RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST
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PREFACE

As this book goes to press, the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament is still in session, with the question of Siberia on that part of the agenda, which the Conference has not as yet reached. The book, therefore, does not contain the actual decisions of the Conference on the Russian question. It appears likely that these decisions will be entirely within the scope of the American position with regard to the "moral trusteeship" over Russia's national interests, and there is no doubt that the deliberations at the Conference will push to the fore many aspects of the Russian situation in the Far East. It is hoped, therefore, that this book will furnish a background for a clearer understanding of this important situation.

Materials on the various Russian phases of the Far Eastern question are not easily available in this country, and their interpretation is most difficult. I wish to express my gratitude to those who have helped me with suggestion and advice, and to thank particularly my
friend, Professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago, for his invaluable coöperation.

Leo Pasvolsky.

Washington, D. C.,
December 20, 1921
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  <strong>RUSSIA AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Russian Question in Paris and in Washington.—The idea of “Moral Trusteeship.”—Three Conceptions of Russia.—The Purpose of the Book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II <strong>RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Early Explorations.—The Acquisition of the Far East.—The Colonization of Siberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III <strong>RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV <strong>TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FAR EAST</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia and Japan after the War.—The Portsmouth Treaty.—The Fisheries and the General Political Conventions.—The Russo-Japanese Secret Treaties.—Russia’s Activities in Mongolia.—The Kyakhta Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V <strong>THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE JAPANESE IN SIBERIA</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siberia during the Revolution.—The Activities of the Japanese Troops.—The Idea of the “Buffer” State.—The Far Eastern Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI <strong>THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA</strong></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its General Aims and Purposes.—The Baku Congress.—Communist Activities in the Near East.—The Soviet Diplomacy in China.—Communist Activities in India and Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>THE SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Transfer of the Emphasis of Communist Activities from the Near to the Far East.—The Kamchatka Incident.—The Overthrow of the Authority of the Far Eastern Republic in Vladivostok.—The Soviet Troops in Mongolia.—The Soviets Banking on a War between Japan and the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>THE SOVIET FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Development of the Idea.—The Dairen Conference.—The Soviet Analysis of the Situation.—Relations between China and the Soviets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Interests vs. Imperialistic Aggression.—Territorial Integrity.—National Sovereignty.—Economic Coöperation with Foreign Powers.—Japan and the United States in Siberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>RUSSIA'S RÔLE IN A WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The World Equilibrium.—The New Importance of the Pacific Basin.—The Six Principal Factors in the World Situation.—Communist Russia as a Supernational Factor.—The Results of Communist Activities in Asia.—The Probable Character of Reconstructed Russia.—The United States and Russia as the Upholders of the World Peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX: TEXT OF TREATIES AND DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>RUSSIA AND JAPAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Political Convention of 1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Secret Treaty of 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Secret Telegram of the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo Regarding the Lansing-Ishii Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Chicherin's Note on the Far East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>RUSSIA AND CHINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Russo-Mongolian-Chinese Convention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Appeal of the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Chicherin's Reply to the Appeal of the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Soviet Note on Chinese-Mongolian Relations</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RUSSIA
IN THE FAR EAST

CHAPTER I

RUSSIA AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Russia is not represented at the Washington Conference. For the second time since the termination of the World War, an international conference of far-reaching importance takes place with Russia absent from the conference table. So it was in Paris in 1919; so it is in Washington in 1921. Yet there is a vast difference between the conditions attending these two instances when Russia is not present at a world conclave of nations.

At the Peace Conference in Paris no serious attempt was made to face squarely the problems presented by the state of affairs that had become established in Russia as a result of her Communist régime. The Conference dealt with problems resulting directly from
the World War, in which Russia was one of the principal participants and in which she suffered losses at least as great as any of her Allies. She had vital and direct interests at stake, which demanded determination and for which some provisions had to be made. Yet no such determination of Russia’s interests was made; no such provision for the eventual satisfaction of these interests was attempted. What the Conference really did was to make every effort to push the Russian question into the background and leave it there hanging in the air.

Almost throughout the duration of the Paris Conference the great powers which controlled it never seemed either decided or in accord even on the question of Russia’s representation at the conference table. They attempted the Prinkipo Conference of different Russian groups. Russia was then in the throes of a civil war, and the differences between the combatant groups were obviously of such a nature as could not be composed by means of the kind of conference proposed from Paris. After the Prinkipo attempt at solving the Russian problem, the Paris Conference permitted the question to drop altogether. Occasionally this question would come up in the deliberations of the great powers, but never either for action or for any
RUSSIA AND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

direct and binding declaration. For weeks the Conference conducted an exchange of notes with Admiral Kolchak, finally ending these protracted negotiations with a promise of assistance which, incidentally, was never carried out to the satisfaction of any Russian groups.

As against this attitude to the Russian question on the part of the Paris Conference, we have quite a different situation in Washington. The subject of “Siberia” is on the agenda of the Conference, and there is an authoritative indication as to the attitude toward the Russian question on the part of at least one great power in the form of the declaration of the Government of the United States, contained in the cablegram to the American Minister at Peking, dated September 19, 1921. This declaration was evoked by the fact that an agent of the Far Eastern Republic, the “buffer” state created by the Soviets in Eastern Siberia, sent a request to the American Legation at Peking that representatives of that Republic be admitted to the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament. In reply to this, the Government of the United States instructed its Minister at Peking to communicate to the agent of the Far Eastern Republic the following “informal observations”: 
"In the absence of a single, recognized Russian Government, the protection of legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole Conference. It is regrettable that the Conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian cooperation in deliberations, but it is not to be conceived that the Conference will take decisions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Conference will establish general principles of international action which will deserve and have the support of the people of Eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties."

The thesis set forth in these "unofficial observations" represents, naturally, only the position of the United States. But it is inconceivable that the position of the whole Conference should be fundamentally at variance with that of the United States, the initiator of the Conference itself, and it is safe to assume that "the moral trusteeship" over Russia's interests will be the attitude toward the Russian problem on the part of the Washington Conference.

If we compare the attitude toward the Russian question at the Paris and the Washington Conferences, we find three basic differences. The Paris Conference failed entirely to face the Russian question with the directness and squareness that the importance of this question merited and demanded; the Washington
Conference, judging by so authoritative a forecast of its position as the September declaration of the Government of the United States, seems prepared to face the Russian question directly and squarely. The Paris Conference was never certain of its position as to whether or not the Soviet régime in Russia was entitled to representation at the conference table, and demonstrated this lack of assurance by its attempt to call the Prinkipo Conference; the Washington Conference, again judging by the same forecast as above, is decided on its refusal to admit the right of the Soviet régime or any of its vassal formations on the former Russian territory to act as the spokesmen for the national and international interests of the Russian people, or to receive officially the representatives of any of the Russian groups in emigration. Finally, the Paris Conference made no attempt to apply international action to any of Russia's legitimate interests, jeopardized in any way by the situation that has become created in Russia because of the existence there of the Soviet régime; the Washington Conference seems prepared not only to examine these legitimate interests of Russia, but also to defend them by international action and hold them in trust for the reconstructed Russia of the future.

But the declaration of the Government of the United
States, defining Russia’s position at the Washington Conference, raises two significant questions.

The first of these questions is concerned with the nature and scope of Russia’s “legitimate interests” and “rights.” There is no doubt that the “unofficial observations” contained in the cablegram of September 19, 1921, were not intended to preclude an opportunity for various Russian groups to present their interpretation of these interests and rights to the Washington Conference, and there is equally no doubt that such interpretations have been presented. But it is the idea of “moral trusteeship” that is to be the main protection of Russia’s rights and interests, and it ought not to be difficult to distinguish between what may properly be considered as Russia’s legitimate interests, the result of healthy national policies, and the spurious and questionable advantages wrested by the Russian Imperial Government at different phases of its unhealthy imperialistic ventures. It seems most important, therefore, in view of the situation, to review the historic background of the events that have recently unfolded themselves in Russia.

Moreover, it is most important to bear in mind that there are at least three conceptions of “Russia” presented to us by Russia’s recent history. The first is
the conception of Imperial Russia, the Russia that was, the Russia that was swept out of existence by the Revolution of March, 1917. This Russia was often aggressive and imperialistic. The second is the conception of Soviet Russia, the Russia that, for the moment, is. This Russia is bound to be, by its very nature, insatiably aggressive and, though in a different sense from its Imperial predecessor, violently imperialistic. The third is the conception of Democratic Russia, the Russia that will be. This Russia emerged for a few short months between the March Revolution and the November overthrow of the Provisional Government; it is this Russia that is bound to emerge from the suffering country's present-day tragic trials.

The "legitimate" interests of Russia are those interests the impairment or violation of which will be prejudicial to this third Russia. Only for such a Russia is a "moral trusteeship" of the United States and of the Washington Conference conceivable.

The second question is concerned with the impossibility to invite representatives of the Soviet Government or of any of its vassal formations to the conference table in Washington. It is often argued that in its foreign policy the Soviet Government follows "nationalistic" lines and consequently defends and pro-
tects Russia's national interests. And this argument is used as a basis for the belief that the Soviet Government is competent to act as the spokesman for Russia in all vital international relations.

It is primarily to the answer to these two questions that this book is devoted. The attention is centered on the Far East, rather than on the Russian situation generally, because the Washington Conference deals principally with the questions affecting the Far East. The book is an attempt to present the salient features of Russia's concern with the Far East in the light of the history of her expansion and policies in Asia, as well as of the special problems presented by the recent activities in various parts of the Asiatic continent of the Russian Soviet Government and of its "General Staff of the World Revolution," known as the Third or Communist International, particularly with regard to their present-day politico-military strategy in the Far East. The concluding chapter is devoted to the relative position of Russia and the United States, in the light both of their relations as separate national entities and of the rôle that they are likely to play in a world political equilibrium, the foundation for which it is hoped will be laid at the Washington Conference.
CHAPTER II

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN ASIA

The story of Russia's expansion east of the Ural mountains is one of nearly five centuries of slow and gradual infiltration, followed by a quarter of a century of very intense and energetic activity. Out of this last quarter of a century grew a number of international conflicts which had far-reaching consequences for the history of Russia.

As early as the thirteenth century, settlers from the more energetic of the Slavic principalities, at that time scattered like oases through the vast stretches of European Russia, began to push their way across the Ural mountains and into the plains of Western Siberia. They conquered the aboriginal tribes which occupied these lands and built their trading outposts. The process continued through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, adventurous bands of Slavs pushing their way farther and farther into the fertile lands beyond the Urals.
In the second half of the sixteenth century, a band of adventurous Cossacks appeared on the territory of Siberia and, in the course of a series of expeditions, secured for Moscow a vast realm east of the Urals. The status of these bands and the precise reasons for their appearance in Siberia does not appear clear in historic records. One version makes them and particularly their leader, Yermak, refugees from justice; another version makes them semi-regular troops in the service of the Russian authorities along the Siberian border. In any event, Yermak and his band pushed their way through the Siberian wilderness, and brought the aboriginal tribes to allegiance to the Tsar of Moscow.

This event is usually taken as the historic beginning of definite and organized efforts on the part of the rapidly consolidating Russian state, centered around Moscow, to push its way eastward. From that time on, for a whole century, groups of adventurous traders went on and on into the heart of Asia. They were drawn by innumerable fantastic tales told by the aborigines of Siberia with whom they came in contact concerning the vast mineral wealth which lies farther and farther east. By the middle of the following century the power of Russia had already become extended as far as Lake Baikal. And all through the territory
lying around the lake, the Russian settlers heard stories about a wonderful river that was supposed to take its source in the heart of China and flow through marvelously rich country into the huge ocean that bounded the continent at its easternmost extremities.

Enticed by these stories, an adventurous emissary sent by the governor of the Yakutsk province, which covers the north-central portion of Siberia, set out in search of the great river and its untold riches. This emissary, Vasily Poyarkov by name, succeeded in 1646 in reaching the Amur river, the great stream that had figured so prominently in the tales of the Siberian aborigines. He sailed down the river and returned to Yakutsk with an enthusiastic story of what he had seen on his journey. Three years after Poyarkov's exploration, Erofey Khabarov, an enterprising peasant settler in the Yakutsk province, sailed down the Amur river with a band of followers and began the real conquest of the land, which was to some extent inhabited by the Chinese and acknowledged the rule of the Manchu dynasty. Others followed Khabarov, and in the course of the next forty years a number of Russian settlements sprang up along the Amur and in the surrounding country.

However, the Peking Government objected to this
colonization, with the result that in 1689 a treaty was signed at Nerchinsk between Russia and China, by virtue of which the whole Amur territory was officially recognized as a part of China.

For a hundred and fifty years after that, the efforts of Russian colonizers in Siberia were restricted to the lands lying west of the Amur territory. But in 1846 Nicholas I ordered an investigation of the Amur question, as well as of the Amur territory itself. Following this order, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, N. Muraviev, sent an expedition to the Amur river, led by Captain Nevelsky, a young and energetic officer, who started out on his mission in 1849.

At that time Russia did not feel herself very strongly situated in her eastern possessions, while her general international situation was far from satisfactory: the clouds of the Crimean War, which was to result in an utter defeat of Russia, were already on the horizon. In view of this, the order for the investigation of the Amur territory was accompanied by strict instructions to avoid any conflict with China. In spite of these instructions, however, Captain Nevelsky in 1850 built a fort near the mouth of the Amur river on the site of the present city of Nikolayevsk, and, raising the
Russian flag over the city, claimed the whole territory as a part of the Russian Empire.

Although the report of this exploit was received very unfavorably in St. Petersburg and the fort was ordered destroyed, the Russian Imperial Government soon after this resumed its efforts to gain possession of the Amur territory. Negotiations looking toward the cession of the Amur lands to Russia were conducted during the following five years by the Russian ambassador in Peking. The Chinese Government at first refused the demands of the Russian ambassador, but finally gave in, and in 1858, by virtue of the Aigun treaty, the Amur territory became definitely and officially a part of the Russian Empire.

Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, or five hundred years after Russia began her movement toward the East, she finally ended her eastward march and came to rest on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. By the time of the signing of the Aigun treaty, Russian settlers were already scattered over the Amur territory and the various points of the coast. The first appearance of Russian settlers on the island of Sakhalin was in 1857, and on the peninsula of Kamchatka much earlier than that.

But the occupation of this whole territory did not
in any way imply an active policy of development on the part of the Russian Government. On the contrary, for a number of decades, following the formal cession of the Amur territory to Russia, scarcely anything was done for an active utilization of the vast resources which had thus been acquired by Russia. One of the great difficulties was the question of transportation, which greatly hindered—in fact, rendered almost impossible—any colonization scheme on a fairly large scale.

Generally speaking, the colonization of Asiatic Russia began soon after Yermak's formal conquest of the country. For three hundred years after that, i.e., until the second half of the nineteenth century, there were recurrent periods of slow infiltration of settler groups into the vast reaches of Siberia. These settlers were principally of four different classes: traders, military contingents, exiles, and free immigrants.

The first colonizers of Siberia were mainly traders, attracted by the fur and mineral wealth of the new lands. Together with them came Cossack groups, who settled there and served for protection. In the eighteenth century, large groups of Cossacks from the Don district moved to the Transbaikal region and settled there. They received special privileges from the Gov-
ernment. Numerically, however, neither of these two classes of settlers was important for the colonization of Siberia.

The exiles were a much more important element in the work of colonizing Asiatic Russia. The system of Siberian exile was begun as early as the seventeenth century, the first recorded legislation providing for exile to Siberia being in 1648. At the beginning, the system of exile was used merely as a punitive measure and was applied mostly to criminal offenders. Gradually, however, economic importance began to be attached to it. The development of Siberia’s natural wealth, particularly of its mineral resources, and the beginning of manufacturing in some of the larger centers, notably in Irkutsk, opened up the possibilities of utilizing the exiles as a source of labor supply. Political offenders and religious non-conformists were early added to the exile elements, and together the three exile groups constituted a rather important factor, from the viewpoint of both colonization and economic development.

In 1753 capital punishment was abolished in Russia, and penal servitude in Siberia was substituted for it. This, naturally, resulted in a certain amount of increase in the number of exiles, though it scarcely improved the character of the exile elements.
The fourth and by far the most important class of settlers was the free immigrant element. During the early centuries of the colonization of Siberia this element was not very large. The Russian Government itself did not encourage free migration to Siberia, and until 1870 even made no efforts to separate the peaceful settlers from the exiles.

But, beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, the importance of the free immigrant element increased very considerably. The liberation of the serfs in 1861 provided a decided stimulus to free migration beyond the Urals. Soon after the actual liberation itself the peasants realized that the agrarian forms established under the new system would scarcely provide them in any part of Russia with sufficient amounts of land. New opportunities began to be sought elsewhere by the more energetic of the liberated peasants.

Lack of transportation facilities, however, impeded greatly the work of colonization. But in the eighties of the past century, when the Russian Government began to take up a project of the construction of a trans-Siberian railroad, interest in free migration into Siberia increased very perceptibly. This interest continued to grow as the construction of the railroad was begun and
was pushed farther and farther eastward. The completion of the railroad line and the Russo-Japanese War served to induce an increasingly rapid tempo into the process of the colonization of Siberia.

This constantly increasing tempo was in a rather interesting contrast with the slow movement of the first centuries of Russian occupation of Siberia. It has been calculated that from the time of the first migrations, following Yermak’s conquest of Siberia and up to the second half of the nineteenth century, less than three million settlers had crossed the Urals. The number that crossed the great Eurasian divide during the last quarter of a century was several times that total. In the course of the half-decade from 1906 to 1910, nearly three million settlers left European Russia and went into the different parts of Siberia.

There was another factor which served to stimulate the migration into Siberia during the years following the Russo-Japanese War, and that was the attitude on the part of the Russian Government, coupled with the direct result of a number of its agrarian measures. In 1906, over 200,000 square miles of governmental or so-called “Cabinet” lands in Siberia were thrown open to general colonization. This in itself caused a rush of colonists, which was still further stimulated
by the fact that, the following year, the agrarian program sponsored by Prime Minister Stolypin went into effect. This program consisted in abolishing some of the features of the traditional system of communal land tenure. Its object was to create a class of small peasant proprietors by permitting the cutting up of communally held lands and granting individual peasants the right of selling their lands without the consent of the communal organizations. All this afforded the more energetic peasant elements more opportunity for migration, and rendered Siberia with its extensive and virgin land tracts more accessible to them.

The migration to Siberia during the year 1906 itself comprised only 141,294 immigrants. But the very next year the number increased to 427,339, while in 1908 the high-water mark of the Siberian migration was reached: in the course of that year 664,777 immigrants entered Asiatic Russia. Then the volume of migration began to decrease, though the number for 1909 was still 619,320.

The colonists in Siberia occupy almost exclusively the "black-soil" belt, which runs through the southern part of the country and through which the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the great Siberian roadway are laid. They spread away from this belt occasionally,
hewing their way into the vast Siberian forests and clearing for themselves tremendously valuable virgin lands.

The colonization of Eastern Siberia and particularly of the Far East proper is of more recent origin than that of the western portion of the country, though, curiously enough, in some territories here the percentage of Russian immigrant population by comparison with the non-Russian elements is very high. In the Transbaikal territory, it was calculated in 1900 that the percentage of Russian population was 64; it is much higher now. This territory was used for a long time as a place of exile for political offenders, and some of the most important political prisons and places of exile were located here.

In the Amur territory the first colonizers were Cossacks who were ordered to settle there after 1857-8, when the territory was formally ceded by China to Russia. Peasant colonization of the territory began in 1869. These settlers came to entirely unoccupied lands, for the native population was extremely sparse, while the Chinese were aggregated at a small number of centers, principally at the confluences of rivers. By 1911 the total population of the Amur territory was estimated at 286,000, of whom only about 44,000 were non-Russian.
The colonization of the Maritime or Primorsk Province proceeded under conditions practically analogous with those which obtained in the Amur territory. The percentage of Russian population there is somewhat lower, being a little over 60, though the total population is more than twice the population of the Amur territory. Neither Sakhalin nor Kamchatka have been found suitable for extensive colonization, except in certain points along the coast.

By the time of the Revolution, Russia's possessions in Asia occupied the whole of the northern belt and a large part of the temperate zone of Asia, stretching clear across the continent, from the Ural mountains to the Pacific Ocean. In some of its mid-Asiatic possessions, notably Turkestan, the Russian Empire pushed into the very heart of central Asia. One third of the total surface of the continent constituted Russian territory. The population of this territory in that year was over twenty millions. The twelve provinces which constitute Siberia had at that time a population of about fifteen millions. Fully seventy-five per cent. of this number were white, almost exclusively settlers from European Russia—the living forces of Russia's expansion in Asia.
CHAPTER III

RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

The awakening of Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century led her to an aggressive policy on the continent of Asia and brought her into a series of violent conflicts, first with China and eventually with Russia. The first important appearance of Japan was the result of a commercial treaty which she signed in 1876 with the Government of Korea. Although at that time practically a vassal of China, Korea made her own international arrangements, of which the treaty of 1876 was probably the most important in her history, for it opened the door to foreigners, made Korea the arena of an international struggle, and led to her almost complete absorption by Japan.

