ἀλαζων (omitting ὃ), i.e. 'he is not very much to be blamed, for a braggart' (= considering that he is a braggart): (β) ὁ ἀλαζων (omitting ὃς), i.e. 'He who does it for the sake of honour is not very much to be blamed—he who boasts, I mean.' Thus the words supply the place of the participle προσποιούμενος which must be understood with ὃ, and if the sentence were written in full would follow τιμῆς. It is most probable however that the words ὃς ὁ ἀλαζων represent a marginal gloss that has crept into the text.

5. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.] Boastfulness as a reprehensible habit consists not so much in the mere capacity (δύναμις) or propensity to boast. That may arise in a manner from natural constitution (τῷ τοιόσοutschen eιναι— with which compare a similar statement as regards Friendliness, vi. 5, τῷ τοιότοτος eιναι κ.τ.λ.), or from force of habit (κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν— with which again compare τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος eιναι in § 7 above). The moral depravity of Boastfulness depends rather upon the motives for which it is adopted (προαίρεσεις), the distinction between some of which motives has just been pointed out. The distinction is in fact the same as that which discriminates ἀρεσκος and κολαζ in the last Chapter.

The remark is introduced in the text to show that the classification just made of boasters according to their motive indicates a real moral difference.
habit or natural disposition may make a man boastful, just as some men have a natural propensity for lying, and others adopt it for a special purpose. In the case of Boastfulness the special purpose is the main point by which we judge the habit. To return to the two last-mentioned types of Boastfulness. The manner in which they are displayed varies with the difference of motive. If the motive be honour, pretension is made to qualities which are praised or envied by men. If it be gain, pretension is made to qualities that are useful, and the absence of which is not likely to be detected; e.g. quackery and fortune-telling. This is the commoner type. The Dissemblers, on the other hand, disclaim their own merits, and this in moderation is not altogether unattractive, as in the case of Socrates. The same habit in an extreme form is very

7. óιον μαντίν σοφόν κ.τ.λ.] e.g., weather-prophets, fortune-tellers, quack-doctors, etc.
12. φεύγουσες το ὄγκηρον] 'wishing to avoid (the appearance of) giving themselves airs.' ὄγκηρος means literally 'bulky' or 'swollen,' and thence 'pompous' (L and S.).

13. The εἰρονεία of Socrates is well known. It consisted in a profession of ignorance, doubt, and a desire to be instructed, by which unwary opponents were
Some part of life being necessarily spent in recreation, there must be in that part also a propriety of conduct, and this will apply, though in different degrees, both to speakers and listeners in such scenes: and here too the law of the mean holds good. In the one extreme we have the Buffoon, who can never resist a laugh however ill-timed, however painful to the feelings of others. In the other we have the Boer, who neither jokes himself, nor tolerates it in others. The character-mean state is characterized by quickness and versatility of wit, though, as nothing is easier than to raise a laugh, the Buffoon often gets credit for such versatility.

**CHAP. VIII.—On Geniality.**

Some part of life being necessarily spent in recreation, there must be in that part also a propriety of conduct, and this will apply, though in different degrees, both to speakers and listeners in such scenes: and here too the law of the mean holds good. In the one extreme we have the Buffoon, who can never resist a laugh however ill-timed, however painful to the feelings of others. In the other we have the Boer, who neither jokes himself, nor tolerates it in others. The character-mean state is characterized by quickness and versatility of wit, though, as nothing is easier than to raise a laugh, the Buffoon often gets credit for such versatility.

1. *προσποιούμενον*] This clause stands in contrast with τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦντα, and therefore we may understand some such words as μὴ δίνασθαι to complete the sense. ‘Those who disclaim small merits, and such as they obviously possess.’

Thus we have two types of εἰρωνεία distinguished:—(1) the more favourable type of ‘Self-Depreciation,’ of which Socrates is an instance, and which is exhibited also by the μεγάλος ψυχος (see iv. 28, note); and (2) the more unfavourable type of ‘affectation,’ which often is a mere disguise of ‘Boastfulness.’

*μεγάλονυσσως* ‘affected knaves.’ *βαύκος*—‘prudish or affected.’

11. *ομιλία τῆς ἐμελης*] ‘a graceful way of conducting oneself in society.’


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2. An adjective, which, in its original sense, means a characteristic, and which is often translated 'versatile.'

1. διοίσει κ.τ.λ.] The same difference in fact as exists in other cases between the doer of an act and one who is only an accessory.

10. Observe the play on words between εὐτράπελοι and εὐτροποι, both having the same derivation, but the former having gained a metaphorical sense like 'versatile,' while the latter retains its literal meaning. The notion is that they are called 'quick-witted' because their wits move quickly.

is another characteristic, which insures that its possessor, whether speaking or listening, shall never forget what it is becoming for a gentleman and a man of refinement, even in the way of recreation, to speak or to listen to. As an obvious instance of the application of such 'tact,' we note what a difference there is between coarseness and innuendo.

Whether then he draws the line at what is becoming to a gentleman, or at what will give pleasure, or at least no pain, to his hearers, is perhaps not easy to define. But in any case he will not willingly listen to anything which he would shrink from saying himself. For though law does not restrain ridi-

2. ἐλευθέριος here means 'a gentleman,' just as conversely ἀνδραποδόδης means 'a low and vulgar man.'

7. αἰσχρολογία] 'outspoken obscenity,' ὑπόνοια 'innuendo.'

The difference would be well illustrated by the contrast between Rabelais and Sterne. or between the coarseness of Aristophanes and the 'intrigue' of a modern French play.

9. εὐσχημοσύνην] 'decency.'

13. ποιεῖν ... ποιήσει] in the sense of σκόπτειν or λέγειν. As there are certain jokes which he would not himself make, so he will also refuse to listen to them.
cule as it does personal abuse, yet a true gentleman is a law
to himself in such matters. The Buffoon however can never
resist a joke. No consideration for persons or regard for
proprieties ever restrains him. The Boor on the other hand
is quite useless in social intercourse. He contributes nothing
11 to it himself, and acts as a continual damper: and yet some
rest and recreation is a real necessity in life.
12 This concludes our account of the three Social Virtues.

2. skōptteiv] Understand 'ένα καλύων' from the preceding.
10 [ούτως] i.e. as if actually re-
strained by law.
4. εἰτ' επιδέξιος εἰτ' εὑτρά-
πελος λέγειται] There being no
settled name for this Virtue,
Aristotle hesitates by which of
its two principal characteristics
(see §§ 3—5) he shall describe it.
7. Observe the emphatic con-
trast between οὔθεν and ένα,
because there are some things
which a man of refinement
(χαριείς) would not say himself,
which however he would not
think it necessary to protest
against if he heard them (see § 1
dιοίσει δὲ κ.τ.λ.)
8. ἄγριος corresponds with
ἀγροῖκος in the Catalogue of II.
vii. It describes a man who
is deficient in humour and the
sense of the ludicrous, and one who
acts as a sort of kill-joy in convivial
society. In the former aspect
he resembles Sydney Smith’s
Scotchman who needed a surgical
operation to get a joke into his
head; and in the latter he recalls
Thackeray’s description of the
‘usual English expression of
suppressed agony and intense
gloom.’
CHAP. IX.—On the quasi-virtue, 'Sense of Shame.'

Shame cannot strictly be called a Virtue, for (1) it is an occasional feeling rather than a permanent state. It may be defined as 'a fear of disgrace,' and its outward marks resemble those of fear. Shame makes us blush, Fear makes us pale, and these are similar physical and transient effects. (2) It

CHAP. IX.—The subject of this concluding Chapter is the Sense of Shame. The Chapter is evidently fragmentary, for we hear nothing of the Excess of the feeling, the embodiment of which was described as ὁ καταπλής in II. vii. 14. In fact the discussion ends abruptly at the words ἀλλὰ τὸς μικτῆς in § 8, after which a few words have been added to connect this Book with the Books that follow. which are thought to be not Aristotle's, or at any rate not to belong to this treatise.

6. τάθει μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξει] If so, not properly a Virtue. See II. v. φόβος τὸς ἀδοξίας] αἴδως has a variety of meanings in Homer, but in all cases it is 'a sentiment which has ultimate reference to the standard of public opinion' (Gladstone, Juv. Mundi. p. 384). In Odys. ii.
is not even a becoming feeling, except in youth: in mature age we certainly should not praise it. (3) It has no place in good men as such, because it is felt only when wrong has been done. If it be urged that some of the occasions for shame are only conventionally wrong, we reply that a good man will avoid even these. If it be said that a good man ought to retain the capacity for feeling shame in case he should do wrong, we reply that as all wrong-doing to which shame is appropriate is voluntary, such occasions will not arise. Thus shame would be only virtuous provisionally; provided, that is, that wrong has been done. Hence it is not strictly a Virtue. We need not however therefore hesitate

64-5, both αἰδώς and νέμεσις are appealed to as distinct motives against wrong-doing.

12. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως | 'subject to a condition,' the condition being that if wrong has been done shame will be a virtuous feeling, not otherwise. No virtue properly so called is subject to such a limitation as this. Aristotle is ready to admit that 'the man that blushes is not quite a brute,'
8 to call Shamelessness a Vice. We do not describe even Continence as a Virtue, because of the mixture of bad desires which it necessarily implies. But of this hereafter. We now proceed to discuss Justice.

though he will not regard him as virtuous on the strength of this. To do so would be to encourage 'doing evil that good may come,' or 'continuing in sin that grace may abound.'

2. oúδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια] For an explanation of ἐγκράτεια see note on I. iii. 7. The point here is that as not even ἐγκράτεια is called a Virtue because it implies strong bad desires, though they are successfully combated, a fortiori Shame cannot be called a virtue, which presupposes actual wrong-doing.

3. ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον] viz. in B. VII.

νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης] Thus not only is the subject of αἰδώς unfinished, but that of νέμεσις and ἐπιχαίρεσακία, of which we had so confused an account in II. vii. 15, is not even alluded to.
NOTE ON CHAPTER III.

THE CHARACTER OF THE μεγαλόψυχος.

Several questions arise in reference to this important character, some of which are inserted here to avoid making the notes too bulky. We have in this chapter Aristotle's conception of a perfect and ideal character (see especially § 16), combining the full social and moral conditions of καλοκαγαθία.

The definition from which the whole discussion starts is that the Virtue of μεγαλόψυχια consists in 'a well-grounded self-esteem' (ὁ μεγάλων αυτών ἄξιον ἄξιος ὁν, § 3), and hence the whole character is, according to our modern ideas, somewhat disfigured by self-consciousness. It may be worth while to state some of the principal objections which are commonly made against it.

1. The pervading selfishness of the character. He has no thought for others (§ 29): even his Benevolence is referred to himself and resolved into a desire for superiority (§ 24). (Compare Hobbes's celebrated theory that Benevolence is simply the love of power and the desire to exercise it.) His courage is based upon a somewhat selfish calculation likewise (§ 23). His love of Truth is similarly qualified (§ 28): so also is his forgiveness of injuries (§ 30).

2. The conspicuous pride of his character, and the total absence, not to say of humility (on which see note § 37), but even of modesty (§§ 18, 22, 28).

3. That such a man would be practically an offensive, unamiable, unsociable character (§§ 27, 29, 31).

Such are some of the criticisms commonly made on the character before us. We may feel sure however, after making all allowance for the difference between the ancient Greek and the modern Christian point of view, that a character so palpably defective and repulsive could never have appeared to Aristotle, not to say admirable, but ideally perfect. Hence, without attempting a defence of all its details, it may be worth while to endeavour to arrive at a somewhat more sympathetic view of this ideal character.
structured ideal States, so Aristotle has here delineated an ideal Man. In both cases alike some allowance must be made for the difference between theory and fact in a world where things, as they are, are not ideal. Within certain limits we may say, 'tant pis pour les faits.'

2. Aristotle had a strong sense of the dignity of Human Nature; of the grandeur and worth of Man as Man, in contrast with all the rest of animate and inanimate creation. He felt something of what a modern writer has called 'the Enthusiasm of Humanity.' (See further, Ecce Homo, 3d ed. p. 162, etc.) This seems to be the key to his conception of the μεγαλόψυχος. The μεγαλόψυχος is one who is deeply conscious of the dignity of his Human Nature, and penetrated by this consciousness is elevated thereby to live a life in all respects worthy of such an ideal. 'He becomes a law unto himself' (ὡσπερ νόμος ὁν ἑαυτῷ, as we read in viii. 10). Doubtless this intense self-reliance of the μεγαλόψυχος appears from our modern Christian point of view an inadequate foundation on which to build the whole structure of the moral character. But it may well be asked whether, apart from revelation, any nobler or more effective stimulus to Virtue can be suggested than the feeling that any other conduct is unworthy of the dignity of human nature. We may also remember that S. Paul appeals in a very similar manner to the feeling that sin is unworthy of, and inconsistent with, our Christian profession and renewed nature, and argues that we should therefore scorn to commit it. A well-known saying of Goethe's recognises the value of this self-estimate: 'If you would improve a man, it is best to begin by persuading him that he is already what you would have him to be.'

In contrast with the character we have described, the χαύρος is one who unworthily lays claim to such a dignity. He desires 'the loaves and fishes' of virtue and worth. So long as he can secure the honour and glory accorded to merit, he is more or less indifferent to the grounds on which he obtains it (§ 36), since it is obvious that it can be obtained from men on secondary and morally indifferent grounds (see §§ 19, 20). The μικρόψυχος on the other hand is one who has no noble aspirations at all. He is quite content with low and grovelling aims, and has therefore no chance of moral elevation. Hence Aristotle declares Littlemindedness to be a worse type of character than Vaingloriousness. The Vainglorious man does not shrink from grand and difficult tasks, he rather courts them, and his unbounded self-confidence may sometimes even carry him through (e.g. Cleon at Sphacteria, if we accept the estimate of him in Thucydides and Aristophanes).
At any rate he will probably be elevated by actual contact with them, even as Dante says, when he has met the great Poets, 'che di vederli in me stesso m’èsalto.' Compare also Tennyson, Queen Mary, Act ii. Sc. ii.:

Yet thoroughly to believe in one's own self;  
So one's own self be thorough, were to do  
Great things, my lord.

But the Littleminded or Pusil-lanimous man can never rise to any great effort; and this is precisely the character which Dante brands in the well-known line, 'Che fecce per villate il gran rinfuso' (Inf. iii. 60).

We may account thus for the strong denunciation of the χαλαροί in Rev. iii. 15, 16, and for the supreme contempt of Dante, in Inf. iii. 36-51, for those 'Che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.' In Rhet. i. ix. 11 μεγαλοψυχία is described as ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητική εὑρετημάτων, μικροψυχία δὲ τονυντίον. Compare also La Rochefoucauld (Max. 41), 'Ceux qui s'appliquent trop aux petites choses deviennent ordinairement incapables des grandes.'

Two further points call for a few words of explanation:

(1) The distinction between Χαλαρός and Ἀλαζονέα.

(2) The apparent and real repugnance between High-mindedness and Humility.

(1) (a) It must be remembered that Ἀλαζονέα is the Excess in relation to one of the three Social Virtues (viz. ἀληθεία) i.e. it has reference to a man's bearing in and towards society. (See note on Catalogue of Virtues at the end of Bk. II.) Χαλαρός has no such reference necessarily. We see from its position in the Catalogue that it is more of a personal Vice, even though its exercise must be more or less public. It relates rather to a moral state or condition of character, whereas Ἀλαζονέα, though based upon this, relates especially to an outward manifestation of character. Hence Aristotle says, in IV, vii. 12, the moral estimate of Ἀλαζονέα depends much more on the purpose for which it is practised than on the mere fact of the tendency to, or capacity for, such conduct existing in the person himself.

(2) Another distinction would seem to be this. The Ἀλαζών lays claim to the possession of anything which can be the subject of admiration (προστοιχίας τῶν ἐνδόξων, IV. vii. 2), especially personal qualities, such as strength, cleverness, skill, etc. etc., and (as we judge from the opposition to Ἀληθευτικός, and also from the consciousness involved in the Vice of Defect, εἰρωνεία), generally speaking, he is a conscious deceiver: his Boastfulness has its root in a vice of Untruthfulness. He knows that he is an impostor. The χαίνος, on the other hand, is most frequently himself deceived. His Vaingloriousness springs from the
root of personal Vanity, by which he is so blinded in his estimate of things, so 'clouded with his own conceit,' that he regards all occasions merely as opportunities for self-display; and this of course especially applies to great occasions—these being a preliminary condition of ἡμνώτης, μεγαλοψυχία and μικροψυχία.