Korea's agreement with Japan was followed by similar treaties with a number of European powers, the last one being with Russia in 1884. The influx of foreigners resulting from these arrangements caused very considerable resentment on the part of the Korean
people and led to a rebellion, which occurred soon after the signing of the Russian treaty. The principal enmity of the Korean people was directed against the Japanese, who were both most active among the foreign groups and were generally considered the initiators and the principal cause of the whole situation. Japan sent troops to Korea, but, upon China's protest, withdrew them, for the rebellion had already been put down. But she conditioned the withdrawal of her troops upon a convention signed at the same time, by virtue of which both China and Japan reserved the right to send troops to Korea to establish order, but undertook to notify each other whenever such dispatching of troops would be in contemplation.

Ten years later, in 1894, another rebellion occurred in Korea, and when the Korean Emperor appealed to Peking for help and the Chinese Government sent troops to Korea, Japan immediately dispatched her own troops there. Under the pretext of taking measures to quell the uprising, the Japanese troops occupied the city of Seoul, the Korean capital. At the same time the Japanese ambassador demanded from the Korean Government the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops and the placing in the hands of the Japanese expeditionary force of the entire task of maintaining order
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

in Korea. China served a counter-demand of the same nature upon the Japanese Government, and this counter-demand, served in the terms of an ultimatum, led to a war between China and Japan.

The war was of a very short duration, and Japan was entirely successful in its conduct. On April 17, 1895, a treaty of peace was signed at the Japanese city of Simonoseki. By virtue of this treaty, China recognized the independence of Korea and ceded to Japan the island of Formosa, a number of other smaller islands, and, what was most important of all, Southern Manchuria and the naval base of Port Arthur; moreover, a large contribution was provided for by this treaty.

The treaty of Simonoseki brought to the Russian Imperial Government a realization of the importance which the Far Eastern situation was beginning to assume. The Chinese colossus was apparently badly weakened. At the same time, a new power appeared on the continent of Asia in the form of the awakened Japan, which was rapidly forcing its influence and was becoming a force to be reckoned with through its acquisition of such an important continental base as rich and fertile Manchuria. Russia immediately set to work to frustrate the plans of the Japanese.
An ultimatum was sent to Tokyo, demanding from Japan the immediate return to China of Manchuria and the city of Port Arthur. France and Germany joined in the Russian protest, which was supported very forcefully by the dispatching to the Chinese waters of a strong Russian-French-German fleet. Japan agreed to relinquish her claims to Manchuria, but insisted on retaining Port Arthur. To this the coalition powers would not consent, and Japan was forced in the end to give up Port Arthur.

This first active interference on the part of Russia in the affairs of the Far East was decidedly a conflict between her and Japan, which resulted in her favor but left Japan very resentful. This initial resentment on the part of Japan increased greatly in intensity, when three years later Russia herself did precisely what Japan tried to do and was prevented from doing by the active interference on the part of Russia and her Allies.

Its success in the reversing of the Simonoseki agreement was no doubt a powerful stimulus in changing the attitude of the Russian Government toward the affairs of the Far East. An excellent illustration of this may be found in its suddenly changed estimate of the significance of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the construction of which by that time had already practically
reached the Amur River. Until its appearance as an active political factor in the Far Eastern situation, the Russian Imperial Government looked upon the Trans-Siberian Railroad solely as an artery of trade and an instrument of colonization. After the first encounter with Japan the Siberian railroad began to loom in its eyes as a strategic possibility.

The terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railroad is the city of Vladivostok. The question of how that city was to be connected by railroad with the already constructed portions of the Trans-Siberian came up just about that time. A line could be run along the left-hand bank of the Amur, or else it could traverse Manchuria at a rather considerable distance from the right-hand bank of the Amur. The second course meant fewer technical difficulties and a very important shortening of the track, but it also involved political considerations of a prime importance, since fourteen hundred versts of the track had to be laid over Chinese territory.

The possibility of a line through Manchuria had been discussed before, and its economic importance to Russia was fully realized since the Amur line, eventually constructed after the Russo-Japanese War, obviously presented great difficulties both of construction and maintenance. Negotiations relative to the con-
struction of this road had been carried on between the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Chinese Government, and a contract was finally signed in 1896. The result of this contract was the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the cession to Russia of important privileges in a strip of Chinese territory, extending along both sides of the railroad.

But the railroad agreement was followed two years later by a Russian-Chinese convention, which was of a tremendously far-reaching nature and which made it possible for the imperialistic groups in St. Petersburg to obscure the paramount economic importance of the Chinese Eastern Railroad by political considerations of a most dangerous nature. By virtue of this convention, signed in Peking on March 15, 1898, Russia leased from China for the period of twenty-five years the cities of Port Arthur and Talienwan, the two important ports in the southern part of Manchuria. Russia received also the right to connect these ports by means of a railroad line with the main line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The lease was made renewable indefinitely by agreement of the two sides.

By the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese agreement, Russia entered definitely upon a policy of imperialistic aggression in the Far East. Her rôle and that of Japan
became reversed. She was now attempting to do, by pushing down from the north, what Japan had attempted to do by pushing up from the south, viz., to establish dominating control in Manchuria. An intense rivalry sprang up between Russia and Japan which lasted for a number of years and finally brought them to an armed encounter. The scene of the rivalry was at first transferred from Manchuria to Korea, only to be shifted back again on the very eve of the Russo-Japanese War.

Deprived of the advantages in Manchuria she had wrested from China by the Simonoseki treaty, Japan turned her attention definitely in the direction of Korea and began to establish her influence there. But she was again brought face to face with Russia, which was quick to follow her to Korea. On May 14, 1896, a convention was signed between Russia and Japan, by virtue of which both Russia and Japan undertook to assist Korea in establishing internal order and otherwise reorganizing her affairs after her break with China. This assistance was to be in the form of the presence of Russian and Japanese advisers in Seoul.

In March, 1898, the Korean Government informed Russia that order had been established in the country and that the presence of foreign advisers was no longer necessary. The Russian Government replied to this
that it was quite willing to cease all active participation in the affairs of Korea, provided Korea had really established order and was in a position to defend her independence. Otherwise Russia would consider it necessary to take measures to insure this. This reply was obviously a mere formality on the part of the Russian Government, for neither Russia nor Japan were prepared to leave Korea. On the contrary, they were vying with each other in the work of economic penetration. Japan was particularly interested in the construction of railroads, while Russia sought timber concessions, which were a very poor disguise for strategic advantages. This ostensibly economic but really military rivalry between Russia and Japan in Korea continued for several years and was one of the immediate causes of the war between the two countries.

In the meantime, Russia was working in Manchuria with a truly feverish energy. Immediately upon her acquisition of the ports in southern Manchuria she began to construct a powerful naval fortress at Port Arthur and a commercial port at Talienwan, which she renamed Dalny. At the same time she was pushing the construction of the railroad line which was to connect these ports with the Trans-Siberian line.

In 1900 a formidable revolt took place in China,
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

known as the Boxer uprising. This uprising was directed against all foreigners, who were acquiring greater and greater privileges in China and obtaining more and more a firm footing on Chinese territory. The revolt was put down by the intervention of the great world powers, which sent an international expeditionary force into China. But before the revolt was put down, much damage was done to foreign life and property.

As far as Russia was concerned, the Boxer uprising affected particularly her property in Manchuria. By the time of the uprising, nearly 1300 versts of the Chinese Eastern Railroad had been laid, and of them over 900 versts were destroyed by the insurgents. Tremendous amounts of property and supplies were also destroyed. As a result of this, Russian troops occupied nearly the whole of Manchuria.

When the Boxer uprising had been put down and the terms of the settlement arranged, the Chinese Government took up with the Russian Government the question of the evacuation of Manchuria, which was still occupied by the Russian troops. On March 26, 1902, a Russo-Chinese convention was signed in Peking, which provided for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Manchuria, but this provision was made in very indefi-
nite terms. At the same time, the convention placed Russia in an especially favorable situation with regard to her economic penetration there. So far as Manchuria was concerned, Russia had practically obtained the application to that part of China of the principle of the “closed door,” with herself as the holder of the key.

Quite carried away by the success which had attended so far its imperialistic ventures in the Far East, the Russian Imperial Government became more and more ambitious in its Far Eastern policies. There were groups that even urged an annexation of the whole of Manchuria in lieu of the Boxer indemnities, to which Russia was entitled by the terms of the settlement following the Boxer uprising. While this part of the Russian diplomatic history is still unwritten, there is reason to believe that Germany was to a large extent responsible for the ambitious Far Eastern policy of the Government of Nicholas II. Russia's international position during that period was very strong, while internally she was going through a very rapid industrial development, which caused considerable apprehensions to Germany. Although the relations between Russia and Germany were very friendly, the Germans were growing more and more disturbed about Russia's economic progress, which, the Germans knew but too well,
would bring with it an insistent demand for a non-freezing port and was bound to be a serious economic blow to Germany. To inspire Russia with ambitions in the Far East, to fill her with fears of a “Yellow Peril,” to whisper into the ear of her Government the dreams of a non-freezing port in Manchuria, to inveigle her in this manner in a hot-headed adventure in the Far East and draw her attention away from development in Europe—all this, there is reason to believe, was planned and executed by the German Imperial Government.

In 1901 a Far Eastern Convention was signed between Great Britain and Germany. This convention guaranteed the integrity of China and freedom of trade there. But it did not mention Korea, and deliberately excluded Manchuria. This exclusion of Manchuria from guarantees of freedom of trade was made at the insistence of Germany with a view to Russian pretensions there.* It was opposed by Great Britain, and not only rendered the whole convention practically inoperative but led to most important consequences in the form

* Prince Bülow, the German Imperial Chancellor, declared in the Reichstag with reference to the German-British convention that the German Imperial Government recognized definitely Russia’s special rights in Manchuria. This declaration of the German Imperial Chancellor caused much jubilation at the time in the Russian governmental circles, which then little dreamt of the consequences that this apparently “friendly” attitude of the German Government was destined to have for Russia.
of an Anglo-Japanese agreement, signed the following year.

The Anglo-Japanese agreement, signed in 1902, guaranteed the independence of China and Korea. But it recognized special interests of Great Britain in China and of Japan in both China and Korea, as well as the right of each to protect its interests in these countries, if threatened by aggression of another country or by internal disorders. The agreement also provided that in case one of the contracting powers should be drawn into a war, the other must preserve neutrality and make every effort to prevent other powers from joining against its ally. Should, however, another power join against the ally, the neutral contracting power would be obliged immediately to render assistance to its ally.

This agreement was Russia's first reverse in the Far East. She countered it, however, by a Russo-French convention, signed the same year, in which the two contracting parties declared that they reserved a right to defend their interests in the Far East. The possibility of an armed conflict with other powers was mentioned in the convention, which was generally taken as a notice on the part of France that the provisions of her offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, then already in existence, would apply in case of an armed
encounter in the Far East. The Russian Government thought it had thus checkmated its opponent, but the very next year Russia's second reverse in the Far East took place.

This second reverse was in the form of the American-Chinese convention, signed in 1903, which opened up for foreign trade the cities of Mukden and Andun and provided that the rules of foreign trade and of the residence of foreigners, i.e., Americans, would be settled by agreement between China and the United States. These provisions were counter to the provisions of the Russo-Chinese convention of the previous year, and the Russian Government protested against it, hoping that it would not be ratified in its original form. Pending the ratification of the convention, Russia interrupted the evacuation of Manchuria, which had already begun, and reoccupied the city of Mukden. However, the convention was ratified as originally drafted, and Russian claims to the establishment in Manchuria of her sphere of special interests was definitely shaken. This reverse was particularly telling for Russia, because Japan was entirely in harmony with the United States in the demand for the maintenance of the principle of "open door" in Manchuria.

All through the year 1903 negotiations were carried
on between Russia and Japan, looking toward a settlement of the Korean question and a composition of the difficulties between the two countries. Finally a tentative agreement was reached, but Japan demanded that the settlement include also the Manchurian question. To this Russia would not consent, claiming that the two questions should not be confused, but should be settled separately. Then Japan suddenly broke off the negotiations and declared a war on Russia.

The Russo-Japanese War began at the end of 1903 and lasted for nearly a year and a half, when it was terminated by an intervention of Theodore Roosevelt, then President of the United States. Japan was entirely victorious throughout the war. The reasons for this were numerous and varied. The Russian advance in Manchuria and Korea was not carried on with any degree of either military or economic skill. Russia was utterly unprepared for the war, in spite of the fact that, for months before it came, its clouds were unmistakable on the political horizon. There were not enough troops in the Far East or close enough to the Far Eastern theatre of war. Supplies were utterly insufficient. Transportation was wretched, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad still in an unfinished state. The naval equipment was thoroughly inadequate. The whole high
administrative personnel, from the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeyev, down, seems to have been scarcely fitted for the difficult tasks at hand. Moreover, the war was never for a moment popular in Russia herself. The public opinion of the country was never in sympathy with the Far Eastern ambitions of the Government, which were so obviously wasteful and unnecessary, the product of foreign intrigue and overbearing hot-headedness.

Beginning with the daring sinking of three Russian warships in the harbor of Port Arthur, which was the first act of war, and on through the victories of Mukden and Tsusima, as well as numerous other major and minor triumphs of the Japanese army and navy, Japan dealt Russia one swift blow after another. But a year and a half of this impetuous fighting exhausted Japan. It is said—and probably, with justice—that at the time when the war was brought to a close by the American offer of good offices, Japan was in no position to conduct either offensive operations or a prolonged war, while Russia, awakening from the stunning influence of her first defeats, had reorganized herself for very effective defensive operations. On the other hand, it is also true that the war had already thrown Russia into the throes of the first revolution, which burst out in all its
fury immediately after the conclusion of the war and could scarcely have been staved off by the Government.

In any event, the Russo-Japanese War ended the first period of Russia's intense, though thoughtless, imperialism in the Far East. Japan's triumph and Russia's defeat once more reversed their positions in Far Eastern affairs, at least so far as Manchuria and Korea were concerned. Japan returned to the position she occupied after the Simonoseki treaty, now practically unchallenged in her attempts at establishing her supremacy on the shores of the Yellow Sea. Russia lost all prestige in the south. But the forces of eastward penetration which she had created during that decade of frenzied imperialism in Manchuria could not be crushed even by so serious a reverse as the defeat she suffered in the Russo-Japanese War. While Japan was busy with the securing of the fruits of her stupendous victory, Russia turned her attention in another direction.
CHAPTER IV

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FAR EAST

The Russo-Japanese War brought to a close a decade of intense and persistent Russian imperialism in the Far East. It took Japan eight years of preparations and two years of the bloodiest war in her history to avenge herself and to get back what she had lost because of Russia’s interference with the operation of the Simonoseki treaty. But, curiously enough, the lesson which should have been drawn by both the Russian and the Japanese empires from the fate of Russia’s imperialistic venture in Manchuria passed entirely unlearnt by either. Just as Russia, immediately after frustrating Japan in 1895, set to work to do precisely what she prevented Japan from doing, so Japan, after defeating Russia on the fields of Manchuria, immediately changed some of the fundamental ideas that had actuated her policies before and began to demand and assure to herself the kind of rights and privileges against which she had protested so strenuously when
they were held by Russia. In each case there was merely a change of technique and of the method of approach.

In 1895 Japan wrested from China by force of arms the recognition of Manchuria as lying within the sphere of her special interests. Essentially, that meant the closing of Manchuria to all outsiders except Japan. During the following three years Russia, by dint of national and international pressure, forced Japan to relinquish this position in Manchuria, and succeeded in replacing Japan by herself. Then Japan immediately began to demand the principle of "open door" in Manchuria. To this Russia was strenuously opposed. The Russo-Japanese War again shifted the position of the principals in this conflict, bringing Japan on top once more.

But the Russo-Japanese War left Japan fully mindful of the price she had had to pay for the political and military achievements in the course of the decade of her acute conflict with Russia. Left panting and nearly exhausted by the war itself, Japan was nevertheless watching carefully the internal political developments in Russia. It was most important for her to determine to what extent the internal perturbations in Russia, brought about by the revolution of 1905, would divert
the attention of the Russian Imperial Government from
the problems of the Far East. When, however, the
revolution was put down by an armed hand and the
Imperial Government seemed entrenched as strong as
ever, Japan came to a realization that such an enemy's
defeat may easily turn to bitter resentment and event-
tually to revenge. And it was certainly far from
Japan's thoughts to endanger the advantages she had
won at such a price by another armed conflict with
Russia, the outcome of which it would have been most
difficult to predict on the basis of the previous en-
counter. The enemy had to be won over in another way.

This policy pursued by Japan dictated a number of
treaties and agreements which she concluded with
Russia in the course of the decade following the Russo-
Japanese War. And it is interesting to see how quickly
Japan changed from an attempt to turn to advantage
the temporary weakness of her opponent to a realization
that a defeated enemy may sometimes be turned into
a valuable partner.

The treaty of peace which formally concluded the
Russo-Japanese War was signed at Portsmouth, N. H.,
in September, 1905. In this treaty the first phase of
Japan's policy found ample expression.

By the terms of the Portsmouth treaty, Russia re-
linquished formally all claims to any privileges or special interests in Korea and Southern Manchuria. She recognized Korea as lying within the sphere of Japan's special interests, and thereby opened the way to Japan's subsequent complete domination of the Korean Peninsula. She ceded to Japan all the rights she enjoyed in Port Arthur and Talienwan by virtue of the Russo-Chinese agreement of 1898, as well as the railroad line, running from these ports to Changchun. She withdrew her troops from all parts of Manchuria, still unevacuated, and formally turned over this territory to Japan, which undertook to restore it to China. She still retained the Chinese Eastern Railroad, but obligated herself to use the line merely for economic, but never for military, purposes. So far as Russia's dominant position in Manchuria and Korea was concerned, these provisions of the Portsmouth treaty ended once for all her pretensions there.

But Japan was not satisfied with merely forcing Russia to liquidate in this manner her whole imperialistic venture in the Far East. She felt that she could also compel the defeated colossus to defray part of the expenses she had incurred during the war and the years that preceded it. The Russian delegation, headed by Count Sergius Witte, was entirely opposed to any pro-
vision for contributions to be paid by Russia to Japan. The whole conduct of negotiations at Portsmouth was permeated by this adamant position of the Russian delegation on the question of contributions. And the compromise arrived at in this regard resolved itself into territorial cession and economic advantages given to Japan by Russia as indemnity due to the victor in the war.

The territorial cession consisted of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, below the line of 50° N. lat. In this manner Russia relinquished to Japan a part of the territory in the Far East which she had been colonizing for nearly fifty years and which she held in formal possession for well over a quarter of a century. The colonization of this island began almost simultaneously by the Russians and the Japanese in the fifties of the past century on the principle of the acquisition of possession of unoccupied lands. This chaotic distribution of mixed population on the island led to numerous clashes and difficulties, and in 1875 a treaty was concluded between Russia and Japan, by virtue of which Japan ceded to Russia all her rights in the Sakhalin in exchange for the Kuril Islands. By virtue of the Portsmouth treaty Japan received back the southern half of the island, which, during the years subsequent
to the treaty of 1875, was discovered to be a veritable treasure-house of natural wealth.*

The economic advantages obtained by Japan as a result of the Portsmouth treaty consisted in a recognition by Russia of the right of Japanese subjects to engage in the fishing trade along the coast of Siberia. The provisions of the treaty with this regard were indefinite, consisting merely of a statement of the general principle involved, and looking toward a more detailed arrangement to be arrived at later on. This arrangement was made two years later in the form of the Russo-Japanese Fisheries Convention, signed on July 28, 1907.

The fisheries rights given the Japanese by the Portsmouth treaty were sweeping and all-inclusive in their nature. They were, however, defined and somewhat curtailed by the Fisheries convention of 1907. This convention and the General Political Convention, signed about the same time, indicate clearly Japan's change of policy in her relations with Russia that took place in the course of less than two years.

By virtue of the Fisheries convention, the Japanese received the right to engage in various fishing pursuits,

* As we shall see below, fifteen years after the Portsmouth Treaty Japan found a pretext for occupying the northern half of the island and is now in full military control of the whole of Sakhalin. Cf. Chapter V.
both in the catching of fish and of other aquatic products, and in manufacturing processes concerned with all such products. But the area open to them was no longer the whole of the Russian coast, as in the Portsmouth treaty, but somewhat restricted areas. A Protocol, attached to the Fisheries convention, defined these areas. The Japanese were specifically prohibited from fishing in the mouths of rivers and in a half-hundred or more enumerated bays and inlets. These exceptions were found to be necessary by Russia for both economic and strategic reasons. Moreover, the whole coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, which had not as yet been sufficiently explored, was subjected to a generalized restriction which provided that the Japanese could not fish in inlets the indentation of which exceeded by three times their width at the mouth.

Outside of the restricted areas, however, the Japanese received full right to engage in fishing on an equal footing with the Russian subjects. The manner of granting concessions to the exploitation of any given fishing area, provided in the Fisheries convention, was that of an annual public auction, held by Russian Government officials at Vladivostok, with the Japanese subjects enjoying at these auctions the same rights as the Russian subjects.
In order to assure the Japanese this position of equality with the Russians in the exploitation of the fisheries in the conventional waters, the convention specifically provided that the Japanese should not be subjected to any restrictions or taxes, from which the Russians in the same locality may be exempt. On the other hand, of course, they were subjected to all the Russian laws with regard to the manner of exploitation, the employment of foreign labor, etc. The Russian Government agreed to impose no taxes on fish and aquatic products caught or prepared in the Maritime and the Amur Provinces, when intended for exportation to Japan, while the Japanese Government agreed to admit such products into Japan free of duty. The restrictions regarding non-conventional waters were to apply only to the process of fishing proper, but not to the processes of preparation and manufacture of fish and other aquatic products, with respect to which the Japanese were granted certain rights.

The Fisheries convention was concluded for twelve years, and provisions were made for its renewal or modification at the expiration of that period.

Almost simultaneously with the Fisheries convention a General Political Convention between Russia and Japan was signed in St. Petersburg on July 30, 1907.
This convention signified the complete establishment of amicable relations between Russia and Japan and, by its Article 2, pledged both Russia and Japan to the principle of "open door" in China. This convention, however, was merely a screen to conceal the secret arrangements made at the same time between Russia and Japan, which were of an entirely different nature.

The Convention of 1907 was very short, consisting of only two articles. In Article 1 each of the contracting parties obligated itself to "respect the territorial integrity of the other." A similar obligation was assumed by each of the parties to respect the rights accruing to each of them from all agreements between them and China, operative on the date of the signing of the convention, as well as from the Portsmouth treaty and subsequent special agreements between Russia and Japan. So far, the convention merely guaranteed the continuation of the general politico-economic conditions that had become established in the Far East, in so far as they concerned the interests of Russia and Japan.

Article 2 referred to China. The two contracting parties recognized the independence of China and the integrity of the territory of the Chinese Empire. But besides this they also recognized "the principle of the
general equality of rights with regard to trade and industry in that Empire for all nations.” And having thus solemnly proclaimed the principle of the “open door” in China, the two contracting parties undertook to “preserve and defend the status quo and the above-mentioned principle by all peaceful means at their disposal.” *

Together with this Convention, Russia concluded a secret treaty with Japan, signed on the same day. The text of this secret treaty is not available at the present, though its existence is established definitely by references to it found in the text of other secret treaties, as published by the Bolsheviki soon after their accession to power in Russia. It is therefore possible only to surmise the nature of the arrangements which were being concluded between the erstwhile enemies. References to this treaty, found in other secret documents published by the Bolsheviki, indicate very clearly that at least one provision of the secret treaty dealt with the question of the division of Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Manchuria, which was obviously in contradiction to the establishment of the principle of the “open door” in China in Article 2 of the General Political Convention, since by the provisions of the

* For full text of this Convention see Appendix I.
Portsmouth treaty Manchuria was to be completely restored to China, and consequently, in 1907, constituted indisputably a part of the Chinese Empire.

References in other secret documents published by the Bolsheviks indicate also the existence of two more secret treaties between Russia and Japan, concluded before the World War, on July 4, 1910, and July 8, 1912. Again, the text of these treaties is not available, and their nature may be only surmised.

One feature of all these agreements, however, appears certain. While the General Political Convention of 1907 provided specifically that the contracting parties undertook to defend their interests in the Far East by "all peaceful means at their disposal," the secret treaties, concluded simultaneously with the Convention and on later occasions, dealt with distinctly military matters and contained provisions for martial preparations. The last secret agreement between Russia and Japan was concluded in 1916. The text of this treaty was made available by its publication in the official organ of the Soviet Government soon after the Bolsheviks came to power.*

The secret treaty of 1916 sheds a most interesting

*Gazette of the Provisional Workmen-Peasants Government, December 8 (21), 1917.
light upon the relations which at that time existed between the Russian Imperial Government and the Government of Japan, as well as on the nature of the preceding secret agreements. The treaty began as follows:

"The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, for the purpose of further strengthening their close friendship established between them by the secret agreements of July 17 (30), 1907, June 21 (July 4), 1910, and June 25 (July 8), 1912, have agreed to supplement the above-mentioned secret agreements with the following articles."

The treaty itself dealt with the situation in China and the manner in which it was likely to affect the interests of Russia and Japan. Article 1 stated the agreement of the contracting parties on the need, so far as the "vital interests" of each of them was concerned, of preserving China "from the political domination of any third power, holding inimical aims against Russia or Japan." The treaty foresaw an eventuality in which an attempt at such a domination may be made, in which case one or the other of the contracting parties would consider itself called upon to take measures in order to prevent "the establishment (in China) of such a state of affairs." And if such measures should lead to a declaration of war upon one of the contracting powers by a third
power, the other contracting party undertook, by the terms of the treaty, to come to the assistance of its ally.

The secret treaty of 1916 was thus a defensive alliance between Russia and Japan, which pledged each of them to a war, in case the special interests that each of them sought to acquire in China should at any time be threatened. The two contracting Governments visualized the possibility of such a conflict as rather imminent at the time, for the agreement was concluded for the period of five years, to expire on July 14, 1921, but continue automatically after that, unless denounced by either of the parties.

This agreement could have been directed against one of two groups of powers. The first was Germany and her allies, at that time still holding their own on the battlefields of the world war. But it is rather inconceivable that Russia and Japan should have felt their interests in China threatened by Germany. In the first place, Germany was never particularly interested in the Far East, but preferred, as we have already seen, to push Russia into dangerous ventures and experiments there. And in the second place, Germany could have been a menace only if victorious in the war, in which case both Russia and Japan would have been at her mercy as defeated enemies. There is no doubt that the
The secret Russo-Japanese agreement of 1916 was directed against the United States, as the power vitally interested in the affairs of the Far East, particularly basing her whole policy there on the strict application of the principle of the "open door" in China. And it is interesting that in publishing the text of this agreement the Bolsheviks gave it the following significant title:

"SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN, with Reference to a Possibility of Their Armed Conflict together against America and Great Britain in the Far East before the Summer of 1921."*

The secret treaty of 1916 was the last agreement concluded between Russia and Japan before the Russian Revolution. The imperialist elements in Russia and in Japan were close friends, akin in the spirit that actuated them.

It is very interesting also to watch the interplay of Imperial Russia’s network of diplomatic intrigue with Japan, as embodied in the open and secret agreements between them, against the background of the activities

* For full text of this treaty see Appendix I. While the explanation of the purpose of this secret treaty given in the text is the current explanation, I have been informed by persons who have discussed the question with the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, that the Russian Government did have Germany in mind and that its chief purpose in signing the treaty was to bind Japan to the Entente by another agreement. Sazonov is reported as saying that Russia was at that time too busy with the problems of the war to give serious thought to possible aggression in China. Even if this explanation is true, nevertheless, by signing the secret treaty with Japan, Russia was giving the latter a powerful instrument for possible use in the near future, as may be clearly seen from the secret telegram on the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the text of which may also be found in Appendix I.
which each of them pursued in various parts of China. Whether by tacit understanding or as a result of one of the secret agreements, the text of which is still unknown to us, Russia and Japan seem to have had no difficulty in delimiting the spheres of their activities. Japan maintained her paramount domination in Korea, in portions of Manchuria, and was rapidly and insistently building up her influence in other parts of China. Russia concentrated all her attention on Outer Mongolia, where the Japanese let her have an entirely free hand.

The basic agreement, under which Russia was conducting her diplomatic relations with China all through this period, was a thirty-year treaty, concluded in 1881, fundamentally built on a previous convention, viz., that of 1860. By virtue of these two agreements, the boundary line between Russia and China was well defined, and a provision was made for the establishment of a fifty-verst zone along the whole frontier, within which there were to be collected no customs duties. This provision stimulated greatly the penetration of Russia into some portions of the Chinese territory, notably in Mongolia.

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, the interest which Mongolia held for the Russian Imperial Government
was primarily commercial and economic generally. But after the war, when Russia found herself out of Korea and Manchuria, Mongolia began to loom large in the eyes of the Russian Government as a political possibility. Russian interest in Mongolia increased very greatly, and some ambitious Russian diplomats began even to dream of an independent Mongol state, under Russian influence and, possibly, suzerainty, constituting a living barrier between Russia and China. Such a barrier was thought necessary and desirable for two reasons. In the first place, should China pass through as rapid a transformation as Japan and appear on the scene as an active power, the Mongolian barrier would prove excellent protection to Russia—so ran the arguments of the protagonists of the Mongolian barrier. In the second place, as a base for economic penetration into China, Russian-controlled Mongolia would be a most valuable asset for whatever imperialistic designs the Russian Government still entertained.

In 1910-11, as the time drew near for the expiration of the treaty of 1881, the Russian Government began to urge upon the Government of the Chinese Empire a renewal and revision of the treaty. One of the revisions sought by the Russian Government was an enlargement of Russian rights in Mongolia. The
Chinese Government, however, persistently refused to accede to the Russian requests in this regard. In October, 1911, the Chinese Revolution broke out and introduced a radical change in the whole situation.

Even before the Revolution, however, in July, 1911, Hu-tukh-tu, the Living Buddha of Mongolia, convoked a council of Mongol princes to discuss the question of relations with the Chinese. Administratively, Mongolia was part of the Chinese territory and was ruled by Chinese officials who were despotic and oppressive. Their rule caused widespread dissatisfaction among the nomadic population of Mongolia, and the council of princes decided to seek Russia’s protection. A delegation was sent to St. Petersburg, and the Russian Government promised the Mongols to make representations in Peking. In accordance with this, Russia proposed to China an arrangement whereby Mongolia would be given administrative autonomy. But this proposal was rejected by the Chinese Government.

Immediately following the Chinese Revolution, Mongolia declared her independence, claiming that the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty absolved the Mongols from their allegiance to the central Government of China. Again the Mongols turned to Russia for protection, and the Russian Government proposed to the new Chinese
Government an arrangement with Mongolia similar to that of the preceding year. But the Chinese Government again rejected the Russian proposal. Then the Russian Government declared that it would negotiate directly with the Mongol authorities in Urga, the capital of Mongolia. The result of these negotiations was a treaty, concluded between Russia and Mongolia, in September, 1912.

While, in concluding this treaty, Russia formally acknowledged the independence of Mongolia, she nevertheless declared her willingness to recognize China's sovereignty over Mongolia on condition of the acceptance by the Government at Peking of the conditions of Mongolian autonomy proposed originally by Russia. China entered a formal protest against the Russo-Mongolian treaty and refused to acknowledge it. Then negotiations began between Peking and St. Petersburg, and finally resulted in a Russo-Chinese-Mongolian agreement, signed in the city of Kyakhta, whereby Mongolia was made into an autonomous state, with its Living Buddha as the supreme ruler, but under Chinese suzerainty.* By this agreement Russia secured valuable rights and privileges on the territory of autonomous Mongolia.

* For the principal provisions of this tripartite agreement see Appendix II.
TREATY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAR EAST 55

To what extent the events in Mongolia ever since 1911 were the work of the agents of the Russian Imperial Government is not known, but that such agents had a hand in their unfolding, especially after the Chinese Revolution, appears fairly certain. After the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Mongolian agreement, Russian activities in Mongolia increased. And while Russia was busy with her Mongolian venture, Japan was pushing very energetically her own penetration in other parts of China. The open agreements between Imperial Russia and Imperial Japan remained merely the screen of the understanding between the two Governments; the spirit which animated the relations between the two was the spirit of undisguised imperialism that permeated their secret agreements.

In March, 1917, came the Russian Revolution and swept out of existence the Russian member of the Russo-Japanese imperialistic partnership.
CHAPTER V

THE BOLSHEVIKI AND THE JAPANESE IN SIBERIA

During the World War and the first stages of the Revolution, Siberia acquired a great importance because it provided Russia with her best available means of communication with the outside world. The port of Vladivostok was literally the door to 'Russia. Immense quantities of munitions and railroad supplies were brought in through it.

The March Revolution affected Siberia at the same time that it did the rest of Russia, and its processes presented nothing novel. The authority of the Provisional Government was readily recognized, and the change at the center was acclaimed with great enthusiasm. Then, during the months that followed, Siberia passed through the same process of the disintegration of the revolutionary ideas through which European Russia passed and which eventually culminated in the overthrow of the Provisional Government in November, 1917, and the establishment of the so-called Soviet régime.
The Soviet authority was introduced in Siberia soon after the establishment of the Soviet régime in European Russia. It appeared in different centers at different dates, but by January, 1918, it was established in all the important parts of Siberia and the Far East. It existed until the late summer of that year, when various isolated uprisings, coupled with the appearance in Siberia of Allied forces landing from the East and the Czecho-Slovak detachments entering Siberia from the West, overthrew the Soviet authority everywhere. The establishment of the Omsk Government, by the removal thither of the Directorate elected by the members of the former Constituent Assembly at Oufa, furnished a center around which the anti-Bolshevist movement in Siberia began to group itself. On November 18, 1918, the Directorate was overthrown, and Admiral Kolchak assumed control. His rule lasted until the beginning of 1920, when his forces were crushed by the Red Armies, while he himself was captured and executed. The Bolshevik armies marched nearly as far as Lake Baikal and there halted, pending negotiations with the political groups of Eastern Siberia.*

* A detailed examination of the anti-Bolshevist movement in Siberia and an evaluation of its various factors is entirely outside the scope of this book. For this reason, the events that had taken place in Siberia and in the Far East prior to the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic are told here in their broad outlines.
The Allies withdrew their forces eastward with the retreat of Kolchak's armies, and eventually took them out of Siberia altogether. The only troops that remained over in Siberia were the Japanese.

Practically all the Russian groups in Siberia are agreed on accusing the Allies of never giving full-fledged support to the anti-Bolshevist movements in Siberia. But the most direct accusation was against the Japanese, who were numerically the largest foreign power in Siberia, and, for obvious reasons, were more directly concerned with the developments in Siberia than any of the others. The Japanese are specifically accused of never giving full support to the principal movement, but rather staking on individual leaders and playing them against each other.

The part of Siberia which is of special concern to Japan is the territory lying between the seaboard and Lake Baikal. The key to this part of Siberia is the port of Vladivostok. During the existence of the Omsk Government almost this whole territory was only under a nominal control of that Government. Different parts of it were held by leaders of armed bands, some of them commanding rather large forces and enjoying outside assistance. The most important of these were the Atamans Semenov and Kalmykov, and General
Rosanov. The latter was stationed in Vladivostok. While nominally under orders from Omsk, he acted, in reality, in an entirely independent manner, and his actions were offensive to all democratic elements. Many attempts were made at Omsk to have Rosanov removed, and finally, on October 25, 1919, Admiral Kolchak ordered Rosanov to give up his command and come to Omsk. But Rosanov appealed to Semenov and Kalmykov for assistance, and having been assured of their support and—so the Vladivostok version runs—of the good-will of the Japanese, he refused to obey the order from Omsk.

The Omsk Government could not enforce its authority, and Rosanov remained the virtual master of the situation. His rule in Vladivostok lasted until January 31, 1920, by which time his authority had degenerated entirely and its remnants were easily overthrown by the partisan forces at the disposal of the Vladivostok Zemstvo, which then set up a Provisional Government.

The next important event in the Russian Far East occurred on April 4-5, when a series of armed clashes took place between the Russian and Japanese troops. During the two months which preceded the clash the relations between the Japanese and the Russians in
Vladivostok and the adjacent territory were becoming more and more strained. The allied troops were being evacuated, but the Japanese made no preparations for leaving. The Provisional Government, headed by the President of the Zemstvo, A. S. Medvyedev, maintained cordial relations with the Japanese political mission at Vladivostok, although its relations with the military command were strained. The Provisional Government declared as its object the ending of the civil war and the coming to some understanding with Moscow, and its chief objection against the Japanese was that they were not in favor of such a program. On the other hand, the Japanese objected most strenuously to the manner in which Medvyedev's Government attempted to hasten the evacuation of the Japanese troops.

There seems to be no doubt that the hostility against the Japanese was something that the Provisional Government could not control, even if it desired to do so. It was growing all the time and expressed itself more and more in open clashes.

This growing hostility against the Japanese was accompanied by an increasing popularity of the Bolsheviki, who were extremely active all the time. The liberal leaders realized that the Japanese would feel entirely free to take any military measures they chose,
if a Soviet régime should become established in Vladivostok and they attempted to prevent such an eventuality warning the extreme elements of the danger of the situation.

These warnings were not heeded, however, by the local Bolshevist groups, while the departure of the American troops left the Japanese alone in the field, who then apparently decided to take effective measures. On April 2 an ultimatum was presented to the Provisional Government. The substance of the ultimatum was that there should be no interference with the actions of the Japanese military authorities, so far as those actions concerned military affairs; that all activities of secret groups or societies considered harmful for the Japanese troops or for Manchuria and Korea should be forbidden; that all publications directed against the Japanese Empire, its existence or its army, should be suppressed.

On April 3, the Soviet of Workmen's and Peasant's Deputies met in Vladivostok, as if in answer to the Japanese ultimatum. On the next day, the Provisional Government accepted the Japanese ultimatum in its entirety, but it was already too late. Everything was ready for an explosion; only the first spark was lacking, and it was supplied on the night of that same day. Although
the Provisional Government officially denied it, the Japanese command claimed that during the night Japanese patrols were fired upon in some parts of the city, and on the following morning, General Oi, commanding the troops at Vladivostok, ordered all Russian troops disarmed. This order was carried out with considerable bloodshed, both in Vladivostok and in Nikolsk and Khabarovsk.

The Provisional Government disclaimed responsibility for the attacks on the Japanese patrols and entered into negotiations with the Japanese military command for the adjustment of the situation. An agreement was finally signed in Vladivostok on April 29. By virtue of this agreement no Russian troops were to be permitted within thirty kilometers of the Ussuriysk and the Suchansk railroad lines and of the China-Korea border. The only exception was made in the case of militia on police duty, but its number was to be determined only by agreement with the Japanese command.

Thus the Japanese military command assumed absolute control of all the means of transportation and the Suchansk coal mines. The Provisional Government was not forbidden to have troops of its own, but it was cut off from all sources of military supplies.
And what was even more important, practically all cities and towns of importance, with the exception of two or three small ones, came under the military control of the Japanese, for they are all situated on or near the railroad lines.

No wonder that the chief representative of the Russian command said: "It is with a heavy feeling that we, the representatives of the Russian military command, sign this agreement."

Nor was this all. At about the same time, a band of partisan troops was reported marching toward the city on Nikolayevsk, at the mouth of the Amur river, which had a considerable Russian population and a small Japanese garrison. Various and conflicting stories are told as to what happened during the struggle for the city, some accounts even making the Japanese command in Siberia directly responsible for the city's inability to offer sufficient resistance. In any event, the occupation of the city was accompanied by a horrible massacre, as a result of which 700 Japanese and 4,000 Russians lost their lives.

Whatever were the circumstances under which the Nikolayevsk tragedy took place, it provided the Japanese with an excuse for occupying the city and thus acquiring possession of the mouth of the Amur river.
Moreover, not content with the occupation of Nikolayevsk, the Japanese also occupied the northern, or Russian, half of the island of Sakhalin, which lies opposite the mouth of the Amur.

A little later, Japanese warships appeared off the coast of Kamchatka, a landing of military forces was effected, and, according to a reliable report, a military post and a radio station was constructed there.

Thus, by the summer of 1920, practically the whole seaboard of Siberia was in the hands of the Japanese, held by them on terms of military occupation.

In the meantime, while all this was going on, a new plan was unfolding itself in Eastern Siberia, a plan of creating a temporarily independent state on the Russian territory lying east of Lake Baikal, that would act as a "buffer" between Soviet Russia and Japan. This idea grew out of the circumstances that characterized the political situation in Eastern Siberia prior to the overthrow of the Kolchak Government.

Admiral Kolchak was deposed and his régime was overthrown in Irkutsk shortly after the seat of government was removed thither from Omsk. The overthrow was effected by the so-called Political Center, created some time before that by the liberal Zemstvo elements. In October, 1919, a conference of repre-
sentatives of sixteen Zemstvos in Eastern Siberia took place and decided upon the overthrow of the Kolchak Government on the ground that it had degenerated into an utterly reactionary régime. The groups represented at this conference later on created the Political Center, and assumed authority on the deposing of the Admiral. The idea of creating a “buffer” state was originally brought forward by these groups.