It should be further observed that Aristotle attributes frequent εἰρωνεία to the μεγαλοψυχόχος (IV. iii. 28'), which plainly shows that εἰρωνεία is widely different from μικροψυχία.

2. It has sometimes been argued (e.g. by Aquinas and others) that μεγαλοψυχία is not inconsistent with Christian Humility. Without going so far as this, we ought at least to take into consideration the following points:

   (a) μικροψυχία must on no account be confounded with Humility, which has nothing in common with it, as has been already sufficiently explained. See note on IV. iii. 37.

   (b) The modern popular notion of Humility is a very false one, in two ways especially:

   (i) Humility is generally thought to consist in a conscious (not to say, often insincere) self-depreciation. In that sense it somewhat resembles εἰρωνεία both in its better and worse phases (see note on IV. vii. 15). Now the Humility of true greatness is a just estimate of its power, not a deprecatory one. If it be consciously deprecatory, it is simply the 'pride of modesty' (see IV. vii. 15). It only appears deprecatory to those who are lost in admiration of a standard above their own reach or aspirations. When Sir Isaac Newton said that in his highest efforts he felt as if he were only a child picking up pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge, that was a humble and yet a just estimate of the powers of human genius, though to an ordinary man it might seem unduly deprecatory. The Greeks, on the other hand, not having yet learnt how limited are man's powers in the universe, could not understand how a low estimate of unusual powers could still be a just one.

   (ii) The popular notions of Conceit and Humility are simply a high or a low self-estimate, without any regard to the relation between the estimate and the merits: just as Liberality and the reverse are often popularly judged by the amount spent, without regard to the relation which it bears to the means of the giver.

At the same time, looking at several expressions in the chapter under consideration, we must admit that the modern notion of Humility as a Virtue was foreign, and perhaps necessarily so, to the Greek mind. As we have said, a low estimate, which is also a genuine and sincere one, of human power and human virtue, can come only from the consciousness of defeat and failure; and it would be as much out of
place amidst the first daring flights and as yet un baffled efforts of the Greek mind, as melancholy would be in the sanguine years of childhood, which have not yet been sobered by disappointment. 1

At the same time some sort of recognition of a feeling akin to humility occurs in the commendation allowed to the better type of ἐμπνευσία in IV. vii. 14.

It is interesting to contrast with this picture what has not inaptnly been described as St. Paul’s delineation of an ideal character in 1 Cor. xiii., especially vv. 4, 5, and 7. Also the total divergence of the ancient and modern conceptions of a perfect character is curiously illustrated by the following statement of a recent moralist, whether we accept it or not:—

‘Were the perfect man to exist, he himself would be the last to know it; for the highest stage in advancement is the lowest descent in humility’ (Archer Butler).

It may be worth while to compare with Aristotle’s ideal sketch an actual instance of a character embodying many of the traits here depicted. Lord Macaulay in his Life of Pitt, p. 181 (Bio-

1 Compare the grounds on which Arist. (Rhet. II. xii. 11) states that the young are μεγαλοψυχοι,—οὕτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βιόν οὕτω τεταπείνωνται ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἀπειροὶ εἰσίν, and the old are μικροψυχοί for the converse reason (II. xiii. 5). Also Mansel (Gnostics, pp. 22-24) notes the little attention paid in Greek Philosop-

graphies, edition 1867), observes that Pitt may be considered as in many respects a noble embodiment of Aristotle’s conception of the μεγαλόψυχος. We may compare the following traits or incidents with the portraiture in this chapter:

‘No person could hear Pitt without perceiving him to be a man of high, intrepid, and commanding spirit, proudly conscious of his own rectitude and of his own intellectual superiority, incapable of the low vices of fear and envy, but too prone to feel and show disdain (§§ 18, 22). Pride pervaded the whole man, . . . was marked by the way in which he walked, in which he sate, in which he stood, and above all, in which he bowed (§ 34). Several men of note (§§ 26, 28) who had been partial to Pitt . . . were so much irritated by the contempt with which he treated them that they complained in print of their wrongs. . . . His ambition had no mixture of low cupidity. There was something noble in the cynical disdain with which the mighty minister scattered riches and titles to right and left among those who valued them, while he spurned them out of his own way’ (§§ 18 fin., 33, etc.). At the age of twenty-two he was offered ‘one of the easiest and most highly paid places in the service of the Crown. The offer was at once declined, for the young statesman had resolved to accept no post which did not entitle him
to a seat in the Cabinet, and announced that resolution in the House of Commons,’ and that at a time when the Cabinet was usually restricted to about seven members, and even Burke was not included in it (ἐις τὰ ἐντιμα μὴ λέναι ἢ οὖ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι, §§ 27, 33).

Lastly, it should be noted (and this perhaps increases our difficulty in taking an appreciative view of Aristotle’s sketch in this chapter), that now-a-days the habit of mind indicated by μεγαλοψυχία is far less common than formerly, and even in comparatively recent times, and that anything approaching to self-assertion is viewed with increasing repugnance. Mr. Mill in his Essay on Liberty protests against the English dislike for eccentricity or conspicuousness of any kind, and deplores the tendency to a dull and dead level of mediocrity which society at present fosters. But be the cause what it may, the fact is undeniable. What would be thought now-a-days of such a title-page to a book, once so common, as ‘A most learned and edifying discourse by . . .’? The late Lord Dalling writes, ‘One of the absurdities of the English character of the present day, is that no one has an estimate of his intrinsic value.’ Yet it may well be doubted whether any great reform, religious or political, has been effected, or any deep impression left in the world’s history or literature, by any one who did not display the self-confidence and even self-assertion of Aristotle’s μεγαλοψυχός in a considerable, and often, to our modern notion, a somewhat distasteful degree. There is no more remarkable instance of this than that of Dante. This spirit breathes throughout the whole of his Divine Poem. He promises immortal fame to those who are named by him in it: to be mentioned there, even for censure, is no small argument of distinction: he fears lest a timid statement of truth, though perhaps increasing his present fame, should injure it with those ‘who shall call these days ancient’: he boldly ranks himself among the six great poets of the world; and so on in innumerable other passages. Nor was this bold self-reliance limited to mere flights of poetry. Boccaccio relates that when appointed to go from Florence on an embassy to Boniface VIII., Dante hesitated, and assigned as his reason, ‘If I go, who remains? and if I remain, who goes?’ So in the Convito (I. x.) he does not shrink from saying, ‘fidandomi di me piú che d’un altro.’ Whatever may have been thought of this self-reliance at the time, the verdict of posterity has fully justified it; and may we not apply the reflection of Aristotle in a similar case, and ask, If this be so, πώς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἶ ὃτ’ ἐστὶν . . . μὴ ἄληθεύσεται κατ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον; (I. x. 7.) ‘There was a time’ (says Dean Church) when great men dared to claim their great-
ness... in the consciousness of a strong and noble purpose and of strength to fulfil it.' To take an instance of a more recent date, Wordsworth, in his Preface to his own Poems, undeterred by the storm of unpopularity and ridicule by which he was then assailed, confidently asserts the immortality of his work, and this, writes Professor SHAIRP, 'is not vanity, but the calm confidence of a man who feels the rock under his feet, and who knows that he is in harmony with the everlasting truth of things.' Merely to suggest other cases, without entering into details, the same self-reliance is conspicuous in men so different as Mohammed, Savonarola (Milman's Essays, p. 9), Angelo Politiano (Roscoe's Life of Lorenzo de'Medici, p. 92, etc.), and in almost all 'self-made men,' as they are styled in modern times. Certain it is that whether society likes or dislikes the habit, the μεγαλόψυχοι, and often even the χαύνοι, are those who chiefly advance themselves, and arrive at distinction, more or less lasting: so true to life is the reflection of Goethe—

Und wenn ihr euch nur selbst vertraut, Vertrauen euch die andern Seelen;

and again—

So bald du dir vertraust, so bald weisst du zu leben.
Aristotle now reverts to the subject of Happiness, the various questions arising out of the Definition in I. vii. having been disposed of. In two respects especially the following discussion differs from that in B. I. (1) The object now is not so much to give a formal Definition of Happiness, as to prove its general character to be contemplative (OtwprjTiKty. (2) Happiness is here considered in the abstract and in its highest ideal development, as it is found in the life of the gods, and no longer under the practical limitations by which it is modified in the life of man (vii. 8). Thus in B. I. we were frequently reminded that it was not ideal Happiness and ideal Virtue but human Happiness and human Virtue that we were in search of. (See especially I. vii. 13 and xviii. 5, 6.) Now however it is argued that human Happiness is not the highest form of Happiness (viii. 13, etc.). Hence while Happiness is still affirmed to consist in an active state of Excellence (cvveral<car>/carapteivηeιατται, vi. 8), yet, since Excellence (ape-n?) may be either Moral or Intellectual, it is proved (ch. vii. and viii.) that the latter is superior to the former on various grounds, and especially because Moral Excellence (implying, as it does, imperfection and the liability to evil) cannot be attributed to the gods (viii. 7). Consequently the Happiness of the gods, which is naturally the highest and most perfect, must depend on Intellectual activity. Hence we conclude generally that the perfection of Happiness consists in Intellectual activity (dtupia. for which see Glossary, p. xli.). Practically none but the best of men, and these onli*
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imperfectly, can ever approach to such perfection of Happiness. Most men can never rise above that which constitutes peculiarly human Happiness (εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρώπων, I. xiii. 5), viz. the Excellence not of the higher portion (τὸ λόγον ἕχον) of the Soul, but of the subordinate part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

Let this distinction then be borne in mind in reading these Supplementary Chapters. Aristotle has shown in the previous Books that man’s Happiness in this world consists in the due regulation of his actions and passions under the control of Reason. His purpose now is to show that the most perfect Happiness consists in the full development and activity of Reason itself, unfettered by the necessity of exercising any such control over the lower nature. In a word, if we might venture on such a modernism, we might say that hitherto he has discussed the Happiness of earth; now he is describing the Happiness of heaven. (See Supplementary Notes.)

VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἕδονας, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ

CHAP. VI.—Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but in Active Excellence.

We have before proved (1) that Happiness is not a passive but an active condition; and (2) that it is a condition which

CHAP. VI.—The following is a brief outline of the argument in the next three Chapters. (Ch. vi.) Happiness having been already shown (I. vii.) to be something sought for its own sake, and it being conceivable that either Amusement or active Virtue might be alleged as answering to that description, ch. vi. is devoted to proving that not Amusement, but Active Virtue, constitutes Happiness. (Ch. vii.)

This Active Virtue, or rather Excellence, being either Moral or Intellectual, Happiness is shown to belong to the latter. (Ch. viii.) Several reasons are given for thus asserting the superiority of Intellectual over Moral Excellence; and the Chapter concludes with some remarks of practical detail.

1. ἀρετὰς, viz. Books II.—VI. φιλίας, Books VIII. and IX. ἕδονας, Appendix to Book VII.
is complete in itself, and is sought for its own sake only. (2) Desired for its own sake. Such are—
(i) Active Virtue;
(ii) Amusements.

3. **Now it might be thought that both Virtuous Actions and Amusements fulfil these conditions:**—the former for obvious reasons; the latter, partly because their **results** are not neces-

2. εἰσπομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐξίσ ἐπίπεταν **viz. in I. viii. 9.** He adds here the consideration introduced by καὶ γὰρ, viz., that if Happiness were a mere state or condition (ἐξίσ) it would not be inconsistent with a life of lethargy, and even of misery. The same argument was used in I. v. 6, to prove that Virtue (which is a ἐξίσ, and therefore may be inactive) is not identical with Happiness.

6. ἐν τοῖσ προτέρου **Especially in the Definition of Happiness in I. vii.**

7. ἀναγκαῖα has the same meaning as βίασ (according to the usual explanation) in I. v. 8 (note). Actions chosen only as means to obtain a further result (δε ἔτερα αἴρεται) are ‘necessary’ or ‘compulsory,’ if we wish to secure that result.

10. αὐτάρκης] If any further result is sought by an action, that action is not αὐτάρκης. Consequently if Happiness were not sought for its own sake it would not be αὐτάρκης, as it was shown to be in I. vii. 6, etc.

14. τῶν παιδίων αἱ ἡδεῖαι] ‘those amusements from which we derive pleasure.’ Conceivably some recreations may be prac-
But Happiness cannot consist in Amusement, because—

(a) Those who say so are incompe-
tent judges, knowing no higher pleasure than Amuse-
ment.

sarily, or even usually, beneficial; and partly because princes and their associates, whose happiness the world envies, devote their lives to amusement. Our first object then must be to show that Happiness cannot consist in Amusement. (a) First, those who, as we have said, find their happiness in Amuse-
ment have no experience of any higher pleasure. They are no more fit to judge therefore what pleasures are the highest than children are, who for the very same reason prefer Amuse-
tised merely as a duty, e.g. because necessary to health, as when they are prescribed to an overworked student by physi-
cians, in which case there is an ulterior result in view and the remarks which follow would not apply. (See Supplementary Note.)

3. τῶν εὐδαιμονίζομεν, "The majority of those who are commonly reputed happy." This was noticed also in I. v. 3.

5. οἱ εἰν ταῖς κ.τ.λ.] "Those who are skilful in such pastimes," i.e. those who have the art of ministering to their amusement, e.g. courtiers, poets, musicians, court-fools, or worse characters.

5, 6. Το εὑρέστηκαί δὲνς τῷ ἡμοῖο διαφοραίον." To παρέχοντι the nominative is οἱ τύραννοι. To παρέχοντι the nominative is οἱ εὐτράπελοι.

10. οἱ τύραννοι] 'active states of excellence,' which may be either Moral or Intellectual (as we have often seen before). ἡμετὴ is here named as the source of the former, νοῦς as that of the latter, condition of activity.
ment to anything else. And as there is a difference between the objects held in esteem by childhood and manhood, so there is naturally a difference between the objects held in esteem by good and bad men. The decision of good men (to whom, as often before, we appeal) is, that Happiness depends not on Amusement, but on Virtuous Action, and therefore we conclude that it does so depend. (β) Besides, is it not absurd to say that we labour and toil all life long for the sake of Amusement, as would be the case if Amusement were Happiness (or the Chief Good)? It is far more rational to regard Amusement as existing for the sake of work (relaxation being sometimes necessary) than work as existing for the sake of Amuse-

4. τολλάκις εἴρηται] e.g. I. viii. 13, and passages quoted in note there.

10. "Απαντά γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Since we may say that Happiness only is desired for its own sake, and everything else ultimately for the sake of Happiness, it will follow that if Happiness and Amusement are identical, everything we do is with a view to Amusement, which seems a reductio ad absurdum.
Chap. VII.

Pre-eminence of Intellectual over Moral Excellence.

Happiness, being dependent on Virtue or Excellence, is intellectually naturally dependent on the highest form of Excellence, viz. the utmost type of virtue.

The natural dependence of intellectual life, in which all human beings have an equal share, on the intellectual virtue of a free and independent career and consequently any share,

Bios is life viewed in relation to its duties, occupations, and pursuits. Similarly, it will be suited, and nearly (as Grant remembered, in I. ix. 9, 10, he translates) its career. This latter, pronounces children and the according to Aristotle's definition, a lower animals to be incapable of slave could not have. He is Happiness merely a passive, though living, man. Recollect also that Aristotle, severing from the community (as is like a living portion of his slave was) was necessarily imperfect, and consequently could not be happy (see note there).

The absence of repose either of Body or Mind, for which, Aristotle has just pointed out, Amusement acts as a sort of compensation. This does not apply to the case of children, to whom παιδία is natural, as is admirably expressed by the etymology of the word. Compare also Addison in the Spectator (No. 381): 'I have always preferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The latter I consider as an act, the former a habit, of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, Cheerfulness fixed and permanent.' (Cf. note on βίος τέλειος, I. vii. 16.)

7. ἕδη here almost = ipso facto.

Amusement has no necessary connexion with what is most noble in man.

1. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἢ ἀνάπαυσις [Thus Amusement is in fact after all not even an end desired for its own sake. Recreation is needed for the sake of work, and (as Aristotle says elsewhere) the busier we are the more we need amusement.

ἐνεκα τις ἐνεργείας] 'in order that we may be able to work.'

3. μετὰ σπουδής = σπουδαίος, in its literal sense, i.e. 'serious,' or 'earnest'; see note on I. viii. 13. Compare Archbp. Whately:—'Happiness is no laughing matter, gay spirits and love of amusement (παιδία) are commonly spoken of as if a proof of Happiness, whereas the reverse is very often, perhaps generally, the case.' They are in fact rather an indication of the absence of repose either of Body or Mind, for which, as Aristotle has just pointed out, Amusement acts as a sort of compensation. This does not apply to the case of children, to whom παιδία is natural, as is admirably expressed by the etymology of the word. Compare also Addison in the Spectator (No. 381): 'I have always preferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The latter I consider as an act, the former a habit, of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, Cheerfulness fixed and permanent.' (Cf. note on βίος τέλειος, I. vii. 16.)

7. ἕδη here almost = ipso facto.
kind would be (to say the least) equally capable of it with the noblest, and this is obviously absurd, and inconsistent with what has already been proved. Hence we conclude as before that active Virtue and that alone can form the groundwork of Happiness.

CHAP. VII.—Pref-eminence of Intellectual over Moral Excellence.

1 Happiness, being dependent on Virtue or Excellence, is naturally dependent on the highest form of Excellence, viz.

2. ei μὴ καὶ βιοῦ] Ζωῆ is mere animal life, in which all, slaves and free, have an equal share. Βίος is life viewed in relation to its duties, occupations, and pursuits, and nearly = (as Grant translates) ‘career.’ This latter, according to Aristotle’s notion, a slave could not have. He is merely a passive, though living, instrument in his master’s hands. Compare ‘A slave is a living machine, a machine is an inanimate slave’ (VIII. xi. 6.) ‘A slave is a part of his master, he is like a living portion of his body, though separated from the rest’ (Pol. I. vii.). Such passages enable us to see how Aristotle denied to a slave any independent career (βίος) and consequently any share in Happiness, as defined by his theory. Similarly, it will be remembered, in I. ix. 9, 10, he pronounces children and the lower animals to be incapable of Happiness (see note there). Recollect also that Aristotle maintained that man was formed by nature to be a member of a community (φύσει πολιτικός ἄνθρωπος), and therefore life severed from the community (as that of a slave was) was necessarily imperfect, and consequently could not be happy (see note on I. vii. 6, fin.).
Εἰτέ δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο, εἶτε ἄλλο τι, ὁ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἐννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἶτε θείων ὑπὸ καὶ αὐτὸ, εἶτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν. τὸ θεϊότατον, ἦ τοῦτον ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἁρετὴν εἰς ἄν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. "Οτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, ἐγρηγται. 5

2 'Ομολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἄν δοξεὶς εἶναι καὶ τοὺς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεί. Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ Excellence of the noblest part of our nature in its highest development, whether we call it Intellect or whatever else it be which is most divine in man. Hence to prove that the highest Happiness consists in Intellectual activity we have the following arguments:—(a) Intellect is the noblest part of our


5. θεωρητική] The student must endeavour to form a clear conception of what Aristotle means by θεωρία, θεωρητική, θεωρεῖν, etc., before proceeding further. No one word in English adequately represents the idea. See Glossary under θεωρία, p. xli.

ἐγρηγται] The nominative is ὁ τοῦτον (τοῦ νοῦ) ἐνέργεια. The reference is very doubtful. Possibly, speaking from memory, Aristotle may be referring to B. VI., where the functions of νοῦς and of Intellectual Excellence generally are described.

6. καὶ τοῖς πρότερον perhaps refers to I. v. 7, where βίος θεωρητικός is mentioned as one of the chief types of life to which Happiness has been held to be long. Though Aristotle does not there assert that this is true, and in fact expressly reserves the consideration of the question, yet as he proves in that chapter that Happiness cannot belong to any of the other types of life enumerated, it may by implication be assigned to this type, viz. βίος θεωρητικός. At any rate it is only said that the statement in the text is 'consistent with' (ὁμολογούμενον) what was said before.

8. νοῦς has been explained in B. VI. to be the faculty by which we are capable of seeing intuitively the truth of Axioms or General Principles. These are the principles from which all demonstrative proof starts, and they are the foundations upon which all scientific knowledge rests. Thus νοῦς is the highest of our intellectual faculties, because it deals with the highest
nature, and its objects are also the noblest. (β) Intellectual activity is able to be more continuous than any other form of activity. (γ) Pleasure is confessedly an ingredient of Happiness, and the palm among pleasures, for purity and perma-

and most important of all truths. Moreover it does not discover or prove them, but it recognizes them, it sees into them (θεωρεῖν). Hence the statement made above (see the note on εἰρήνην, § 1) that the operation of νοῦς is θεωρητική.

1, 2. θεωρεῖν and πράττειν are emphatic and in contrast.

3. παραμεμιχθαί.] It was explained in I. viii. 10—14 in what sense Aristotle considers pleasure to be an ingredient in Happiness.

ηδίστη δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Observe the contrast between σοφία and φιλοσοφία. The pleasures of philosophy, or the pursuit of Truth, are commonly thought (δοκεῖ) to be of a very high order; confessedly, therefore, the pleasure of the possession of Truth (σοφία) must be higher still; for possession (as he proceeds) must be better than pursuit; fruition better than aspiration. Φιλόσοφος was a title first assumed by Pythagoras as being a more modest one than σοφός. He would not call himself ‘a wise man,’ but a ‘lover of wisdom.’

6. εὐλογοῦν τοῖς εἰδόσι κ.τ.λ.] ‘It is reasonable to suppose that those who have attained knowledge pass their time more pleasantly than those who are still seeking it.’ This, however, is a point much disputed, and the balance of general opinion is perhaps the other way. The saying of Lessing is well known: ‘Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand, Truth, and in his left, Search after Truth, offer me the choice, I should prefer in all humility, but without hesitation, Search after Truth.’ Pascal (Pensées, I. ix. 34) compares the pleasures of the acquisition and the pursuit of knowledge to the pleasures of having won a game, and of actually playing the game. Similarly Butler, (Sermons, xv.), ‘Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gain-
nence, is allowed to belong to the pleasure of the pursuit of knowledge. Still greater then must be the pleasure of the conscious possession of knowledge. (δ) Intellectual activity is most self-sufficient and independent of external appliances.

5 (ε) This is the only sort of activity which can be truly said to

ing, not the having of it (knowledge), which is the entertainment of the mind.’ Shakespeare again,—

‘All things that are, Are with more pleasure chased than enjoyed.’

Superior as the pleasures of knowledge are, it may perhaps be true of them as of lower pleasures, that ‘pleasure unattained is like the hare we hold in chase, pleasure attained is the same hare hanging up in the sportsman’s larder, disregarded, despised, dead’ (Horace Smith). Or, once more, in the familiar words of Pope,

‘Man never is, but always to be, blest.’

It should, however, be remembered that Aristotle uses the words ‘possession of knowledge’ here in reference to his own doc-

trine of θεωρία, i.e. an active fruition not a passive possession of it. See this fully explained in the Glossary under θεωρία.

3. σοφός is taken as the type of διανοητική ἀρετή, δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ῥεῖσθαι ἢ ἰδίκη ἀρετή.

4. κεχορηγημένων] See note on I. viii. 15, ἀχωρίζοντος ὀντα. 6. The cases of σώφρον and ἀνδρείοι are further explained in § 4 of next chapter.

7. σοφός is not ‘wise’ in the popular sense, but one who has attained σοφία in the technical sense of the last section, one who has reached the goal of philosophy. The full fruition of σοφία is that θεωρία already explained.

9. In §§ 5-8 Aristotle in the last place argues the superiority of intellectual activity to all
be desired entirely for its own sake: the only sort of activity in
which we can repose, and this rest or repose is an essential
characteristic of Happiness. Take the most striking develop-
ments of practical (as distinguished from intellectual) activity,
viz. War and Statesmanship. War is utterly inconsistent
with repose, and it is inconceivable that it should be desirable
per se: it can only be so for its results. To Statesmanship
the same remarks apply. It excludes the idea of repose, and
its pursuit always implies the ulterior aim of securing for one’s-
other activity, because in it, and
in it alone, we can absolutely re-
pose and be satisfied (ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
ἐστὶ). That this cannot be said
of any kind of action is proved
by taking what are considered
the noblest types of action (see
beginning of § 7), viz. War and
Statesmanship. They are essen-
tially ἀσχολοῦ (l. 8). We can-
not rest in them. A fortiori we
cannot do so in any inferior type
of practical activity.

4. ἐν τῇ σχολῇ] Happiness
implies repose. This idea is
well expressed by Wordsworth:

Craving peace,
The central feeling of all happiness,
Not as a refuge from distress or pain,
A breathing time, vacation, or a truce,
But for its absolute self; a life of peace,
Stability without regret or fear,
That hath been, is, and shall be ever-
more.

12. ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ] Under-
stand from the preceding sen-
tence either πράξις or ἐνέργεια.
Happiness then, if an ulterior aim of political life, cannot be identified with it. Intellectual activity then unites all the qualities now enumerated, and, if it be life-long, is the perfect self or one's country power, honour, or in short Happiness. 7

1. *ye draws attention to τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. If Happiness itself is an ulterior end of the Statesman's activity, we have the clearest proof that it is not identical with it.

2. ἔτεραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς explained by παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι in I. 13, p. 249. The prosperity which is secured by Statesmanship is obviously something different from the practice of Statesmanship itself: even as peace, the object of war, is different from war. In θεωρία or intellectual activity there is no such result separate from the activity itself.

3. § 7 is a recapitulation. Εἰ δὴ must be understood with each clause up to that which commences with καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες δὴ, which is the apodosis of the sentence.

7: σπουδῆ] 'earnestness,' or 'intensity.'

9. αὐτὴ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν] 'This (i.e. the pleasure of it) helps to intensify the activity itself.'

10. σχολαστικῶν] 'capability of affording repose,' in reference to § 6; ἀτρυπον (from τρύω, to wear) 'freedom from weariness.' See § 3 (init.) and last chapter § 6 (fin.). ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, 'so far as is possible for man.' Compare the limitation at the end of I. x. μακάριος δ' ἄνθρωπος, 'happy as men.'
8 ideal of Happiness. True, such a life is beyond man’s reach. It is as much beyond such Happiness as he can attain to, as pure Intellect is beyond our composite and imperfect human nature. Still we must strive after that perfection which we can never hope fully to reach, for the life of the Intellect is the life of that which is not only most divine in man, but which also constitutes each man’s true and proper self. From 1. μήκος βίου τέλειου] See note on I. vii. 16. 5. τοῦ συμβετοῦ] ‘the whole compound nature of man,—including not only the divine element of intellect, but the animal body, with its passions, appetites, etc. See next chapter § 3, where this argument is more fully worked out. 8. A favourite maxim of Greek writers: among others Cf. Eur. Αἰ. 799: ὡντας δὲ θυντοὺς θυντα καὶ φρόνειν χρείαν. 10. ἄθανατίζειν] ‘to act the immortal.’ The termination -ιζω often has the force of acting or imitating, without becoming, what the root of the verb implies, e.g. Μηδίζω, ‘to take the side of the Medes’; Φιλιππιζω, ‘to join Philip’s party’; σοφίζω, ‘to set up to be σοφός.’ 12. τῷ ὤγκῳ μικρόν] literally ‘small in its bulk.’ This need not necessarily imply that Aristotle believed the intellect (νοῖς) to have ‘bulk’ at all, i.e. to be material, any more than Horace’s ‘divinae particula aures.’ It is a popular way of speaking. 13. εὶναι ἐκαστός] i.e. ‘to be Such a life is divine rather than human. Still it is most truly human.
Thus far we have shown how Intellectual Excellence holds the first place. We can also bring positive arguments to prove that Moral Excellence as compared with it holds a secondary place in regard to Happiness. (i) First, it is essentially human, and bound up with all the imperfections of man's composite nature. In proof of this—(a) Justice, Courage, and other Moral Virtues in detail, have for the sphere of their action the circumstances of ordinary human life. (β) Some Moral Virtues would have no meaning apart each man's self, 'to constitute personality.' Not a man's features, or his body, or his appetites, or his passions, but his intellect, is his proper self, which distinguishes him from all other men, and all other beings whatsoever.

2. τινος ἄλλον is neuter, 'of something else.'
7. Δευτέρως δὲ . . . ἀρετὴν] Understand ὁμοίως εὐδαιμονεῖν ἔστιν.
13. πολλὰ συναφείωσθαι τοῖς πάθεσι] 'has many points of connexion with the feelings,'
3 from the existence of a body and bodily appetites. (γ) Practical Wisdom, though a sort of crown to all the Moral Virtues, is, together with them, concerned with our passions, and therefore with the imperfections of our composite nature. Hence we conclude that any Happiness depending on Moral Excel-

\[\text{CHAP. VIII.] ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. 255}\]

\[3 \text{tois πάθεσιν ή τού ἥθους ἀρετή. Συνεξευκταὶ δὲ καὶ ή φρόνησις τῇ τού ἥθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ φρονήσει, εἰ-}

\[\text{περαι ἐν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἥθικας ἑώσιν ἀρετᾶς, τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶν τῶν ἥθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Συνηρτηµέναι δὲ αὐταί καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἢ ἀν ἐιεκν αἰ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταί ἄνθρωπικαί. Καὶ ο̣ βίος δὲ ή κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ή εὐδαµονία. 'Η δὲ τοῦ νοῦ\]
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κεχωρισμένη τοσούτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εὐρήσθω διακρι-βοσάται γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστὶν. Δόξειε δὲ ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χρησιμος ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἡ ἐπ’ ἐλαττὸν δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίον ἁμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἐστω, εἶ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικὸς, καὶ ὁ σῶσα τοιαῦτα μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρον πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἑλευ-θερίῳ δεῖσαι χρησμάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἄνταποδοσεῖς (αἱ γὰρ βουλη-σεις ἀδηλοὶ, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλει-θαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρεῖῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἰσπέ ἐπι-τελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας: 5 πῶς γὰρ δὴ λος ἐσται ἡ ὑοτος ἡ τῶν ἀλλων τις ; Ἑμφιασ-βητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριότερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις

lence can never be more than merely human Happiness.

ii. While under no circumstances can the body and its welfare be wholly neglected, yet Moral, as compared with Intellectual, Excellence has much greater need of external circumstances, regarding at any rate the active exercise of each. Moral Virtue cannot be practised, nor Moral Character manifested, without favourable circumstances; and the more ex-

2. This is the converse aspect of the argument in § 4 of the last chapter.

7. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας] ‘for their respective activities, there will be a great difference,’ viz. for those of Moral and Intellectual Excellence.

11. δυνάμεως] ‘power,’ or ‘strength,’ e.g. a cripple or paralytic could not display active courage (ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν).

12. ἐξουσία] ‘opportunity’ or ‘license to indulge.’ There would be no outward difference between the teetotaller and the drunkard if there were nothing but water to be had.

14. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ.] The importance of intention (προαίρεσις) was insisted on in III. ii. 1, μᾶλλον τὰ ἡθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ‘(Intention) is a greater test of character than actions are.’ So also in II. iv. 3, where the conditions necessary to a virtuous act were enumerated; and among them is a deliberate resolution arising from pure motives, etc.
4. Observe the limiting and emphasizing force of γε here and in I. 6.

6. ἦ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.] In actual human life intellectual activity cannot rightly be severed from moral practice. So that the philosopher, like others, stands in need of these external appliances for the exercise of Virtue. He does not however need them as a philosopher, but as a man among men, nor with a view to his peculiar work, intellectual activity. On the contrary, though otherwise necessary, to it they are only impediments.

8. ἄνθρωπεύεσθαι 'to be a man,' ἄνθρωπεύεσθαι 'to act one's part as a man.' The same difference exists between the active and middle of many similar words, e. g. δουλεύω, προσβείω, πολιτεύω, etc. So in III. vi. 12 ἄνθρωπεύεσθαι 'to play the man.'