One of the first actions of the Political Center after assuming authority was to enter into negotiations with the Soviet authorities concerning the idea of the “buffer” state. On January 19, 1920, a conference took place at Tomsk, between the representatives of the Irkutsk groups and the Soviet leaders. It was decided to create such a state with its capital at Irkutsk, and on September 21 Moscow sanctioned this agreement by telegraph.

But even before the Irkutsk delegates returned from Tomsk, the Government which they represented was overthrown by the local Bolsheviki, and the whole western part of the proposed “buffer” state was officially declared part of the Soviet territory. However, the idea of the “buffer” state was not given up. The city of Verkhneudinsk was declared capital of the new state, and Moscow hastened to recognize it.
The situation that became established as a result of all this by the beginning of the summer of 1920, was as follows: the Soviet authority officially extended as far as the Verkhneudinsk "buffer" state. Beyond the "buffer," which was controlled from Moscow, was Chita and its district, controlled by Ataman Semenov, who resisted all pressure from the west and from the east and was openly supported by the Japanese. On the coast was the Provisional Government of the Maritime Province, located in Vladivostok, but practically powerless because of the conditions of the Japanese control. Besides these larger centers, there were several of lesser importance, but nevertheless powers unto themselves. Such were Blagovyeshchensk and Khabarovsk. During the summer, a number of attempts were made to unite all these independent groups into one state, but it was not until the fall of 1920 that such a unification was finally effected.

During this period there were three elements in the situation. The first element comprised the Bolshevist or Communist groups, directed from Moscow. The second consisted of the Japanese, who dominated the situation. The third element consisted of the local non-Bolshevist groups, finding themselves wedged in between their fear of permanent Japanese control of the terri-
tory and its consequent loss to Russia, and the alternative of making peace with the Bolsheviki. They chose the second course. At the Tomsk conference, the leader of the Irkutsk delegation expressed the views of these groups in the following way:

"We are not speaking here of any moral or academic considerations; we are interested in a mere evaluation of forces. If Soviet Russia has at the present time sufficient strength to crush the Japanese reaction and the Japanese militarism, then the question is very simple: let the Soviet troops continue their march to Irkutsk and on beyond Irkutsk. Then no 'buffer' state is necessary. But if Soviet Russia does not possess such forces at the present time, then, for the sake of preserving the unity of Russia and the reunification of Eastern Siberia with the rest of Russia, it is necessary to create a special democratic formation. As far as Soviet Russia is concerned, the creation of such a 'buffer' state would be rendered easier for it by the fact that the Siberian democracy will not conduct a struggle against it. The Siberian democracy has determined quite firmly the line it is to follow: the giving up of all struggle on the western frontier of Siberia, and the concentration of all forces on the eastern frontier for a struggle against the reaction." *

In the negotiations which were conducted between the Japanese and the Soviet representatives during this period, the former were inclined to accept the idea of the "buffer" state, provided its forms of organization would not be Communist. On the other hand, the Soviet representatives readily assured the Japanese

* From a speech by E. E. Kolossov, quoted in Sovremennia Zapiski, No. 3, for 1921.
that the "buffer" would have forms of government that would be quite acceptable to them. As early as April, the Soviet Plenipotentiary in the Far East, V. D. Vilensky, assured the head of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission, Count Matzudaira, that the Soviet Government considered the "buffer" state as "a zone, in which the capitalistic activities of the foreigners, particularly the Japanese, could be carried on in conditions more customary for them than would have been the existence of Soviet forms." *

An obstacle to the creation of a unified "buffer" in Eastern Siberia was the existence of the barrier between Verkhneudinsk and Vladivostok in the form of the Semenov Government at Chita. The Japanese command was inclined to remain on friendly terms with the Ataman, and as late as June, 1920, the Central Information Bureau of Vladivostok reported the following interview with General Takayanaga, Chief of Staff of the Japanese expeditionary forces:

"The General considers that the territory controlled by Semenov must be considered as a separate political entity in the negotiations for the unification of the Far Eastern formations. According to Semenov's claims, his authority is supported by at least 75 per cent. of the population, by the Cossacks, the Buryats and a part of the Zemstvos. The liquidation of the barrier is desirable, but it must be done

* Vladivostok Dalnevostochnoye Obozreniye, April 29, 1920.
without violence, through agreement on the part of the political groups and a free expression of the will of the people.”

In spite of this, efforts were continued to call a conference, representing the whole of Eastern Siberia. Finally, arrangements for such a conference were completed, and the final attempt was made to eliminate Semenov. On the night of October 21, a surprise attack was undertaken against Chita, Semenov was defeated and the city was occupied by the troops of the Verkhneudinsk Government. Several days later, the conference for the creation of the “buffer” state met in Chita. It consisted of representatives of Verkhneudinsk, Chita, Blagovyeshchensk, and Vladivostok. The result of the conference was that the four territories agreed to unite into a state to be known as the Far Eastern Republic, and that elections were to be held to elect a Constituent Assembly.

These elections were held at the beginning of 1921, and returned a peasant majority, though the elections were so manipulated that the Communists actually controlled the Assembly.

To what extent is the Far Eastern Republic under the control of Moscow? This is the question that ac-

* Vladivostok Dalnevostochnoe Obozreniye, June 2, 1920.
quires vital importance in connection with the whole situation in the Far East. Speaking at the Chita conference, the first premier, of the Far Eastern Republic, Krasnoshchekov, said:

"Our Republic has a sign, and there is writing on both sides of the sign. On one side it is written, 'Democracy.' What is inscribed on the other side is for us, for our own consumption."

The story of its organization, the purpose for which it has been organized, and the activities of the Far Eastern Republic, as we shall see later on, indicate unmistakably that it is completely under the control of Moscow. It is a truly vassal formation of Soviet Russia.

The Far Eastern Republic merely represents a method by which the Bolsheviks and the Japanese are attempting to carry out their policies in Siberia. Of and by itself it is of comparatively little importance and interest. But as a channel for the activities of these two elements in the Russian Far East, it has a distinct significance and interest.
CHAPTER VI

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL IN ASIA

Domination in Siberia and in the Russian mid-Asiatic possessions could not, of course, satisfy the Moscow leaders. In their dreams of a world social revolution, Asia with her numberless millions always loomed very large. And soon after the establishment of their power in Siberia through the overthrow of the Kolchak Government, the Communist leaders turned their attention definitely to activities in different parts of Asia.

"Real revolution on a world scale will not begin until Asia's eight hundred millions of people will join our movement."

With these words, constituting the central point of his address at the Baku Congress of the Nations of the Orient, G. Zinoviev, president of the executive committee of the Third or Communist International, proclaimed, in the summer of 1920, the policy and the aim of the Communist movement in Asia.

It is almost a paradox that a group of men who have
thought out, in the very heart of the civilization of the West, their ideas of social philosophy and the methods of applying these ideas should now be the inspirers and the leaders of this agitation of the East against the West. Yet it is the Third International, the Moscow General Staff of the World Revolution, that in the summer of 1920 began to make attempts to organize, co-ordinate and lead through its various agencies and instrumentalities the numerous and variegated movements which agitate the Orient. And today, everywhere in Asia, from the shores of the Mediterranean to the utmost reaches of China, from the tundras of Northern Siberia to the southernmost point of India, the agents of Communism are at work, bending all their energies toward the consummation of their ends.

Movements of all sorts agitated the Orient before the leaders of the world Communism thought of diverting the energies and the forces thus aroused to their own ends. But these movements were sporadic, poorly organized, in most cases mutually antagonistic, with scarcely any coördination, either in the aims they pursued or the methods they used. Moreover, the aims of most of these movements have been and still are either not in correspondence with or even directly opposed to the aims which the world Communism sets before itself.
Yet these difficulties do not deter the Third International from making an attempt to befriend and control all these movements. For the tactics of Communism render not only permissible but actually necessary the utilization of movements that are not Communistic in their nature, provided those movements are working toward the disruption or the destruction of institutions and organizations which it is necessary for Communism to disrupt or destroy in order to achieve its objects. And so confident are the leaders of Communism of the ultimate triumph of their aims that they are willing, for reasons of expediency, to permit their oftentimes incongruous allies to enjoy temporarily a triumph of their particular aims, achieved with the assistance of the masters of Communism. Nowhere are these tactics illustrated better than in the work which the active agencies of Communism are doing in the East.

There are two lines of activities that are pursued there by the general staff of the revolution in Moscow, and out of the two there rapidly emerges now a third, more formidable than either of the others. Through its various channels of propaganda the Third International makes every effort to bring down to the widest possible masses of the Orient the simplest of the ideas of Communism, the doctrine of destruction, that would
set them afame and prepare them for an uprising, in which the Communist leaders hope their trusted agents will be the guiding spirits. Through the diplomatic agencies which now constitute such an important part of the Russian Soviet Government, the leaders of Communism make active efforts to bring within the sphere of their influence all the official and semi-official, formulated and half-formulated governmental centers of the Orient. Finally, under the protection and with the complete assistance of Moscow and its military organization, armed forces are being brought into existence in some parts of the Orient.

In order to co-ordinate the work of propaganda in different parts of Asia, the Third International, at the time of its Second World Congress, held in Moscow in July and August, 1920, decided to call a special conference of the representatives of the various movements in the countries and territories of the Near and Far East that are either in sympathy or at least in contact with the Communist movement. For the seat of this conference, the city of Baku, the important oil port on the Caspian Sea, was chosen. An appeal was issued by the executive committee of the Third International, signed by its president and also by delegates to the
Second Congress from the most important countries of the world, including the United States.

This conference, known officially as the Congress of the Nations of the Orient, opened on September 1, 1920, and lasted for more than two weeks. It represented twenty nationalities of the Near East, Central Asia and the Far East, among them the following: Turkey, China, Turkestan, Hindustan, Daghestan, Khiva, Bokhara, Armenia, Persia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan.

The outstanding figure at the Baku Congress was G. Zinoviev, the president of the executive committee of the Third International and the head of the government in Petrograd, one of the most active and prominent leaders of the Communist movement. Zinoviev was chosen honorary president of the congress, and delivered an address at the opening session in which he stated the program which the Third International expected the movements represented at the Baku Congress to carry out.

At the outset of his address Zinoviev noted particularly the fact that the congress in Baku, organized under the auspices of the Communist International, really represented, as far as the majority of its delegates was
concerned, movements that are not Communistic in their nature. But this circumstance was more than offset, in the opinion of the International, by the fact that the congress represented for the first time at least tentative unity of purpose and action on the part of twenty or more nations of the Orient which had been until then either isolated from each other or more or less hostile to each other. The great task of the congress was to find common ground upon which these nations could unite for co-operation and the strength of collective effort.

This common ground the Communist movement makes it its object to supply and develop. The nations of the Orient have differences of old standing and mutual enmities that are traditional. But at the same time all of them have grievances that may be reduced to simple terms and a common denominator. All of them find themselves in a condition of political and economic dependence upon the so-called great powers of the world. A compounding of these grievances, an accumulation of hostilities springing from these grievances, and a consequent releasing of forces and energies which may be turned against the dominating powers—all these, if properly directed and handled, may be organized for an active struggle. This work of organiz-
ing the forces in the Orient is the aim of the Third International in its activities in Asia. The stimulation of this work was the object of the Baku Congress.

Revolution in the Orient, sweeping like wildfire through all the expanses of Asia—that is the ideal of Communism. Revolution, as conceived by the Communist movement, is and must be a world-wide affair. But it is not proceeding at an even pace or developing into similar forms in the West and in the East. There are really two streams of the world revolution. That of the West Zinoviev characterized in his speech as rapid and turbulent and direct, hurling itself in a definite direction, making rapid inroads into all those phases of life in the West which it must traverse in order to reach the goal toward which it is striving. The stream in the East is slow and hesitant. The nations of the West, whose powers and efforts feed the stream of the revolution there, know what they want and proceed to get it. The nations of the East have not as yet awakened to definite and complete desires. The stream of the revolution fed by their movements has, in consequence, different characteristics from the stream in the West.

It is the object of the directing center of the world Communist movement, the Third International, to
work for the uniting of these two streams. But such a union is possible only if the forces which direct, stimulate and hurl forward the stream of the West should turn their attention to the stream of the East, in order to arouse its activities and bring them to a pitch which would make the movements that make it up a really effective factor for the world revolution.

Whatever the movements in the East which were represented at the Baku Congress have now as their aim, ultimately their efforts must result in the establishment of Communism there. But none of the countries of the Orient or of the territories which have not as yet risen to the dignity of statehood has anything like the degree of capitalistic development which is usually presupposed as a necessary condition for the establishment of Communism. In other words, is it necessary to wait until capitalistic development should come to the Orient before attempting to light up there the fires of revolution which would eventually lead to the establishment of Communism?

Zinoviev answered this query in a negative sense, and offered a very general and simple formula, universally applicable in its simplicity. As long as Soviet power has become established in Russia or in any other one country, that is the signal and the guarantee of success
for any movement looking to the establishment of Communism in any country, even if that country is economically backward.

In its application to the countries of the Orient this formula assumes a very definite political form, in tactical conformity with the general character of the movements actually existing there. These movements are either agrarian or national-democratic in character. The first kind of movements assures the participation of the great masses of the people, for the vast majority of the population of Asia is agricultural. The system of landholding in most of the countries there is such that the best lands are generally held by large land proprietors on the basis of very extensive holdings and of an exploitation of the masses of the people. Resentment on the part of the peasantry against such an agrarian scheme may easily be turned to account, provided enough propaganda can be conducted among the peasantry with the view of convincing them that the chief cause of such a state of affairs lies in the fact of their economic and territorial dependence upon the particular great power which holds the protectorate over their country. In this way the agrarian movements which have narrow and immediate aims may be used as a powerful adjunct of the other kind of movements, the
control over which the leaders of the Communist movement are striving to seize—namely, movements for the political independence or the liberation from economic domination of the countries and the territories of the Orient.

These political or national-democratic movements are essentially of two kinds. In countries like China, Turkey, Persia, which have officially independent existence as sovereign states, but are in reality politically and economically dependent upon one or another of the great powers active in the affairs of Asia, the national-democratic movements have the character of a struggle against this unofficial but nevertheless real political and economic dependence. In countries like India, which even officially do not have the status of sovereign states, these movements, in their political aspects, assume the character of a struggle for independence. The task of Communism is to render sufficient assistance to these movements to exact from them in return pledges to accept the Soviet form of government, once their independence or complete liberation is achieved.

Soviets must be organized throughout the Orient. This is the order of the day from the general staff of the world revolution. And they must be real Soviets—so Zinoviev admonished the delegates to the Baku
Congress; not toy Soviets of the kind that exists in Turkey. Yet the Communists in Moscow are ready to support even these toy Soviets if there are any prospects of utilizing whatever force they may represent. Zinoviev himself illustrated this by giving a vivid description of the character of that movement in Turkey which had then the support of the Third International and of the Moscow government, the peasant movement in Anatolia, the Turkish province in Asia Minor, led by Mustapha Kemal. This movement is essentially religious in character and as different from Communism as day from night.

According to Zinoviev the only thing that Kemal is fighting for is the re-establishment of the religious supremacy of the Sultan. To Kemal the person of the Sultan is sacred, although in deference to present-day tendencies he has invented a title for him that is in keeping with the general trend of modern affairs. The Sultan, as he is represented by Kemal and his followers to the peasants whom they urge to rise at their bidding, is the President of the Democratic Union of the Islamic Nations. But at the present time the Sultan has fallen into the power of foreign non-believers, and his exalted position has become degraded. Kemal has declared a holy war against the invader for the purpose
of saving the Sultan from this degradation and freeing him from his enemies.

If such is the character of the Kemal movement it is logically absurd and paradoxical for Communism to support it. And yet it has enjoyed that support, because there is one element in it which, in the estimation of the Communist leaders, offsets all the possible contradictions to the Communist movement itself that there may be in the monarchic-religious movement led by Kemal and disguised but very thinly by his clumsy adaptations of modern terminology. That element lies in the fact that the Kemal movement is primarily directed against Great Britain as the great European power with extensive interests and influence in the Near East. In relating the circumstances under which Communism finds it possible to support such a movement as that led by Kemal, Zinoviev laid down the most important of the fundamental theses of the whole policy and program of Communism in Asia.

In his own words this policy is: “We are ready to support any revolutionary struggle against Great Britain.”

In presenting this program to the Baku Congress and in laying down the fundamentals of the Communist
policy in the East, Zinoviev, in the name of the Third International, appealed to the nations of the Orient to co-ordinate all their efforts for a struggle against the European power in the East.

The watchword under which this struggle was to be carried on was presented by him to the congress in the following form: "Declare a holy war against European imperialism, particularly against Great Britain."

This watchword was adopted by the congress, and efforts began to be made to write it in plain letters upon the standards of every revolutionary movement in the East.

The Baku Congress resulted in two definite actions. The first consisted in a signed pledge to fight the world capitalism. Besides the signatures of the delegates from the Oriental countries, the pledge bears also those of many of the guests at the congress—that is, of prominent leaders of Communism from Soviet Russia, as well as other countries of the world, including the United States, who attended the congress. The second action of the Baku Congress was the organization of a Council for Propaganda and Action in the Countries of the Orient. This Council was elected at the congress to act as the agent of the executive committee of the Third
International, which now issues its instructions to the various leaders of the movements in the East through this Council.

The Baku Congress was intended particularly to serve the purpose of organizing an apparatus of propaganda in the various countries of Asia. It represented movements which are essentially revolutionary in character. It did not, of course, represent the nations themselves in which these movements exist. In each one of these countries there is a political organization which finds its expression in definite governmental institutions. The Baku Congress was convoked for the purpose of reaching the movements, but Communism is not content with reaching them alone. Wherever possible it strives to exert its influence also over the governmental institutions.

This requires the work of diplomacy, and for this purpose the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government and its various diplomatic agencies are utilized by the Third International to the largest extent possible.

During the months following the first steps in the organization of Communist work in Asia, the Soviet diplomacy devoted considerable attention to China, as a politically independent power, presumably amenable
to diplomatic influences. The general political situation in China, as the Soviet diplomats visualized it, was characterized during the year 1920 by the fact that the government which existed there at the beginning of that year was pro-Japanese in its sympathies and orientation. The Anfu party, which was in power, was responsible for the Japanese-Chinese agreement which rendered possible the penetration of the Japanese influence into China, and, if we take for it the word of the Soviet experts on Far Eastern affairs, placed China entirely under the domination of Japan. Through its agencies in Siberia, ever since the collapse of the Kolchak movement, the Soviet Government has been doing everything in its power to effect the overthrow of this government.

The Soviet diplomatic plan was built on the following considerations: China has for her neighbors two powers which are antagonistic to each other—namely, Japan and Soviet Russia. As long as the Anfu group remained in power and continued its pro-Japanese orientation the chances of any influence in the affairs of China that could be exerted by Soviet Russia were very small. On the other hand, the policy pursued by the Anfu group was never popular among the masses of the people in China; there has been a growing and
widespread opposition to the Japanese. This opposition was counted upon by the Soviet agents as a possible instrument for the overthrow of the pro-Japanese régime. They expected that if properly stimulated and directed this popular opposition would eventually transfer its resentment against the Japanese to the whole Anfu group and its régime, fastening upon it the blame for the Japanese domination. If such transferred resentment could result in an overthrow of the Anfu régime, it was reasonable to expect, according to the Soviet diplomatic plan, that its successor in power, having broken with the Japanese orientations, would have to seek a rapprochement with the other of China's neighbors—that is, with Soviet Russia.

When the Anfu régime fell, its place was taken by a strongly anti-Japanese régime, in which the power behind the throne was, for the time being, General Wu-Pei-Fu. The Soviet diplomats interpreted this change as signifying unquestionably the imminence of a definite Chinese orientation in favor of and in the direction of Soviet Russia. V. Vilensky, the former high commissary of the Soviet Government in Siberia and one of the most prominent Soviet experts on the Far East, in an article devoted to this phase of the Far
Eastern situation,* characterized the change in the Chinese régime in the following terms:

"Wu-Pei-Fu has hung out his flag over the events which are taking place in China, and it is clear that under this flag the new Chinese cabinet must take an orientation in favor of Soviet Russia."

In arguing for what he called the "logical and objective necessity" of such a step on the part of the Chinese Government, Vilensky cited three definite actions then already taken by the latter in the direction of establishing friendly relations with Moscow. The first step was initiated by Moscow, and sanctioned by Peking. It consisted of a commercial treaty signed by the representatives of the Soviet authorities in Russian Turkestan and the group in power in Chinese Turkestan. The treaty provided for the establishment of diplomatic as well as commercial representation in both territories, and the total mutual abrogation of extraterritorial rights. The contact thus established provided Soviet Russia with an unmolested access into China. Officially the Turkestan treaty was not valid until approved by Moscow and Peking. The Moscow sanction was naturally not long in coming. The sanction from Peking, given September, 1920, finally settled the mat-

* Moscow Izvestiya, October 9, 1920.
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

ter, and Soviet Russia acquired a recognized frontier with China, regulated by treaty.