9. ἐντεῦθεν] The outline of the argument is—All activity must be either πρακτική, or ποιητική, or θεωρητική. The two former cannot be assigned to the gods who are supremely happy, and yet they live, and live actively too. Hence their activity must be θεωρητική, an intellectual or contemplative activity.

(ii) It cannot be attributed to the gods.

(iii) It cannot be attributed to the gods.
Virtues: (β) They have none of those moral imperfections which others presuppose: (γ) If moral activity, and a fortiori productive activity, be excluded, there is only intellectual activity left. Therefore the activity of the gods, whose life is essentially a most blessed one, is contemplative or intellectual.

5. φορτικός] 'gross,' or 'degrading'; see note on I. v. 1.

6. διεξιόους δὲ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] Of the precise sense in which these Virtues are exercised in our experience the statement in the text is obviously true, Virtue being, as has been said, 'goodness in a state of warfare.' Whether there may not be a higher sense and a different sphere of action in which analogous Moral Virtues may be attributed to the Deity is another question, which the argument here leaves untouched. After all it is to some extent a question depending (1) on the precise meaning of the Greek words δίκαιος, σώφρων, etc., as was the case in reference to ἔταυνος being inapplicable to the gods—see I. xii. 3. Also (2) still more on the Greek conception of the Divine nature, for which see Glossary s.v. θεὸς and φύος. We may well compare Butler's argument, Anal. i. c. v. (p. 97, Angus's edition). 'Nor is our ignorance what will be the employments of that happy community, nor our consequent ignorance what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity amongst the members of it with regard to each other any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind or character which is formed by the practice of those particular virtues and which is a result of it,' etc.
Hence we infer that as men approach to this ideal their Happiness is highest. Indeed we find a complete scale of corresponding degrees between Happiness and the capacity for intellectual activity. In the lower animals both are totally absent. In the gods, both are present in perfection. Among men, both exist imperfectly, but in exact proportion to each other: and we affirm that this correspondence is not accidental, but that it implies an essential connexion between

1. τοῦ πράττειν 'moral action,'
tοῦ ποιεῖν 'productive, or creative, action.' (See Glossary s.v. πρᾶξις, ποιήσις.) The former has been excluded by the arguments in § 7. As to the latter, it is clear from this passage as well as many others that Aristotle did not believe in God as a Creator in our sense of the word. He would consider such work as unworthy of him (φορτικῶν), inconsistent with the perfection of His nature and mode of existence. See further Glossary s.v. theós—φύσις.


The argument of § 8 closely resembles the process of Modern Induction called by Bacon 'The Scale of Degrees,' 'Tabula graduum,' or by Mill, 'The Method of Concomitant Variations.'

13. αὐτὴ γὰρ] 'For this in itself (i.e. θεωρία) is essentially ad-
Happiness and Intellectual activity. And therefore again we assert that the highest Happiness is Intellectual.

9 To descend once more to practical details. For man this continuous activity of Intellect only is a practical impossibility. He cannot be independent of some amount of external advantages. That that amount, however, is not excessive, but moderate, rate, theory, experience, and the teaching of the wisest among

mirable,’ a characteristic proved to belong to Happiness also in I. xii.

§§ 9-13. The concluding Sections recur to some practical questions connected with the conclusion now reached: the relation of Happiness to external circumstances; the concurrence of Aristotle’s theory with those of previous philosophers, and, what is still more important, with facts; the superiority of Happiness as now defined, owing to the good-will of heaven favouring that life which is ‘likest God’s.’

3. τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν = ‘the other care that the body needs,’ besides the securing of mere health and sustenance. μὴν in the next sentence is corrective. We must not take this ‘θεραπεία’ to include too much.

6. ὑπερβολῇ] Understand τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.
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S
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1

2. 'Αναξαγόρας οὖν ἐπολούσιον] Anaxagoras of Clazomene, in Ionia, resigned all his property to his relations and gave himself up to philosophical study for some thirty years at Athens.

6. τοῖς λόγοις = our definitions or theories.

7. μὲν οὖν, as usual, fixes a strong emphasis on the preceding word, and thus marks a contrast between πίστιν and τὸ ἀληθὲς.

Some ground for belief may be afforded by such a consensus, but the test of actual truth is to be derived in practical subjects from facts and from life.' Cf. Shakespeare, Henry V. Act. I. Sc. i.:

So that the art and practic part of life Must be the mistress to this theoret.

12. λόγους ὑποληπτέον] 'we must take them to be mere theories.'
CHAP. IX.—Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and transition to the Complementary Science of Politics.

This sketch of Virtue and subjects akin to it might now be concluded, except that no theory on such matters can be con-

In conclusion we must apply our theories to practice.

CHAP. IX.—This Chapter forms a general conclusion to the whole treatise. When we turn from theory to practice, Ethics must look for some authority to enforce its injunctions on those who will not hear. Failing the intervention of the State, Parental authority must take its place. In either case a scientific study of Politics or of the principles of Statesmanship is a necessary sequel to that of Ethics, if theory is to be carried on to practice at all. In the absence of any accessible means for such a study Aristotle proposes to write a treatise on the subject himself, and the concluding words of the Book lead us at once to the commencement of his treatise on Politics.

10. οὖκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] Compare I. iii. 6, τὸ τέλος οὕτως ἄλλα πρᾶξις: also II. ii. 1, and many other passages.
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2 ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ πρᾶττειν αὐτά; οὔτε δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰκανον τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατεύον, ἢ ἐὰν πως ἄλλως ἁγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθούς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἐφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγονυ, καὶ ἐδεί 5 ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαινονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἦδος τ' εὐγενεῖς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἄν κατοκόχυμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἄδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλόκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὔ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ 10 πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας Ἰδοὺς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐτὰ ἐσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἦδος οὐδ' ἐννοιοι ἔχουσιν, ἄγενστοι ἄντε. 15

5 Τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ γὰρ οἰδόμ θε ἢ οὐ τά ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ήθεσι κατειλημ-2 sidered complete until it is connected with practice. Mere 3 theories of Virtue can never make men good, unless they are previously disposed to goodness. On the majority of man- 4 kind such theories have no effect whatever. With them we must appeal not to shame but to the fear of punishment: pleasure is all they seek, pain the only thing they avoid: these therefore are the only feelings through which we can 5 influence them. Virtue is in truth hard enough to attain to, even when all circumstances are favourable; if they are other- wise, the voice of the teacher is powerless.

2. ἢ ἐὶ πως ἄλλως] 'or by any other means that there may be' —other, that is, than ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι. 3

5. Theognis made this remark in reference to the dignity of the physician’s calling, if only the gods should have enabled him to heal the minds and characters of men as well as their bodies.

8. κατοκόχυμον (κατέχω) = 'capable of being influenced or restrained by.'

17. τοῖς ήθεσι κατειλημμέναι] Moral theo-

ries have no influence except on those already fitted to receive them.
Now there are three courses, as it is commonly held, by which men arrive at Virtue. (1) Natural disposition; (2) Moral training; (3) Intellectual teaching. The first is clearly beyond our control. As to the last, its influence varies in different cases, and depends on the hearer's mind having been previously prepared, like soil for the seed. Passion when supreme will not hear, and indeed cannot understand, any argument but that of force.

The acquisition of Virtue depends on Disposition, Training, Teaching.

'firmly fixed in the character.' For a similar statement cf. II. iii. 8, \( \chiαλεπόν \) \( \alphaποτριφύλασθαι \) \( \πάθος \) \( \εγκεχεροσμένον \) \( \τό \) \( \ βίον \). Also compare the expression \( \συνειλημένα \) \( μετά \ τῆς \) \( \φανύλητοις \) in II. vi. 18.

4. \( \φόει \) . . . \( \εθει \) . . . \( \διδαχὴ \)
We might compare the various causes suggested in I. ix. for the acquisition of Happiness: \( \τότερον \) \( \εστὶ \) \( \ μαθητῶν \) \( (= \) \( \ διδαχὴ \) \( ) \), \( \ η \) \( \ ε\)\( τιστόν \) \( \ ή \) \( \ ἄλλας \) \( \ πως \) \( \ αυκτήτων \) \( (= \) \( \ εθεί \) \( ), \) \( \ η \) \( \ κατά \) \( \ τίνα \) \( \ θελαν \) \( \ μοίραν \) \( \ ή \) \( \ καὶ \) \( \ διὰ \) \( \ τύχην \) \( (= \) \( \ φόει \) \( ). \)

6. \( \ τοις \) \( \ ή \) \( \ άληθῶς \) \( \ εὑτυχέσιν \) \( \) 'those who are in the truest sense fortunate.' Compare III. v. 17, \( \tauό \) \( \ ε\)\( υ \) \( καὶ \) \( \ τό \) \( \ καλῶς \) \( \ τούτο \) \( \ τεφυκέναι \) \( \ ή \) \( \ τελεία \) \( καὶ \) \( \ άληθινή \) \( \) \( \) \( \ άν \) \( \ ε\)\( ιή \) \( \ ε\)\( υφίσταναι \).

7. \( \ ή \) \( \ διδαχὴ \) \( \) Aristotle is perhaps led to lay stress on the inadequacy of mere intellectual teaching in Morals, on account of the undue prominence given to it by Plato, who held all Virtue to be (1) intellectual, (2) \( \ διδάκτον \). The words \( \muή \) \( \ σοτρ' \) \( \ ο\)\( υ \) introduce the statement in a suggestive form, and almost = 'perhaps,' or 'it would seem that.'

8. \( \ προδειρύγασθαι \) \( \ διεργάζομαι \) is similarly used by Theophrastus for the 'tilling' of land.

11. \( \ οὕτω \) \( \ α\)\( ς \) \( \ συνείν \) \( \) 'he could
The second of the courses above named therefore alone remains: Moral training is our necessary starting-point in the formation of moral character; such training moreover must begin in childhood, and it can only be secured by the authority of Law; for it must always be a painful process till we become accustomed to it, and especially so in youth. Moreover the majority of men (who yield only to force and to the fear of punishment) need to have their conduct and occupations thus regulated for them not in youth only but all through life.

Hence it has been thought to be the duty of a legislator to begin with moral training, and that must be enforced by external authority.
Aristotle

appeal to the nobler instincts of those in whom nature or good training has implanted such instincts, but to compel obedience from all others by pains and penalties, and, speaking generally, by inflicting such pains as are most opposed to the offending pleasures. All this implies a guiding Intellect, with power to enforce its decrees. Where then is this to be found? Parental authority, and indeed that of any single individual, except he be an absolute monarch, lacks that

\[ \text{rape}, \text{i.e. 'quod lex non jubet vetat.'} \]

\[ \text{2. kolâseis te kai timôrias] For this distinction see note on III. v. 7.} \]

\[ \text{7. ai} \ \text{máliost' énantiwntai k.t.l.] Compare the argument in II. iii. 4, ai de latreiai dia tōn énantiōn pefúkasai gînendha.} \]

\[ \text{11. taúta de' génoi} \ 'av] \ de' marks the apodosis or conclusion of the sentence.} \]

\[ \text{15. logos òn k.t.l.] 'being a declaration proceeding as it were from wisdom and intelligence.'} \]

\[ \text{i.e. Law expresses in an impersonal form the conclusions of human wisdom. As expressing such conclusions, it commands our obedience, as doing so personally and in the abstract, it does not excite our resentment. Aristotle in the \textit{Politics} describes Law as vous ånev oðègèwos.} \]
power. Law however possesses it, and its interference is not 13
resented as that of a fellow-man would be. Practically how-
14 ever Law seldom even attempts such an aim; and, failing
that, the duty devolves upon each individual in his own
sphere. It is clear however that he will best perform it by
becoming acquainted with the principles of Legislation, seeing

4. Δακεδαιμονίων] See note on I. xiii. 3.
8. κυκλοπικῶς θεμιστεύων] In
allusion to the often-quoted patri-
archal society of the Cyclops de-
scribed by Homer, Od. ix. 114-5:

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἐκαστὸς
παῖς ὡς ἀλῶχων, ὡς ἀλλήλων ἀλέ-
γουσιν.
10. δράν αὐτῷ δύνασθαι] 'that
there be power to carry it out.'

This is explained by ἔχουσαν
ἰσχύν in § 11 above.

13. νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος] Legislation is naturally the high-
est branch of πολιτικὴ. See § 20,
fin. of this chapter. At the very
outset (in I. ii. 8) Aristotle de-
scribed Ethics as πολιτικὴ τέως, and
this concluding chapter brings
out the connexion still more
forcibly.
9. Οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιπλοκῆσαι ["does not impart the same style of fighting."] Περιπλοκῆσαι is similarly used in the sense of ‘conferring’ or ‘impacting,’ with κράτος, τιμήν, ἔλευθερίαν, etc.
17 startling cures. On the same principle then we maintain that the best educator in private life is he who understands the 18 general principles of legislation. Next we ask—How is such knowledge to be acquired? At first we should be inclined to answer—From Statesmen: but strange to say in Politics theory and practice are dissevered. Those profess to teach who do not practise, viz. the Sophists: others practise but do

Φρόνησις also is specially practical wisdom. See note on II. vi. 15 and B. VI. c. v. throughout.

13. έδόκεις] The nominative apparently is νομοθετία understood from νομοθετικός, and the reference is probably (as Grant suggests) to I. ii. 7, or it may be to VI. viii. 2.

tás te δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς. τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγελλοῦνται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταῖ, πράττει δ’ αὐτῶν οὕτεις, ἀλλ’ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, δι’ ἰδίᾳ τῶν δυνάμεών τινος πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία, μάλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ; οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες, οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καὶ τοιὸ κάλλιον ἢ ἒσων ἐπιλόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὔδ’ αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους 19 νείς ἢ τίνας ἄλλοι καὶ φίλων. Ἐνδολογοῦ δ’ ἢ, εἴπερ ἐδύναμον τε οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλι- 10 πον ἢ, οὐδ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει προελοντ’ ἢ μάλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὔδε δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἐσείκεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγύνουντ’ ἢ διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοῦ διὸ τοῖς ἐφιμεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἐσείκεν 15 ἐμπειρίας. Τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίγαν not profess to teach, viz. Statesmen. As to the latter, they seem to act by a sort of instinct and from experience rather than on fixed principles; they never write or speculate upon Politics; they cannot even train their children and their 19 friends in their own profession, as they doubtless would if they could. Still we would not depreciate the value of experience, which is an essential condition of the knowledge of 20 Statesmanship. As to the former (viz. the Sophists), they

4. After οἱ πολιτεύομενοι understand πράττουσιν.

6. καὶ τοιού κάλλιον κτλ.] Not improbably a sneer at the statesman and orator Demosthenes, all of whose writings are oratorical and not political.

12. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε κτλ.] This is to correct the apparent depreciation of the value of experience involved in the above censure of practical statesmen.

14. πολιτικῆς συνηθείας ‘familiarity with political life.’ The fact that this, apart from a body of fixed and conscious principles (l. 4), makes men statesmen, is a proof of the importance of practical experience.

15. προσδεῖν On the force of this compound see note on L. x. 9.
Hence we investigate the subject of Politics for ourselves. The field then is still open: a fresh and independent investigation of the true principles of Statesmanship is called for to complete the subject of the Science of Human Life. We propose therefore to undertake such an investigation, to acquaint ourselves of the labours of our predecessors in that science, not, as it is sometimes translated, prescriptions as is clear from what follows.

6. Ὅσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἕκλογην κ.τ.λ.] In what is called a system of 'Eclecticism,' the real system is the principle on which the selection is made. The fact that the selected details form parts of other systems is a secondary and accidental consideration.

10. τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις κ.τ.λ.] The practical results of a system when at work is a matter that any one living under it can form some opinion about. The means best adapted to secure any given results, their compatibility with other conditions (ὅτι δὲν . . . συν-ἀδει), and so forth, can only be estimated by those who have special training and experience. From the latter consideration Bacon says that popularity is a positive objection against any system of a philosophical character, and from the former he makes an exception in favour of 'Politics and Theology.'
The field then is still open: a fresh and independent investigation of the true principles of Statesmanship is called for to complete the subject of the Science of Human Life. We propose therefore to undertake such an investigation, availing ourselves of the labours of our predecessors in that field.

1. συγγραμμάτων] ‘treatises,’—not, as it is sometimes translated, ‘prescriptions’—as is clear from what follows.

10. εὐσυνετώτεροι] ‘more intelligent.’ Though the study of medical treatises, or of collections of laws, can never make men physicians or statesmen, it may make them more intelligent and ‘appreciative’ in such subjects respectively.

15. ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία] This term was considered by Aristotle to include Ethics, Economics, and Politics—three practical Sciences dealing with the life and conduct of man in reference to himself, to his family, and to society respectively. The subject of Economics, though not mentioned here, occupies the first Book of the so-called ‘Politics’ of Aristotle.
field, as well as of the experience supplied by constitutions that have already existed. Hence we may perhaps gather what is the most perfect form of government, and also what laws and customs are best suited to each particular form.

2. συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν] ‘collections of constitutions;’ in reference to such συναγωγαί as are mentioned above in § 21; or else, as some suppose, in reference to a collection framed by Aristotle himself. Fragments said to belong to such a work still exist.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

P. 1.

See further Hansel's note on Aristotle's use of this word in Aldrich's Logic, Ch. vi. De Methodo. Its use in the text may be illustrated by Poet. xix. 1, ῥοτ' ἐπὶ ΤΤ}ς πρὶς ΤΙκ').

P. 9.

Compare Ant. and Cleop. Act i. Sc. iv. 4

As we rate boys, who, being mature in knowledge, Pawn their experience to their present pleasure, And so rebel to judgment.

Also see further the discussion on the etymology of δ/καρπία, in III. xii. 5-8.

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The following extracts will illustrate, from a modern point of view, the difference between τυκπαρτις and αἱλτπρυ: He who refrains from gratifying a wish on some ground of reason (τυκκπαρτις), at the same time feels the wish as strongly as if he gratified it. The object seems to him desirable; he cannot think of it without wishing for it. ... On the other hand, when a stronger passion controls the weaker (αἱλτπρυ), the weaker altogether ceases to be felt. For example, let us suppose a bribe offered to two such men to betray their country. Neither will take the bribe. But the former may feel his fingers itch as he handles the gold. The other will have no such feelings; the gold will not make his fingers itch with desire, but, perhaps, rather seem to scorch them.

The difference between the two men is briefly this, that the one has his anarchic or lower desires under control, the other feels no such desires; the one, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of crime; the other, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of temptation. ... Or again, while a virtuous man is one who controls and coerces the anarchic passions within him, so as to conform his actions to law (τύκπαρτις), a holy man is one in whom a passionate enthusiasm absorbs and annuls the anarchic passions altogether, so that no internal struggle takes place (<ρ>πριπ′) τ 

and the lawful action is that which presents itself first, and seems the one most natural and most easy to be done. (Ecce Homo, pp. 148-150.)
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

P. 1, I. i. 1. \(\mu\varepsilon\th\delta\sigma\varsigma\) See further Mansel's note on Aristotle's use of this word in Aldrich's Logic, Ch. vi. 'De Methodo.' Its use in the text may be illustrated by *Poet.* xix. 1, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ρητορικῆς κείσθω τοῦτο γὰρ ἵδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

P. 9, I. iii. 7. διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Compare *Ant.* and *Cleop.* Act i. Sc. iv.—

'As we rate boys, who, being mature in knowledge,
   Pawn their experience to their present pleasure,
And so rebel to judgment.'

Also see further the discussion on the etymology of \(\acute{a}k\omega\lambda\alpha\varsigma\alpha\), in III. xii. 5-8.

\(\acute{a}k\varphi\rho\alpha\tau\vartheta\varsigma\) The following extracts will illustrate, from a modern point of view, the difference between \(\acute{e}g\kappa\rho\varrho\alpha\tau\varepsilon\varsigma\) and \(\sigma\omega\varphi\rho\omega\nu\) : 'He who refrains from gratifying a wish on some ground of reason (\(\acute{e}g\kappa\rho\varrho\alpha\tau\varepsilon\varsigma\)), at the same time feels the wish as strongly as if he gratified it. The object seems to him desirable; he cannot think of it without wishing for it. . . . On the other hand, when a *stronger passion* controls the weaker (\(\sigma\omega\varphi\rho\omega\nu\)), the weaker altogether ceases to be felt. For example, let us suppose a bribe offered to two such men to betray their country. Neither will take the bribe. But the former may feel his fingers itch as he handles the gold. . . . The other will have no such feelings; the gold will not make his fingers itch with desire, but, perhaps, rather seem to scorch them. . . .

The difference between the two men is briefly this, that the one has his anarchic or lower desires under control, the other feels no such desires; the one, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of crime; the other, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of temptation. . . . Or again, while a *virtuous* man is one who controls and coerses the anarchic passions within him, so as to conform his actions to law (\(\acute{e}g\kappa\rho\varrho\alpha\tau\varepsilon\varsigma\)), a *holy* man is one in whom a passionate enthusiasm absorbs and annuls the anarchic passions altogether, so that *no internal struggle takes place* (\(\sigma\omega\varphi\rho\omega\nu\)), and the lawful action is that which presents itself first, and seems the one most natural and most easy to be done.'—(Ecce *Homo*, pp. 148-150.)
Hence in IV. ix. 8 Aristotle denies that ἐγκράτεια is, strictly speaking, a Virtue, but only ἀρετή τις μικτή.

The distinction given in the Notes between ἀκόλαστος and ἀκρατής may be further illustrated by the statement in VII. viii. 1, ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος οὐ μεταμελητικός... ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής μεταμελητικός πάς. Also ἀκόλαστον is described as συνεχῆς πονηρὰ like consumption, etc., ἀκρατεία as οὐ συνεχῆς like epilepsy, etc.

P. 12, I. iv. 4. ἐπιπολαζούσας] The former of the two explanations given in the Notes seems preferable, viz., that which is 'obvious,' or 'on the surface,' — Latin 'in promptu esse.' This suits the two other places where the expression occurs in the Ethics, viz., I. v. 4, IV. viii. 4. Also the phrase ἐπιπολῆς εἰναι occurs in Rhet., etc., in the sense of 'to be obvious.'

— 5. What is stated in the note on γνωρίμων... διττῶς is not only true of 'a being of more perfect knowledge,' but also of ourselves in the higher and more advanced stages of our knowledge. As Grote says, 'Even facts are then employed, directed, modified, by an acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.' Compare the distinction in the text with that drawn by Pope, Essay on Man, iv. 361-2, between Human and Divine Love:

'God loves from whole to parts: but human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole.'

P. 13, I. iv. 6. As a further illustration of the necessity of personal experience for the appreciation of Moral facts or ideas, add John vii. 17, 'If a man will do (θέλη τοιεῶ) his will he shall know of the doctrine.'

P. 15, I. iv. 7. 'Ὡς δὲ μηδέτερον, ο. ο. neither the διὰ nor the διότι. The lines from Hesiod which follow are embodied by Livy (xxii. 29), in a speech of Minucius when acknowledging his bad treatment of Fabius.

P. 16, I. v. 3. βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρόμενον] Compare Hamlet, Act iv. Sc. iv.—

'What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed?—a beast, no more.'

P 17, I. vi. 5. θέσις διαφυλάττων] Perhaps it would be more correct to give θέσις h.l. the more technical sense of a 'paradox,' which is assigned to it by the Definition in Topics, I. ii., θέσις ἐστίν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωριμών τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

— 7. ἐγκυκλίον] Cf. Pol. I. vii. 2, where ἐγκύκλιον διακονήματα are the ordinary daily duties of slaves.

P. 37, I. vii. 20. The explanation of 'ἀρχαλ derived from experience'
given in the notes, is different from that adopted in the earlier edition, and, I believe, more correct. Under any circumstances, ἐπαγωγή h. l. is not to be confused with the logical process of Induction, which (1) itself starts from ἀρχάι, and does not give them; and (2) is a process to which θεωρῶνται (denoting immediate apprehension) would not apply. Ἀρχή here is simply 'what one starts with,' not necessarily (as in I. iv. 5) 'a general principle' (see Glossary, s.v. ἀρχή). It may be 'a general principle,' as in Mathematics, which a reference to (sometimes) a single fact of experience is sufficient to establish without further or formal proof.

Such a reference to experience would be ἐπαγωγή in the sense of this passage. Or it may be a simple fact, as the facts of observation in Physics and other a posteriori sciences, where again no further proof is required, e.g. 'This body falls with a definite accelerating velocity;' or as in Morals (so this passage asserts), e.g. 'This action is right,' or 'This approves itself to me,' or vice versa.

P. 37, I. vii. 21. Μετέβας δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Observe the generality and vagueness of this word (lit. 'to go after'), as also of θεωρεῖν ('viewed' or 'perceived'), and of εἶλαί δ' εἴλας. Aristotle's object here is not to enter upon the thorny subject of the nature of the evidence on which ἀρχάι rest, but only to insist on the negative point, that at any rate there is never demonstrative proof or a direct establishment of the δήλοι. Grote (Fragments, p. 131) translates, 'We ought in all our investigations to look after the ἀρχή in the way which the special nature of the subject requires, and be very careful to define it well.'

P. 42, I. viii. 12. It may be worth while to quote at length the passage in Ecce Homo referred to in the note:—'Those who think that we should not make pleasure our chief object, yet commonly maintain that he who lives best will actually attain the greatest amount and the best kind of pleasure. . . . The practical objection to Epicureanism is not so much that it makes pleasure the summum bonum, as that it recommends us to keep this summum bonum always in view. For it is far from being universally true that to get a thing you must aim at it. There are some things which can only be gained by renouncing them. . . . Now a practical survey of life seems to show that pleasure in its largest sense—a true and deep enjoyment of life—is also not to be gained artificially. . . .' So Mill, Autobiography, p. 142: 'Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. . . . Aiming at something else, they find happiness by the way. . . . Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so.' [The same is true of bodily health, etc.]
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

P. 54, I. x. 11. τὰς τούχας οὗτε ... τετράγωνος] Cf. Dante, Par. xvii. 24, 'Ben tetragono ai colpi di ventura.'

— 12. διαδίματε τὸ καλὸν] Cf. a similar metaphor in Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew, Act iv. Sc. iii.—

'And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honour peereth in the meanest habit.'

P. 58, I. xi. 4. προούπάρξευν ... ἡ πράττεσθαι] This corresponds with the distinction in Hor. A. P. 179, 'Aut agitur res in scenis ant acta refertur.' Compare the use of προούπάρξευν in IV. ii. 14, also in Rhet. I. ii. 2. Aristotle describes marcial proofs as being δόσα μὴ δὲ τῇ ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προούπηρξευ. In the Poetics Aristotle several times refers to incidents which are ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, or ἔξω τοῦ δράματος (cf. esp. the phrase δόσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν, in xv. 7), and gives precepts for the management of such incidents, which rest on the fact noticed in this passage, viz., that they make a less distinct impression upon us; e.g. in reference to such incidents, a deus ex machina is less objectionable ( xv. 7): improbability generally is more admissible, e.g. the circumstances connected with the murder of Laius and the marriage of Jocasta by ÓEdipus ( xv. 7; cf. xiv. 6).

— 5. συλλογιστέων] Owing to the almost invariably technical use of this word in Aristotle for a logical conclusion or inference, this passage is frequently translated, 'we must conclude.' This does not however suit the general context, or the combination of particles δὴ καὶ. It should be rather, 'we must take into our calculation then this difference also,' viz., the difference resulting from our being present to, or absent from, the scene of action, as well as the difference in weight among troubles themselves, even when we are present. On this latter difference cf. x. 12. This sense of συλλογιζομαι occurs in Hdt. ii. 148, and in a passage still more closely parallel in Dem. de Fals. Leg. p. 356, ἐπειδὴ τῶν καιρῶν συλλογιστεῖν τὶς ἐφ᾽ ὅν ἐγράφη, καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, κ.τ.λ.

P. 59, I. xii. 1. Thus these three classes of Goods correspond to those in vii. 4, δύναμις being good as means; τίμια good always per se as ends; ἐπαυνετὰ good per se as ends, and also good as means. In § 2, τὸ ποῖον τι εἶναι refers to the former condition of ἐπαυνετὰ, and τὸ πρῶς τι πῶς ἔξεσθαι to the latter.

P. 62, I. xiii. 8. ἔξωπερικὸς] Besides the explanations of this word given in the note two others deserve notice—(1) It has been thought to mean simply any discourse or treatise other than that in hand. (2) Grote (Aristotle, i. 69) maintains the view that it means outside the regular method of Philosophy; i.e. discussion conducted in the method
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of Dialectic (in the technical Aristotelian sense). With the explanation given in the note compare that of ἐγκύκλιος λόγος in v. 7.

P. 69, I. xiii. 20. It should be particularly noted that φρονησις, in spite of its constant connexion with Moral Virtue (συνέχεται ἡ φρονησις τῇ τοῦ ἴθεου ἀρετῇ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ φρονήσει, X. viii. 3), is itself an intellectual quality. Dante (Conv. iv. 17) thinks it necessary to bring Aristotle's authority against the opinion 'held by many' that it was a Moral Virtue. In proof of this (besides the distinct statement in the text)—(1) It is discussed by Aristotle in B. VI. among the διανοητικά ἀρεταί; (2) In X. viii. θεωρία is shown to be superior to ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν on the ground of its superiority to the kindred intellectual excellence of φρονησις which is allied to them; (3) φρονησις is described in Rhet. i. ix. 13 as ἀρετὴ διανοιας καθ' ἴν εὖ βουλέουσθαι ὄντως ἐναντιαὶ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

P. 77, II. ii. 6. ὀμολογεῖ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Merchant of Venice, Act. i. Sc. ii., 'They are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing. It is no mean happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean.'

P. 79, II. iii. 2. ὡς δὲ Πλάτων φησιν] Probably in reference to Laws, B. ii.

P. 84, II. iv. 3. Add to the note on ταῦτα δὲ, κ.τ.λ.—The 'motive' which led to the execution of some of Michelagnolo's great works was (if we may believe tradition) mean and spiteful, but this, if true, does not affect our estimate of their artistic merit; nor do we think less of Benvenuto Cellini's Persens because he consoles himself, on failing to kill an enemy, with the reflection, that, if God would permit him to complete that work, he would thereby crush his hated rivals more effectually than if he killed them with the sword.

Again, as to the condition βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως. If an artist wishes to destroy his work, being dissatisfied with it, and regrets having executed it, neither does this affect its artistic worth. In fact, artists are frequently bad judges of the relative merits of their own works (cf. Plato, Phædo, p. 274, fin.), and poets (among others notably Wordsworth) have frequently altered for the worse some of their finest passages. The artistic merit of such works or passages remains the same notwithstanding.

P. 94, II. vi. 15. Illustrate further the necessity for adding the qualification ὡς δὲ φρονήμος ὀρίζειν (as explained in the Notes), by the reflection of Pope, Essay on Man, π. 169, etc.:—

'Let pow'r or knowledge, gold or glory, please,
Or (oft more strong than all) the love of ease;
Thro' life 'tis followed, ev'n at life's expense:
The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence;
The monk's humility, the hero's pride;
All, all alike, find reason on their side.

Also by La Rochefoucauld (quoted by Pattison, l.c.), 'Il n'y a pas de violente passion qui n'ait sa raison pour s'autoriser.' Again, the 'so-called dictates of conscience and reason are sometimes only passions in the form of a syllogism' (Ugo Foscolo). In B. VII. c. iii. Aristotle explains at length how Reason may help a man to go wrong selon les règles.

P. 95, II. vi. 17, etc. The refutation of the misconceptions of Aristotle's theory contained in these sections affords an answer also to another objection sometimes brought against it, that it makes the difference between Virtue and Vice to be quantitative only, and not qualitative; a question of degree merely, and not of kind; so that Virtue is a little more or less of Vice, and Vice a little more or less of Virtue; or, as it has also been put, that 'Virtue is only Vice a little exaggerated or a little controlled.' Take the following illustration:—Excess or defect of temperature will (so to speak) destroy Water by converting it either into Steam or Ice; a moderate degree (though within considerable limits) will preserve it in the form of Water: but Water is not a little more Ice or a little less Steam. The difference, though quantitative in respect of temperature, is qualitative in respect of the resulting material. So Virtue differs from Vice qualitatively, and is not Vice increased or Vice diminished, though in respect of the πάθη and πράξεις, with which they deal, the difference may be mainly, or even wholly, quantitative.