The second step of the Chinese Government in the direction of a rapprochement with Soviet Russia, according to Vilensky, indicated still further the correctness of the Moscow analysis of the diplomatic situation in the Far East. Under the Anfu régime China still continued to recognize officially the Russian ambassador remaining there after the overthrow of the Provisional Government. All diplomatic courtesy was extended to him, and his status was more or less formally acknowledged. The action of the Peking government in refusing to continue the recognition of this status of the Russian ambassador, announced on September 23, 1920, was logically a preliminary step to the negotiations which China was expected to inaugurate with Moscow.

This second step was almost immediately followed by the third, for which it obviously cleared the way. A Chinese military-diplomatic mission was sent to Soviet Russia, reaching Moscow at the end of September. This mission, headed by General Chjan-Si-Lin, one of the younger followers of Wu-Pei-Fu was charged with the task of negotiating with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. The tenor of these negotiations was obviously
an attempt to push China into an armed conflict with Japan, with which, incidentally, the Soviet diplomats were at that time negotiating for an agreement through the instrumentality of their diplomatic agents in the Far East and through the Far Eastern Republic.

But it was not merely as a cat's-paw against Japan that the Soviet Government is ready to use China and her possibilities. We must always remember when dealing with any of the activities of the Soviet Government that it has no policies of its own, but that whatever step it undertakes is of necessity in furtherance of the larger plans of the Third International, that general staff of the world revolution. The International and the Soviet Government are parts of the same mechanism; the International therefore is behind the activities of the Moscow Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Now what is the situation in China from the point of view of the Communist International?

According to the report presented to the Second Congress of the Third International by the Chinese delegate, Lai,* the nationalist-revolutionary movement in China has been stimulated particularly by the fact that, as he expressed it, "China was refused everything

* For text of this report, as well as other reports on the Communist situation in various countries of Asia, mentioned below, see a Memorandum, entitled "The 2nd Congress of the Third or Communist International," published by the Department of State in 1920.
at the Peace Conference." This movement of resentment, headed very largely by students and by the industrial elements of Shanghai, took the form of strikes and of similar manifestations of discontent and protest. The shifting in the political scenery of China, of which we have already spoken and which took place since the congress, indicates what forms the activities of these elements in China have assumed.

Delegate Lai's report discussed also the agrarian and the industrial situation from the point of view of Communism. The two outstanding features of the agrarian situation in China are the absence of large landed estates and the general shortage of land. The overwhelming majority of the population in China is agricultural, and the problem of land shortage is a very real one there. An agrarian movement therefore is scarcely possible, because it would have nothing to strive for. The solution of the problem resulting from the agricultural and agrarian crisis is obviously in industrial development, which would divert large numbers of the surplus rural population to the industrial centers and relieve the land shortage as far as possible. At the present time, however, China's industrial development is a thing that scarcely has any existence at all. According to Lai's statement, the industrial proletariat
in China is just beginning to come into existence. But whatever there is of it, weak as it is in numbers, the industrial proletariat of China is violently revolutionary in its tendencies.

The intensity of the nationalist revolutionary movement and the revolutionary nature of the Chinese proletariat constitute the basis of the work which the leaders of the Third International consider possible in China. From the point of view of the methods and tactics of Communism, the situation in China presents conditions that are almost ideal. China is a country of tremendous potential resources. The vast bulk of her population is agitated by various kinds of resentment, swept by different kinds of discontent. There is a small minority of the population, very active, very determined, very ambitious. If this minority could be won over to try an experiment in Communism in an attempt to further its own aims the Third International would have just what it desires in China—a Soviet Government, organized and run by a determined minority, with the masses of the population induced to unprotesting acquiescence by the methods of demagoguery, of which the Communist leaders are such past masters.

In other countries of the Far East preparations for
a revolution are being made similar in kind to those in China, except that there the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Government are not available as an adjunct of the propaganda work of the Third International. But everywhere the scheme is the same. A determined minority is called into being, organized and prepared for the eventualities which the Third International foresees as possible.

Looking at the situation in these countries, again through the eyes of the reports presented to the congress of the Third International, we find that in the Dutch Indies, for example, the Socialist propaganda, which has been going on for the last five years, is now rapidly growing in intensity and gaining in the influence it exerts by being directed primarily against foreign capital. In Java, where of its thirty million population three millions are proletarians, the mass movement of the latter began as far back as 1912. But in the course of the past three years this movement has been rapidly gathering momentum as far as its revolutionary intensity is concerned. Special attention is being given to the organization of railroad workmen. Out of the forty thousand railroad workmen on the island, ten thousand have already been organized. Though the revolutionary Socialist party numbers only sixteen hundred members,
of whom fifteen hundred are natives, it is a very compact and very active body. In Korea a revolutionary movement of a purely political nature began in 1914, and included in its ranks at the beginning only the nobility and the richer elements. But now the revolutionary tendencies have begun to penetrate into the masses of the people. For the past year and a half this latter phase of the movement has been developing quite satisfactorily from the point of view of Communism.

In India the situation appears to be almost least promising of all. Judging by the report of the Hindu delegate to the congress of the Third International, Roy, though a movement of a political and nationalist character began in India in the eighties of the past century, this movement has been centered almost exclusively among the students and the middle classes, finding very small response in the masses of the people. The latter are interested exclusively in problems of narrowly economic character. The agrarian question plays a very important rôle and is characterized by the existence of large landed estates, the shortage of land among the great masses of the population and the fact that the exports of foodstuffs from India are too great in proportion to the agricultural production of the country. Because of the last circumstance, very largely,
there are frequent famines in India. The industrial proletariat is very small numerically, and is very poorly organized. There is as yet no Communist party, although there exists a movement for the creation of one. However, this movement makes every effort to isolate itself from the movement for national independence, looking upon the latter as bourgeois in character. In this the Communist leaders in India present a rather marked opposition to the general policies of the Third International in the East. Their attitude on this question constitutes a rather important problem for Moscow, since it weakens considerably the position of the Third International in India.

However, the situation in India, though it would be affected profoundly by any events that may take place in China, is not expected to be directly affected by the conditions there. In 1920 the situation in India was expected to be affected from the Communist storm center in the Near East, which was then rapidly being built up in Afghanistan.

In their work of organizing this storm center in the Near East, the Third International and the Russian Soviet Government followed the same methods as those they pursued in the Far East. Propaganda was carried on actively, and wherever possible diplomatic alliances
were attempted. A very important alliance of this kind was effected in Afghanistan. But to these two weapons of the Communist movement a third one was added here, which rendered the activities in the Near East far more formidable and important, at least for the time being, than those in the Far East. There the Communists found an opportunity for actually creating armed forces that would be directly under Moscow's control and orders.

Next to Zinoviev, the most prominent figure at the Baku Congress was the former Turkish general, Enver Pasha, who in the course of the past three years has gone through a most amazing transformation. From a trusty agent of the German Imperial Government and the military genius of the Turkish armed forces at the time when they were controlled from Berlin, Enver has become converted into a no less trusty agent of the Russian Soviet Government, and was intrusted with a military mission of high importance. Driven out of Turkey by the eventualities of the war, Enver Pasha found refuge and warm welcome in Moscow. In the fall of 1920 he was again in the Near East, charged with the execution of plans which were much more vast than anything he had ever dreamed of under the Sultans and their protectors in Berlin.
Enver did not arrive in Baku in time to attend the congress. He reached Baku only a day or two before the congress ended, but he was received with all the pomp and enthusiasm accorded to the most prominent representatives there. He made his views known by addressing a large meeting held in his honor. Enver Pasha has now two ambitions in life. His first ambition is an old one—to fight Great Britain and the British to the last ditch. To this ambition he was devoted all through the war, stimulated in his perseverance in it by the German gold that flowed so freely into the Turkish coffers. His second ambition is new—he is now fighting for the overthrow of the Sultan and his power. And in both of these ambitions Enver is strongly supported by the masters of Moscow.

Enver Pasha left Moscow accompanied by a large group of military and civil specialists. His destination was Afghanistan, and his route lay through the Caucasus; hence his presence in Baku at the time of the congress. The task intrusted to him consisted in organizing and coördinating the military efforts of the various movements in the Near East.

Ever since the Soviet troops helped the natives of Afghanistan practically to free themselves from the
British control the little country in Central Asia became a special object of attention for the leaders in Moscow. From dependence upon the British, Afghanistan fell into a still greater dependence upon Soviet Russia. It is a sort of connecting link between the former Russian possessions in Central Asia which are still entirely controlled by Soviet Russia on the one hand and India and Persia on the other. It constitutes, therefore, an excellent base for Communist operations in these two important outposts of the British interests. It is an ideal center from which to direct the struggle against the European—particularly the British—supremacy in the Near East. Moreover, ever since its falling under the virtual protectorate of Soviet Russia, Afghanistan has become a refuge for all kinds of malcontents in India, Persia, Turkey and other countries of the Orient. All these refugees constitute inflammable material for the revolution and an excellent foundation for a military force.

The immediate purpose of Enver's mission in Afghanistan was the recruiting of these refugees, particularly those from India, for the Soviet armies. It was reported that he had been officially designated as chief of staff of the various revolutionary armies of the
Orient, and that there were under his command and direction considerable bodies of troops, whose equipment and armament came from Soviet Russia.

For several months, the agents of Communism carried on feverish activities in the Near East, no doubt, to some extent for political purposes, involved in their negotiations with Great Britain for trade relations and possible recognition. One of the British stipulations was a cessation of Communist propaganda in the countries of the Near East. Partly for this reason and party for other reasons, which we shall take up in the next chapter, the Communist activities in the Near East slackened considerably in the spring of 1921, and the main emphasis of the Communist work in Asia was transferred definitely to the Far East.
On July 12, 1921, the Soviet radio service in Moscow announced to the world the fact that a revolutionary government had just been formed in Mongolia. This simple announcement passed practically unnoticed by the world at large. And yet the event it described represented a most important achievement of the Communist work in Asia. Of itself, wind-swept and barren, Mongolia, lost in the mountains of Asia, has no special significance. But it happens to have been the storm-center of some very acute problems in the Far East and is particularly important to-day, because it is the center of the Soviet strategy in the Far East, which is unmistakably the most important phase now of all the Communist activities in the Orient.

In 1920, the main emphasis of the Communist work in Asia was on the Near East; in 1921, this emphasis became transferred to the Far East.

This does not mean, of course, that the Soviets have abandoned their work in other parts of Asia or even
curtailed their activities there. On the contrary, in all their latest discussions of the world situation, their activities in the Orient loom even larger than before. For example, in describing the world situation from the viewpoint of aggressive Communism, no less an authority than Trotsky * has stated that from now on the chief struggle against the "world imperialism" will be in the East, rather than in Western Europe as heretofore. A writer in the official organ of the Soviet Government † in discussing the Soviet policy in the East, stated that this policy is based on the fact that "Soviet Russia and the East really complement each other." Soviet Russia, according to this writer, is a "support for the East" in the latter's struggle against the great European powers; while the East is the Soviet's "powerful ally in the struggle against the world imperialism."

And if the Soviets now transfer the emphasis of their activities to the Far East, it is because, in the first place, they have very definite and pressing aims in that part of the world, and in the second place, because they are rather disappointed with their work in the Central and Near East.

* Speech before the 3rd World Congress of the Third International, in July, 1921.
† Moscow Izvestiya, July 17, 1921.
The Baku Conference last summer had for its object the organization of the work of anti-Allied, particularly anti-British, propaganda in the countries of Central Asia and of the Near East. As we saw above,* the Soviets were not, however, satisfied with the work of propaganda alone. Their agents were laying the foundation for aggressive activities all through these portions of Asia. But by the time of the Third Congress of the International in July, 1921, it was already quite apparent that all these efforts had failed.

It has been reported that the Soviet plans in Central Asia called for an armed expedition into India, calculated to arouse whatever revolutionary fires may be smouldering in that land. For this purpose a number of measures were taken. Special detachments of reliable troops were being trained in Turkestan and recruiting efforts were made in Afghanistan. A school of propaganda instruction was organized in Samarkand, and by the summer of 1921, 916 Hindu and 500 Afghan instructors were graduated from it. A great deal of work was done for the organization of transportation and liaison service in Afghanistan. But when all these military preparations were already well under way, in fact, practically completed, it was suddenly discov-

* See the preceding chapter.
erected that the political situation in Afghanistan was most unfavorable for the carrying out of the original plans. The fires of nationalism there are reported as having subsided very considerably. In view of this, the ambitious expedition into India had to be postponed indefinitely.

Afghanistan was also to be used as a base for work in Persia and Turkey. But here, too, the results so far have not been altogether gratifying to the Soviets. The new Persian Government, established after the "revolutionary" outbreak of the bands of Persian Cossacks, was headed by Seid Zia as Prime Minister, who has behind him a long period of pro-English activities.* Two years ago he was an ardent supporter of an alliance with Great Britain. It is true that after his elevation to power, he refused definitely to sign any agreement with the British and has demanded an evacuation of Persia by the British troops, still his rule causes considerable uneasiness to the Soviets.

The new Persian Government rests particularly on the support of the bourgeois class, i.e., principally the trading elements, who are anti-British for purely commercial reasons. The whole coup d'état was directed against the landed aristocracy, for one of the first acts

* Moscow Izvestiya, May 21, 1921.
SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST

of Seid Zia was the nationalization of the large estates, the division of state lands among the peasantry, and the arrest of practically the whole aristocracy of Teheran, the capital of Persia. It is interesting that among those arrested were the Shah’s uncle and a well-known pro-British leader, Ferman, a close personal friend of Lord Curzon. According to the Soviet reports from Persia, the Shah asked Seid Zia for the release of his uncle, while Lord Curzon similarly asked for the release of his friend; but both requests were refused.

At the present time, the Soviet Government is doing everything in its power to keep the new Persian Government under its influence. It has concluded a treaty with it, which was signed in Moscow. Moreover, as a sort of token of good will, it has formally handed over to it the Bank of Persia, formerly owned by the Russian Government. It is doing everything in its power to promote trade relations with Persia. But with all that, it is rather uneasy about the “revolutionary” Government, especially about its present head. Once so easy a convert from a pro-British to a violently anti-British orientation, Seid Zia may perform the somersault over again, only reversing the direction. It has been intimated that the radical groups in Persia have
promised his Government support just so long as it remains anti-British.

With the situation in Turkey, *i.e.*, principally in Anatolia, the seat of the "Nationalist Government" and the headquarters of Mustapha Kemal, the Soviets are thoroughly disgusted. They knew all the time and admitted it readily enough that the Kemal movement is far from being Communistic in its aims or purposes. However, to the extent to which it was violently anti-European, particularly anti-British, it enjoyed the good graces and the support of the Soviets. But it now appears that the estimates of the "revolutionary" value of the Anatolia movement have been very grossly exaggerated. Writers in the official Soviet press seem to stand aghast before some of Kemal's activities. For example, in discussing the budget of the "Nationalist Government" they point out the fact that huge sums of money are spent for the maintenance of the Sultan's Government and household,* and they must be wondering what part of the subsidies that the Anatolian "nationalists" had obtained from Moscow at one time or another had been used for this worthy purpose.

All through this time the Soviets were rather quies-

* Moscow Izvestiya, July 13, 1921.
cent in the Far East. Propaganda, of course, was carried on, especially in China and Korea, but, generally speaking, the policy of the Soviets there was one of "watchful waiting." As the People's Commissar of National Minorities recently explained it, the Soviets did not feel that they had enough forces, particularly from the point of view of Communist leadership, to do active work at both ends of the vast Asiatic continent.

Until the spring of 1921, the situation in the Russian Far East remained very much the same as it finally crystallized during the months following the defeat of Admiral Kolchak's armies and the overthrow of the Omsk Government. The power of Moscow officially extended only to Lake Baikal. All the territory east of that, stretching clear to the Pacific Ocean, was the Far Eastern Republic, or the "buffer" state, as it is usually termed.

In the spring of 1921, the Soviet Government began to show very considerable interest in the affairs of the Far East. The first notable indication of this increased interest came in the form of a formal cession by the National Assembly of the Far Eastern Republic to Soviet Russia of the peninsula of Kamchatka. This act was, no doubt, dictated by a number of considerations, the most important of which seems to lie in the
fact that the Moscow leaders suddenly discovered that by recognizing the independence of the Far Eastern Republic they had officially rendered Russia no longer a power on the Pacific Ocean. As such, Soviet Russia would have no claim whatever to participation in any discussions dealing with the Pacific problems. The cession of Kamchatka was one of the ways of repairing this situation so far as the possible Soviet claims were concerned. Moreover, the re-acquisition of Kamchatka was important to the Soviets in view of their notion, frankly expressed by Lenin and other responsible leaders, that by granting concessions in Kamchatka to the Vanderlip group and to other American capitalists they would be able to embroil the United States in a war with Japan.

The Kamchatka incident was followed by a rather important development in the Maritime or Primorsk Province of the Far Eastern Republic, which stretches for thousands of miles along the coast. This development consisted of a revolt against the authority of the Far Eastern Republic in the city of Vladivostok, which was successful and spread to several other important towns. On May 26, 1921, a new government was established there, consisting of non-Socialistic elements.
What part the Japanese played in this revolt it is very difficult to determine with any degree of precision. Both the Soviet Government in Moscow and the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, of course, lay the blame on the Japanese. On May 30, I. L. Yurin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Republic, sent a note to Tokyo, demanding the immediate cessation of all Japanese interference with the affairs of the Russian Far East.* He asked the Japanese whether or not they want friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic and the consummation of a trade agreement with it, and if so why Japan does not withdraw her troops from the Siberian territory and give the Government of the Far Eastern Republic a free hand in dealing with the situation. Specifically, he demanded an open and definite declaration of the Japanese Government and of the Japanese Command in Siberia on their attitude with regard to the new Vladivostok Government, headed by Merkulov; the return of arms to the militia of popular defense (troops of the Far Eastern Government) which had been disarmed by the Japanese; and no interference on the part of the Japanese with any action that the emis-

* The text of this Note was published in the Moscow Izvestiya, June 9, 1921.
saries of the Far Eastern Government may take for the purpose of putting down Merkulov's revolt and punishing its leaders.

At the same time, George Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs in the Moscow Government, sent a wireless note on the Far Eastern situation to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy. In this note,* Chicherin cited a number of actions of the Japanese Government, interpreted as inimical by the Soviets. The most important of these actions consisted of alleged usurpation of Russian fishing rights in Kamchatka by the Japanese authorities and their allotment to Japanese subjects, rather than to Russian citizens, and of the rendering of assistance by the Japanese to various Russian anti-Soviet groups in the Far East, notably those of Ataman Semenov and Baron Ungern in Mongolia and the remnants of the Kappel troops, which were instrumental in bringing about the Vladivostok overthrow. In this connection Chicherin issued the following warning to Japan:

"The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the Russian masses, warns the Japanese Government that the masses of the Russian people, having taken their fate into their own hands and having repelled all attacks of their enemies, will be able to conduct victoriously this new

* For complete text of this Note see Appendix I.
struggle and will make those who have attacked them feel their strength."

But the Soviet Government was not satisfied with merely issuing this warning to Japan. It sought at the same time to fasten the blame for the events in the Far East upon the Allied powers generally; for this reason the Chicherin note was addressed to the three great European powers. The Moscow Commissar stated that the Soviet Government considers these powers "morally responsible for this new link in the chain of intervention." This statement he announced as applying particularly to Great Britain, which he accused of hostile acts with respect to the Soviet Government, "entirely out of keeping with the Anglo-Russian agreement." The note ended with the following significant words, which state with all clarity the vassal position of the Far Eastern Republic with respect to the Moscow Government:

"The Russian Government protests most energetically against these acts directed against Soviet Russia as such or through the Far Eastern Republic which is friendly with her, as an intermediary step."

However, about the time that the Yurin note went to Tokyo and the Chicherin note was put on the Soviet radio, the Far Eastern Republic Embassy in Moscow
issued an official statement, summarizing the situation for the period ending June 1.* In this statement it was announced that although the authority in the Primorsk Province is in the hands of the Merkulov Government, the attitude of the Japanese towards this group is negative, since it not only refuses to furnish it with arms, but even avoids all contact with it. According to the statement, the Merkulov forces consist of 600 bayonets in Vladivostok and of 345 bayonets in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk. Moreover, the statement announced that a conference took place between Comrade Tseitlin, the representative of the Far Eastern Republic, and the Japanese representatives, in the course of which the latter declared that the events in the Primorsk Province will have no influence upon the relations between Japan and the Far Eastern Republic and were disposed to blame the Military Command for what had actually taken place.

But the events in Vladivostok and the Primorsk Province generally were by no means the most important feature of the Far Eastern situation. Of far greater significance were the events that took place in Mongolia during the spring and summer of 1921.

As we have already seen, the general political im-

* Published in Moscow Izvestiya, June 9, 1921.
The importance of Mongolia lies in the fact that its geographical position makes of it a barrier between Siberia and China proper. Its immediate political importance last summer lay in the fact that it had become the refuge for the remnants of anti-Bolshevist forces that had operated in Siberia against the Bolsheviks, principally under Ataman Semenov. In the spring of 1921, one of the more energetic of Semenov's officers, Baron Ungern, made his way into Mongolia with small detachments of troops and entered into an agreement with the Living Buddha, the ruler of Mongolia, to free the country of the Chinese, who had occupied it some time previously, in violation of the officially recognized autonomy of Mongolia. With the aid of the Mongolian troops, Ungern drove out the Chinese division which constituted the army of occupation, and arrived at Urga, the capital of Mongolia, where he entered into a more definite arrangement with the Living Buddha.

Ungern became a Mongolian subject and was given a very high position; according to one report, he was made Minister of War and was given complete authority to recruit an army for the purpose of recovering from China the portion of Mongolia known as Inner Mongolia.* The Peking Government instructed

* Vladivostok Daily News, June 24, 1921.
the Inspector-General of Chinese forces in Northern Manchuria, Chan-Tso-Lin, to send troops into Mongolia. But these instructions were not carried out, the current explanation being that the Inspector-General, who has great ambitions for the acquisition of power in the internal affairs of China, was not willing to weaken his forces by an expedition into Mongolia, especially since the Ungern activities represented no direct menace to him.

The Soviet explanation of the whole affair, however, is different. In spite of an official denial of the Japanese Government of any connection with the Ungern affair, the Soviet explanation makes the whole incident the result of Japanese intrigue and part of the general Japanese plans. An editorial article in the Moscow Izvestiya of June 7, signed by U. Steklov, the responsible editor of the paper, described these plans as consisting primarily of two parts. The first is the creation of a base of operations against Soviet Russia in the southern part of the Primorsk Province, i.e., in Vladivostok and Nikolsk-Ussuriysk. The second is the creation of a similar base in Mongolia, which would make it possible for the Japanese to invade Siberia in the direction of Lake Baikal and cut off the Far Eastern Republic from the Soviet territory proper.
A more detailed version of the Soviet explanation, more specially with reference to Mongolia, is found in an article by Vilensky, which was published in the Moscow Izvestiya of July 13. According to Vilensky, Baron Ungern, in his operations in Mongolia, was simply carrying out the plans of the Japanese. He says that Japanese agents had been working in Mongolia for a long time and had succeeded in bribing the Living Buddha and most of his dignitaries, while at the same time, even before the final defeat of Ataman Semenov, who was notoriously supported by the Japanese, the Ungern groups were concentrating arms and munitions on the Mongolian border. He quoted Chinese newspapers as having reported contraband deliveries of rifles, ammunition, and even machine guns, concealed in bags of rice, to the palace of the Living Buddha.

The reason why Marshal Chan-Tso-Lin made no effort to move against Mongolia, according to Vilensky, was that he is pro-Japanese and represents the groups of Chinese reactionaries who are banking on Japanese assistance for the furtherance of their political ambitions in internal politics. Japan's interest in Mongolia he explained on the basis of her plans of imperialistic control of Eastern Asia, which, says Vilensky,
call for the creation of a living barrier between China and Soviet Russia along the line Manchuria-Mongolia, both under Japanese control.

The policy of the Far Eastern Republic with regard to this situation was described in the Steklov editorial. In its military phases, it was to consist of energetic efforts to crush oppositionary armed bands, while politically it was to be a "struggle against the monarchists of Northern China and the reactionaries of Mongolia by a close contact with the working masses of China and Mongolia." Steklov particularly emphasized the fact that the various activities of the Far Eastern Republic along these lines should be carefully coördinated with the revolutionary activities of the Chinese and Mongolian masses. And a month later, Vilensky reported the formation of a "popular-revolutionary party in Mongolia organized to fight for self-determination." It can be very easily surmised that the appearance of this party was a direct result of the policy of "coördination of activities."

There was a special reason, too, for the formation of such a party. The Soviet technique of promoting revolutions in territories bordering on Russia consists of bringing into life in such a territory a Communist
group, however small and insignificant; of inducing such a group to proclaim itself the provisional revolutionary government of the territory in question and to appeal to Moscow for military assistance, which would be immediately furnished. This was the program gone through in the Caucasus and elsewhere. And this was precisely the plan worked out for Mongolia.

The Soviets made an attempt to do this sort of thing in November, 1920. The following note, sent by the Peking Government to the Chinese ambassador in London and handed by the latter to Krassin on December 31, 1920, tells the story of this first attempt of the Soviet Government to send its troops into China:

"In his telegram of November 10, the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet Government, upon the request of the Chinese authorities in Urga, ordered the Siberian Command to dispatch troops to Mongolia in order to assist in the liquidation of the Semenov bands, whereupon those troops were to return to the Russian Soviet territory. On November 27, another telegram stated that, since the Chinese troops had already driven out the Semenov bands, the Soviet Government did not intend any longer to send troops there; however, should the followers of Semenov be found again within the boundaries of Mongolia, and should the Chinese authorities apply to Russia for assistance, such assistance will be given.

"We consider it necessary to state that the crossing of the frontiers of one country by the troops of another violates the sovereignty of that country, and that the statement in the first telegram to the effect that we asked for assistance is not
true. Though the dispatching of troops did not actually take place, there still remains the offer of military assistance, which we should not accept.  

Five months after this incident, however, the Red troops actually crossed the Chinese frontier. Again the reason given for this was a request for assistance on the part of Chinese authorities, which would seem rather doubtful in view of the above-quoted note. The ostensible objective of the expedition was an attack upon some detachments of anti-Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia which had fled to China and had been interned by the Chinese in the district of Chuguchak. These troops were commanded by General Bakich and were joined in May by remnants of the detachments under the command of Gnoyev, which were until then still operating in the Semipalatinsk district of Siberia.

On May 24, the Red troops attacked the Bakich forces and surrounded the city of Chuguchak. Forced to retreat, Bakich turned in the direction of Mongolia and was reported in June as attempting to effect a juncture with the forces of Baron Ungern, operating on the Mongolian territory—with the Red troops in pursuit.  

* The Russian text of this note was published in Moscow Izvestiya, January 5, 1921.  
† Moscow Izvestiya, June 11, 1921.
SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST

All this cleared the way for an effective Soviet expedition to Mongolia and furnished the first impetus to such an expedition. The “popular-revolutionary party” proclaimed itself Government and attempted to capture the capital of Mongolia, Urga. It already had an army, organized and equipped on Russian territory.* At its request, the Red troops in the Baikal region immediately concentrated all their attention on Mongolia. The troops commanded by Ungern were defeated and were forced to retreat into the Eastern steppes. And soon after that, the Soviets staged the most farcical feature of the whole Mongolian incident.

At the end of July the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Government addressed an official appeal to the Moscow Government, in which it requested the latter “not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia,” until there can be effected a “complete removal of the menace from the common enemy.” The appeal explained that the Mongolian’s People’s Revolutionary Government had not as yet succeeded in organizing and perfecting its apparatus of governmental authority and need the aid of the Red troops for the purpose of maintaining the security of the Mongolian

* Moscow Izvestiya, November 6, 1921.
territory and of the frontiers of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. *

The Moscow Government immediately and most graciously acceded to this request. Through the representative of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at Irkutsk, Chicherin transmitted to the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia a pompous note, which began as follows:

"The Russian Soviet Government, in alliance with the Government of the Far Eastern Republic, ordered its troops, operating side by side with the revolutionary army of the Provisional Government of Mongolia, to deal a crushing blow to the common enemy, the Tsarist General Ungern, who has subjected the Mongolian people to unprecedented enslavement and oppression; violated the rights of autonomous Mongolia; at the same time threatening the security of Soviet Russia, and the inviolability of the territory of the fraternal Far Eastern Republic."

This is the explanation Chicherin offers for the appearance, in the first place, of the Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia. The Russian Soviet Government "notes with great satisfaction" the appeal addressed to it by the Mongolian Provisional Revolutionary Government "that the Soviet troops should not be removed from the territory of Mongolia." The Soviet Government considers this appeal a manifestation of "close and friendly bonds" that now unite

* For full text of this note see Appendix II.
the people of Russia with the people of Mongolia. It announces its firm decision to withdraw the Red troops just as soon "as the menace to the free development of the Mongolian people and to the security of the Russian Republic and of the Far Eastern Republic shall have been removed." But the Russian Government is in complete agreement with the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia on the fact that the moment when such withdrawal of its troops may be possible "has not yet arrived." And for this reason, the Soviet Government has decided to accede to the request of the Revolutionary Government of Mongolia and order its troops to remain on the territory of Mongolia.*

Several days after the dispatching of this note, the Soviet press reported new successes of the Red troops operating in Mongolia. It was stated that after the capture of Urga by the Red troops, Ungern retreated east and was pursued for over 100 versts, where he was finally defeated by the pursuers. A large number of prisoners was taken, including many of Ungern's immediate assistants. Baron Ungern himself was captured soon after that, and on September 10 the Moscow wireless announced his execution together with sixty-one of his officers.

* For full text of this note see Appendix II.
The Mongolian incident, however, is far from being closed. Nevertheless, its culmination is, undoubtedly, a brilliant victory for the Soviet policy in the Far East. Another state with a definite Moscow orientation has been created, and the territory controlled by the Third International has been pushed to the very boundaries of China proper.

There is one more phase of the Soviet Far Eastern strategy that deserves attention in this connection. The Chicherin note of protest against the Japanese activities in the Far East was addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and against these countries the accusation of support of the Japanese was directed. The United States was omitted from the list of the accused powers and, apparently, by implication exonerated from the accusation. This was not, by any means, an oversight or an accident on the part of the Soviet diplomacy. It was entirely in keeping with the whole Soviet view of the American position in the Far East.

The Soviets are frankly banking on a possibility of a war between the United States and Japan. Whatever the outcome of such a war, the Soviet leaders believe that the war would exhaust both sides and, possibly, lead to a social revolution in both, and even if the revo-
olution should not take place, both sides would be weakened very greatly by the effort. This is particularly important for the Soviets in the case of Japan, as in that manner their only strong adversary in the Far East would be eliminated. Thus, whatever the outcome of an armed encounter between the United States and Japan, the Soviet leaders feel that they would be the only and the real winners. And they are ready to spare no efforts for the consummation of this end.
CHAPTER VIII

THE SOVIET FAR EASTERN CONFERENCE

The sovietization of Mongolia was not only a distinct triumph for the Soviet strategy in the Far East, but it opened before the Moscow leaders rather alluring and timely possibilities in connection with the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. The Soviet Government never had any illusions as to the possibility of its being asked to send representatives to the Conference in Washington. Its July note of protest against not being invited was merely a matter of form and of rhetorical exercise for the facile and eloquent Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs. For a time, the Soviet Government rather hoped that the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic might be invited to attend the Washington parley. Then the Moscow Government would be able to speak through them, in the same way in which it had thus conducted indirect negotiations with China and Japan. The agent of the Far Eastern Republic in Peking even
applied for an invitation to Washington, but the position taken by the Government of the United States, which issued the invitations, was one of inalterable opposition to this.

It so happens that this is not the first time that the Soviet Government fails to receive an invitation to a world parley. When the Peace Conference was in progress and the Moscow Government found itself uninvited to it, it immediately organized a world congress of Communist groups and hastened to organize them into the Third International, which it pronounced as an "antidote" to the League of Nations. This International has proven to be a most valuable instrument in the hands of the Soviet Government. It is brought into play whenever the Soviet Government wishes something done for which it can, if necessary, disclaim responsibility. So the Third International is now being pushed forward in the Far East for the purpose of organizing a Soviet Far Eastern Conference in competition with the Washington Conference, in so far as it deals primarily with the problems of the Far East.

The question of a possible Far Eastern conference to be called by Moscow was first raised in the Soviet press by V. Vilensky. In an article, published in the official organ of the Executive Committee of Soviets,
i.e., the political organ of the Government,* he urged the need of such a conference, to oppose the Washington Conference. According to his analysis of the situation, the four great powers to be represented in Washington — the United States, Great Britain, Japan and France — are primarily interested in a division of their control over the Pacific ocean and the territories lying on the Pacific. The Washington Conference is bound to become a conflict of "the contradictions which exist among these four pretenders to hegemony in the Pacific."

Whatever compromises or decisions may be reached at the Washington Conference are bound, according to Vilensky, to be at the expense of the interests of the peoples which inhabit the Far East, viz., China, Mongolia, the Far Eastern Republic, and Soviet Russia. Consequently, a counter-conference of these four nations is not only desirable but essential from the point of view of safeguarding the interests of these nations.

The next step in the development of this idea was a discussion of the question, taken up where Vilensky left it off, in the leading article in the official economic organ of the Soviet Government. † This article approached

* Moscow Izvestiya, August 2, 1921.
† Moscow Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn, August 10, 1921.
the question entirely from the economic viewpoint. Its thesis was that “if the peoples of the Far East are to be able to offer sufficient resistance to imperialistic aggression, no matter whence it comes, it is necessary for them to determine and unify their own interests.” This unification of interests has to proceed along two lines, the external and the internal.

The external unity of interests lies in a coördination of the forces of these nations for defense against direct imperialistic aggression. But this external unity can never be effective, unless it is based upon a mutuality of economic interests, which would act as a force of internal cohesion.

There are three stages, maintains the author of the article, in the process of effecting such internal unity. The first is the establishment of close economic relations between Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic. This is the easiest of the three stages, for what is called the Far Eastern Republic has been carved out of Russian territory, and, by the very nature of its development since the first days of its settlement by Russia, constitutes an integral part of the rest of Siberia and of the whole of Russia. The second stage is more difficult, consisting of a similar unification of the economic interests of Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern
Republic on the one hand and of Mongolia on the other.

This task—according to the Soviet analysis we are quoting—is facilitated by two circumstances. In the first place, Mongolia is more easily accessible to Russia than to any other country, including China herself, of which Mongolia was until recently a component part; and in the second place, the primitive character of the Mongolian market makes it possible for Russia, even in her present state of industrial collapse, to satisfy its needs, while Mongolia's exports, consisting of meat and hides, can easily be consumed by the Russian markets. Moreover, the recent events in Mongolia and the control, which Soviet Russia now has over the country, renders quite possible very close relations between Soviet Russia, its Far Eastern vassal, and Mongolia. But there is also one disturbing factor, viz., the attitude on the part of China, of which we shall speak below.

With regard to China, there is a number of important questions which require solution in any event, i.e., even apart from the possibility of a conference, and which would determine the inter-relations among her, Soviet Russia and the Far Eastern Republic. These are questions of customs; trade routes, overland as well as by water; the status of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, etc.
The article we are quoting ended with the hopeful assertion that the solution of all these questions is not only possible, but inevitable, and that a Soviet Far Eastern Conference would be the best method of welding the four territories enumerated into an economic unity. The conference would have to define their common aims, determine their common interests, and lay down the fundamentals of a plan of collaboration and of coördination of forces.

In all this preliminary discussion of a possible Far Eastern Conference, the distinguishing feature was that it was to be a conference of nations, in which the representatives of the governments of the four countries would gather around a conference table. But, apparently, something was going on behind the scenes of the Soviet diplomacy all this time, and before long the idea of the Far Eastern Conference reappeared in a new guise.

The next step in the development of the idea was the publication of the Theses of the Executive Committee of the Third International on the Washington Conference, in the official organ of the Russian Communist Party.* These theses give the view which the Third

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*Moscow Pravda, September 1, 1921. The Theses are signed by Carl Radek, Secretary of the Executive Committee.
International takes of the situation and the position which it intends to take with regard to the whole matter.

The Washington Conference is defined in these theses as "an attempt on the part of the United States to take away from Japan by diplomatic means the fruits of the latter's victory," which consist of economic advantages in China and Siberia. The Conference may result in a compromise, in which case Great Britain will side with the United States, and the two together will force Japan to give up the advantages which the United States seeks for herself. In that case, just as it happened when Russia, Great Britain and France forced Japan to give up the advantages she had wrested from China by the Simonoseki treaty, such an enforced compromise will be the basis for new international groupings and for new world conflicts. Or else, the Washington Conference may settle nothing, in which case the economic competition and the armament rivalry will go on at an even more rapid tempo than heretofore. But in either case, the fundamental contradictions which exist among the great capitalistic powers will remain uncomposed, and consequently, the Conference as such is doomed to failure.

The concluding paragraphs of these theses are in the
form of a warning, issued by the Executive Committee of the International "to the laboring masses and to the enslaved peoples of the colonies", that they should expect no alleviation from the Washington Conference in the way of removing militaristic dangers. At the same time, the Executive Committee appealed to the Communist parties and labor organizations in all countries "to increase their agitation and struggle against the imperialistic states," and to the masses of the population of Eastern Siberia, China, and Korea, "to unite more closely with Soviet Russia."

For a whole month after that, the question of a Soviet Far Eastern Conference was not discussed in the Moscow press. Then V. Vilensky again took up the question,* and his discussion disclosed a very important and interesting fact. In that interval, the question of calling a counter-conference was settled by the Soviet leaders, and the decision was to have the Executive Committee of the Third International, rather than the Soviet Government, call this conference. It is to be a "congress of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia," not a conference of the representatives of governments.

The reason for this decision does not appear clearly, but some of the events that have taken place

* Moscow Izvestiya, September 30, 1921.
in the Far East during the interval shed a very interesting light on what is going on behind the scenes of the Soviet diplomacy. For it was certainly not without a reason that the Soviet leaders gave up the idea of staging a regular diplomatic conference, with four nations represented, to offer to the world their own solution of the problems which stand out in such sharp relief at the present time.

Ever since the creation of the Far Eastern Republic at Chita, the Soviet Government has been doing everything in its power to arrange for an official conference between the representatives of that Republic and Japan. That was really the primary purpose for which the Soviet leaders agreed in the first place to the creation of the "buffer" state, for they hoped to be able to use it as a channel for an understanding which it wanted with Japan. On the other hand, Japan quite obviously consented to the creation of this "buffer" between herself and Soviet Russia, because she expected to derive advantages out of the situation that would have thus come about.

But at the same time, Japan continued her old policy of making no definite and clear-cut declarations of her position with regard to the Russian Far East. She continued to hold the coast and the island of Sakhalin
on the plea of defending her interests, and yet ostensibly preserved a state of neutrality with regard to the Far Eastern Republic itself.

Finally, a conference took place early in September between the representatives of Chita and of Tokyo in the city of Dairen, in Manchuria. What took place at the Dairen Conference is not known. The Conference was interrupted about the middle of October, and then resumed in November.

The questions of a trade agreement and of the evacuation of the Russian Far East were taken up seriously in Dairen, and the Japanese representatives showed themselves quite willing to settle both of these questions quite satisfactorily to the Chita Government. These two points appear obvious from Vilensky’s discussion. He took this apparent change of front on the part of the Japanese diplomats in conjunction with the Japanese negotiations with China regarding the Shantung question. And the point of his argument was that all this does not, necessarily, indicate a reversal of Japan’s postwar policy with regard to the continental Far East. His explanation of Japan’s motives ran as follows:

"With the aid of all these ‘conferences’ and ‘negotiations’ Japan merely attempts, on the eve of the Washington Con-
ference, to safeguard her rear so far as the continent of Asia is concerned. The current task of the Japanese diplomacy is to bind China or the Far Eastern Republic by means of some sort of agreements. The Hara Cabinet wants to be able to say that all the acute problems of the Far East have already been settled by Japan's direct negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic and with China."

In accordance with this analysis, Vilensky forecast the following as the basic object of the congress of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia, that is being convoked by the Third International:

"To disclose the schemes of the Japanese imperialism, which is the chief oppressor of the nations of the Far East, and to oppose to it the organized will of the toiling masses of Eastern Asia."

The Dairen negotiations were not broken off, however, and the Soviet Government does not risk the calling of a diplomatic Far Eastern conference. It is so much simpler to relegate the task to the Third International, to make the conference serve the agitation and propaganda purposes which, in any event, would have been the only possible outcome of any Soviet Far Eastern Conference, and then, if necessary, to disclaim all official responsibility for any criticism or decisions in which the conference might indulge.

There is another reason why the Soviet diplomats are rather diffident about launching a diplomatic counter-conference. The position of China, the participation of
which in such a conference is vital, is far from being favorable to the Soviet plans. The Peking Government is not at all in sympathy with the efforts made in the course of the past months by Moscow to reach a friendly understanding with it. After the overthrow of the Anfu party and the accession to power of the present régime, the Soviet diplomats, as we saw above, had great hopes of reaching such an understanding with the new Government. Their calculations were based on the strongly anti-Japanese position of General Wu-Pei-Fu, whose antagonism to Japan they expected to turn into friendship for Soviet Russia. But their anticipations in this regard failed of materialization almost completely, while Wu-Pei-Fu’s own influence in Peking lasted but a very short time. The present Peking Government is very cold to the Soviet advances.