P. 97, II. vii. This proof of the Definition of Virtue (as explained in the Notes) is a good instance of 'Inductio per Enumerationem Simplicum,' or (as it is sometimes called) 'Perfect Induction': since if the Catalogue of Virtues is complete, all the possible cases to which the Conclusion can refer have been examined in the Premisses. By the same method, any general proposition relating to a limited and ascertainable number of cases may be established, as, e.g., 'all the Popes (until the present) have reigned less than twenty-five years.'

P. 99, Ii. vii. 3. Ἐξελεποντες δὲ] In VII. ix. 5 it is stated that ἄκρασια and ἐγκράτεια, like ἀκολογία and σωφροσύνη, are defective in a third related term, and for a similar reason.

P. 101, II. vii. 8. ἐπιδικάζουσιν] A legal term, relating to a double claim for some disputed object. Similarly, in IV. iv. 4, ὡς ἐρήμης ἐνώκεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἀκρα. Still it is clear that if there is Excess and Defect there must be a Mean, else how could the transition occur from the one
to the other of these extremes? If the balance has turned, there must have been a point when it was even. This is admirably put by Pope (Essay on Man, ii. 207, etc.), when, speaking of 'extremes,' he says—

'Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade,
As in some well-wrought picture light and shade,
And oft so mix, the difference is too nice,
Where ends the virtue or begins the vice.
Fools! who from hence into the notion fall,
That vice or virtue there is none at all.'

P. 104, II. vii. 15. ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαίρέκας, κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that Aristotle corrects himself on this point in Rhet. II. ix. 5, 'Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιχαίρέκας καὶ φθονερός. In fact, they are (to borrow his illustration in c. xiii.) like the convex and concave sides of a circumference, τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἄχρωμα πεφυκότα. The true defect of the feeling of νέμεως would be a sort of moral indifference, such as is typified in the popular (though perverted) conception of 'a Gallio.' Also we might illustrate the feeling implied in νέμεως by Ps. lxxiii. 3, etc., 'I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see the ungodly in such prosperity.' In the present day the recognition of the virtuous side of Resentment (νέμεως), as well as that of Anger, Self-Esteem, and perhaps Ambition, has rather fallen into the background. (See further, note p. 238.) The following passage from Dr. Abbott’s most suggestive Bible Lessons (p. 175), on the Virtue of Resentment, is worth quoting:—'Anger is indifferent, being sometimes right and sometimes wrong; vindictiveness gives a selfish character to anger, and is always wrong. But there is an anger that is always right, such as one feels at the sight of cruelty, injustice, and oppression, a moral recoil of sentiment from evil.' After pointing out the etymological significance of Resentment as 'recoil of sentiment,' he proceeds, 'Resentment then is a Virtue, and a man who feels no resentment at the sight of injustice is destitute of a true sense of sin. There is almost as great a deficiency of resentment in the world as there is an excess of vindictiveness.'

It may be worth while to compare the νέμεως of Aristotle with Resentment as depicted by Bishop Butler, and to contrast both with Anger in its legitimate manifestation by the πρᾶσος, as in Eth. IV. c. v.

Nέμεως, both in Eth. and Rhet., is emphatically connected with the undeserved prosperity of the wicked, rather than with the mere fact of their turpitude. See esp. Rhet. II. ix. 1, 7. Hence (1) it 'marches with' Envy; (2) it is in some sense the converse to Pity, which is aroused by undeserved adversity (Rhet. II. ix. 1).
Resentment is (according to Butler) of two kinds, 'Sudden Anger,' and 'Settled Resentment.' The latter is Resentment proper, and in that aspect it is aroused 'not by natural but moral evil,' not by suffering, pain, or loss, but by injury; 'it is never occasioned by harm as distinct from injury.' So again, 'its natural object is one who has been in a moral sense injurious to oneself or others.'

Anger, on the other hand, (1) may be aroused (as Butler says) by mere harm as distinct from injury;' [though no doubt the 'harm' is often spontaneously assumed to be also 'injury.' Cf. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἐπὶ φανομένη ἀκίδα ἡ ὁργὴ ἐστίν, also VII. vi. 1, ὅ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ ἡμασία, ὅτι δὲρις ἡ δλιγυρια, ἐδήλωσεν ὅ δὲ [θυμὸς] ὀσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπταίνει δὴ εὐθὺς]; (2) it is more of a personal feeling [Aristotle's Rhet. II. ii. 1, ἔστω ἡ ὁργὴ δρεῖς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φανομένης διὰ φανομένην δλιγυριάν τῷ εἰς αὐτόν ἡ εἰς αὐτοῦ τινα μὴ προσηκόνως. So, ib. II. iv. 30, Ὁργὴ ἐστὶν ἐκ τῷ πρὸς ἐαυτόν. Compare Butler, Sermon viii. p. 437, ed. Angus]; (3) 'its reason and end (says Butler) is to prevent and resist sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such.' Similarly, Aristotle (Eth. IV. v. 6) notes that in its absence a man is not ἀμυντικός.

In Rhet. II. iv. 31, etc., Aristotle describes the feeling of μῖσος, in contrast with ὁργῆς, in terms which bring it into close resemblance to Butler's Resentment, e.g. ὁργὴ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα, ... τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συνοφάντην ἀπαί καὶ τὸ μὲν λατόν χρόνῳ (cf. Eth. IV. v. 8, etc.) τὸ δ’ ἀνιατον—καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἐφέσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ—'Ο μὲν ὁργηζόμενος λυπεῖται. ο δὲ μισῶν οὖ, κ.τ.λ.

P. 106, II. viii. 2. ἀνδρείας ... πρὸς τὸν θρασύν δείλδυ] As, for instance, Fabius in the estimate of Minucius: 'Pro cunctatore segnm, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat' (Livy, xxii. 12 fin.)

P. 107, II. viii. 7. Speaking generally, we may say that the Excess is better when the Virtue mostly relates to the encouragement of the Feeling with which it is concerned, and the Defect when the Virtue mostly relates to its repression.

P. 110, II. ix. 4. We might illustrate ἐνκατάφοροι λ.λ. by an expression applied in Athenæus to Charæmon, that he was ἐπικατάφορος ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνθη, i.e. 'fond of dwelling on descriptions of flowers.'

P. 111, II. ix. 8. ὁ μὲν μικρόν, κ.τ.λ.] Hence it follows that the Virtuous mean is not like a straight line without breadth, but a moderately wide path, not to be too closely defined, although after all—
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'Sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.'

P. 113. It has been suggested that the same social principle probably underlies Dante's classification of vices, in respect of their moral turpitude, (There is of course no such gradation intended in Aristotle's classification here.) 'Dante's moral standard is wholly social. The worst crime is fraud, because it strikes at the root of society by undermining confidence [cf. Inf. xi. 55]. . . . Next in the scale of evil is violence, less dangerous, because avowed and open. The most venial of the sins of Hell is incontinence, which chiefly concerns the individual alone' (Symonds' Introduction, p. 120).

III. i. 11. In VII. ix. 4 Aristotle gives an instance of καλὴ ἡδονή overpowering a resolution to act in the case of the Neoptolemus of Sophocles, who was unable to abide by the determination which he had formed to deceive Philoctetes, καίτω δὲ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν. Cf. VII. ii. 7, where the paradoxical phrase σπουδαία τις ἀκρασία is suggested for this case.

P. 119, III. i. 13. Hence in the case mentioned by Jeremy Taylor, 'He that threw a stone at a dog, and hit his cruel stepmother, said that though he meant it otherwise, yet the stone was not quite lost,' the act would not be involuntary, not being ἐπιλυτὸν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ. Somewhat similar would be Aristotle's condemnation of Pompey's morality in Ant. and Cleop. Act ii. Sc. vii., when he will not consent beforehand 'o a scheme of treachery, but regrets that it had not been carried out without his being consulted:

'Repent that e'er thy tongue
Hath so betrayed thine act; being done unknown,
I should have found it afterwards well done,
But must condemn it now.'

P. 120, III. i. 14. οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν . . . ἀλλ' ἄγνοῶν] δὲ ἄγνοιαν πράττειν is applied to an act caused by ignorance; ἄγνοῶν πράττειν to an act which is merely accompanied by ignorance.

P. 121, III. i. 17. ὡσπερ Ἀλεξάνδρος τὰ μυστικὰ] Eschylus is said to have been accused of divulging some portions of the Eleusinian Mysteries in one of his plays, and to have defended himself on the ground that never having been himself initiated, he must have done it, if at all, unconsciously.

P. 122, III. i. 20. The conception of an Involuntary act is more
definite and positive than that of a Voluntary act. Hence Involuntary is investigated first (as in Book V. Injustice is discussed before Justice, cf. V. i. 8), and this Definition of ‘Voluntary’ simply excludes the two conditions which have been shown to constitute Involuntariness, viz., βιά and ἡ καθ’ ἐκαστα ἄγνοια. The words οὐ ἢ ἄρχῃ ἐν αὐτῷ refer to the former, and εἴδοτι τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστα ἐν ὅτι ἡ πράξεις to the latter. In V. viii. 6, 7, Involuntary acts βιά are described as ἄτυχήματα, those δι’ ἄγνοιαν as ἀμαρτήματα.

The supplementary §§ 21, etc., contain an argument similar to that in §§ 11, etc.: as it was there shown that the violence of pleasure is not such as to constitute the involuntariness of compulsion, so it is contended here that the blindness of passion or desire does not constitute the involuntariness of ignorance.

P. 123, III. i. 25. ἀκούσει λυπηρά] This is true in all cases, for ἀκούσει βιά are of course λυπηρά at the moment (κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν, § 6), and ἀκούσει δι’ ἄγνοιαν are ἐπίλυπα (§ 13) as soon as we discover what we have done.

— 27. φευκτά μὲν] The converse of the argument from δεῖ in § 24. In that case we ought to do something; in this case we ought to avoid something.

"Ἀτοπον δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] The reason for this assertion seems to be that so many of our actions proceed rather from unreasoning impulse than conscious and deliberate purpose, that we should have to relegate too large a proportion of our lives to the sphere of involuntary action on the supposition in question. The opponent’s contentment would prove too much, as in § 22. Τὰ ἄλογα πάθη refer to θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία; cf. Rhet. I. x. 8, ἄλογοι δὲ ὀρέξεις, ὀργῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

P. 124, III. ii. 3. Compare I. xiii. 18, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὀλως ὀρκετικὸν, which shows that ἐπιθυμία falls under ὀρέξεις as its genus.

P. 125, III. ii. 6. It is difficult to find a precise equivalent for θυμὸς, but we can gather its meaning (1) from Plato’s use of θυμὸς or τὸ θυμοειδὲς as the element of Spirit, or Will, or Resolution, or whatever it may be called, which gives practical effect to the abstract decisions of Reason, in its conflict with the ἐπιθυμία, and causes the man’s action to follow it rather than them; (2) From Aristotle’s use of the word elsewhere, e.g. the description of the Spurious Courage of θυμὸς (High Spirit or Impetuosity) in III. viii. 10, etc.; also the opposition of impulsive to deliberate action, τὰ ἐκ θυμὸν . . . τὰ ἐκ προνοιῶν, Eth. V. viii. 9; also from its occasional interchange with ὀργῇ, e.g. Rhet. I. x. 8, etc.
**AND ILLUSTRATIONS.**

*Eth. III. i. 24, V. viii. 9;* also from the greater evil of \(\alpha\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \theta\upsilon\omicron\omicron\) as compared with \(\alpha\kappa\rho\alpha\sigma\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \epsilon\pi\upsilon\upsilon\mu\omicron\upsilon\nu\), *Eth. VII. vi.* (cf. II. iii. 10, \(\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\omicron\pi\omicron\epsilon\omicron\nu\ \eta\delta\omicron\upsilon\gamma\) \(\mu\alpha\chi\varepsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \eta\ \theta\upsilon\mu\omega\). Hence I have ventured, though with much hesitation, to translate it *h. l.* 'Spirit,' in the sense of an impulsive and resolute, but unreflecting, source of action. St. Hilaire, though translating the word by 'colère' in i. 27, paraphrases it in this chapter 'la passion que le cœur inspire.'

P. 131, III. iii. 11-13. \(\theta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\ \tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma \tau\iota \ldots \ \dot{\alpha} \phi\mu\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\nu\tau\alpha\iota\] Shakespeare has described the process similarly in 2 *Henry IV.* Act i. Sc. iii.—

> When we mean to build,
> We first survey the plot, then draw the model;
> And when we see the figure of the house,
> Then must we take the cost of the erection;
> Which if we find outweighs ability,
> What do we then, but draw anew the model
> In fewer offices; or, at least, desist
> To build at all?

P. 136, III. iv. 4. In technical language, the \(\sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\alpha\iota\varsigma\) is related to \(\tau\alpha\lambda\nu\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\) as the *causa cognoscendi*, not the *causa essendi*. Such a relation is similar to that claimed by the Vatican Council towards Papal Infallibility, as *declaring*, but not *constituting*, the Popes infallible.

P. 137, III. v. 1. As a further illustration of Plato's theory of the involuntary error of Vice, we might say that he regards a vicious choice as like that of a man who should take poison mistaking it for wholesome medicine. *At the time* he takes what he thinks is good for him, though it is in reality bad. He does not however choose it as such, and so he commits not a 'crime,' but a 'blunder,' which, in Plato's estimate at any rate, was better. Aristotle, in V. ix. 6, adopts language very similar to that of Plato, when he says *οὐτε γάρ βούλεται οὐθές ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἰναι σπουδαῖον*. So also in *Rhet.* I. x. 8.

P. 138, III. v. 4. \(\omega\theta\epsilon\iota\varsigma \epsilon\kappa\omega\nu \piο\nu\gamma\rho\delta\), κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that \(\piο\nu\gamma\rho\delta\) has the double sense of 'wretched' and 'wicked' (compare 'cattivo' in Italian),—language, in this and many other words, reflecting the natural tendency to connect physical and moral imperfections. The former sense was doubtless intended by the unknown author of the line quoted in the text, as the antithesis with \(\mu\acute{\alpha}k\alpha\rho\) would show.

P. 139, III. v. 7-15. The general argument of these sections is that legislators never punish except for what is voluntary, and they are so careful about this as to follow up to their sources vicious acts, which might seem *prima facie* involuntary, and if they can trace them, however remotely, to an *avoidable* cause, they treat them as voluntary, and
punish accordingly. So fully, therefore, do mankind generally hold the voluntariness of Vice, that we are treated as responsible not only for our immediate actions, but also for all the demonstrable and inevitable results of our actions, however little we may have contemplated those results. If we fire a train of gunpowder, we are responsible for the damage done at the other end, though it may be far beyond our reach.

P. 143, III. v. 17. δ παρ' ετέρου . . . εὐφυτα] Compare Poet. c. xxii. § 9, μένων γὰρ τοῦτο [τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι] οὕτω παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν, εὐφυτας τε σημείῳ ἔστιν.

P. 147, III. vi. 10. ὑπόγυμα δυνα] Lambinus translates, 'iis impendentibus atque instantibus quse mortem afferunt.' The following illustrations are in favour of the interpretation 'handy,' or 'close at hand,' rather than 'sudden.' In Pol. VII. (VI.) viii. 3, Commerce is said to be ὑπογυμιτατων πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, the readiest or most handy means for securing independence. And Rhet. II. iii. 12, κεχρονικότες, καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυμοι τῇ ὅργῃ δυνας' παθεί γὰρ ὁργὴν ὁ χρόνος, where ὑπόγυμος means 'while they are still close at hand to the feeling of anger': 'quum non recentes ab ira sumus' (Muretus). [Compare τῷ παθεῖν δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον, Thuc. III. xxxviii. 1.]