This coldness on the part of Peking toward Moscow was not, of course, dispelled by the recent activities of the Soviets on the Chinese frontier; rather was it increased. Ever since the Chinese revolution furnished an opportunity for the Imperial Russian Government to establish its ascendancy in Mongolia and elsewhere along the Chinese boundary, there have been constant difficulties between Peking and Petrograd regarding the status of these territories. The Mongolian question
was finally regulated by the tri-partite Kyakhta agreement in 1915,* but the question of the Urankhai Territory, for example, was never settled even tentatively. The establishment in Mongolia, in the summer of 1921, of a government that rests almost exclusively on the bayonets of the Russian Red troops can scarcely be considered by the Peking Government as furthering its own aims.

The Kyakhta agreement made Mongolia an autonomous state under China's suzerainty. The Mongols were not satisfied with this agreement, for they demanded complete independence. But such as it was, the agreement stood until 1919, when it was abrogated by China, and Mongolia was included in the territory of the Chinese Republic. This state of affairs lasted until the events which we described in the last chapter unfolded themselves, and the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, established with the aid of the Russian Red troops, placed itself under the protection of Soviet Russia.

Peking's reply to this was expressed in new instructions to Marshal Chan-Tso-Lin to march against Mongolia. This time Chan-Tso-Lin decided to carry out the instructions, and began making preparations for the

* For the important provisions of this agreement see Appendix II.
expedition. But these preparations were halted when the Canton Government began its war against Peking.

In the meantime the Soviets have done everything in their power to reach an understanding with China over the Mongolian question. All the means at its disposal have been utilized to this end. In a note, addressed on September 14, 1921, to the head of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bodo, George Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, said:

"More than once has the Russian Government approached the Government of China, both directly and through the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin negotiations on these questions (relations between Mongolia and China)."

All these efforts failed, however, and in September, 1921, the Soviet Government decided to send a special mission to take up this question. In order to have a pretext for this mission, which was to go in the guise of a trade delegation, the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was inspired from Moscow to request the Soviet Government to present to the Chinese Government an offer of the new rulers of Mongolia to enter into negotiations with Peking.

* For complete text of this note see Appendix II.
In the meantime the Soviet troops had occupied not only Mongolia but also the Urankhai Territory. Here, again, the pretext was the need for the Soviet Government to defend its frontiers from "white guard bands" which were claimed to have found refuge in the mountains of Urankhai. And just as with Mongolia, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs dispatched an official note to the shepherds of Urankhai, assuring the "people of the Urankhai Territory" that the sole object of the occupation of their land by the Russian Red troops was to defend them from the "reactionary tsarist officers who had found refuge among them" and to protect the territory of Soviet Russia from these "bands." The note also contains assurances that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn as soon as these dangers would be removed.*

Knowing only too well the Soviet technique of overthrowing governments in territories contiguous with Soviet Russia, the Peking Government has been watching with considerable apprehension this massing of Russian Red troops in the vicinity of Northern China. Its leaders know that the possibility is not precluded that some group may appear there, subsidized and

*The text of this note was published in the Moscow Izvestiya, September 17, 1921.
instructed from Moscow, declare itself a government and immediately apply to Soviet Russia for military assistance.

Under these conditions it is more than likely that the Peking Government would rather trust itself to the "imperialistic intrigue" of the Washington Conference than participate in a Soviet diplomatic conference. And without China such a conference would be worthless, as the Soviet leaders themselves fully realize.

But neither were the Soviet leaders willing to let such an opportunity of general international interest in the affairs of the Far East as presents itself in connection with the Washington Conference pass unutilized by them. The Congress of the Toiling Masses of Eastern Asia was the natural outcome of the situation that had thus unfolded itself in the Far East on the eve of the Washington Conference.
CHAPTER IX

RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST

The story of the Russian phase of the Far Eastern question, given in the preceding chapters, incomplete though it be, brings out two important things. The first is that the interplay of a number of factors operative in the course of the past quarter of a century has obscured and rendered confusingly complex the basic elements of Russia's position in the Far East. The second is that it is most important to distinguish in the situation between the fundamental structure of Russia's real national interests and the confusing superstructures of the highly questionable policies followed by the Russian Imperial régime during the years of its imperialistic aggression and by the Soviet régime in its present-day activities. Let us attempt to make such a differentiation.

The elemental eastward movement of Russian colonization through the centuries, in the course of which Russia had made her way across the virgin stretches
of Siberia and finally came to rest on the shores of the Pacific, is the first and the most important element in the situation. To settle this vast territory and introduce into it modern civilization has been a truly stupendous task that required sturdy colonizing genius and colossal expenditures of effort, human life, and material wealth.

The Russian settlers in Siberia came to an economically virgin land that had very little native population. There were no organized states to conquer, no foreign nations to absorb. Russia came into these vast Asiatic stretches, bringing with her the arts of civilization, millions of her own population, and the resources of a powerful, organized state. She developed the country and made of it an organic part of her own politico-economic whole. This applies to the Far East with even greater justice than to the rest of Siberia, for the conditions that Russia encountered there were even more difficult to overcome than those with which she met in the western portions of the country.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the violent imperialism of the Russian Government intruded itself upon this process of peaceful colonization. Fed by inordinate ambitions and by questionable intrigue, this Russian imperialism proceeded to wrest for itself advantages in places where such acquisitions could be of
no possible good to the national interests of Russia. The whole Manchurian episode of Russia's history, ending so ingloriously with the Russo-Japanese War, involved no national interests and could not possibly have brought Russia any permanent and necessary advantages.

Of equally questionable value were the advantages which the Imperial Russian Government wrested from China after the revolution took place there in 1911. There seems little doubt that the manner in which the Russian Imperial Government handled the Mongolian situation was merely an echo of the methods it had employed on a larger scale in Korea and Manchuria ten years before.

But if the Far Eastern imperialism of the Tsar's Government was entirely foreign to the national interests of Russia, the present-day activities of the Soviet régime in the Far East are even more foreign to these interests. Of what possible interest to the people of Russia can be the question of the sort of government that exists in Mongolia, when this question presents no threat whatever to the honor or the prosperity of Russia? Russia is being frankly used by her Communist rulers as merely the base for a world revolution, and the foreign ventures of the Soviet Government and
of the Third International cannot be regarded as having in view any national interests of Russia.

Moreover, the Soviets are doing on the territory of China precisely what they accuse Japan of doing on the territory of Siberia. They demand from the Japanese the evacuation of the Maritime Province, and at the same time occupy Mongolia, offering the same excuse that the Japanese had given for their acts and making the same sort of solemn promises of withdrawal. Anyone reading carefully the Chicherin notes on the Far Eastern Republic and on Mongolia, given in the Appendix, cannot but be struck by this similarity.

So after all it is not so difficult to distinguish between Russia’s national interests and the activities which have been and are carried on in her name by her Imperial or Soviet masters. In Russia’s present situation these fundamental interests seem to be divided into two broad classes: those of territorial integrity, and those of national sovereignty. Both of these two classes of interests are involved in the Russian Far Eastern situation.

The boundaries of the Russian empire were well defined. These boundaries remained defined as the frontiers of Russia when the Provisional Government was in existence. Since the overthrow of that government and the disappearance in Russia of any legal and
recognized government, numerous attempts have been made to dismember Russia. Only a Russia restored to national statehood can deal authoritatively with the question of the preservation or non-preservation of the territorial integrity of what was formerly the Russian empire. Therefore the interests of Russia's national integrity demand that no power, friendly to Russia, should make attempts to enter into agreements with the governments which now exist unrecognized on any portion of the former Russian empire concerning permanent disposition of any portion of this territory. Specifically, so far as the Far Eastern question is concerned, the interests of Russia's territorial integrity require that the great powers sanction or accept no permanent separation from Russia of any territory within the frontiers of the former Russian empire.

The interests of national sovereignty are concerned with the rights which have accrued to Russia by virtue of the international agreements that had been made by her recognized governments. This means, first of all, the application to Russia of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

On September 23, 1920, the Chinese Government violated all the treaties which had existed between Russia and China. This act undoubtedly constituted
a direct violation of the interests of Russia's national sovereignty. The treaties which had existed between Russia and China may or may not have been internationally just. They may or may not have been to the best interests of Russia. But whatever they were, they cannot be abrogated arbitrarily by one of the signatories.

One of these agreements between Russia and China was concerned with the Russian control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Aside from the legal considerations involved in this question, the continuation of this control constitutes a matter of great economic importance to Russia.

The economic development of Siberia depends to a large extent upon the country's unhampered and convenient exit to the sea. This exit is provided by the port of Vladivostok, and the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the construction of which cost Russia over 300,000,000 roubles, has its vital importance in the fact that it provides the only possible convenient and economical connection between the interior of Siberia and the port terminal. The railroad was originally conceived of as an economic necessity, and Count Witte in his Memoirs spoke of it as "designed exclusively for cultural and peaceful purposes," though "jingoist adventurers turned
it into a means of political aggression.” Even the Japanese recognized the economic need to Russia of this railroad, and the Portsmouth treaty specifically provided for the continuation of Russia’s economic use of the railroad, while precluding just as specifically any utilization of it for political purposes.

But apart from these general interests which must enter properly within the category of Russia’s “legitimate” interests, over which a “moral trusteeship” has been proposed by the Government of the United States, Russia’s national interests in the Far East require permanent peace there. The economic havoc wrought there, as well as elsewhere in the country, by the Communist experiments, can be repaired only by means of rapid and energetic development, and such development is possible only if Russia succeeds in enlisting for it the aid of foreign capital, and if such capital can work in conditions of free and unhampered activity.

There are two nations that can engage in such economic activity in the Russian Far East on a large enough scale to be commensurate with the needs of the situation. These two nations are the United States and Japan. And there is no doubt that restored Russia would be willing to open her door wide to both of them, if they came in the proper spirit.
It is not only conceivable but, in the long run, inevitable that Russia and Japan should be friends. True, in order that this should take place, Japan would have to undergo something of a transformation. It would have to be a different Japan, just as it would be a different Russia. It would have to be a Japan that will have learnt the lesson which Germany's experience in the course of the past decade taught the world—a Japan that will realize that one hundred thousand bayonets cannot give her one hundred satisfied customers or friends. That such a Japan is possible there seems to be very little doubt. And with such a Japan, Russia can, and, no doubt, will be friends.

Freedom of economic opportunities in Siberia, which a restored Russia would undoubtedly offer to the world, would place Japan in a position of advantage which nothing short of specific restrictions against her can take away. Her geographical proximity, her knowledge of the local conditions and her ability to adapt herself to these peculiar conditions presented by Siberia, are bound to put her in the same position with regard to Asiatic Russia that Germany is certain to enjoy with regard to European Russia.

But whatever scope Japan's economic activities may assume in Siberia, the greatest share in the development
of that country would still go to the United States. The United States is the only country in the world today that possesses the necessary resources for financing the large phases of the constructive work which would have to proceed in Siberia in the near future on a truly gigantic scale. The similarity of the problems which Siberia faces today with the problems which America faced during the past fifty years in the development of her own West, coupled with the accumulation of capitalistic resources in America, which has come about as a result of the World War, renders the United States unmistakably the most important factor in the economic development of Siberia. And the traditional friendship which has existed between Russia and the United States for generations, and which was greatly accentuated by America’s friendship for Russia since the revolution, make such an economic partnership between Russia and America a certainty.
CHAPTER X

RUSSIA'S RÔLE IN A WORLD BALANCE OF POWERS

It is not only in their attitude toward each other as nation to nation, however, that lies the importance of the relations between the United States and Russia. The world political situation of the present time places demands of vastly more far-reaching importance upon their possible accord and a harmony of their views on certain fundamental questions of policy and action. The rôle that each of them plays or is likely to play in the new political equilibrium of the world which is coming about as a result of the World War is a question to which scarcely any other is superior today in paramount importance.

At the time of the Peace Conference in Paris, a French diplomat was complaining on one occasion to an eminent Russian statesman of the difficulties encountered by the Preliminary Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers, and of the lack of steadiness of purpose that characterized so prominently that con-

147
clave of nations. The Russian statesman gave the following reply to his French colleague:

“What would you expect? Russia is not represented at the Conference. In former European conferences, it was she, with her massive strength of two hundred millions of people, that supplied the steadying and stabilizing influence. Now there is nothing to take her place.”

The Russian statesman, watching the work of the Peace Conference, visualized it from the viewpoint of what he rightly interpreted as an irreparable disturbance of that European balance of powers, which existed so prominently before the war and which was shattered forever when the first shot of the war was fired. He himself had taken a very important part in the network of diplomatic intrigue which had created and maintained that balance. The negative factor of Russia’s absence from the Paris Conference, which of itself rendered the reëstablishment of the old balance impossible, naturally loomed in his eyes as the outstanding feature of the situation.

Yet there was another factor in the situation as it unfolded itself at the Paris Conference, and this factor was even more important, positively, than the absence of Russia was negatively. It was the presence of the United States, for the first time in history projecting herself into a world situation and placed by the circum-
stances attending that situation in a position of unprecedented dominance.

There is no doubt that at the time of the Paris Conference, i.e., in the spring and the summer of 1919, this position of the United States was not, by any means, as clearly defined and as widely accepted as it is today. On the contrary, ostensibly the European diplomats of the old school, instinct with the psychology of a European balance of powers, were in control of the situation.

But whether or not the leaders of the Peace Conference realized the new importance which America was destined by the war to play in the affairs of the world, the two years that have elapsed since that Conference have offered ample demonstration of America's new rôle. The alacrity and readiness with which the great powers consented to attend the new world conference, proposed by the President of the United States, furnish the most convincing proof of this acceptance of America's leadership, while the almost complete absence of opposition to having the capital of the United States as the seat of the conference was the crowning manifestation of America's position. And it is most important to note that this supreme importance of the new rôle of the United States lies in the fact that it is America's
larger interests that now hold the center of the world stage and that the incidence of these interests, coupled, of course, with a number of other factors, constitutes the decisive influence in the determination of what and where that center is to be.

The Paris Conference worked in an atmosphere which radiated from a tradition of Europe as the center of world affairs and the European balance of powers as the most important factor in the world situation. The Washington Conference meets in an atmosphere that radiates from a center of world affairs which has moved to the vast reaches of the Pacific ocean and a balance of powers that is truly world-wide in its scope, rather than essentially European.

The war and the storm of acute social unrest which followed in its wake have left the continent of Europe a panting wreck. Europe's sources of basic raw materials are less accessible than before—partly because of war's devastations, as in Northern France; partly because of general disorganization, as in some of the newly created states; partly because of sporadic political controversies, as in Silesia or Western Germany. Its mechanical industrial equipment was almost everywhere impaired by the war. Its manpower deteriorated during the war and the war's aftermath from the point of
view of both physical strength and psychological attitude toward the processes of economic production. The spoliation and ruin of Russia by her Communist vivisectionists have left a breach in the continental economy of Europe that will not be repaired for a long time to come. Finally, the creation of a number of new states on the continent and the status in which the war left the two great continental states, France and Germany, render the internal political situation in Europe one of confusion and uncertainty.

At the same time the war, by its very demands upon the economy of the whole world, expressed in the far-flung processes of its conduct, has crystallized the politico-economic status on a world scope of that part of the earth upon which at least one side in the conflict drew for its resources. The United States and the British Overseas Dominions were to a large extent the inexhaustible source of strength from which the Allies drew the possibility of victory. The war forced these countries into a new attitude toward the world problems. It left them in a politico-economic status that renders them the active bases of the world reconstruction after the ravages of the conflict. At the same time, the war increased the importance of the undeveloped countries of the East as the passive bases of such reconstruction.
And all these countries have the Pacific ocean for their center of interests and the world comity that is now formulating itself about the problems of the Pacific as a nucleus for their principal concern.*

Thus, the importance acquired by the Pacific in the affairs of the world is no longer due primarily to a menacing or even a significant awakening of the Orient—a “Yellow Peril,” with the specter of which the former German Emperor strove so hard to frighten the world. Rather is it due to a new projection of the Occident into the possibilities of development held by the Orient. This projection is not a new thing, of course. But the crystallization of the Occident’s strength in the Orient has been rapid and spectacular in recent years through its emergence out of the World War. Not only has this process taken place under the conditions and in terms of a rapidly growing vital economic dependence of the war-wrecked Europe upon the war-developed basin of the Pacific ocean, but this basin has acquired its new world significance, because the Pacific has become, to a very important extent, the white man’s sea—no longer solely as an object of

* I am indebted for some of the ideas expressed here to an excellent series of articles on the general subject of “Europe’s Decline,” by Alexander Kerensky, former head of the Provisional Government of Russia, published in the Prague Volya Rossi and translated in part in The Living Age.
exploitation, but as a place in which the white man makes his habitat and begins to build up great national states. To this kind of white man's appearance in the Pacific there is very strenuous opposition on the part of one Oriental power—Japan—which has adopted the European technique and is bent on using it for the establishment of its hegemony in some parts of the Orient, besides making quite a definite bid for a control of the Pacific.

To the extent to which it deals primarily with the problems of the Pacific, the Washington Conference is confronted by this very complex and inherently unstable situation, in which the following are the principal national factors:

1. Japan, which is for the present moment still dominated by ambitions, imperialistic elements that are striving to secure and maintain a hegemony in the East and a control of the Pacific, and at the same time confronted by such vital internal problems as the growth and the distribution of her population and a danger of economic exhaustion due to the staggering drain on her resources of her stupendous military and naval preparations.

2. Great Britain, faced by disturbing internal difficulties due to the war's aftermath, and still more dis-
turbining symptoms exhibited by the radical changes which have taken place in her intra-Imperial relations, as between the Metropolis and the Dominions, striving at the same time to secure her colonial empire and looking to Japan for at least temporary assistance in this regard.

3. The British Dominions, finding themselves on terms of competition with Japan, rather than of the possible coöperation sought by the mother-country, confronted by what appears to be an inevitability of serious conflicts with Japan on the questions of racial migrations and economic rivalry.

4. China, over which Japan seeks to establish dominating control in order to use her as a powerful base for a possible carrying out of her own ambitions.

5. Continental Europe, temporarily passive because of its internal economic situation and the rapidly re-emerging rivalry between France and Germany for continental hegemony, but vitally interested in the eastern developments.

6. The United States, finding herself in a position with regard to Japan practically identical with that of the British Dominions, but faced at the same time by the realization that America alone can and must act as the stabilizing factor in this highly unstable situation.
These are the six principal factors in the world situation. Out of them the Washington Conference is making an attempt to create a world balance of powers. But here again, as in Paris in 1919, one factor is absent, which by its very absence makes the creation of a world balance of powers in Washington just as impossible as its absence in Paris rendered unthinkable a re-creation there of a European balance. This absentee is Russia, the seventh factor in the world situation.

Russia is not represented at the Washington Conference, but it is impossible to strike out of the world situation her one-seventh of the earth's surface, which includes one-third of the total continent of Asia, or the massive strength of her teeming millions, or her centuries of active international history. All this gives her a place in the world balance of powers, the importance of which can neither be gainsaid nor minimized with immunity.

The existence of the Communist régime in Russia sets her apart from the rest of the world. The six factors in the world situation which we enumerated above are moved by national and international considerations. The present régime in Russia is actuated by what may be termed super-national considerations. It wants to change the whole fabric of political and
economic relations, and it has no vital or basic interest in relations among separate national units. Certainly it has no interest whatever in any efforts to reconstruct these relations on a different plan from that which exists today.

From the story of the activities of the Third International in Asia generally, and of its more recent strategic moves in the Far East, as told in the chapters of this book devoted to those topics, it is quite apparent that, in the best case, individual and group arrangements among the various national units interest the leaders of Russian Communism only to the extent to which these arrangements and the consequent relations may be utilized by them for purposes of their own. Their tactics are plain. They are ready to make the most incongruous alliances, provided those alliances afford them an opportunity for stimulating discord and conflicts among nations. In this regard, their aims are inherently antagonistic to the aims which actuate the Washington Conference.

But while this condition is the inevitable consequence of the very nature of Communism, there is no doubt that there are only two outcomes possible for the processes which the Moscow régime brings into being: either Communism will spread to the rest of the world,
or it will disappear in Russia herself. The national existence of the Communistic and the non-Communistic systems side by side is rendered impossible by the very nature of Communism; the Communist leaders themselves are most emphatic in the statement of this fact. To the extent to which we believe that the second, rather than the first, of the two outcomes will be the fate of Russian Communism, it is a matter of certainty that Russia is bound to return to the status of a national state, rather than remain merely a base for the supranational activities of the Soviet Government and the Third International. Until that time comes, Russia cannot be a part of any world balance of powers; but at the same time any such balance that may be established can be merely tentative, pending the determination of what will be Russia's rôle in it.