Twice in the Rhet. (I. i. 7, II. xxii. 11) the adverbial phrase ἡ ὑπόγυμον occurs—'suddenly,' 'on the spur of the moment.' It seems probable that Aristotle would have employed it here if that had been the sense intended. His meaning seems rather to be that courage is exercised not only when death actually occurs, but also in dangers like those of war, when it appears imminent or close at hand, even if it be ultimately escaped. Thus a prisoner may be actually led out ὡς ἐπὶ θάνατον, or βάσανον, and even if he were released unhurt, might have displayed courage as genuine as if he had actually died. The passage will thus be very similar to that in Rhet. II. v. 2, where, after defining those things which are, strictly speaking, φοβερά, Aristotle adds, καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβεράς ἐγγύτως γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν τούτου γάρ ἐστι κινδυνός, φοβερότι πλησιάσμος.

P. 148, III. vii. 1, 2. Compare Macbeth, Act i. Sc. vii.—

'I dare do all that may become a man;
Who dares do more is none.'

P. 150, III. vii. 7, 8. Observe the two characteristics of the ἰπασοῦ here indicated—(1) his excess of confidence (§ 7); (2) his desire to display his courage; he wishes 'to appear unto men' to be brave (§ 8). So
also the βάναυσος in IV. ii. 20. With the words ἐν οἷς οὖν βάναυσι: μειται compare Merchant of Venice, Act iii. Sc. ii.—

'There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.
How many cowards, whose hearts are all as false
As stairs of sand, wear yet upon their chins
The beards of Hercules and frowning Mars,
Who inward searched, have livers white as milk;
And these assume but value's excrement
To render them redoubted.'

P. 150, III. vii. 9. θανατωδεῖς] Another instance of this character on its comic side may be found in Sir Andrew Aguecheek in Twelfth Night. See especially Act iii. Sc. iv., and his disposition as described in Act i. Sc. iii.—'He is a great quarreler, but that he hath the gift of a coward to allay the gust he hath in quarrelling,' etc.

P. 151, III. vii. 13. Very similarly Sir T. Browne, Rel. Med. i. 44, writes,—'It is a brave act of valour to contemn death; but where life is more terrible than death, it is then the truest valour to dare to live.' We might compare with the opinion of Hadrian, quoted in the Notes, a well-known order of the day of Napoleon, in which he declared any Frenchman who committed suicide to be a deserter from the army. So in Ethics V. xi. 2, 3 the Suicide is described as τὴν πόλιν δικόων. In Hamlet's celebrated Soliloquy (Act iii. Sc. i.) the question of Suicide is argued on grounds similar to those in the text, but with the different result that the possible future ills after death leave the balance in the cowardly calculation against suicide. Compare Claudio's conclusion in Measure for Measure, Act iii. Sc. i.—'Ay, but to die,' etc.

P. 152, III. viii. 2. Shakespeare represents Ulysses as plying Achilles with a similar argument—Troilus and Cressida, Act iii. Sc. iii.—

'But it must grieve young Pyrrhus now at home,
When fame shall in our islands sound her trump,
And all the Greekish girls shall tripping sing,—
"Great Hector's sister did Achilles win,
But our great Ajax bravely beat down him."'

(So a few lines below)—

'Αχ. Shall Ajax fight with Hector?
Πατ. Ay, and perhaps receive much honour by him.
Αχ. I see my reputation is at stake.'

P. 153, III. viii. 5. Tacitus (Hist. iii. 18) notices the converse effect
of facility of retreat in diminishing the courage of soldiers: 'Et propinququa Cremonensium moenia, quanto plus spei ad effugium, tanto minorem ad resistendum animum, dabant.'

6. κενά τοῦ πολέμου] Another illustration of this might be found in the strange and dazzling costumes adopted by the Samnites, in a.c. 308, to strike terror into the Romans. The Dictator Papirius Cursor forewarned his troops of the unreality of such a display, 'horridum militem esse debere ... illa praedam verius quam arma esse,' etc.—(Livy ix. 40.)

P. 156, III. viii. 11. θυμὸν ἐξελανυμένα . . προορίντα] Compare Shakespeare, Ant. and Cleop. Act iii. Sc. xiii.—

'To be furious
Is to be frightened out of fear; and in that mood,
The dove will peck the estridge; and I see still,
A diminution in our captain's brain
Restores his heart.'

12. φυσικωτάτη, κ.τ.λ.] In reference to the comparative amount of the elements of θυμὸς and προορίντας in Courage, Professor Mahaffy (Rambles in Greece, p. 146) remarks that the ordinary Greek Courage involved more θυμὸς than accorded with our notions, but that these again seem to allow more of that element than Aristotle's ideal of Courage. [See Introduction, p. xxxvi, etc., and note on ix. 4.] Greek generals, instead of advising coolness, specially incite to rage, ὀργῇ προσμίξωμεν, etc., as if a man not in this state would be sure to estimate the danger and run away.

P. 158, III. viii. 16. ἀξίωμα] In Pol. II. v. 25, οἱ μηδὲν ἄξιωμα κεκτημένοι ['peu jaloux de leur dignité' (St. Hilaire)] are opposed to θυμοειδεῖς καὶ πολεμικὸν ἄνδρες. See inf. p. 234 fin., on the advantage gained by even the χαῖνος in this respect.

P. 161, III. ix. 6. ἔτομοι γὰρ οὖτοι κ.τ.λ.] Like the 'Luculli miles in Horace Ep. II. ii. 26-40.

P. 162, III. x. 3. φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοῦς, κ.τ.λ.] This seems to be precisely the type of character assigned to the Athenians in Acts xvii. 21, 'who spend their time in nothing else but to hear and tell some new thing.'

P. 169, III. xii. 3. δῆξει δ ἄν, κ.τ.λ.] The former of the cases mentioned in the note would, in fact, be exactly that of Falstaff in his well-known soliloquy on Honour, 1 Henry IV. Act v. Sc. 1; or again in Sc. 3 (fin.), 'Give me life: which if I can save, so; if not, honour comes unlooked for, and there's an end.'
P. 171, III. xii. 6. The absence of κόλασις, indicated by the word ἀκόλουθος, is expressed by the Latin 'improbos.' Compare with this passage I. iii. 7, where those who live κατὰ πάθος are described as children in character.

P. 182, IV. i. 30-32. A good illustration of this better type of ἄσωτος will be found in Timon of Athens, as depicted by Shakespeare in the first two Acts of the play. Compare especially with § 31 fin. Timon's reflection in Act ii. Sc. ii.—

'No villainous bounty yet hath pass'd my heart;
Unwisely, not ignobly, have I given.'

Dante also recognises two somewhat similar classes of Prodigals, whose moral turpitude he considers to be so different that he places those corresponding to Aristotle's better type (§ 31) in the fourth circle of Hell, but the latter in the seventh circle, ranking them, in fact, with the Suicides. Cf. δοκεῖ δ' ἀπόλυειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ή τῆς οὐσίας φθορὰ, ὡς τοῦ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτων ἄσωτος (§ 5). He also connects the Vice of the former with ἀκρασία, that of the latter with κακία (Inf. xi. 70, etc.)

P. 188, IV. ii. Μεγαλοπρέπεια. I am inclined now, on the whole, to prefer the translation 'Magnificence' for μεγαλοπρέπεια. That word is not, it is true, in our usage limited to the expenditure of money; but, on the other hand, it is not so restricted to the notion of mere amount as Munificence would seem to be. It is important to observe that the conspicuousness and grandeur of the expenditure and its occasion is the essential point of difference between μεγαλοπρέπεια and έλευθερώτης. Naturally, greatness of amount is an almost necessary accompaniment of such conditions. Still it is only one form of the grandeur implied in μεγαλοπρέπεια. Cf. οἴον μέγεθος (§ 10); also, διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι (§ 18). We see also in both the Excess and Defect that display and showiness are an essential element in this group of habits. The βάναυσος thinks most of the display, and that in reference to himself chiefly (§ 20). The μεγαλοπρεπής thinks worthily and adequately of the display, and not exclusively in reference to himself. (Contrast ἐμελέως in § 5 with λαμπρόνεται παρὰ μέλος in § 20. See also πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπείοντεστατον, § 9, etc. etc.) The μικροπρεπής does not rise to a grand occasion at all. He is 'paltry' rather than merely 'sordid.' Note that he too is described as τὰ μέγιστα ἰαναλόσεια sometimes (which could scarcely be said of the 'Sordid' man), but that he wishes to make a display and keep his money too; and so ἐν μικρῷ τῷ καλῷ ἀπολοεῖ (§ 21). He lacks that almost 'scientific instinct' (see §§ 5, 10) by

T
which the megaloprepēs sets off with a ‘grand style’ (§19) all that he does.


Chalks successors their way.’

P. 195, IV. ii. 19. αὐτὸν εὐπρέπησθεν] Cf. iii. 24. It is related of Lorenzo de’ Medici, surnamed ‘the Magnificent’ (megaloprepēs), that even in his childhood, having received as a present a horse from Sicily, he at once sent the donor in return a gift of much greater value, remarking, when reproved for profuseness, that there was nothing more noble than to overcome others in acts of generosity.—(Roscoe’s Life.)

P. 198, IV. iii. 5. τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ νόμωτι] This notion enters into the Greek ideal even of female beauty, e.g. Homer, Od. xiii. 289, ἑναυξὺ ὑπὲρ γυναίκι καλὴ τε μεγάλῃ τε; Od. xviii. 248, ἅτινες περὶ κεφαλήν οἰδίπο τε μέγεθο τε (a sort of S. Barbara after Palma Vecchio). So Aristotle, Rhet. I. v. 6, says, θελεῖν δ' ἀρετῆ, νόμοτε μὲν, κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος.

P. 201, IV. iii. 16. μείζων . . . ποιεῖ] Hence the relation of megalophugia to the other virtues is somewhat like that of the Chief Good to the other Goods, as described by the words παρὰ αὐτῆς καὶ καθάρμουμένη (I. vii. 8). Megalophugia unites and includes them all, and it also gives them an additional lustre, ‘οἷον οἷον τοις,’ very much as megaloprepēs ‘sets off’ expenditure, καὶ ἀλῶ τῆς λογίας δαναγής.

— 17. We might illustrate this lofty indifference of the megalophugia to the opinions of others, by a saying of Angelo Poliziano (Ep. iii. 24), ‘I am no more raised or dejected by the flattery of my friends or the accusations of my enemies, than I am by the shadow of my own body; for although that shadow may be somewhat longer in the morning and the evening than in the middle of the day, I do not think myself a taller man at those times than I am at noon.’

P. 203, IV. iii. 21. “Ἀνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. La Rochefoucauld Max. 25: ‘Il faut de plus grandes vertus pour soutenir la bonne fortune que la mauvaise.’

P. 204, IV. iii. 25. Διακούσι δὲ, κ.τ.λ.] Demosthenes contends that the reverse ought to be the case (De Cor. p. 316):—ἐγὼ ποιῶ τὸν μὲν εὖ παθῶντα δεῖν μεμηχανῆ τάτα τῶν χρόνων, τὸν δὲ παύσαστα εἰσίς ἐπιπελεχθῆς, εἰ δεῖ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ, τὸν δὲ μὴ μεροπρόχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπων τὸ δὲ τὰς ζῆσις οἰερογέλαις οὐτοματίσκει καὶ λέγειν μικρὸν δεῖν διδοὺν ἄτι τῷ ἄρειβίτεν.
P. 205, IV. iii. 25. τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκουεῖ τὰ δ᾽ ἀνδῶς] Compare Shakespeare, Ant. and Cleop. Act iii. Sc. i.—

'I have done enough: a lower place, note well,
May make too great an act: for learn this, Sillius,
Better to leave undone, than by our deed
Acquire too high a fame, when him we serve’s away.

Who does i’ the wars more than his captain can
Becomes his captain’s captain: and ambition,
The soldier’s virtue, rather makes choice of loss,
Than gain, which darkens him.
I could do more to do Antonius good,
But 'twould offend him.'

dio καὶ τὴν Θετων] Mr. Monro of Oriel College has kindly sent me the following note on this passage:—

'The reference to the prayer of Thetis is, I think, correct. Aristotle is probably repeating an observation made by one of the earlier grammatici, the point being this:—In Iliad i. 394-407 Achilles advises Thetis to remind Jove of a great service she had done him, and which he tells at length. In the regular Homeric style the same story would be repeated in the prayer of Thetis, vv. 503-510, in place of which we only have the general form εἰποτε δὴ σε, κ.τ.λ. Thetis does not relate her services—οὐ λέγει τὰς εὐεργεσίας. This is just the sort of point which an ancient critic would notice, and I have no doubt that it had been noticed before Aristotle's time.'

Similarly in Twelfth Night (Act iii. Sc. iv.) Antonio οὐ λέγει τὰς εὐεργεσίας to Sebastian, though compelled to hint at them—

'Is't possible that my deserts to you
Can lack persuasion? Do not tempt my misery,
Lest that it make me so unsound a man
As to upbraid you with those kindesses
That I have done for you.'

P. 206, IV. iii. 27. ἄργον καὶ μελανήτην, ἄλλ' ἢ διότω τιμή, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Hamlet, Act iv. Sc. iv.—

'Rightly to be great,

Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw,
When honour's at the stake.'

— 29. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, κ.τ.λ.] Contrast this with the description of the ἄρεσκος in vi. 1. 9. He lives altogether πρὸς ἄλλον, and that,
AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

So Dante on the demoralising effects of viltate (Inf. ii. 45, etc. (Gary's translation), Which oft overcasts a man, that he recoils from noblest resolution, like a beast at some false semblance in the twilight gloom.

And La Rochefoucauld similarly of faiblesse:

La faiblesse est le seul defaut que 1 on ne saurait corriger (Max. 130). La faiblesse est plus opposee a la vertu que le vice (Max. 445).

The more so perhaps as Aristotle (ETiet. II. xiii. 9) states that a too great regard for self is a mark of megalopsuchos (L. 1013a) (see Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31).

With this definition of this compare Dante's conception of it as not so much unresisting gentleness to evil as the righteous indignation which repels it without any feeling of personal irritation. (M. F. Rossetti.) (See Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31.)

So in the Convito (iv. 17) he gives as a description of the irpatos of Aristotle, The Virtue which moderates our anger and our too great patience against our external ills. If we look only at the former aspect (see 6, fin.), the irpatos might degenerate to Hamlet's description (Act ii. Sc. ii.), and become pigeon-livered and lack gall, to make oppression bitter.

Further, Dante punishes this vice of defect (Accidia) in the same Circle with the vice of Excess (Iracundia). These habits are distinguished from its related vices, in that the former involve the notion of personal injury (including that of friends, 67018) as well as injury. See also Supplementary Note on II. vii. 15.

Anger is like a full-hot horse, who being allowed his way self-mettle tires him. Cf. VII. vi. 3, 6 vpatapcs (ob nvr) om (3ovos, etc.

The first two classes here mentioned resemble the passion and the peevish of Bishop Butler's eighth Sermon (p. 440, ed. 1684): As to the abuses of Anger, which, it is to be observed, may in all different degrees (i) Treppoi, card irvTa pvylverat, the first which occurs is what is commonly called passion.

This dis-
So Dante on the demoralising effects of ‘viltate’ (μυκροψυχία), *Inf.* ii. 45, etc. (Cary’s translation),—

‘Which oft
So overcasts a man, that he recoils
From noblest resolution, like a beast
At some false semblance in the twilight gloom.’

And La Rochefoucauld similarly of ‘faiblessé’: —‘La faiblessé est le seul défaut que l’on ne saurait corriger’ (*Max.* 130). ‘La faiblessé est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice’ (*Max.* 445).

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. ὄρεγετο γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] The more so perhaps as Aristotle (*Rhret. II. xiii. 9) states that a too great regard for self is a mark of μυκροψυχία—μυκροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὐτή [sc. ἡ λιαν φιλανία].

P. 213, IV. v. 3. With this definition of πράσθης compare Dante’s conception of it as being ‘not so much unresisting gentleness to evil as the righteous indignation which repels it without any feeling of personal irritation.’—(M. F. Rossetti.) [See Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31.] So in the *Convito* (iv. 17) he gives as a description of the πράσθης of Aristotle, ‘The Virtue which moderates our anger and our too great patience against our external ills.’ If we look only at the former aspect of it (see § 6, *fin.*), the πράσος might degenerate to Hamlet’s description (*Act ii. Sc. ii.*), and become

‘Pigeon-livered and lack gall,
To make oppression bitter.’