By all signs of logic and all tests of politico-economic prognosis, Communism is bound to disappear in Russia. But the years of its existence and the far-flung nature of its activities cannot pass unnoticed in the history of the world. And nowhere will these effects be felt more than in the situation which is rapidly shaping itself in Asia under the influence of a number of important factors.

The two outstanding results of the existence and the
activities of Russian Communism in Asia are as follows: First, the stimulus that these activities have given to military ambitions on the part of Japan; and, second, the general agitation of the East against the West, for which the Communist propaganda and activities have served as an active ferment. Both of these heritages of Russian Communism the world has to face as a whole.

It is hoped that the first of these conditions will be met at the Washington Conference. Allured by the possibilities which seemed to have opened before them for playing a lone hand in the field of imperialistic intrigue in the Far East by the disappearance of Imperial Russia, Japan’s militaristic elements eagerly seized the excuse given them by the Communist activities in the Far East to push forward a bold policy of military imperialism. Under such circumstances a permanent weakening of Russia would have been a most welcome contingency so far as Japan is concerned.

But Japan’s military imperialism may—and, it is hoped, will—evolve into virile economic energy, which would be a most welcome change for the peace of the world. In that case she will have no occasion to fear a regeneration of Russia, for economically she has more to gain from a peaceful cooperation with Siberia than
from military control there, backed by a policy of snarling at the rest of the world and, incidentally, exhausting herself by an insupportable burden of naval armament.

As for the revolutionary ferment in the East generally, stimulated so powerfully by the agents of Communism, that may or may not develop into a serious menace. Sooner or later it must become clear to the peoples of the Orient, which are goaded into a blind and unreasoning fury by the Communist propaganda, that they have chosen very poor allies for the consummation of their national aims. Communism has no more sympathy with their fierce and revolutionary nationalism than it has with any other movement, not conforming to its own dogma. With the disappearance of Russian Communism much of this revolutionary activity in the East will, of necessity, have to subside. But there is no doubt that at least some of its effects will not wear off. The present fermentation will undoubtedly crystallize, all through the Orient, forces that will be active in re-shaping the views and the policies of the various territories affected by the process. The development of these processes it is difficult to forecast at the present time with any degree of precision, but it would be most unwise to disregard them as very imminent possibilities, and certainly disastrous to fail
to lay a foundation for meeting them. For even now their general outlines are quite distinct: economic rivalry, from beyond which appear possible racial conflicts.

The Washington Conference will not be able to solve all the problems that agitate the world. It may solve some. It may merely bring them out in more or less sharp relief. But there is one thing that the Conference can do, and, it is hoped, will accomplish. It can lay down the fundamentals of an idealistic international policy, which has been so characteristic of America's view of the world ever since she appeared as a factor in the world situation. Only such a policy, if consistently carried out, can really bring into the world situation, rendered complex and highly unstable by the war and its aftermath, the stabilizing influence that the United States can, and, no doubt, will exert.

But to the extent to which this stabilized equilibrium of the world depends upon peace in the Far East, the United States will scarcely be able to exert a sufficiently powerful influence in this direction unless she has, working side by side with her, a strong, democratic Russia, actuated by the same international idealism, working toward the same ends. And such a Russia can
be neither the Imperial Russia, with its aggressive imperialism, nor the Soviet Russia, with its irrevocable pledge to a world revolution. It can be only the third Russia, the Russia that is really representative of the country’s national character and shapes her policies in correspondence with the people’s actual needs, and not in conformity with aggressive, predatory aims.

What reasons are there to believe that it will be such a Russia that will emerge out of the country’s present trials? These reasons lie in the tasks which a nationally reconstructed Russia will inevitably have to face, after she will have reacquired her political status as an organized state with a recognized government.

The first of these tasks will be internal reconstruction. Too much has been torn down in the mad orgy of the various phases of her revolution. She must turn her attention to actual rebuilding, or else go down in a welter of utter chaos and ruin. She must have peace with her neighbors, if for no other reason than because she will have no strength to fight and build at the same time. And since these two conditions are fundamental, even apart from the natural inclinations of the Russian people, traditionally prone to idealism, reconstructed Russia is bound to be most sympathetic in her partici-
pation in all international agreements looking toward universal peace, the reduction of the burden of armaments, etc.

Russia's future is still before her. Her historic destiny has not yet run out. And it is most significant that the United States, the giant of the Western Hemisphere, should be so clear in her realization of this fact and so emphatic in expressing the need of concerted international action to conserve the national heritage of the temporarily prostrate giant of the Eastern Hemisphere. The world still needs, even more than ever, the stabilizing effect of Russia's massive strength—this time on a truly world scale. The paths of Russia's and America's historic destiny have converged, and their common path is the road of the world peace.
RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

APPENDIX

TEXT OF TREATIES AND DOCUMENTS

1. RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

A. POLITICAL CONVENTION OF 1907.

[Translation from the Official Text published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

The Government of His Majesty, the Emperor of All Russia, and the Government of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, desirous of strengthening the peaceful and neighborly relations so happily established between Russia and Japan, and of removing all cause of misunderstandings in the future between the two Empires, have agreed to the following:

Article 1.

Each of the High Contracting Parties obligates itself to respect the territorial integrity of the other and all

163
the rights accruing to each of the Parties by virtue of all treaties, conventions, and contracts, existing between them and China, copies of which have been exchanged by the High Contracting Parties (in so far as these rights are compatible with the principle of the general equality of rights); by virtue of the Portsmouth Treaty of August 23 (September 5), 1905; as well as by virtue of all special agreements concluded between Russia and Japan.

Article 2.

Both High Contracting Parties recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of the general equality of rights with regard to trade and industry in that Empire for all nations, and undertake to preserve and defend the status quo and the above-mentioned principle by all peaceful means at their disposal.

In witness of this, the signatories hereto, properly authorized by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures and seals to this Convention.

Concluded in St. Petersburg, on July 17 (30), 1907, which corresponds to the 30th day of the 7th month of the 40th year of Meidji.

IZVOLSKY.

MOTONO.
B. SECRET TREATY OF 1916.

[Translation from the text published in the Gazette of the Provisional Workmen-Peasants Government, December 8 (21), 1917.]

The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, for the purpose of further strengthening their close friendship established between them by the Secret Agreements of July 17 (30), 1907; June 21 (July 4), 1910; and June 25 (July 8), 1912, have agreed to supplement the above-mentioned Agreements by the following Articles:

Article 1.

Both High Contracting Parties recognize that the vital interests of each of them demand the preservation of China from political domination by any third power holding inimical aims against Russia or Japan and therefore mutually obligate themselves in the future, every time when circumstances would make it necessary, to enter with each other into frank and sincere relations based upon complete trust, in order to take together all measures necessary for the prevention of the possibility of the establishment (in China) of such a state of affairs.

Article 2.

In case that, as a result of measures taken by mutual consent by Russia and Japan on the basis of the pre-
ceeding Article, there should come about a declaration of war against one of the High Contracting Parties by any third power contemplated in Article 1 of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party must come to the assistance of its ally at the latter’s first request; each of the High Contracting Parties hereby obligates itself, in case of such a contingency, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without the preliminary consent to it of its ally.

Article 3.

The conditions under which each of the High Contracting Parties shall render armed assistance to the other in accordance with the preceding Article, as well as the methods by means of which such assistance shall be rendered, must be determined by common agreement of the proper authorities of both High Contracting Parties.

Article 4.

It must be especially noted that neither the one nor the other of the High Contracting Parties shall consider itself bound by Article 2 of this Agreement to render its ally armed assistance * to the extent to which it itself shall be given guarantees by its own allies that they would render it assistance corresponding in scope to the seriousness of the impending conflict.

* The word “except” is obviously omitted in the Russian text, from which this translation has been made.—L. P.
Article 5.

The present Agreement goes into effect from the moment of its signing and will remain in force until July 1 (14), 1921. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties would consider it necessary to declare its unwillingness to prolong this Agreement twelve months before its expiration, the same shall continue in force until one year shall have elapsed from the moment of the declaration of one of the High Contracting Parties concerning its renouncing.

Article 6.

The present Agreement must remain a profound secret for all, except the two High Contracting Parties.

In witness of this, the representatives of the two Parties have set their signatures and seals to this Agreement in the city of Petrograd, on June 20 (July 3), 1916, which corresponds to the following Japanese date: the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of the rule of Taisee.

Sazonov.

Motono.
C. SECRET TELEGRAM FROM THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO REGARDING THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT.

[Translation from the Gazette of the Provisional Workmen-Peasants Government, December 2 (15), 1917.]

To the Minister: October 19, 1917.

Having invited me to call on him today, the Minister of Foreign Affairs communicated to me confidentially, but at the same time quite officially, the text (transmitted by me in telegram No. 2) of the Notes which will be exchanged in Washington on November 2 or 3, new style, between the American Secretary of State and Viscount Ishii. A similar communication was made today to the British Ambassador here. The text of the Notes will be communicated in a few days privately for their information to the French and the Italian ambassadors. The publication will take place, probably, on November 7. Until that time, the Minister requests that this communication be kept secret.

In communicating to me the text of the Notes, Viscount Motono stated that he had received it in its final form only yesterday by telegraph from Washington, and since Viscount Ishii must leave in the evening of the day after tomorrow, in spite of the (desire) on the part of the Japanese Government to acquaint itself with
the opinion of the Russian Government on this matter before the signing of the Notes, the affixing of the signatures could not be postponed. The Minister hopes that no blame will be attached to him in Petrograd, especially since he is certain that the Japanese-American Agreement in question cannot meet with any opposition on our part. Viscount Motono mentioned then that in the conclusion . . . . . . . . . . * among other things, with the view of putting an end to the German intrigues, directed toward inciting distrust between Japan and the United States of North America, and thus show most clearly to China that there is between these two powers complete agreement with regard to China, which, therefore, should not expect to gain anything for herself by playing them against each other.

To my question whether he does not apprehend misunderstandings in the future that may spring from a difference of interpretation on the part of Japan and of the United States of the phrases "special position" and "special interests" of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied that . . . . . . . . . . * Nevertheless, the impression produced on me by the Minister's words was to the effect that he realizes the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but considers that in such a case Japan would have at her disposal

* Omission in the original, indicated by dots. It is most regrettable that the Bolsheviki, in publishing the text of this telegram, omitted such obviously important portions of it.—L. P.
better means for applying in practice her interpretation, than would the United States.

Krupensky.

D. CHICHERIN'S NOTE ON THE FAR EAST.

[Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, June 3, 1921.] Note addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, dated June 1, 1921.

The struggle of the toiling masses of Russia for peace and for the right of disposing independently of their own fate has entered upon a stage of new trials. Having gloriously repulsed, by gigantic effort and miracles of heroism, the combined attacks of the counter-revolution from within and of the majority of foreign powers from without, the toiling masses have won the right to govern themselves by means of their own soviets of workmen and peasants. They had hoped to assure for themselves a free opportunity to devote their forces to an internal reconstruction of Russia, in collaboration with other countries for mutual interests and for the achievement of the economic aims that confront them.

Unfortunately, their hopes have been blasted by a new attempt at external interference and a new coördinated attack of the Russian counter-revolution and the foreign Governments. Under the protection of the
Japanese bayonets, the white guardists of Vladivostok, who constitute but an insignificant clique, suddenly seized authority in that city. A similar coup d’État has been effected in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk and in other localities occupied by the Japanese. Thus, the most open sort of counter-revolution has been installed by the Japanese armed forces in the territory of their occupation.

The Russian masses of peasants and workmen in the Far East have done everything in their power to obtain an acceptable peace with Japan. They have organized a separate democratic republic in order to make this peace possible, and the independent Far Eastern Republic, with this in view, signed an agreement with Japan, which, under this condition, was ready to withdraw her troops from this territory and to return freedom to the Russian popular masses of the Far East. In their name, the Government of their Republic constantly strove toward the consummation of a complete agreement with Japan, in order to live with her in peace and in friendly and neighborly relations. But the Japanese Government replied to their peaceful efforts with a new cruel attack upon their internal freedom and their external independence.

The bitterest foes of the Russian popular masses, the extreme reactionaries, whose obvious object is to conquer Siberia with the aid of the Japanese bayonets and then become there the subservient agents of the Japanese
conquerors, have, by violence, seized authority in those places, in which the Japanese armed forces are in control. However, this first test step on the road of the conquest of Siberia is not an isolated fact. The Japanese Government distributes among its own capitalists the fishing rights in the waters of Kamchatka, which rights have hitherto belonged to the Russian coöperatives and to others of our citizens. Japan has introduced her own control there and has seized the revenues accruing from the Kamchatka fisheries; this constitutes an act of arbitrary seizure and plunder of Russia’s wealth, which the Russian Government considers a violation of the elementary rights of the popular masses of Russia. At the same time, with the aid of Japanese armed forces, the remnants of the counter-revolutionary bands of Semenov and Kappel retain their positions on the boundaries of China and continue to occupy the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Only with the assistance of Japanese auxiliary troops are Ungern’s bands able to terrorize Mongolia and prepare their attacks against the Russian Republic. The agents of the Japanese imperialism penetrate even into Central Asia, attempting to start insurrections there, while the emissaries of the Turkestan counter-revolutionary elements gather in Japan in order to work out their plans in common.

The Russian Republic has, on a number of occasions, offered peace to the Japanese Government, and yet, in spite of all of Russia’s efforts toward peace, the Jap-
Japanese Government is at the present time the initiator of a new interventionalist campaign, directed against the rule of the Russian workmen and peasants.

The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the Russian masses, warns the Japanese Government that the great popular masses of Russia, having taken their fate into their own hands and having repelled all the attacks of their enemies, will be able to conduct victoriously this new struggle, and will make those who have attacked them feel their strength more than sufficiently.

However, the responsibility for these inimical acts cannot be laid at the door of the Japanese Government alone. There are proofs to the effect that the French Government, in its irreconcilable enmity toward the rule of workmen and peasants in Russia, is one of the active instigators of this new interventionalist campaign and takes part in Japan's plans of conquest in Siberia. Soviet Russia cannot but consider all the powers of the Entente morally responsible for this new link in the chain of intervention, which is a product of the collective workmanship of the Entente powers. It considers this on the part of the British Government as a manifestation of inimical activity, entirely out of keeping with the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

The Russian Government protests most energetically against these acts, directed against Russia herself or through the Far Eastern Republic which is friendly
with her as an intermediary stage, and retains the right to draw from this the inevitable conclusions.

The People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin.

2. Russia and China.

A. The Russo-Mongolian-Chinese Agreement of 1915.

[Text of Articles 1 to 8.]

Article 1.

Outer Mongolia recognizes the Chinese-Russian Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia on the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (October 23, 1913).

Article 2.

Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty, China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, forming part of Chinese territory.

Article 3.

Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international treaties with foreign powers respecting political and territorial questions. As regards questions of a political and territorial nature in Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform to Article 2 of the Note exchanged between China and Russia on the
5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (October 23, 1913).

Article 4.

The title "Bogdo Cheptsun Damba Ku-tukh-tu Khan of Outer Mongolia" is conferred by the President of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in official documents.

Article 5.

China and Russia, in conformity with Articles 2 and 3 of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the 5th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China (October 23, 1913), recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of its internal administration and to conclude with foreign powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia.

Article 6.

In conformity with the same Article 3 of the Declaration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the system of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer Mongolia.

Article 7.

The military escort of the Chinese dignitary at Urga provided for by Article 3 of the above-mentioned Decla-
ration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military escorts of his assistants at Uliassutai, at Kobdo, and at Mongolian-Kyakhta are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, Assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other localities in Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not to exceed fifty men each.

Article 8.

The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send more than one hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its representative at Urga. The military escorts of the Imperial consulate and vice-consulates of Russia, which have already been established or which may be established by agreement with the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men each.

B. APPEAL OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF MONGOLIA.

[Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, August 10, 1921.]

The People’s Revolutionary Government of Mongolia addresses to the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic a request not to withdraw the Soviet troops from the territory of Mon-
golia until the complete removal of the menace from
the common enemy, who is now seeking reinforcements
in the Eastern Steppes. The People’s Revolutionary
Government finds it necessary to address this request
to the Government of the R. S. F. S. R., because the
Mongolian Government has not as yet completed the
organization of the apparatus of the new authority.
The presence of the Soviet troops is dictated by cir-
cumstances, its purpose being to preserve the security
of the territory of Mongolia and of the frontiers of the
R. S. F. S. R. The People’s Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Mongolia is confident that the Govern-
ment of the R. S. F. S. R. will realize the seriousness
of the situation and the common interest in the defeat
of the common enemy, and will accede to this request.

Members of the People’s Revolutionary
Government of Mongolia,
Bodo.
Bolyuk-Sai-Khan.

C. Chicherin’s Reply to the Appeal
Of the People’s Revolutionary
Government of Mongolia.

[Translation from the Russian text published in the
Moscow Izvestiya, August 12, 1921.]

The Russian Soviet Government, in alliance with the
Government of the Far Eastern Republic, ordered its
troops, side by side with the revolutionary army of the Provisional Government of Mongolia, to deal a crushing blow to their common enemy the Tsarist General, Ungern, who has subjected the Mongolian people to unprecedented enslavement and oppression, violated the rights of autonomous Mongolia, at the same time threatening the security of Soviet Russia and the inviolability of the territory of the fraternal Far Eastern Republic. The appearance of the Soviet troops on the territory of autonomous Mongolia has for its sole aim the destruction of the common enemy, thus removing the danger which threatens the Soviet territory, and safeguarding the free development and self-determination of autonomous Mongolia.

Welcoming the first steps of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia on the road toward creating a new order in its country, now freed from the enemy by common effort, the Russian Government notes with great satisfaction the Appeal addressed to it by the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, which appeal expresses the wish that the Soviet troops should not be removed from the territory of Mongolia until the complete destruction of the common enemy shall have been encompassed. Considering this proposal a manifestation of the steadfast, close and friendly bonds which unite the liberated people of Mongolia with the workmen and peasants of Russia who have thrown off the yoke of the exploiters, the Russian Gov-
The government declares that it recognizes fully the seriousness of the situation and the common interest of Russia and Mongolia in the destruction of the common enemy. Having firmly decided to withdraw its troops from the territory of autonomous Mongolia, which is bound to Soviet Russia only by the ties of mutual friendship and common interests, just as soon as the menace to the free development of the Mongolian people and to the security of the Russian Republic and of the Far Eastern Republic shall have been removed, the Russian Government, in complete harmony with the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, notes that this moment has not yet arrived. In response to the request addressed to it by the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, the Russian Government announces its decision to give this request complete satisfaction.

The Russian Government is convinced that, in the near future, by the united efforts of the two peoples who are struggling against the violence of the Tsarist generals and against foreign oppression and exploitation, the free development of the Mongolian people will be secured on the basis of its autonomy, and that, as a result of the organization of the apparatus of popular revolutionary authority in Mongolia, such authority will be definitely established and firmly secured there.

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin.

August 10, 1921.
D. SOVIET NOTE ON CHINESE-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS.

[Translation from the Russian text published in the Moscow Izvestiya, September 17, 1921.]

Telegram sent by the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Revolutionary Government of Mongolia, Bodo, dated September 14, 1921:

The toiling masses of Russia and the Workmen-Peasants Government which expresses their will greeted with joy the establishment of the People’s Revolutionary Government of Mongolia and the liberation of the friendly Mongolian people from a foreign yoke and from the bloody rule of the former Tsarist General, Ungern. The glorious Red army of the Russian Soviet Republic, together with the troops of the friendly and allied Far Eastern Republic, hand in hand with the people’s revolutionary army of Mongolia, fought against the enslavers of the Mongolian people, who are at the same time enemies of the workmen and peasants of Russia, and assisted in the liberation of the Mongolian people from oppression.

The Russian Government expresses its gratitude to the People’s Revolutionary Government of Mongolia for the friendly feelings toward the toiling masses of
Russia and toward the Soviet Government and for the confidence in them, expressed in the Note of citizen Bodo of September 10. The Russian Government shares the conviction of the People's Revolutionary Government of Mongolia as to the need of establishing peaceful and business-like relations between Mongolia and China. It hopes that the steps it is taking in this direction will lead to favorable results in the near future, provided the Mongolian people at the same time applies its right to self-determination.

More than once has the Russian Government approached the Government of China, both directly and through the representatives of the Far Eastern Republic who were in communication with the latter, with offers to begin negotiations on this question. In the near future the Russian Government expects to enter into permanent relations with the Government of China by means of a trade delegation which is being sent to Peking.

The Russian Government notes with joy the readiness of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government to enter into negotiations with China on this question, as expressed in citizen Bodo's Note of September 10. It hopes that the Chinese Government will receive favorably this offer, which it will present in the spirit of good offices, in order to remove the possibility of a conflict between the peoples and the governments of Mongolia and of China.

Chicherin.