Further, Dante punishing this vice of defect (Accidia) in the same Circle with the vice of Excess (Iracundia). These habits are distinguished from νέφεως with its related vices, in that the former involve the notion of personal injury (including that of friends, ὁ γὰρ φιλος ἐτέρως αὐτός); also that they include what Bishop Butler calls ‘harm’ as well as injury. See also Supplementary Note on II. vii. 15.


*Act i. Sc. i.*—

‘Anger is like
A full-hot horse, who being allowed his way
Self-mettle tires him.’

*ἔτεροι εἰς*] Cf. VII. vi. 3, ὁ θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, ... ἀλλὰ φαινότας.

—§ 9] The first two classes here mentioned resemble the ‘passionate’ and the ‘peevish’ of Bishop Butler’s eighth Sermon (p. 440, ed. Angus):—‘As to the abuses of Anger, which, it is to be observed, may be in all different degrees (ἥ υπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γινεται, § 7), the first which occurs is what is commonly called passion. ... This dis-
temper of the mind seizes men upon the least occasion in the world, and
perpetually without any reason at all, and by means of it they are plainly
every day, every waking hour of their lives, in danger of running into
the most extravagant outrages (§ 8). Of a less boisterous but not of a
less innocent kind is peevishness (cf. ol Δκρόχωλοι ὀξεῖς), which I men-
tion with real pity for the unhappy creatures who . . . are obliged to be
in the way of it (cf. τοῖς μᾶλλον φίλως, § 10). That which, in a more
feeble temper, is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself upon every-
thing which comes in its way (πρὸς πᾶν ὄργυλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ), the same
principle in a temper of greater force and stronger passions becomes rage
and fury."

P. 217, IV. vi. 2. δύσκολος] Equivalent to difficulis in Horace’s descrip-
tion of Old Age, A. P. 173. Conversely, Dante mentions ‘Affability’ (by
which word he translates Aristotle’s φιλία) as one of the four Virtues
peculiarly appropriate to Old Age (Conv. iv. 27).

P. 220, IV. vii. 8, fin. With this characteristic of φιλία compare ‘Let
the righteous rather smite me friendly, and reprove me’ (Ps. cxli. 5).
Also Shakespeare, Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act iii. Sc. i.—

‘Thus for my duty’s sake, I rather choose
To cross my friend in his intended drift,
Then, by concealing it, heap on your head
A pack of sorrows,’ etc.

IV. vi. 9. (As another illustration of the habits of the κόλαξ)—Swift
in his Journal to Stella writes: ‘Did I ever tell you that the Lord
Treasurer hears ill with the left ear, just as I do? I dare not tell him
that I am so, for fear he should think that I counterfeited to make my
court.’ A striking, though exaggerated, illustration of the Churl (ὁ πᾶσι
δυσχεραίνων) may be found in Apemantus (Timon of Athens), who stands
in vivid contrast with the herd of κόλακες who surround Timon in his
prosperity.

P. 222, IV. viii. 5. ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἐνεκα πράττῃ] Some special motive
may intervene as a disturbing force, and then the resulting act may not
be a true index of general character, of what the man is ἐν βίῳ τεκλείῳ.
E.g. one who is δύσερπς καὶ δύσκολος by nature, may occasionally be
transformed by self-interest into a κόλαξ.

P. 223, IV. vii. 7. ὢν γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, κ.τ.λ.] Hence
one ‘who sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it
were to his own hindrance,’ would be classed as δίκαιος rather than
ἀληθῆς.

ἐν οἷς . . . ἀληθεύει] There is an abrupt change of construction here
from ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ὧν μηθὲν διαφέρει ... ἀληθεύοντος, which the former clause would have led us to expect.

P. 223, IV. vii. 8. ἐτι μᾶλλον] The mercenary, interested, or malicious lie is worse than the lie simple, just as κόλαξ is worse than ἄρεσκος, or the ἀλαξῶν ἄργυρου ἐνεκα of § 11 is worse than the ἀλαξῶν of § 10. In the former case there would be falsehood and injustice as well.

— 11. The parenthetical use of ὁ ἀλαξῶν, if that reading be adopted, is exactly parallel to that of ὁ ἔγκρατὴς in VII. ix. 2.

— 12. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, κ.τ.λ.] The interpretation given in the Notes is confirmed by the use of the same phrase in Ῥhet. I. i. 14, to distinguish the Sophist from the Dialectician; the essence of the former being the conscious use of a fallacious argument against an opponent not likely to detect it (argumentum ad ignorantiam). The motive, or 'particular condition of the Will' (Grant), is the important point. Compare also the statement in VII. x. 2, that φόροισι differs from δεινότης (mere cleverness or shrewdness), κατὰ τὴν προάρεσιν. So in V. ii. 4, Aristotle observes that one who commits adultery τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἐνεκα, would not be called ἄκλαστος, but ἄδικος or πλεονέκτης. The difference of purpose (προάρεσις) in that case, as in the case in the text, quite alters the moral character of the act. Cf. VIII. xiii. 11, and see Glossary.

P. 225, IV. vii. 13. ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα] ἐν αὐτοῖς refers to τὰ τοιαῦτα, and τὰ εἰρημένα are the qualities of being profitable, and of being easily assumed without detection.

— 14. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὖν] The καὶ is explained by a reference to § 2, where τὰ ἐνδοξά were stated to be the sphere of ἀλαξωνεία also.

P. 226, IV. vii. 15. καὶ ἡ λιαν ἐλευξὶς ἀλαξωνικὸν] Repudiating for oneself μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ at once suggests, and is of course intended to suggest, a 'par exemple!' on the part of others, and so amounts to 'fishing for compliments.' Dickens has familiarised us with types of this character in Pecksniff and Uriah Heep. In fact, this baser type of el Rowevel approaches most nearly in Aristotle's catalogue to the modern vice of Hypocrisy, and only needs the condition of being exercised in a moral or religious sphere to make it identical with it. The following illustrations may be added:—When Diogenes, treading on Plato's carpet, is said to have exclaimed, 'I am treading on Plato's vanity,' the latter replied, 'Yes, and with a different vanity of your own.' So S. Augustine, 'Vainglory often glories most vainly of the very contempt of vainglory.' Congreve has indicated a more harmless type of the same disposition—

'Careless she is with artful care,
Affecting to seem unaffected.'
La Rochefoucauld attributes to human nature generally this characteristic of bablepouvaγια—'On ne se blâme que pour être loun' (Max. 33).

P. 227, IV. viii. 3. ἐπτροπή[ This quickness of intellectual movement in the ἐπτράπελος stands in contrast with the afterthought-wit so happily described in the French phrase, 'l'esprit de l'escalier,' and it is similar in kind to the power of employing metaphor (τὸ γὰρ ἐν μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ βροικον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν), stated by Aristotle (Poet. xxii. § 9) to be a mark of genius.

P. 228, IV. viii. 6. τῶν καυνὸν[ This expression (as in the Poëtes) does not refer to what is technically known as the 'New,' but the 'Middle' Comedy. The 'New' had not yet arisen. (See Donaldson, Theatre of the Greeks, sixth ed., pp. 63, etc.)

πρὸς ἐπισκύμοσον[ It does not, however, therefore follow that the latter method has the advantage from the point of view of morality. It is quite possible to maintain the reverse. Speaking of Shakespeare's occasional αἰσθαλογία, Coleridge writes:—'It may sometimes be gross, but I boldly say that he is always moral and modest. (?) In our day, decency of manners (ἐπισκυμοσύνη) is preserved at the expense of morality of heart, and delicacies for vice are allowed (ὑπὸ νο) whilst grossness against it is hypocritically, or at least morbidly, condemned.'

— 7. τῶν ἐν σκώπτοντα[ Compare with this expression the definition of επτραπέλια in Rhet. II. xii. 16, as τεσαυδεμένη ὑβρις.

P. 229, IV. viii. 9. ἑτεὶ δ' ἑως καὶ σκώπτει[ Juvenal (iii. 153) regards liability to ridicule as the hardest part of the lot of poverty; and La Rochefoucauld remarks, 'Le ridicule déshonore plus que le déshonneur' (Max. 326).

— 10. πᾶσι δυσχεραινε[ Compare Merchant of Venice, Act i. Sc. i.—

'And other of such vinegar aspect
That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.'

P. 240 (Introductory Note to Book x.) The same distinction, derived doubtless from Aristotle, between the Active and the Contemplative Life, constantly reappears in Medieval writers. With Dante especially it is a favourite subject. He symbolises the antithesis in the Commedia by Leah and Rachel, and also (in a somewhat different aspect) by Matilda and Beatrice, and in the Convito by Martha and Mary. The following passage especially may be quoted in illustration,—'In truth it should be known that we can have in this life two kinds of Happiness, according as we follow two different good and excellent paths which lead us thither;
AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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the one is the Active Life and the other the Contemplative. The latter (though by the Active we arrive, as has been said, at true Happiness) leads us to the highest Happiness and Felicity [compare ἐνδαίμων and μακάριος in I. x. 14], as the Philosopher proves in the tenth Book of the Ethics.'—Convido, iv. 17.

P. 243, X. vi. 3. τῶν παίδων αἱ ἡδεῖαι] Such recreations as are suggested in the Note would fall under the head of συμφέροντα rather than ἡδέα (see II. iii. 7). A higher class still might deserve the title of καλὰ (see VII. iv. 5), and such the σπουδαῖος would take pleasure in (§ 5), since he, like all men, needs ἀνάπαυσις (§ 6). To such Aristotle would rather apply the term διαγωγή [cf. Pol. V. (VIII.) v. 10, τὴν διαγωγὴν ἡμιολογομενῶς δεὶ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἱδονήν], and he would consider Music as fulfilling such a condition. The whole passage in Pol. V. (VIII.) v. 10-13, should be compared where Aristotle again explains why παιδία is often thought to be τέλος, and why it is not really so.


P. 253, X. viii. 8. οὐ χρῆ κατὰ, κ.τ.λ.] This standard of Happiness, though superhuman (κρείττων ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον), is still human, in the same way that the Christian standard of moral perfection is a true standard to set before men, even though the highest human efforts can never be otherwise than an asymptote in reference to it.

P. 255, X. viii. 3. συνέξεκακα δὲ καὶ ἡ φρονήσις, κ.τ.λ.] Hence the ἀκατῆς cannot be φρόνιμος, though he may be δεινός, see VII. x. 1. Also in VI. xiii. 6 we read, οὐ χαὶ τε ἅγαθον ἐγάμη κυρίων ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἱδικῆς ἁρετῆς, and in VII. ii. 5, πρακτικὸς γε ὁ φρόνιμος.

P. 256, X. viii. 4. αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἀδηλοὶ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Measure for Measure, Act i. Sc. i.—

'For if our virtues
Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike
As if we had them not.'

—— 5. The dispute as to the relative importance of intention or act, 'will' or 'deed,' in Morals, twice referred to by Aristotle, may remind us of the later theological controversy respecting the rival claims of Faith and Works.
P. 261, X. viii. 11. κρίνουσι τοὺς ἐκτὸς τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον] Compare Merchant of Venice, Act ii. Sc. ix.—

'What many men desire! that "many" may be meant.
By the fool multitude, that choose by show,
Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach;
Which pries not to the interior.'

— 13. ei γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Addison, Cato, Act v. Sc. i.—

'If there's a power above us
(And that there is all nature cries aloud
Through all her works), he must delight in virtue,
And that which he delights in must be happy.'

The following scheme will show at a glance the connection of Ch. vi.-viii.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{desired for their results.} & \\
\text{Happiness not this, c. vi. § 2.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{desired for themselves.} & \\
\text{Happiness not this, c. vi. §§ 3-8.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Happiness not this, c. vii.} & \\
\text{θεωρητικήν.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Happiness is this, c. vii.} & \\
\text{ηθικήν.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]
[The occasion of a Fourth Edition being called for induces me to add a few more ‘Supplementary Notes and Illustrations,’ some of which, it is hoped, may be interesting to more advanced students than those for whom the footnotes generally are intended.]

P. 38, B. I. viii. 1. In illustration of this use of ὑπάρχοντα, compare Poet. xxii. 2, where ‘a riddle’ is defined, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδώνατα σωνάψαι, i.e. ‘while describing actual facts to make an impossible combination.’

P. 66, B. I. xiii. 15. ἀλλὰ τὶς φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς] A good account of Aristotle’s theory of the three ‘φύσεις τῆς ψυχῆς’ in contrast with the view of Plato of three souls in one body (see Dante, Purg. iv. 5, 6), will be found in Grote’s Aristotle, II. pp. 191-6, 221, etc. The varieties of soul are not mutually exclusive species of the same genus, but successive types of development, the higher types possessing all the properties of the lower, πλέον others of their own.

Pp. 104, 281-2. αἰδώς and νέμεσις] We might add to the illustrations above given the Homeric conception of αἰδώς and νέμεσις. ‘If a man breaks θέμισ in any way, he feels that others will disapprove. This feeling is called αἰδώς. Hence αἰδώς has as many shades of meaning as there are ways in which θέμισ can be broken:—‘sense of honour,” “shame,” “reverence,” etc. And the feeling with which he himself regards a breach of θέμισ by another person is called νέμεσις,—“righteous indignation.”’ (Jebb’s Introduction to Homer, p. 55.)

Pp. 119, 283, III. i. 13. Add the following illustration from Cic. Phil. II. xii. § 29: ‘Quid refert utrum voluerim fieri, an gaudeam factum?’

P. 146, III. vi. 5. οὐδ’ εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι ἄνδρεῖος] This is well illustrated by the following remarks of Fuller (Holy War, v. c. 2) in reference to many of the Templars having succumbed to torture. ‘It is to be commended to one’s consideration whether slavish and servile souls will not better bear torment than generous spirits, who are for the enduring of honourable danger and speedy death, but not provided for torment, which they
are not acquainted with, neither is it the proper object of valour.' 
Comp. inf. c. ix. § 6.

P. 151, III. vii. 12. Add to the illustrations in the note the 
graphic contrast drawn by Livy (vii. 10) between the Gaul and 
Torquatus before engaging in single combat. He says of the latter, 
'pectus animorum iraeque tacitae plenum, omnem ferociam in 
discrimin ipsum certaminis distulerat.' Conversely, Tacitus ascribes 
both to the Gauls and Britons the habit censured by Aristotle in 
the text: 'in deposcendis periculis eadem audacia, et ubi advenere, in 
detractandis eadem formido.' (Agricola, c. xi.)

Pp. 152-3, III. viii. 2, 3. In the following passage Dante 
recognises this form of courage due to aíðos:

But shame soon interposed her threat, who makes
The servant bold in presence of his lord.

Inf. xvii. 89, 90. (Cary's Translation.)

P. 176, IV. i. 11. τῶν ἀπὶ ἀρετῆς] We may compare with this 
periphrasis the following expressions in the Epistle to the Romans:
oi ἐξ ἐρυθελας (ii. 8), οἱ ἐκ περιστομῆς (iv. 12), οἱ ἐκ νόμου (iv. 14).

Pp. 205, 291, IV. iii. 25. Compare further Tac. Ann. v. 18 
(fin.): 'Nam beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi 
posse: ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur': which 
is thus commented on by Oldbuck in Scott's Antiquary: 'from this a 
wise man may take a caution not to oblige any man beyond the 
degree in which he may expect to be required, lest he should make 
his debtor a bankrupt in gratitude.' In Germ. xxi. (fin.) Tacitus 
mentions as a proof of the generosity of the German barbarians, 
'nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.'

P. 206, IV. iii. 28. εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς τὸν τολλοῦς] Most mss. read 
eἰρωνεῖα (auct. Grant) which certainly avoids the great difficulty of 
finding any construction for the accusative eἰρωνα.

P. 214, IV. v. 8. ἀνταποδίδοσιν κ.τ.λ.] Thus Cleon (ap. Thucyd. 
III. xxxviii. 1) remarks that summary vengeance is always most 
effective and satisfactory; and conversely (in illustration of § 10) 
Tacitus says of Domitian (Agricola, c. 42) that he was 'praeceps in 
iram, et quo obscurior eo irrevocabilior.'
Aristoteles
An introduction to Aristotle's Ethics, books I-IV.